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African Economic Development
This book challenges conventional wisdoms about economic performance and possible
policies for economic development in African countries. Its starting point is the striking
variation in African economic performance.
Unevenness and inequalities form a central fact of African economic experiences. The
authors highlight not only differences between countries, but also variations within coun-
tries, differences often organised around distinctions of gender, class, and ethnic identity.
For example, neo-natal mortality and school dropout have been reduced, particularly for
some classes of women in some areas of Africa. Horticultural and agribusiness exports have
grown far more rapidly in some countries than in others. These variations (and many
others) point to opportunities for changing performance, reducing inequalities, learning
from other policy experiences, and escaping the ties of structure, and the legacies of a
colonial past. This study rejects teleological illusions and Eurocentric prejudice, but it does
pay close attention to the results of policy in more industrialized parts of the world. Seeing
the contradictions of capitalism for what they are – fundamental and enduring – may help
policy officials protect themselves against the misleading idea that development can be
expected to be a smooth, linear process, or that it would be were certain impediments
suddenly removed.
The authors criticize a wide range of orthodox and heterodox economists, especially for
their cavalier attitude to evidence. Drawing on their own decades of research and policy
experience, they combine careful use of available evidence from a range of African countries
with political economy insights (mainly derived from Kalecki, Kaldor and Hirschman) to
make the policy case for specific types of public sector investment.
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Praise for the Book
This is a stunningly good book: historically grounded, rich with evidence and examples,
skeptical of the conventional wisdom, and infused with a realistic ‘bias for hope’ that
counters the over-pessimistic and over-optimistic analyses of many far less thoughtful
writers. Read it and be inspired.
Deborah Brautigam, Bernard L. Schwartz
Professor of International Political Economy,
Director of the SAIS China Africa Research Initiative,
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)
Somewhere between a bird’s eye view of Africa’s development dilemmas and a pragmatic
assessment of the intricacies of policy making the authors of this book found a superb
niche: to guide us through what is essential because it is often different from the common
views. A masterful undertaking that will become essential reading for African policy makers
eager to deepen their thoughts.
Carlos Lopes, Professor, Nelson Mandela School
of Public Governance, University of Cape Town
Cramer, Sender and Arkebe do an excellent job of looking at the theories of economic
development from a refreshing perspective. And I highly welcome their belief in African
policymakers to make good decisions when presented with robust evidence. Development
practitioners around the world will benefit immensely from this book, as it challenges
accepted economic theory, while providing intriguing alternatives.
K.Y. Amoako, Founder and President,
African Center for Economic Transformation,
and former Executive Secretary
of the UN Economic Commission for Africa
African policy makers generally struggle to find evidence to support initiatives they would
like to pursue. Pressure on them to find such evidence has grown as the number of
‘stakeholders’ interested in the outcomes has grown. This book on economic development
in Africa is designed to help them in their pursuit of what is good economics, relevant and
more easily manageable. It is a great complement to the recent volumes on African
development, offering a refreshingly different approach that appeals to common sense
and the new realities of the region.
Ernest Aryeetey, Secretary-General of the African Research
Universities Alliance, former Vice Chancellor of the University of Ghana
In this remarkable book, Cramer, Sender, and Oqubay present a view of Africa unlike
anything we have seen. Facing head on the brutality of capitalism in Africa—as elsewhere—
they show how nonetheless it has brought about significant, if uneven, progress in human
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welfare. Analysing trends in structural transformation, they never lose sight of the welfare
of ordinary people. Acknowledging the weight of history, they show how a country’s
prospects are mainly shaped by what a country does, not what it is and has. They offer
realistic optimism for a continent where policies have too often been crippled by fatalism. It
is one of those very rare books that make you see the world differently after you have read it.
Ha-Joon Chang teaches economics in the University of Cambridge
and is the author of books including: Kicking Away the Ladder and
Economics: the User’s Guide
Cramer, Sender and Oqubay offer us in this book not only their deep knowledge of African
economies and their challenges—with their inherent diversity—but also of other develop-
ment experiences. Based on the evidence that these experiences provide, as well as an
interdisciplinary framework, they put forwards an ambitious agenda for investment and
structural change for African development that overcomes the over-pessimism but also the
over-optimism of many alternative proposals.
José Antonio Ocampo, Professor Columbia University,
and Chair of the UN Committee for Development Policy
Africa is a fascinating continent, and this superb book provides the depth of insight that is
often missing in other commentary which tends to the extremes of pessimism or over-
optimism based on simplistic notions of how economies function and evolve.
Tony Addison, Chief Economist/Deputy Director, UNU-WIDER
Arguing against both ‘African pessimism’ and the naïve optimism of ‘Africa rising’, this
innovative book makes the case for ‘possibilism’. This is not just another economics
textbook on Africa: it is deeply interdisciplinary and draws not only on history, politics,
anthropology, and soil science, but strikingly too on the world of art and literature. The
authors offer an unmistakeably progressive political economy, unafraid to challenge weak
arguments of radical ‘left’ economists as much as the worn-out narratives of the
mainstream.
Vishnu Padayachee, Distinguished Professor and
Derek Schrier and Cecily Cameron Chair in Development Economics,
School of Economics and Finance, University of the Witwatersrand,
Johannesburg; life-Fellow of the Society of Scholars,
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore and Washington DC
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PART I
CONTEXT
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Introduction
A Fresh Outlook on Evidence, Analysis, and
Policy for Economic Development in Africa
1.1 The Air that Policy Officials Breathe
Every day policy officials are tasked with coming up with solutions to complex
puzzles. They must do this in a context of (often) inadequate staffing levels and
unreliable data; multiple claims on the resources at their disposal; and having to
think strategically while under intense pressure to address short-term issues. At
the same time, they must field the attentions of an array of domestic political
forces and international agencies (international financial organizations, bilateral
partners, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and a stream of
beltway consultants).
All the while, they are breathing in an atmosphere thick with ideas. Some they
may have absorbed while ploughing through a standard textbook on economics;
some are part of the popular discourse of African nationalism; and some are
supposed ‘universal truths’ about global political economy. Often, these ideas
contradict each other. In short, being a policy official in an African—or any—
country is difficult.
In this book, we will attempt to introduce some fresh ways of thinking about the
complex economic policy problems facing many African countries. However, this
does not mean we claim to know the policy answers. Policies have to be designed
in detailed ways, addressing the specific needs of individual countries (and parts of
countries) at particular times. Furthermore, as we argue in this book, often the
most interesting policy design issues emerge during the process of policy imple-
mentation, where they either fail or at least do not turn out as was intended—
policies can then be adjusted, improvised, and improved in response to these
unpredicted problems.
Policy is made within a global and a structural context. In other words,
countries are shaped by their histories, and their current options may be con-
strained by the often hostile characteristics of the international environment. Even
so, we strongly argue that the keys to generating sustained economic growth and
development lie within African countries, in the form of policy and investment
strategy decisions. In this sense, following the economist Albert Hirschman,
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we argue that policy officials can achieve better results by widening their horizons
and adopting an attitude of ‘possibilism’ (see Chapter 5).
Sceptics, while perhaps acknowledging that the arguments and evidence pre-
sented in this book may be well founded, will doubtless assert that there is little
chance that any policies arising from them can or will be implemented in Africa.
Some might argue that there are too many ‘failed states’; too many economies
dominated by rent-seeking, patrimonialism, and the ‘politics of the belly’. Others
might argue that the weight of the continent’s colonial past is too heavy; that the
noose of global economic governance rules is too tight. Contrary to this, we argue
that while the policymaking process is complex, and its trajectory uncertain, there
is often unexpected scope for adroit policy reasoning. Policies are designed and
implemented through shifting coalitions among political leaders and policy offi-
cials, often blending conflicting interests and logics. The evidence—gathered both
from our own long experience of working with African governments and from the
work of others—is that there are in fact cadres of thoughtful, public-spirited policy
officials and even politicians; and furthermore that there is ample demand from
wage workers and the intelligentsia for industrial policies rooted in evidence
rather than abstruse economic theory. This positive assessment is confirmed by
discussions with thousands of policy officials attending more than ten years of
residential schools through the African Programme on Rethinking Development
Economics (APORDE), as well as those taking part in APORDE’s predecessor at
Cambridge and in residential schools in African countries funded by the
Mo Ibrahim Foundation/SOAS Governance for Development in Africa (GDiA)
programme, not to mention by our more direct experiences of policymaking.
1.2 How This Book Differs from Others
on the Economics of Africa
The spirit of possibilism is one of the things differentiating this book from other
economics texts on Africa. Many of these are afflicted either by a profound
pessimism—that, due to the legacy wrought by the continent’s colonial past and
the current strictures of global economic governance imposed by the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and the Bretton Woods Institutions, there is little that can
be done—or by the overly optimistic idea that if only this or that barrier could be
removed then a smooth, sustained, and inclusive path to economic development
would naturally unfold. Possibilism, by contrast, is a form of realism: it reflects a
‘bias for hope’ but is rooted in a pragmatic, often somewhat depressing, awareness
of the cruel historical record in Africa and globally. A record that is, in fact, the
history of capitalist development.
It is important to state that this book it is not merely an ‘economics’ text,
confining itself to narrow economic theory or research. Instead, we draw on the
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work of historians, anthropologists, and political scientists; agronomists, soil
scientists, and engineers; and here and there—for illustrative purposes—on
works of art and literature. Economies and economic policies do not exist in a
vacuum, sealed off from the social relationships, historical patterns of behaviour,
power relations, and physical environments of which they are a part. Women’s
participation in wage labour markets, for example, cannot simply be ‘read’ from
abstract models of labour supply and demand, or from game theoretic models
of household bargaining. Rather, this is often a product of skewed power
relations and violent coercion within households and wider social institutions.
Throughout the book, our approach to discussing gender relations is to offer
thicker descriptions of the ways in which the majority of African women are
struggling to survive.
There are two consequences of taking ‘interdisciplinarity’ seriously. First, there
is an unusually wide range of references in this book. Despite citing an array of
experiences and perspectives, we have, inevitably, failed to be comprehensive.
Many gaps have been left, with the rationale for our specific choices the subject of
some further discussion in Section 1.3. We do not expect most readers to follow up
every thread and scholarly reference, but we hope at least that the references pique
the curiosity of some, allowing them to delve further into their own areas of
special interest and discover a variety of publications that economists often
overlook. Unpublished doctoral dissertations (readily available on the web) are
also rarely cited in textbooks, but can be an important resource and one of which
we have made use.
There are other reasons to include a wide range of references. The most
important of these is that we cite arguments with which we disagree. Too often,
economics publications feature scant citation, with what little they do cite pro-
duced by a familiar stable of data-crunching workhorses. That prevents readers
seeing where contrary arguments come from, or even sometimes realizing that
contrary points of view exist at all. We are happy to cite arguments made by
the economists of the World Bank and Department for International
Development (DFID); as well as official reports produced by organizations
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) but also the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the International Food
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), the International Labour Organization (ILO),
and so on. Many African intellectuals distrust the Washington institutions
especially, and in this book we provide a number of reasons for querying
much of the economic analysis promoted by the World Bank and the IMF. At
the same time, we recognize that these institutions are not monolithic, that they
are subject to internal conflicts and ideological shifts over time, and that they
have been able to marshal unparalleled resources to undertake economic
research in Africa. However, we also cite many other economists, from Adam
Smith to Karl Marx, Joan Robinson through to Alice Amsden and Prabhat
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Patnaik. This is done not to make a display of our erudition, but to expose
readers to a range of different arguments, to support explanations given in the
book, and to encourage policymakers, students, and scholars to be more
confident in formulating their own nuanced responses to the pronouncements
of mainstream economists traipsing through Africa.
The second consequence of taking interdisciplinarity seriously is that we
understand the relationship between economics and other ‘disciplines’ differently
from the way most mainstream economics scholars appear to. There is a strong
current within neoclassical economics that claims to be able to explain not only
market transactions but virtually every other kind of social phenomenon as well—
a tendency amounting to ‘economics imperialism’. Some economists, for example,
believe they can ‘explain’ the incidence and causes of civil (and other) wars in
Africa though the application of neoclassical economic theory. Our approach, by
contrast, comes closer to the ‘trespassing’ idea espoused by Albert Hirschman (see
Chapter 6). We are open to learning from non-economists and advocate humility
regarding the relative strength (and many weaknesses) of the methods employed
by economists.
We also draw on historical experiences of capitalist development. This is not,
we stress, due to some notion that everything will ultimately work out the same
way it has in, say, the UK or South Korea; or that the path of African economies is
determined by colonialism or its legacy. The outcomes and trajectories of capit-
alist expansion vary hugely and unfold through conflict and contingency. The
implication of this is that past ‘lessons’ should not be relied upon, and that
development trajectories are unlikely to repeat past experiences. Ethiopia will
not follow the same pattern of development as Taiwan, nor Ghana that of
Malaysia. Nonetheless, we remain convinced that a close study of the historical
record of industrialization and uneven technological change is important. One
reason is that it at least offers some evidence regarding the complexity of how
economic change comes about, and what the implications of this are for employ-
ment and welfare. The historical evidence, though, should not be used lightly in
order to highlight failure—for example, the alleged ‘failure’ of the Green
Revolution in Africa—or as a cast-iron guide to appropriate policy in contem-
porary economies. There is, however, a hierarchy of plausibility, and evidence
from a wide range of countries trumps anachronistic claims based primarily on
ideological assumptions.
1.3 Types of Evidence in This Book
Throughout the book, we make use of the kinds of statistical evidence commonly
employed by economists, both for individual countries and in cross-country
comparisons. In doing so, we present a number of charts illustrating trends in
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variables, drawing on both national and international statistical agencies. All this
said, we take far more seriously than the majority of economics texts the charge
that much of this statistical evidence is unreliable.
Huge numbers of academic papers and many well-known economics books are
published without much thought being given as to whether the underlying data
are accurate and comparable over time or between countries (or even parts of
countries). This is not mere nit-picking. We argue, again and again, that policy
officials cannot be expected to design, implement, monitor, and refine effective
policies without the quality of evidence being taken more seriously. This applies
to everything: do we really know how much coffee is produced in Ethiopia, or
how much maize is produced in Malawi? Just how sure can we be about
pronouncements on the level and rate of food availability growth in a given
economy? How accurate are current estimates of the total population or the
level and rate of urbanization in a specified country? There are a number of
technically advanced econometric models laying claim to explaining patterns of
growth across African economies, the majority of which have very little to say
about the evidence being fed into their equations. Even if the underlying
theories, concepts, and models appear sophisticated, such exercises cannot be
taken at face value because of the lack of attention paid to the quality of
evidence—in effect, it is ‘garbage in, garbage out’. Sometimes, the situation is
even worse than a misguided faith in such econometric models. On several
occasions, we have listened to senior economists make evidence claims in
order to serve an ideological purpose, in the full knowledge that such assertions
are misleading.
This points to one of the main purposes of this book: providing readers with the
tools and confidence to question ‘expert’ evidence, claims, and arguments. It is
also why we devote considerable space to the difficulties of economic analysis
where evidence is poor. One of the key priorities for any effective policy official
should be to constantly question the evidence, which is why in this book we cite
authors with whose arguments we disagree. Readers—whether policy officials,
graduate students, or researchers—need the tools to critically interrogate a wide
range of positions before coming to their own conclusions.
Similarly, difficulties in trusting the evidence mean we do not restrict our
analysis to ‘large-N’ statistical evidence, but also draw on other kinds of evidence
where available and appropriate. It is worth noting here that our examples are
‘biased’ towards particular places in Eastern and Southern Africa, specifically
Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Africa. This is not because these countries
are in any way statistically ‘representative’, but rather because of our general
scepticism about evidence. We have more direct experience of policy debates in
these countries and have carried out considerable primary research in them.
Additionally, we have greater knowledge of what other sources of evidence are
available, and why some published evidence may be unreliable. This is not to say
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we know everything there is to know about these countries either. For Ethiopia,
for example, we draw on research evidence from the Upper Awash Valley, but not,
say, from the Raya Valley. Some of our evidence is unashamedly anecdotal,
deployed with the aim of helping readers digest large doses of theoretical political
economy. In short, we are happy to acknowledge that our coverage of Africa is far
from comprehensive.
1.4 How the Book is Organized and
the Main Arguments It Develops
Inevitably, policy officials will have limited time to devote to reading books
from cover to cover. Thus, we have organized the book into four clearly defined
sections.
Part I, opening with this chapter, sets the stage for later analysis and arguments.
Chapter 2, on the contradictions of development in Africa, provides contextual
evidence from a range of countries, as well as a wide array of socio-economic
indicators, ranging from gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates to the
incidence of teenage pregnancy. Going beyond this, however, the chapter makes
two closely related arguments. First, capitalist development is everywhere, and
always has been, a messy, non-linear, and often brutal process. It is, therefore, not
possible to know at any particular moment where it is ‘headed’. This is an
important point. Many commentators indulge in ‘African exceptionalism’,
marking the continent out as different from the rest of the world. In reality,
many of the things people point to as being peculiar problems of African
economic development closely resemble historical experiences that have
occurred in many places across the globe. Urban slums or abusive exploitation
of mine and child workers are not pathologies of African development but have
been at the heart of capitalist development everywhere. To be clear, while this
does not mean we think African economies will evolve in exactly the same way
as other parts of the world, there are important features worth abstracting and
highlighting from global experiences of economic change. The second argument
put forward in Chapter 2 emphasizes the extraordinary variety and contradictory
characteristics of recent economic experiences both across and within African
countries. If ‘Africa is not a country’—and it is remarkable how easily many
people still resort to sweeping continent-wide generalizations—it is just as true
that ‘Nigeria is not a country’. And beyond mere diversity, we argue that
capitalist development in African countries, as elsewhere, has been contradict-
ory: all good things do not go together.
In Chapter 3, we return to the atmosphere of ideas that policy officials inhale:
the common-sense notions that are rarely questioned and that condense and then
rain down in a repertoire of phrases and assumptions we refer to as ‘rhetorical
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commonplaces’.¹ We suggest that many of these influential ideas can be categor-
ized as either naively optimistic or overly pessimistic, and in doing so aim to
liberate policy officials from the institutionalized ideas they inherit and are under
pressure to accept. What is distinctive about our argument is that we show how
people who regard themselves as sharply opposed to each other often in reality
share attitudes and even assumptions that are excessively optimistic or pessimistic.
Nor are the ideas swirling around the policymaker consistent. For example, in
some African cities it is possible to identify a poisonous atmosphere that combines
elements of ‘neoliberalism’ with a Third World nationalism that in theory ought
not to sit easily with neoliberal instincts. The ideas surveyed in Chapter 3 echo
many of the ideas and analyses examined throughout the book. For example, a
critique of naive hopes for ‘capitalism with a human face’ picks up the argument
developed in Chapter 2 about the way capitalist economic development is and has
always been messy, non-linear, and brutal, even as it produces historically unpre-
cedented advances in welfare and human potential. Meanwhile, a critique of the
pervasive ‘small is beautiful’ notion rehearses arguments developed in, for
example, Chapter 6’s discussion of mega-projects and Chapter 9’s analysis of the
productivity of small farms.
Part II addresses policy questions at the core of strategies for sustained eco-
nomic growth, productivity improvements, employment creation, and foreign
exchange generation. Chapter 4, the principal focus of which is investment, is
noticeably longer than other chapters, the reason being that it makes a point of
avoiding false distinctions between ‘macro’ and ‘micro’, or between macroeconomic
policies and industrial policy. In it, we argue that African governments should as a
matter of urgency raise their share of investment in GDP. Furthermore, they should
proactively direct such investment towards activities that have the highest potential
for increasing returns of scale and scope, for raising demand for labour, and for
earning foreign exchange.
Access to foreign exchange is critical. If developing countries grow quickly, this
inevitably results in a huge thirst for and therefore growth in imports, which can
be very difficult to keep up with. Borrowing abroad or making requests for foreign
aid can certainly help, but both potentially introduce new forms of uncertainty
and can threaten the coherence of development strategies. Chapter 5 deals with
these and other international dimensions of economic strategy. In doing so, it
discusses trends in Africa’s net barter terms of trade and how these may affect
policy choices, exchange rate policy, and the place of regional African (as opposed
to broader international) trade within overall strategies of growth and develop-
ment. In brief, we argue that sustained, broadly welfare-improving growth
depends on maintaining a high growth rate of imports, which, in turn, requires
¹ Jackson (2006).
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rapid export growth. A modestly competitive—that is, undervalued—exchange
rate is one (necessary but not sufficient) way of supporting such growth. Regional
integration among African economies may also have some positive consequences
(though probably mostly in helping the largest firms in the most advanced
economies across the continent). However, we argue that regional trade should
not be promoted above exporting to large and growing high-value markets further
afield. African intra-trade may be a complement to, but is certainly not a substi-
tute for, an ambitious global trade strategy.
Our arguments about trade exemplify the possibilism we advocate throughout
Part II and the book as a whole. This possibilism also extends to ‘big projects’ (e.g.
large-scale irrigation) as well as to an overall strategy of rejecting all recommenda-
tions for balanced growth. Hirschman’s approach, discussed in Chapter 6, is not
reducible to making the case for unbalanced growth versus balanced growth, but
rather represents a profound difference in undertaking economic analysis and
thinking about projects and policies in low-income economies. Above all, we take
to heart Hirschman’s observation on how a country’s prospects for economic
development should be considered. The great majority of economists—whether
‘left’ or ‘right’, mainstream or heterodox—seem to think that a country’s prospects
are determined by what that country has and is: its previous history, its factor
endowments, its linguistic fragmentation and geography. Hirschman argued that,
instead, a country’s prospects are determined by what a country does, and by what
it becomes as a result of this.²
Part III extends some of the arguments made in Part II and draws out their
implications. Above all, it is concerned with the broad welfare of people in African
countries, especially those on lower incomes, and women in particular. Chapter 8
argues that many myths and problems abound in how economists and inter-
national organizations define and measure poverty and how they design policies
for poverty reduction, and that these myths help account for the record of such
programmes. We contrast these with very different ‘stylized facts’ about who
exactly the poorest people are. The poorest people live in small, not large,
households. Also, while they live in households with a relatively high number of
women, this is not the same as saying they live in ‘female-headed’ households.
Additionally, the poorest people depend for their survival on access to wage labour
opportunities—much of the problem results from the fact that such opportunities
are often few and far between, and even when they are available the pay and
conditions for the work involved are pitiful.
Wage employment—generating more and better jobs—is at the heart of this
book. This, too, is surprisingly unusual, with many influential texts on Africa
barely even mentioning employment. Even when they do, the focus tends to be on
² Hirschman (1967: 5).
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small farmers, the self-employed, and entrepreneurial start-ups rather than on
those working for wages. In fact, many people still classify as self-employment
economic activities that are really wage employment. An example of this is the
young men paid a wage for carrying passengers on motor cycles or for touting and
ticketing car and mini-bus passengers.
The macroeconomic policies discussed in Part II have wage employment
expansion as one of their main objectives. Chapter 8 argues that an overwhelming
majority of the very poorest people have to work for wages—casually, seasonally—
in order to survive, but that their poverty is exacerbated if the demand for wage
labour in rural Africa is not sustained. Chapter 7 brings together a range of
arguments about wage labour markets and relations, and again emphasizes the
lack of good-quality data on labour markets and employment status as a serious
failing of national and international organizations, as well as a major impediment
to progressive policy design.
Chapter 7 is also where we argue that the prospects for rising productivity and
poverty reduction are likely to improve in circumstances where strong trade union
organizations can develop. Throughout the long history of capitalist development,
trade unions and other workers’ organizations have played extremely important
roles in protecting and bringing about improvements in working conditions.
Many of these improvements were achieved after periods of protracted social
conflict, rather than being the inevitable result of a smooth working out of shifting
supply and demand, rising skills, and increases in productivity. For example,
during the 1920s and 1930s Norway and Sweden were relatively poor economies,
having some of the highest levels of industrial strife in the world.³
Unions have also played an important role in economies such as China, where,
despite there being clear repression of unions, worker organizations have been
able to generate changes in the law that have dramatically improved working
conditions.⁴ And unions have been very important in African development,
having been central to bringing about the end of apartheid and, more recently,
at the forefront of the movement calling for regime change in Sudan.⁵
Raising agricultural productivity acts as a foundation for broader sustained
economic development and should therefore be a priority for policy officials. This
is so for a number of reasons. First, most of the poorest people in Africa will,
despite rapid rates of urbanization, continue to live in rural areas for some time to
come. Both small- and medium-sized farms, as well as functionally landless people
reliant on wage incomes, depend for their welfare on rising agricultural product-
ivity. Second, higher productivity in the output of food crops bought and con-
sumed by African wage workers is a key part of a non-inflationary strategy to
sustain profitability, investment, and growth (as well as political stability). Third,
³ Moene and Wallerstein (2008); Bengtsson (2019). ⁴ Chan (2019).
⁵ Marais (2013: 56ff.); Webster and Englert (2020: 6); El-Gizouli (2019: 7–9).
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agriculture is central to securing foreign exchange earnings that can allow for the
expansion of imports, thereby fuelling investment and growth. Fourth, there is
increasingly scope for agricultural production and processing to reap productivity
and other gains previously associated exclusively with manufacturing, and that
have wider spill-over effects throughout the economy. Chapter 9 is devoted to
understanding the constraints on raising agricultural productivity in African
economies, querying conventional arguments concerning the role of extension
advice and micro-credit in raising yields, and to presenting arguments for what
needs to and could be done.
Finally, in Chapter 10 (Part IV) we draw together the policy priorities that flow
from earlier chapters. In doing so, we emphasize strategic policy priorities—and
their rationale—rather than setting out a lengthy ‘must do’ blueprint. We have
little faith that such a blueprint would stand any chance of becoming operational
across such a diverse range of contexts and uncertainties, given that policy choices
are in reality products of technocrats and politicians having to respond to the
pressures of prevailing economic conditions as well as to powerful and often
conflicting class interests. Additionally, all policies, once introduced, will probably
have unintended and unpredicted consequences that can fundamentally change
their dynamic.
We hope that this book provides officials with the confidence to raise questions,
as well as the means to design, implement, monitor, and refine specific policies.
We also aim to present students of economics with material that is both more
challenging and exciting, and features fewer bland platitudes about Africa, than
many other textbooks.
Our own arguments are explicit and many of them are deliberatively provoca-
tive. We do not hold back when criticizing work on African policy issues by other
social scientists. We justify our many and robustly expressed criticisms because we
make a consistent effort to outline alternative theoretical and practical proposals.
For example, we not only show the limitations of the most popular approaches to
rural labour markets and poverty, but constructively argue the case for a very
different approach. In attempting to encourage debate and further reading, we try
to emphasize how and why we differ from many widely accepted and fashionable
views. Some of these differences are highlighted in Figure 1.1.
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Figure 1.1 Contrasting outlooks on African economic development
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2
Uneven, Contradictory, and Brutal
Economic Development in Africa
2.1 Introduction
This chapter sets out the context for the analytical and policy discussions under-
pinning this book, emphasizing the importance of variation across and within
countries as a spur to policy possibilism. In doing so, we make three points
fundamental both for understanding how African economies perform and for
considering policy design.
First, capitalism is contradictory always and everywhere. Even where capitalist
expansion brings about dramatic and, in many ways, progressive changes, it is
contradictory, uneven, and brutal. Thus, the contradictions of development in
Africa should come as no surprise, nor is there any reason to mark out African
countries as tragically different. These contradictions also mean that any attempt
to fit Africa into a simple narrative—a narrative of ‘tragic growth’ or of ‘Africa
Rising’—is bound to fail. For capitalism is never linear and smooth, never friction-
free in its expansion. Benign statements suggesting that ‘all good things go
together’, such as the combination of growth, market liberalization, democracy,
and poverty reduction, are pure fantasy.¹
Second, unevenness and diversity form a central fact of African economic
experiences. It is not only the differences between countries we highlight, but
also the astonishing differences in experience within countries, differences often
organized around distinctions of gender, class, and ethnic identity. Despite this,
economists continue to smother variations with averages, making sweeping claims
about the entire African continent based on only a few countries.²
Third, the variety, diversity, and unevenness of performance within and across
countries is not descriptive exoticism. Although some of this variation—such as in
girls’ access to schooling or in export performance—is a function of different
histories, nonetheless variation is a font of possibilism. That is, it suggests there
is scope for changing performance, learning from other policy experiences, and
¹ See Mills et al. (2017: 1) for an example.
² See, for example, a widely read academic journal article claiming to know the secret behind
‘Africa’s growth tragedy’ (Easterly and Levine, 1997), or the sweeping statement that for ‘forty years,
Africa stagnated while other developing regions grew’ (Collier and O’Connell, 2008: 77).
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escaping the ties of structure, legacies of the past, and prior ‘endowments’. For
instance, if neonatal mortality can be reduced rapidly in some African countries, it
is surely worth understanding why, in order to assess the prospects of accelerating
improvements elsewhere.
Policymakers are in a difficult position. Constrained by storylines of linear
development imposed by (some) scholars and aid agencies, they are also under
pressure to deliver rapid and smooth growth and development. We argue that it is
useful, as a platform from which to launch policies, to form a more realistic
understanding of the history of capitalist development, and of the varied trajec-
tories of economic change within African countries.
2.2 Contradictory, Brutal, and Uneven
Urban Deprivation
Suffering in sub-Saharan Africa, for example in rapidly growing urban slums, is
often lamented as being somehow unique to the region. These horrors are real, but
they are far from being exceptionally African. They have always been a central
feature of capitalist growth. Urban squalor is not a good indication of stagnant
capitalism in Africa or of ‘tragic’ growth; this squalor and other forms of suffering
are historically compatible with growth, structural change, and development.
These are the kinds of formative calamity characteristic of capitalist development
everywhere.
The living conditions of poor people—often recent migrants to the city—in late
nineteenth-century London, provide a good example,³ with people crammed into
tiny spaces and wracked by illness, scraping together the very barest of livings.
This squalor seems little different to the ‘endless and uniform sea of shacks,
overcrowded and impoverished, with an ever-growing population’ observed in,
for example, Khayelitsha on the fringes of Cape Town.⁴ Despite Cape Town being
regarded as the second wealthiest city in Africa, in some sections of Khayelitsha in
2006 less than a quarter of people had access to taps and less than half could use
toilets connected to sewage infrastructure. Furthermore, levels of unemployment
were extremely high, with many people scrabbling to earn something from
activities with ‘vanishingly small economic rewards’.⁵
Contradictory, brutal, and uneven development is nothing new. Early modern
capitalist expansion in England (and elsewhere) brought with it grime and immis-
eration in rural areas and in the slums of the new towns and expanding cities—
‘filthy, disease ridden, gin-sodden hell holes’.⁶ Real wages stagnated, especially in the
³ Wise (2009). ⁴ Seekings (2013: 2). ⁵ Du Toit and Neves (2007: 23).
⁶ Hilton (2006).
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first half of the nineteenth century, and inequality increased. Furthermore, the
record of socio-economic development within Europe in the first half of the
twentieth century showed profoundly contradictory trends. The period 1913–45
‘was littered with civil wars, famines, economic depression, population displace-
ments, ethnic cleansings and World Wars’,⁷ but even so, declining mortality rates
led to a huge increase in the European population. In 1913, there were much higher
mortality rates in Eastern and Southern Europe compared to the rest of the
continent, but by 1945 there had been dramatic convergence in mortality rates,
despite the traumas suffered after 1914.
In this chapter we will show the importance of variation and contradictory
developments within Africa, and why this matters. We have insisted on similar-
ities between the unevenness and contradictions experienced in Africa and in
Europe; but we deny that our references to economic history and to contingent
outcomes in England, for example, is evidence of Eurocentric prejudice or teleo-
logical illusions.
Forced and Prison Labour
Capitalism—one of the defining features of which is a ‘free’ labour market—has in
many places and times resorted to forced labour. In post-Civil War Spain, for
example, the government used the forced labour of thousands of political prison-
ers to construct irrigation canals benefitting landowners who had backed the
military coup.⁸ Convict labour, meanwhile, was concentrated in some of the
fastest-growing and most important sectors of the US economy—including lum-
ber businesses, railways, and state-run mines; in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries ‘the bearers of modernity frequently [carried] with them its antithesis’.⁹
Forced labour continues to be widespread, though some question how much
distinction there is between this category and the broader phenomena of
extremely exploitative working conditions.¹⁰
So, there is nothing especially surprising or uniquely ‘African’ about substitut-
ing prisoners for wage labour. In 2013, for example, the manager of a private
sector Ethiopian coffee plantation near Jimma was not at all embarrassed to give
costed details (to two of this book’s authors) about how he was paying to lease
prison labour. The widespread use of prison labour on large-scale private farms in
Uganda has been investigated in more detail.¹¹ Nor is it an anomaly that in Angola
in the early 2000s, armed forces ran some diamond mines using forced labour.¹²
⁷ Millward and Baten (2010: 233). ⁸ Preston (2012). ⁹ Lichtenstein (1996).
¹⁰ Lerche (2007).
¹¹ Todrys and Kwon (2011); https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/w3cswf5b.
¹² Marques de Morais and Falcão de Campos (2005).
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In one of the best-known African historical examples, French colonial rule in
West Africa normalized forced labour through various bureaucratic forms,
including mandatory prison labour on public works and the prestation or labour
tax system, which was organized through local chiefs and frequently mobilized
children and women to build roads.¹³ While King Leopold of Belgium’s drive to
join the club of modern colonial capitalist powers led to extreme, and infamous,
uses of forced labour,¹⁴ the effects of forced labour under Belgian colonialism at a
later period appear to have had more complex and contradictory effects. For
example, when some of the forced recruits into the colonial army returned to their
villages as non-commissioned officers after seven years, they became very
successful—much to the consternation of the historically dominant leaders of
the Kuba who had recruited them.¹⁵
Order and Discipline
One aspect of modern capitalism’s expansion has typically been the effort by
capitalists—in particular in capital-intensive mines and in large-scale factories—
to persuade a free labour force to stick to the rhythms of production regimes.
There are plenty of constraints on the successful development of modern factories
but, as Freeman shows in a history of large factories, ‘they paled before the
problem of discipline’.¹⁶ Employers often resort to a gendered approach to
controlling and ‘socializing’ a new capitalist labour force:
Many local men proved . . . unwilling to submit to the unaccustomed close
supervision and discipline that came with them. In any case, . . . owners did
not want adult men for most positions, preferring women and children whom
they could pay less.¹⁷
Experiences of industrialization in England and America were very similar in this
respect to recent experiences in African economies such as Ethiopia, where the
creation of a labour force internalizing the rhythms and requirements of industrial
capitalism has challenged employers.¹⁸ Elsewhere in Africa, recruiting, retaining,
and disciplining wage workers has long been difficult, as discussed by Frederick
Cooper.¹⁹ In the early 1990s, the general manager’s attitude to the workforce on
one South African gold mine remained very simple: ‘Let’s rubberize them and we
will have them back to work.’²⁰
¹³ Tiquet (2018: 135). ¹⁴ See Hochschild (1999). ¹⁵ Vansina (2010: 327).
¹⁶ Freeman (2018: 18). ¹⁷ Ibid. ¹⁸ Oya (2019).
¹⁹ Cooper (1992); see also Gibbon (2011). ²⁰ Donham and Mofokeng (2011: 125).
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In one dispute during the rapid industrialization of South Korea in the 1970s,
management tried to prevent union elections by nailing shut the door to the
women’s dormitory, having already cut off their water and electricity supply.
When striking women were confronted by riot police, they believed that if they
undressed the police would not attack them—to no avail. Two years later the
managers of this factory encouraged an attack on the union office by men using
buckets of human excrement.²¹ And, just as British police claimed to be acting in
self-defence when inflicting violence on striking miners in the 1980s, so too did
their better armed South African counterparts at Marikana in 2012, where the
mine owners provided helicopters and logistical support. In the latter case, police
shot dead 34 workers.²² Earlier, the Zimbabwean security forces were guilty of
even greater brutality in ‘the Chiadzwa massacre’ of October 2008. Having killed
miners and terrorized the local population they were easily able to use forced
labour, including child labour, to mine diamonds in Marange.²³
Child labour also made a major contribution to industrialization in Europe and
the USA. In England, many girls migrated to work in urban factories in the
nineteenth century, although most children working for wages in 1870 were still
employed in agricultural and rural occupations.²⁴ In Europe, ‘traffic in children
was managed by Foundling Homes, orphanages or poor relief authorities; in the
German and Scandinavian countryside, poor children were also put up for public
auction’. These children, who ‘played a particularly important role in early
industrial development’, were often physically and sexually abused.²⁵ Overseers
tortured them with long working hours:
[I]f a child becomes sleepy . . . there is an iron cistern filled with water. He
takes the boy by the legs and dips him in the cistern, and then sends him back
to work.²⁶
The Greenhouse Grind
Today, celebrities and even politicians criticize abusive labour conditions in East
Asian garment and other factories. But agricultural workers rarely get the same
attention, just as was the case in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
in the UK and USA, when the ‘long-standing exploitation of agricultural workers,
domestic producers, servants . . . and others went largely unnoted by politicians,
journalists, and writers’.²⁷
For example, thousands of seasonal migrants work on horticultural and fruit
farms in the USA and live in uninsulated and insanitary labour camps hidden
²¹ Kim (2011). ²² Bench Marks Foundation (2012). ²³ Towriss (2013: 106).
²⁴ Horrell and Humphries (2018: table 1a); on girls working in factories see Rawson (2017).
²⁵ Honeyman (2016: 7). ²⁶ Ibid. ²⁷ Freeman (2018).
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from public view. Among these female pickers there is a high incidence of
premature births and developmental malformations.²⁸ Migrant workers have
been even more abused in other parts of the world, including in Sicily’s green-
houses and parts of Africa.²⁹ Contradictions within this sector include the tension
between providing much-needed wage employment opportunities for women and
evidence suggesting that increased exposure to pesticides—especially among poorly
educated and weakly organized workers—may lead to adverse health outcomes,
including morbidity and spontaneous abortion.³⁰ Attempts to unionize in this
sector stoke conflict: in 2010, for example, police viciously set about a group of
women who went on strike at Uganda’s largest rose-exporting farm in Entebbe.³¹ In
Tanzania, 20 migrant agricultural workers protesting about the failure of the state-
owned sugar company to pay their wages were shot by the field force in July 1986.³²
A further reason why less attention is paid to working conditions in agriculture
is that rural wage employment is not thought to be very important in African
economies. Later chapters, especially Chapter 7, dispel this myth. Wage employ-
ment is a dominant feature of rural lives.
Capitalist White Elephants
Resources are often wasted on grandiose or ill-conceived infrastructure projects.
The delays, overspending, and repeated redesign of the Inga hydropower dams
on the Congo make for an easy—and fair—target. But again, there is no African
exceptionalism when it comes to big scheme waste and slowness. To give just
one example, Berlin’s new airport was scheduled to open in 2011. By 2018 it had
still not opened and was some €5 billion over budget.³³ Meanwhile, in Nacala
(Mozambique), a new airport terminal did open for business, in 2014. It has capacity
for 500,000 passengers and 5,000 tonnes of cargo annually. However, it operated for
just three years at only 4 per cent of capacity, amid (as was also the case with Berlin)
rumours of corruption. We will discuss other African mega-projects in Chapter 7,
where arguments in favour of large projects are also introduced.
The Bad, the Ugly, and the Good in the Extractive Industry
Contradictions may be especially concentrated in mining. Many development
economists treat the extractive industries with distaste, citing statistics that ‘show
²⁸ Holmes (2013: 266, 553). ²⁹ Tondo and Kelly (2017); Cole and Booth (2007).
³⁰ Handal and Harlow (2009); Mrema et al. (2017).
³¹ http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/688334-851606-ca2dt2z/index.html.
³² https://www.tzaffairs.org/1987/01/tanzania-in-the-international-media-18/.
³³ https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/w3csy81k. Delays, huge cost overruns, and accusations of
political corruption and malfeasance have often been documented in the USA, for example in Boston’s
$15 billion urban transport project—finally completed after 15 years in 2007 (Smith, 2010).
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a penalty for living in a resource-rich country compared with a non-resource rich
country in Africa’.³⁴ While mining may contribute to foreign exchange earnings, it
may also leave an economy exposed to volatile commodity prices. And although the
value of production in the mineral extraction sector in Africa is immense (around
$176 billion a year in 2010–12), African governments collect a mere 3 per cent of
that in tax revenue, with some ‘not selling national assets’, but effectively ‘giving
them away’ to foreign mining companies.³⁵
Mining may crowd out foreign exchange earnings from, and investment in,
other activities. It is commonly assumed to be an enclave activity with only
negative spread effects to the national economy. These negative effects include
pollution, which may reduce agricultural productivity and output growth. Oxfam
alleges that women suffer disproportionately as mining leads to a depletion
of firewood and restricted access to, and greater pollution of, water. Women
may have to devote more time to collecting water and firewood. And because of
this, women may be unable to find paid work and become increasingly dependent
on men.³⁶
There may be other negative effects of mining if, for example, greater fiscal
flows lead to greater corruption rather than increased public goods provision. One
well-documented example is the Marange alluvial diamond mine in Zimbabwe.
When it was discovered in 2006, huge numbers flocked there to work as
artisanal miners. But the state security services soon moved in, launching a series
of violent attacks in Chikorokoza Chapera (Operation End Illegal Trading). By
2008, the remaining artisanal miners had been brutally evicted and the Marange
diamond field was absorbed by a regulated sector dominated by security and
political elites.³⁷
However, investment by large-scale foreign corporations has been shown to
deliver some benefits to people living near mines. Large-scale open-pit gold mines
have expanded in a number of African economies in recent years, including
Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Ghana,
the Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, and Tanzania. These mines do cause terrible pollution,
which might be expected to reduce agricultural yields and negatively affect infant
mortality in surrounding areas. However, survey evidence shows there have
instead been rapid declines in infant mortality, possibly linked to women’s
employment and improved access to health care.³⁸ A study of gold mining in
Ghana, Mali, and Tanzania also found some positive outcomes: the chances of
finding work throughout the year improve for women closer to the gold mines
compared to those living further away;³⁹ infant mortality fell in Ghana in
³⁴ Chuhan-Pole et al. (2017b: 3). ³⁵ Moore, Prichard, and Fjeldstad (2018: 92, 258).
³⁶ Oxfam International (2016: 7). ³⁷ Towriss (2013); Rutherford (2018).
³⁸ Benshaul-Tolonen (2018). ³⁹ Chuhan-Pole et al. (2017b: 137–8).
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communities nearer gold mines; in Mali there were higher cereal yields near mines
than in other areas.⁴⁰
Capitalist Instability, ‘Post-Development’,
and the Possibility of Progress
The contradictory and indeterminate character of capitalism is more than a quirk of
early English industrial history or a blighted feature of twenty-first-century African
capitalism. Rather, it is such an enduring and central feature of capitalism that most
theories of capitalism focus on its instability and proneness to crisis. The outcomes
of capitalism are so uncertain that its very future has often been questioned.⁴¹
Indeed, one of capitalism’s contradictions is that it has repeatedly outlived predic-
tions of its demise, rescued by shifts in technology or dramatic reconfigurations of
politics and regulation. Another glaring contradiction is that while capitalist expan-
sion has often been regarded as a source of peace, in reality capitalism has often been
rescued by militarism. The idea that capitalism, by repressing the ‘passions’ or
greater evils in the quest for ‘interests’ or lesser evils, may nurture peace is not
new.⁴² Some neoclassical economists and neoliberal ideologues have, despite the
horrific experiences of the twentieth century, resuscitated the idea of blaming
violence on the poor and on the lack of capitalist development to support a ‘liberal
peacebuilding’ approach to international intervention.⁴³
Within an overall pattern of instability, inequality, and war, many astonishing
gains in welfare have been secured, but only through protracted political struggle
and often at extremely high costs. Seeing the contradictions of capitalism for what
they are—fundamental and enduring—may help policy officials protect themselves
against the misleading idea that development can be expected to be a smooth, linear
process, or that it would be were certain impediments suddenly removed. Across the
ideological spectrum ‘grand narratives’, supporting the idea of unstoppable devel-
opment and progress, have held strong appeal. Some have been attracted by
simplistic, Stalinist versions of Marxism,⁴⁴ while others have fallen for the promise
of ‘automatic convergence’ wrapped in Solow–Swan neoclassical growth models.
These models predict that ‘if ’ states could only stop distorting market prices then,
given mobile capital and diminishing returns, low-income countries would attract
investment flows and converge on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) countries in terms of income per capita.⁴⁵
Wariness of grand narratives, combined with the myriad disappointments of
development and twenty-first-century capitalism, with its frequent financial crises
⁴⁰ Sanoh and Coulibaly (2015: 25–6). ⁴¹ For a recent example, see Streeck (2016).
⁴² Hirschman (2013). ⁴³ Cramer (2006).
⁴⁴ Cohen (2001: 134–74); Howard and King (1992). ⁴⁵ Barro and Sala-i-Martins (1992).
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and environmental catastrophes, has also led to the idea of a ‘post-development’
phase. Anthropologists Ferguson and Li write of the ‘failure of long-established
transition narratives, notably the narrative centred on a universal trajectory from
farm-based and “traditional” livelihoods into the “proper jobs” of a modern
industrial society’.⁴⁶ But these and similar criticisms of ‘transition’ narratives
ignore a rich history—less crassly teleological—of writing about the unevenness,
contradictions, and indeterminacy of capitalist development. Charles Dickens
captured this famously:
[I]t was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of
hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing
before us . . . ⁴⁷
And some sociologists, such as Göran Therborn, do not hesitate to acknowledge
that capitalist development can achieve real progress: ‘Trend lines are
discernible—in scientific-technical knowledge, economic growth, and life expect-
ancy, for example.’⁴⁸ Humanity is at a peak of its capabilities and a survey of its
achievements suggests that there has ‘been real progress in the development of
human resources and human freedom’.⁴⁹ Political economists regard this progress
as fundamental: the development of labour power is at the centre of the develop-
ment of the productive forces (the combination of labour power with the means of
production to generate products), which in turn shape and underpin an economic
structure (a set of production relations).⁵⁰
The Empirical Imperative
The remainder of this chapter traces the ‘trend lines’ identified by Therborn across
the landscape of economic development in Africa. We do not rely on charting
gross domestic product (GDP), a composite indicator that is extremely useful but
has well-known limitations.⁵¹ Nor do we try to summarize Africa’s experience
by referring to the Human Development Index, the Multidimensional Poverty
Index, or other poverty indicators—discussed in Chapter 6. Instead, we make use
of selected individual indicators.
We emphasize two points. The first is, as already discussed, that capitalist
development always shows inconsistent and messy patterns of advances in tech-
nology and welfare alongside persistent failure, wastage, exploitation, and misery.
The second is that patterns of development are, typically, distinctly varied. This is
very much the case in Africa, where rates of change and levels of performance on a
⁴⁶ Ferguson and Li (2018); Li (2017). ⁴⁷ Dickens (2003: 17). ⁴⁸ Therborn (2016).
⁴⁹ Ibid. ⁵⁰ See Cohen (1978; 2001: 42). ⁵¹ Coyle (2015); Pilling (2019); Jerven (2013).
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range of indicators vary hugely between and within countries, and even within
villages. So we ignore Binyavanga Wainaina’s satirical advice:
In your text, treat Africa as if it were one country. It is hot and dusty with rolling
grasslands and huge herds of animals and tall, thin people who are starving. Or it
is hot and steamy with very short people who eat primates. Don’t get bogged
down with precise descriptions.⁵²
2.3 Telling Poor Stories about African Development
Ignoring complexity and contradictions in capitalist economic development,
many economists tell stories marred by three common flaws: first, oversimplifying
the protagonist by homogenizing sub-Saharan Africa (‘Africa is a country’);
second, resorting to hyperbole (Africa is ‘beyond any doubt . . . the most tragic
example of a growth disaster’);⁵³ and, third, a cavalier attitude to evidence.⁵⁴
Before criticizing these stories, we turn to very different types of evidence to tell
a story of our own—about the complex dynamics and ironies of African history.
A sculpture produced by the Núcleo de Arte in Maputo (Figure 2.1) brings to
mind several contradictory ideas. This elegant bird resembles the black-winged
stilt that features on Mozambican stamps. The metal figure is delicately balanced
as it strides forward on webbed feet. On closer inspection, we realize that the
elegance and balance of this symbol of peace are made from the most brutal
components—pieces of stripped-down assault rifles, the decommissioned scraps
of the millions of small arms imported in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s to wage wars
in Mozambique.⁵⁵ A cruel history literally underpins sculptures now in such
fashionable demand in the metropoles.⁵⁶ The bird and this history recall Walter
Benjamin’s insistence that there is no document of civilization that is not at the
same time a document of barbarity.⁵⁷
Another, older bird sculpture embodies an even wider range of contradictions
and horrors. Now hidden out of sight somewhere in Jesus College, Cambridge, in
response to student demands for its return to Nigeria, this proud and fierce
cockerel embodies power (Figure 2.2 shows a similar bronze held in the
Smithsonian). In the late nineteenth century it probably stood on the altar of
the Queen Mother inside the Oba’s compound in Benin.⁵⁸ The altars in the royal
compound from which so many works of art were looted by British forces in 1897
were described by the British Consul-General as ‘covered with streams of dried
human blood and the stench was too frightful’.⁵⁹
⁵² Wainaina (2005). ⁵³ Smits (2006: 1); Collier and Gunning (1999: 4).
⁵⁴ On sweeping statements about African growth failure see Sender (1999).
⁵⁵ Elmquist (2005). ⁵⁶ Verhagen (2017). ⁵⁷ Benjamin (1992: 128).
⁵⁸ Ezra (1992: 86). ⁵⁹ Admiral Rawson, cited in Bodenstein (2018).
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Figure 2.1 Swords into ploughshares, guns into sculptures
Source: J. B. Sender, photo C. Cramer.
Figure 2.2 Benin bronze cockerel
Note: Image provided by the Smithsonian Institute.
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The aim of the British had been to eliminate barriers to trade; the gory and
exaggerated descriptions of the ‘stench’ of human sacrifices served as an excuse for
deploying Maxim guns and burning the entire city; lurid descriptions also
enhanced the exotic allure on the international art market of Benin objects by
adding the frisson of a cruelly ‘barbaric’ provenance. The magnificent plumage
and naturalistic realism of the bird, subtly achieved through the brass casters’
repeated use of abstract and ornamental motifs, cannot now be openly displayed
in Cambridge. When it is eventually displayed to a wider public, viewers will pay
tribute to Edo cultural achievements and condemn colonial atrocities, but their
attention should also be drawn to Robin Law’s scholarly work on pre-colonial
inequality and human sacrifice.⁶⁰
The Africa Dummy
Mainstream economists have placed a dummy variable into their regressions to
tell a story about African growth failures that combines dubious data, homogen-
ization, and hyperbole. They were trying to explain why, on average, African
economies appeared to be growing slower than the rest of the world, by about 1.5
percentage points per year.⁶¹ Variables were stacked up on top of variables in the
pursuit of the mystery of the Africa dummy, but the more variables were dreamed
up, the less these exercises had to do with any coherent theory of growth and
change in Africa.⁶² Too many of these variables were empirically questionable,
both in terms of their design and in terms of the provenance and credibility of the
actual data. For example, unreliable quantitative indices were constructed to
measure the quality of ‘African’ institutions, governance, and the degree of
ethno-linguistic fractionalization.
The regressions also relied on estimates of GDP per capita growth that are not
reliable. Even in OECD economies, the techniques and assumptions behind GDP
estimates shift over time. Where a great deal of economic activity goes unre-
corded, as is the case in many low- and middle-income and African economies,
GDP involves guestimates of the scale of activity in agriculture, services, and
small-scale unregistered manufacturing enterprises. Guesses about the size of
the ‘shadow’, or unrecorded, economy in Africa range from almost 60 per cent
of GDP in Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and Nigeria, to around 30 per cent in Botswana,
Cameroon, and South Africa.⁶³
When we do fieldwork, we routinely ask the largest farmers if a government
official had ever visited to collect data or for any other reason. They laugh at the
naivety of our question. But one farmer in Mozambique said: ‘the Labour
⁶⁰ Law (1985). ⁶¹ Jerven (2011). ⁶² Deaton (2009). ⁶³ Schneider (2005).
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department did visit once—because we gave them a lift’. Thus it is unsurprising if
estimates of the scale and dimensions of output, employment, and earnings—or
other aspects of the rural economy—are unreliable (see Chapters 7 and 8).
A former Ugandan official described the lack of resources in the Bureau of
Statistics in the 1990s: the national accounts were totted up by hand for lack
of computers, and the office had a single roadworthy vehicle. The upshot is that a
reported growth rate in an African economy of 4 per cent a year may actually
mean growth was up to 6 per cent a year or it may mean it was zero.⁶⁴
Calculating GDP is one thing: measuring GDP per capita runs into an
altogether different, often highly political, challenge of population census data.
Problems with population data in Africa are discussed in Chapter 7.
So the data need handling with a great deal of care. But the shortcomings of the
cross-country regression approach were not only a product of bad data (though
‘garbage in’ most definitely guaranteed ‘garbage out’), but also of a reliance on
sweeping averages to capture what in reality were highly varied patterns of
economic performance over time. The simple stories often told about the experi-
ence of ‘African’ growth are plain wrong. It seems clear that there was a concen-
tration of weak growth episodes and growth reversals in the 1980s and 1990s,
when around half of the African economies for which we have long-run data
contracted.⁶⁵ However, for most of the 1950–2016 period, the majority of coun-
tries were growing, some modestly, some fairly rapidly. Growth rates and cumu-
lative growth differed between African economies, as shown in Figures 2.3 and 3.1
(Chapter 3).
Although very few countries recorded extremely low rates of growth in all
periods, the Africa dummy regression analyses offered few insights into growth
dynamics, or into episodes of rapid growth or growth reversals in different African
economies at different times.⁶⁶ In other words, they had nothing to say about
contradictory developments, their implicit assumption being that ‘all good things
go together’ (and hence bad things go together too). The regressions had further,
technical deficiencies: for example, many include variables that are endogenous to
growth (fertility or institutions, for example) on the ‘explanatory’ right-hand side
of the equation, meaning they cannot capture causal effects.
If Africa’s relatively slow growth is ‘explained’ by its institutions, what accounts
for the lack of appropriate institutions in so many African countries? Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson attempt to answer this question, claiming that when
Europeans ventured out to the rest of the world from around 1500, they met
with essentially accommodating conditions in some places (Australasia, North
⁶⁴ Jerven (2013).
⁶⁵ This refers to the 43 African countries covered by the Maddison Project Database: https://www.
rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/.
⁶⁶ Some of the flaws in the Africa dummy literature are discussed in Imam and Salinas (2008).
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America), but were stymied by inhospitable climates and diseases such as malaria
elsewhere (in Africa and parts of Asia).⁶⁷ In the former, they settled and brought
with them the ‘inclusive’ institutions that provided building blocks for long-run
capitalist development. In places such as ‘Africa’, they found it difficult to settle,
and opted instead for ‘extractive’ institutions, making it difficult for sustained
economic growth to emerge.
Compressing 500 years of history like this has attracted criticism from more
informed historians.⁶⁸ There has also been criticism of the notion that Western
European institutions could be described, at least for much of the past 500 years,
as resembling transparent and accountable democracies with secure private prop-
erty rights. A related critical point is that many parts of the world have managed to
‘catch up’ with the already advanced economies, but often by violating the liberal
principles of ‘good’ institutions or governance. It has been suggested that institu-
tions and markets ‘co-evolve’: that apparently weak institutions may be useful in
the creative development of new markets, but as a market expands there will be
increasing pressure for institutional changes to help consolidate that market.
This argument has been made, for example, about processes of institutional
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Figure 2.3 Growth episodes in sub-Saharan Africa, 1950–2016
Source: Maddison Project (2018).
⁶⁷ Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002). ⁶⁸ Austin (2008) and Bayly (2008).
⁶⁹ Ang (2016). See Chapter 6 on whether this can be applied to make sense of the rise of the Nigerian
film industry, Nollywood.
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of putting this is to say that historical evidence suggests that growth is a non-linear
process, while much of the growth literature in economics deals in linear pro-
gramming models (see also Chapter 5).⁷⁰
Mal-integration through a Perverse Logic
The pessimistic assumptions behind econometricians’ use of an Africa dummy
match the fundamental pessimism of scholars influenced by dependency theory
and ‘world systems’ interpretations of capitalism. Just as neoclassically trained
economists bemoan ‘market distortions’ in low-income economies, so many
radical economists highlight ‘distorted’ forms of capitalism in Africa. If orthodox
economists have in mind a fantasy benchmark of perfectly competitive markets,
so many of their critics invoke the fantasy of an undistorted, ‘natural’ capitalism in
the ‘core’ countries.
For these critics, respected by many African intellectuals, development pros-
pects throughout Africa are shackled by the rules of a rigged game; and they
have no wish to play for the prize of ‘second-class, hand-me-down capitalism,
ludicrous and doomed’.⁷¹ The theory is that Africa is prey to a ‘perverse capitalist
logic of disarticulated accumulation’ or is a victim of ‘mal-integration’ into the
world economy.⁷² Again, the point to emphasize here is the lack of room for
contradictions in development—for the possibility of a complex and uneven mix
of both success and failure. The arguments and (weak) evidence for this strand of
pessimism are discussed further in Chapter 3.
2.4 The Worst of Times: South Africa
Violent Democracy
There is no shortage of fodder for pessimistic outlooks on African economic
development. We begin by selecting South Africa to provide negative examples
illustrating one side of capitalist development—‘the worst of times’—partly
because so many people expected better outcomes in the most obviously indus-
trialized economy in sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa can be described as a
‘violent democracy’.⁷³ Not only is there a great deal of violence—pogroms
against foreigners, rapes, widespread sexual violence, abuse by teachers and
nurses, beatings, abuse and neglect of children—but the institutions and practices
⁷⁰ Rodríguez (2008). ⁷¹ Achebe (1987: 141).
⁷² Shivji (2009: 70); Moyo in Patnaik, Moyo, and Shivji (2011: 72).
⁷³ Bruce (2014); Taylor (2002); Johnston (1996); and von Holdt (2014).
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of democracy and the state are frequently vicious. Assassinations linked to
political positions have been an alarmingly common feature of South African
politics, with an estimated 450 political killings taking place between 1994 and
2012. Murderous factional rivalries resulted in the assassination of many local
councillors between 2011 and 2017, while threats to inflict physical harm were
commonplace.⁷⁴
Institutions of the state, especially the police, are directly involved in other
forms of violence. While the most infamous example in recent years was the
Marikana shooting in 2012 (see Section 2.2), the police also condoned and
perpetrated violence in the grape-growing regions of the Western Cape. First,
they were accused of turning a blind eye when Zimbabwean migrant workers had
their homes torn down and their possessions ransacked in De Doorns in
November 2009.⁷⁵ Then, in late 2012, when tens of thousands of people were
involved in ‘farm worker strikes’ that spread from De Doorns to some 25 other
towns in the area, police fired rubber bullets, struck protesters with batons, and
shot dead three people.⁷⁶
As the conflict on and around mines and farms in South Africa makes
clear, it is not easy to separate out violence directly involving and concen-
trated in state institutions, violence in and around labour relations, violent
antipathy towards Africans born in other countries, and violence in other
social (including family) contexts. The outburst of rage arguably displaced
onto foreign scapegoats in De Doorns in 2009 is often cast in the general,
problematic, term of South African ‘xenophobia’. ‘Xenophobic attacks’ on
non-South African Africans, and their property and businesses, have been
common, flaring up, for example, in 2008 and 2019, and on a smaller scale on
many other occasions.⁷⁷
Violent Society
Violence pervades much of South African society. It has a death from injury rate
double the global average (Figure 2.4) and the incidence of women killed by
intimate partners is six times the global average. About 40 per cent of reports of
rape to the police concern girls younger than 18, but the 55,000 reported rapes
each year are the tip of the ‘iceberg of sexual violence’. The actual number is
thought to be around nine times higher. Rapes are part of a continuum of sexual
violence that also includes intimate partner violence, intimidation, threats, and
abuse and neglect of young girls. Twenty per cent of women attending antenatal
⁷⁴ SALGA (2017). ⁷⁵ Kerr and Durrheim (2013). ⁷⁶ Eriksson (2017).
⁷⁷ Fauvelle-Aymar and Segatti (2012); Mlilo and Misago (2019); https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-47800718.
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clinics in Soweto reported sexual violence by their intimate partners, while
68 per cent of them reported exposure to psychological abuse (including threats
of violence, insults, and controls on their movement).⁷⁸ A survey of more than
3,500 children in Mpumalanga and Western Cape found a 56.3 per cent preva-
lence of physical abuse; a 35.5 per cent prevalence of emotional abuse; and that
9 per cent had at some point experienced sexual abuse.⁷⁹
Intimate partner violence and highly unequal gender relations increase the risk
that young women will risk exposure to HIV/AIDS.⁸⁰ The prevalence rate for all
15–49 year olds is around 19 per cent; the prevalence rate for women is higher—
23.7 per cent. One urban survey carried out in 2016 found that 60 per cent of
women patients aged 30–39 were HIV positive.
Maternal Mortality, Neonatal Mortality
South Africa has had a woeful record on maternal mortality. One longitudinal
study carried out in a rural location in northern KwaZulu-Natal characterized by
























Figure 2.4 Estimated deaths in South Africa caused by intentional and non-
intentional injuries in 2016
Source: WHO Global Health Estimates (2018).
⁷⁸ Seedat et al. (2009); Jewkes and Abrahams (2002). ⁷⁹ Reported in Day and Gray (2017).
⁸⁰ Jewkes et al. (2010).
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650 per 100,000 live births during the 2000–14 period. This is significantly higher
than the least developed country average of 436 per 100,000 live births. Rural
women in South Africa often have long travel times to antenatal clinics, very high
costs of delivery, and unacceptably poor-quality service.
Large numbers of South African mothers die in or shortly after childbirth, but
so too do many babies. The number of neonatal deaths is ‘unacceptably high for a
lower-middle-income country like South Africa’ and also appears to be linked to
poor investment in properly trained health staff.⁸¹ Underinvestment is a major
factor explaining why many clinic staff neglect pregnant women, turning them
away in early pregnancy. This is on top of a generalized lack of blood for
transfusions, a lack of emergency transport facilities, poor referral systems, and
inadequate intensive care provision in rural areas.⁸²
Dismal Economic Performance
Underpinning many of these dismal signals has been the poor overall perform-
ance of the South African economy. Investment dropped off from 1976 (the year
of the Soweto uprising) and, as a share of GDP, carried on falling until 1993.
After that, gross fixed capital formation stuttered for a few years, before climbing
to a post-apartheid peak of 23.5 per cent of GDP in 2008 (still significantly below
the 32 per cent of GDP level of 1976—see Figure 2.5). After 2008, however, it
again fell away and by 2018 was at only 18 per cent of GDP. In marked contrast,
the 18 most successful emerging economies, (as defined by McKinsey), have
managed to sustain an average investment-to-GDP ratio of 30 per cent since
1965.⁸³ We will argue in Chapter 4 that high investment rates are associated with
sustained economic growth and structural change. By structural change we
mean the shift of resources over time from lower to higher-productivity eco-
nomic activities.
South Africa’s weak investment record has been accompanied by high
unemployment. By the first quarter of 2019 the official unemployment rate
was 27.6 per cent. Furthermore, Statistics South Africa adopts a ‘strict’ definition
of unemployment which excludes ‘discouraged workers’—those who very
much want to work but who live in poor areas where search costs are high
and the probability of finding employment is so low they do not formally ‘search’
for jobs. Yet panel data tracking individuals over time show that the ‘non-
searching’ unemployed (the discouraged) are no less likely to find employment
than the ‘searching’ unemployed, providing strong grounds to include discour-
aged workers in the South African unemployment figures.⁸⁴ When ‘discouraged
⁸¹ Rhoda et al. (2018). ⁸² Tlou (2018), Silal et al. (2012), Sender (2016).
⁸³ McKinsey Global Institute (2018: 48). ⁸⁴ Posel, Casale, and Vermaak (2014).
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workers’ are included, the estimated unemployment rate in early 2019 was 40
per cent. The ‘New Growth Path’, announced in 2011, reasserted the need
for a very orthodox, contractionary fiscal policy. Despite international applause,
it did not do the trick.⁸⁵ More recent government macroeconomic policy
proposals have reproduced the fiscal orthodoxy—yet again—and are unlikely
to succeed.⁸⁶
There does appear to have been a genuine tragedy of economic growth in
South Africa: investment has been sluggish; unemployment is high; inequality
rose after the end of apartheid and has remained extremely high, the main
reason being high inequality in the labour market; and the real rate of GDP
growth has stuttered like a car running out of fuel for decades.⁸⁷ The element of
inevitability about this tragedy stems from religious adherence to economic
policies following the ‘treasury’ line, favouring minimal state intervention, an
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Figure 2.5 Investment and unemployment in South Africa, 1985–2016
Source: ILO for unemployment data. World Bank Indicators for Gross Fixed Capital Formation
Database (2018).
⁸⁵ Tregenna (2011). ⁸⁶ Adelzadeh (2019).
⁸⁷ Leibbrandt, Finn, and Woolard (2012); Finn and Leibbrandt (2018).
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2.5 Disappointment, Violence, and the Oppression
of Women in Sub-Saharan Africa
Violent Conflicts
While evidence on violence is unreliable everywhere in Africa, an especially high
number of deaths have been directly linked to armed conflicts in some countries
in 2017. Figure 2.6 shows high estimates of casualty levels in Nigeria, South Sudan,
Somalia, and DRC. The latter is a classic example of problems with data on
violence. Global media paid attention to International Rescue Committee (IRC)
estimates of 5.4 million fatalities in warfare in DRC between 1998 and 2007. It
became clear that the IRC had used inappropriate assumptions to extrapolate
from specific survey sites that had experienced particularly intense fighting. An
alternative approach, covering the same period and drawing on the same survey
evidence but making different assumptions about pre-conflict mortality rates,
came up with a much lower estimate—less than a million.⁸⁸
Between 1989 and 2017, Rwanda, Ethiopia, DRC, Sudan, and Nigeria
recorded fatality numbers from organized violence that were among the highest
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Figure 2.6 Countries in sub-Saharan Africa with the highest number of deaths in
violent conflicts, 2017
Source: ACLED (2017).
⁸⁸ Human Security Report (2013).
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 13/5/2020, SPi
     33
anywhere in the world. Between 2016 and 2017, the number of non-state
conflicts in African countries increased dramatically, including several different
conflicts in Nigeria, Sudan and South Sudan, DRC, and the Central African
Republic (CAR).⁸⁹ There is evidence that the greatest suffering caused by
all types of violent conflict is experienced by women and girls, who are
affected by the indirect effects of war, such as reduced access to food, health
services, and clean water. This may be reflected in a narrowing—across a wide
sample of conflicts—of the gender gap in life expectancy between women
and men.⁹⁰
Intimate Violence and the Blaming of Girls
With or without large-scale armed conflicts, violence against women and girls is
prevalent. Intimate partner violence is, again, extremely difficult to measure
accurately, but it seems to be a commonplace feature of African women’s lives,
as Achebe suggests:
[A] concerned neighbour once called the police station and reported that a man
was battering his wife and the Desk Sergeant asked sleepily: ‘So Therefore?’ So,
behind his back, we call him Mr ‘So Therefore’.⁹¹
Figure 2.7 uses the best available data in 2018 to suggest that in several African
countries more than 20 per cent of surveyed women between the ages of 15 and 49
had experienced intimate partner violence within the past year, with the figure
rising to well over 30 per cent in some countries. In Sweden and the UK the figure
is around 6 per cent.
As discussed in Chapter 8, teenage pregnancy is an excellent predictor of poor
life outcomes for both children and women.⁹² In a number of African countries, a
very high percentage of women have at least one child before they are 18.
Mozambique is perhaps the most extreme case, with the proportion of women
giving birth before they turned 18 (40 per cent) having barely changed between
the early post-war years and 2012. But in the rural areas of some other countries
(Chad and the CAR) close to 50 per cent of young women give birth before they
are 18. And, in both rural and urban Africa, girls living in the poorest households
are most at risk of teenage pregnancy.⁹³
⁸⁹ Pettersson and Eck (2018); https://www.acleddata.com/data/.
⁹⁰ Plümper and Neumayer (2006). ⁹¹ Achebe (1987: 35).
⁹² Jeha et al. (2015); Corcoran (1998).
⁹³ https://data.unicef.org/topic/maternal-health/adolescent-health/.
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One obvious explanation for these high rates of early childbearing is enforced
child marriage. Data from Amhara regional state in Ethiopia show that well over
half of rural women and girls are married before they turn 18, with 15 being the
median age at first marriage among 20–49-year-old women.⁹⁴ In some countries a
very high proportion of women, especially unmarried women, have unmet
contraception needs. In Uganda, for example, well over half of unmarried
women aged 15–49 expressed unmet demand for contraception (Figure 2.8).
Social attitudes, often reinforced by political leaders (or their wives), compound
the often-coercive conditions that young women must endure. In 2017,
Tanzania’s President insisted that pregnant students be excluded from schools,
with Burundi’s Minister of Education following suit in 2018.⁹⁵
If the welfare of teenage girls is harmed by policy choices or neglect, it is
unsurprising that some countries have lagged behind the more general African
trend (discussed in Section 2.8) towards declining fertility rates. In Angola,
Uganda, Chad, and Nigeria, for example, average fertility rates are still exception-
ally high, at more than 4.5 live births per woman.⁹⁶




















Figure 2.7 Proportion of women reporting physical and/or sexual violence in selected
sub-Saharan African countries
Source: UNDS (2018).
⁹⁴ Jones et al. (2018: 45).
⁹⁵ Martínez, Odhiambo, and Human Rights Watch (Organization) (2018). ⁹⁶ UN (2017).
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Dying Young
West and Central Africa suffer the highest rates of under-5 mortality (U5MR)
anywhere in the world: on average 98.7 deaths per 1,000 live births across these
regions. That is roughly 15 times higher than the high-income country average.
There are U5MRs higher than 100 per 1,000 live births in Angola, Chad, Somalia,
CAR, Sierra Leone, Mali, and Nigeria. However, U5MRs in Africa cannot be
explained at the national level. Instead, it is necessary to look at the local factors
increasing mortality risks. Researchers from Stanford University conclude that not
only are U5MRs in sub-Saharan African nations highly heterogeneous but that
subnational factors account for more than three-quarters of the overall variation in
mortality.⁹⁷Their results support the policy casewemake for targeting (inChapter 8).
2.6 The Best of Times: South Africa
Electricity provision can fundamentally improve living conditions—allowing
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Figure 2.8 Percentage of women with unmet need for contraception (selected sub-
Saharan African countries)
Source: Guttmacher (2016).
⁹⁷ Burke, Heft-Neal, and Bendavid (2016).
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South Africa has made great strides since the early 1990s, when access levels were
less than 40 per cent. By 2012/13, more than 85 per cent of households reported
being connected to the electricity grid.⁹⁸
Neonatal deaths may still be unacceptably high in South Africa but in fact
the U5MR in the country has been falling dramatically, from around 80 per 1,000
live births in 2003–5 (the peak of the AIDS epidemic) to 37 per 1,000 live births
by 2015. This has not been the only positive demographic change in South
Africa. The rise in the percentage of girls giving birth before they are 18 has
tailed off and may be in decline. National Adolescent Friendly Clinic Initiative
facilities are providing reproductive health advice targeted at young people.
These facilities have been associated with extended schooling for girls, higher
wages among employed young adult women, and improved health for children
born to young women.⁹⁹
By 2015, 92 per cent of 5 and 6 year olds (pre-school age) were in some form of
educational establishment, a rise of 38 per cent since 2002. In three provinces
(Gauteng, the Free State, and the Western Cape) more than 90 per cent of children
have access to safe water. Though easy access to safe water remains inadequate in
Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal, and the Eastern Cape, dramatic progress has been
made in the latter two provinces.¹⁰⁰
After years of massive losses of life and disability-affected life years (DALYs),
the government was forced to abandon its AIDS denial stance. A surge in
funding after 2005 resulted in, among other things, the world’s largest anti-
retroviral programme.¹⁰¹ More than 98 per cent of pregnant women attending
antenatal clinics were tested for HIV and more than 92 per cent of HIV-positive
pregnant women received treatment.¹⁰² More broadly, there have been import-
ant improvements in health-care capacity. Between 1996 and 2016, the esti-
mated number of physicians per 1,000 people rose from 0.593 to 0.818. There
were only about 2,000 black African medical practitioners in the public sector in
2001 but by 2016 there were nearly 7,500. Meanwhile, the number of nurses on
the South African Nursing Council register rose by 74,000 (a 35 per cent
increase) between 2008 and 2017.¹⁰³
2.7 Sub-Saharan Africa: Light at the End of the Tunnel?
After 2000, when African growth seemed to be outstripping much of the rest of
the world, a new oversimplified narrative replaced that of the ‘Africa dummy’.
⁹⁸ Harris, Collinson, and Wittenberg (2016). ⁹⁹ Branson and Byker (2018).
¹⁰⁰ Jamieson et al. (2017). ¹⁰¹ Mayosi and Benatar (2014). ¹⁰² Cooper et al. (2016).
¹⁰³ https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.MED.PHYS.ZS?locations=ZA; http://www.sanc.co.za/
stats/stat2017/Growth%202008-2017.pdf.
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Now the story was of ‘Africa Rising’: there were hyperbolic celebrations of growth
spurts and fables of ‘Lions on the Move’; and the discussion of policy lessons
focused on the positive contribution of governance ‘improvements’ and elections.
Facts that had previously heralded a dark and hopeless future, such as the ‘youth
bulge’, were now turned into the stirrings of development resurgence. So the age
composition of Africa’s population and its rate of growth came less to define a
‘security demographic’ fear, but now promised a valuable ‘dividend’—a rapidly
growing consumer market and source of (cheap) labour.
Despite exaggerated prognoses, there actually is evidence of socio-economic
changes in much of Africa that are remarkable by historical standards. These
changes—the improvements in women’s welfare above all—go deeper than a brief
spurt in GDP growth or momentary upticks in ‘doing business’ scores.¹⁰⁴ In this
book, we will outline important evidence of development across a range of
indicators in Africa. However, we also stress that this experience of economic
and social change has been uneven, both over time and across (and within)
countries. We underline the need to consider a more complex protagonist in
narratives of development in Africa.
We have already shown that in some African countries a very high percentage
of women give birth as adolescents. This, though, is only part of the picture.
Figure 2.9 shows that in a number of other African countries a far smaller share
of women experience teenage pregnancies. This figure also shows that there
have been declines in the incidence of teenage live births in a few countries, with
Senegal being just one example (down from 27 per cent to 18 per cent between
1998 and 2016).
The prospects for further reductions are encouraging. Not everywhere has
political leadership that stokes the stigmatization of schoolgirl mothers and
limits access to condoms.¹⁰⁵ Many African countries have already enacted laws
protecting the rights of young women to return to school after giving birth.
Some have addressed particular barriers to their return by removing school fees
and indirect costs; others, for example Senegal and Cape Verde, have provided
facilities for breastfeeding mothers; and Zambia allows for flexible learning
timetables.¹⁰⁶
There is evidence of dramatic and deep fertility declines, as can be seen in, for
example, Ethiopia and Rwanda since the early 1990s (Figure 2.10). Overall, the
fertility transition (the decline in the average number of births per woman to a
¹⁰⁴ If the Doing Business Index was not already questionable, its weakness became widely recognized
when the then World Bank chief economist, Paul Romer, suggested that Chile’s ranking had been
politically manipulated to reflect badly on particular Chilean administrations (https://eurodad.
org/doing-business-report).
¹⁰⁵ In Uganda, Pentecostalist campaigns supported by Janet Museveni have explicitly and repeatedly
opposed the marketing and distribution of condoms (Bompani and Brown, 2015).
¹⁰⁶ Martínez, Odhiambo, and Human Rights Watch (Organization) (2018: 11).
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Figure 2.9 Percentage of women who had at least one child by the age of 18 (selected
sub-Saharan African countries, 1995–2016)
Source: UNICEF (2018).
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Figure 2.10 Rapid fertility decline (selected sub-Saharan African countries)
Source: UN (2017).
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generally agreed figure of two) has advanced quite rapidly in Africa’s urban areas.
The fertility transition is almost complete in Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, urban
Kenya, and, remarkably given income levels, urban Ethiopia. Set against this, in
five countries that have been through wars and not had effective family planning
policies—Angola, Mozambique, DRC, Congo (Brazzaville), and Cameroon—the
rural fertility transition has barely begun.¹⁰⁷
With fewer very young women becoming pregnant and with better public
health and improved living standards reflected in falling fertility rates, some of
the risks of maternal mortality fall away. On average, the maternal mortality rate
in sub-Saharan Africa fell from 987 deaths per 100,000 live births in 1990 to 546
per 100,000 in 2015. This, of course, masks wide variations, with improvement
in the maternal mortality rate especially striking in some countries. In Ethiopia,
for example, the rate fell from 1,250 to 353; while in Rwanda it fell from 1,300
to 290.¹⁰⁸
We could present additional demographic statistics to illustrate disparities in
rates of improvement in women’s well-being within and between African coun-
tries. We could, for example, chart dramatic trends in the educational status of
women—such as the exceptional acceleration after 2000 in the median number of
women enrolled in tertiary education in Ghana, Tanzania, Côte d’Ivoire, and,
above all, in Ethiopia.¹⁰⁹ We prefer, however, to shift gear—to provide a different
type of illustration of changes in the status of some African women. In 2017, an
all-female African crew (Figure 2.11) took charge of a Boeing 777 flight from
Addis to Lagos; they are emblematic of an expanding cohort of female technical
graduates who have begun to find it possible to overcome daunting historical
prejudices.¹¹⁰
Millions of women continue to suffer because, as noted, a high proportion of
their children die before reaching the age of 5—especially in West and Central
Africa. But 90 per cent of sub-Saharan African countries had a faster average rate
of reduction (ARR) of U5MR between 2000 and 2015 than they had in the 1990s.
In 21 of these countries the 2000–15 ARR was either a reversal of a negative trend
in the 1990s or represented a tripling of the 1990s ARR.¹¹¹ Nine sub-Saharan
African countries achieved a steady, linear decline in U5MR over the entire
1950–2000 period. Some recent trends captured by the data on armed conflict
have clearly contributed to improvements in infant mortality. In countries as
diverse as Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda, levels of fatalities
directly caused by armed conflict have declined sharply in the past 10 to 25 years.
Most violent conflicts—state-based or otherwise—affect relatively small geo-
graphical areas of African countries, except in Somalia. In addition, armed conflict
has become less violent, at least in the sense that the number of battle deaths is
¹⁰⁷ Garenne (2018). ¹⁰⁸ https://data.unicef.org/topic/maternal-health/maternal-mortality/.
¹⁰⁹ http://data.uis.unesco.org/. ¹¹⁰ Egne (2014). ¹¹¹ You et al. (2015).
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relatively modest. Fatalities from state-based conflict and one-sided violence have
both fallen markedly since around 2000 compared to the 1990s.¹¹²
Progress in addressing the AIDS/HIV epidemic, in the provision of safer water
and in access to electricity is not restricted to South Africa. Wider access to anti-
retroviral drugs (ARVs) has led to a striking recovery in overall life expectancy.¹¹³
The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that 43 per cent of people in
sub-Saharan Africa gained access to an improved drinking water source between
1990 and 2015.¹¹⁴
In 1990, a mere 16 per cent of sub-Saharan Africans had access to electricity; by
2016 this figure had risen to 43 per cent.¹¹⁵
2.8 Nigeria is a Country
The very idea of a homogeneous ‘country’ or economy like Nigeria needs to be
pulled apart. There are many sources of variation in Nigeria (as in other coun-
tries). One very striking indicator is the regional disparity in girls’ education. In
Figure 2.11 The first all-female air crew on Ethiopian Airlines
Source: Ethiopian Airlines.
¹¹² Bakken and Rustad (2018). ¹¹³ UNAIDS (2016). ¹¹⁴ WHO and UNICEF (2015).
¹¹⁵ World Development Indicators.
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2015, women of reproductive age in Ekiti state had an average school attainment
level of 11.3 years. This was the highest average in Nigeria. In several northern
Nigerian states the attainment level was less than two years (e.g. in Kebbi, Sokoto,
Yobe, and Zamfara).¹¹⁶
Under the radar of Nigeria’s allegedly debilitating ‘resource curse’, the produc-
tion of some crops in Nigeria has begun to expand steadily. Nigeria has become
Africa’s biggest cashew nut exporter and the second-largest cashew producer in
the world after Vietnam. Cashew production is now nine times higher than in
Mozambique, which was in the 1970s the world’s largest cashew producer (see
Chapter 3).¹¹⁷
The Nigerian national context might be considered unfavourable for expanding
production, investment, and capital accumulation. The country experienced ‘civil
war’ in the 1960s, low-intensity on-off insurrection in the Delta, ‘state-based
conflict’ with Boko Haram (and with Islamic State [IS]) in the north, as well as
a proliferation of ‘non-state conflicts’, including between Fulani pastoralists and
more settled agriculturalists. But this is the same context within which Aliko
Dangote not only built a cement industry that operates in much of Africa, but has
embarked on an industrial complex that is set to include a $12 billion oil refinery,
a petrochemicals plant, and a fertilizer plant with capacity for 3 million tonnes of
urea a year. This complex benefitted from Lagos State government incentives, and
is just one sign of the revival of Lagos in recent years, where the quality of state
interventions raises questions for stereotypes about Nigerian capabilities. The
literacy rate among 15–25 year olds in Lagos State is around 95 per cent; more
than 90 per cent have access to improved water sources; and more than 90 per cent
live in homes with a mobile phone. All these are streets ahead of the wider
Nigerian average.¹¹⁸
Variation and the Scope for Policy
Appreciating variation may be a gateway to policy potential. It is more difficult to
throw up one’s hands in despair, to blame a colonial past or adverse conditions
and rules of the game in the global economy, if it becomes clear that some
countries in the same region (and some people within the same country) have
managed to perform better; if those adverse conditions are not consistently
debilitating; if countries with—in some respects—similar ‘cultures’ have nonethe-
less reduced the incidence of teenage pregnancy, for example.
¹¹⁶ Graetz et al. (2018: 49).
¹¹⁷ FAOSTAT (Food and Agriculture Organization Statistical Database).
¹¹⁸ Pilling (2018).
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Variation also often provides clues to explanation. If some features of a set of
economies have been fairly similar, but outcomes or performance vary, then the
quest to explain outcomes may edge forwards. We argue that variation in per-
formance generally ought to expand the space for the ‘art of the possible’ (see
Chapter 6).
Perhaps the clearest example of the scope for policy is the variation in rural
fertility decline. By 2010, the fertility transition in rural Rwanda was over halfway
to being achieved, compared to a mere 5.6 per cent transition in rural Burundi.¹¹⁹
These are two countries with many similarities, from terrain and population to
colonial experience. The difference lies in Rwanda’s far more comprehensive and
resolutely implemented family planning policies, leading to a greater prevalence of
contraception. In rural Kenya, fertility fell very fast between 1980 and 2010 to the
point where again a fertility transition had been roughly half achieved. But in rural
Uganda fertility rates remained very high for a longer period. Again, Kenya, which
had had the highest fertility rate in the world at independence, had a long post-
independence history of family planning policies and institutions, with various
forms of contraception remaining free, widely disseminated, and accessible to
most of the population. A similar story holds for the contrast between Ghana—
with sustained, clear family planning policies and a rapid reduction in rural
fertility—and Nigeria, where policy has been less consistent, opposition from
Islamic and Catholic groups has been more strident, and progress in fertility
transition has been more uneven and slower.¹²⁰
There are similar disparities in the rate at which African countries have reached
the level of at least one insecticide-treated bed net (ITN) per household. While
Benin, for example, achieved dramatic increases in the percentage of households
with at least one ITN (from 25 to 80 per cent between 2006 and 2011/12), Angola
managed only a paltry rise from 28 per cent to 35 per cent. Thirteen out of 19
African countries also improved the equity of distribution of ITNs across wealth
levels, while there was no change in two and a worsening of distribution in four
countries. Again, the differences appear to be driven by variations in policy at the
national level.¹²¹
Another illustration is the difference in the rates of change in child mortality in
Tanzania and Uganda. In 1995, both countries were at very similar levels in terms
of child mortality. They also received similar amounts of foreign aid for the health
sector over the following 12 years. They have broadly similar climatic conditions
and colonial histories, similar levels of income per capita, and similar economic
structures. Yet in recent years Tanzania achieved a dramatic reduction in child
mortality and Uganda did not. In Tanzania, the government gave high and
¹¹⁹ This is a very widely observed trend, whereby as economic development proceeds the average
fertility rate—the mean number of children a woman has—falls from high to low.
¹²⁰ Garenne (2018). See also Sharan et al. (2011). ¹²¹ Taylor, Florey, and Ye (2017).
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sustained priority to the health sector, as well as protecting the independence
of health research by both government researchers and the external researchers
to whom they were linked. In Uganda, by contrast, health interventions have
been prey to privatization ideology and to the evolving politics of the regime.
The biggest differences seem to be in policies preventing and treating malaria.
Meritocratic appointments, technical autonomy, and continuity of individuals
in key posts were features of the National Malaria Control Program (NMCP) in
Tanzania. In Uganda, meanwhile, ‘there were numerous examples of political
interference in technical NMCP matters, high-profile and well-documented
instances of corruption, and high levels of staff turnover in the NMCP over the
period in question’.¹²²
The same principle—analysing variation as a first step in identifying a role for
policy—works for variation within a country. An example is the assessment of the
relative performance of three different manufacturing subsectors in Ethiopia,
carried out by one of the authors. Ethiopia has had a single economic strategy
and a common approach to industrial policy, but performance across
subsectors—including floriculture industry, leather and leather goods, and
cement—varied markedly in recent years. Assessing variation pointed to possible
explanations, which, in turn, provided a clearer understanding of where inter-
sectoral differences accounted for variation and of where, despite and because of
these differences, there was scope for new policies to improve performance.¹²³
2.9 Conclusion: Beware the ‘Dominican Model’
The aim of policymakers and their advisers should always be to learn much more
about the heterogeneity of social and economic experiences in Africa, between and
within countries. Our argument is they should begin with a careful analysis of the
‘effective reality’ in specific places and moments. We have also emphasized the
contradictory, often horrific, characteristics of development in Africa, arguing that
these are only to be expected given the history and theoretical dynamics of
capitalism. Both these points should reinforce the guard that policy officials
need to put up against analyses and prescriptions that smother complex diversity
under a blanket of averages and that repress the contradictions in bland summary
mash-up indices. We have also argued that variation in welfare outcomes and
patterns of economic performance can provide insights when considering the
potential for policy interventions.
Many policy prescriptions followed by African policy officials are based
on standard diagnoses that draw on the simplistic narratives and explanations
¹²² Croke (2012: 448). ¹²³ Oqubay (2016).
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challenged in this chapter. The standard diagnoses are too often based on ignor-
ance: a consultant arriving for the first time in Maputo to lead a team evaluating
the impact of donor expenditure was asked what he knew of Mozambique. He
replied to one of the authors of this book, ‘oh, very little but it does not matter
because we can use the Dominican model’. Much policy advice is dusted off the
shelf and takes this form.
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3
Varieties of Common Sense
3.1 Introduction: The Fog of Development Economics
The air that policymakers breathe is thick with the smog of conventional wisdom:
with particles of ideas and assumptions that stick loosely together to form a
miasma of apparently self-evident truth—of common sense. The effect is that
assumptions and evidence are not always challenged. Common-sense works like
the mental short-cuts that people make, relying on habits of thought and bias: the
field studied by behavioural psychologists that has begun to influence economists
and policy officials.¹
In this chapter, we outline two archetypal forms of conventional wisdom that
have come to hang over the atmosphere in which policy decisions are taken in
Africa. First is the set of ideas associated with orthodox, neoclassical economics.
Second is the bundle of arguments linked to anti-imperialist ‘third worldist’
development theory, as well as some forms of structuralist development econom-
ics. At first sight, these are very different, contradictory approaches. However,
rather than tracing their origins and complex trajectories, which has been done
many times elsewhere, our objective is to draw attention to what they have in
common.² The ideas of these two supposedly contending approaches can often be
seen to overlap in the views and statements of policy officials, advisors, and
university economists. One example, discussed in Section 3.4, is reflected in
widespread support for the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).
If there are two different schools of thought influencing policymakers, neither is
wholly self-contained. Rather, each has a range of variants, some more narrowly
intolerant than others. Additionally, approaches from both schools often share
one of two distinct attitudes: pessimism (and ‘impossibilism’), or naive optimism.
We will show how an attitude of ‘impossibilism’ is shared by development
economists who otherwise would regard themselves as sharply at odds. This
‘impossibilism’ unites, for example, those who are pessimistic about gains from
processing primary commodities in low-income countries with those who insist
that such countries can never create firms capable of climbing higher than the
¹ Kahneman (2012); Lewis (2017). For a very different approach to how decisions are made, see
Tuckett (2011); Chong and Tuckett (2015); Dow (2012).
² See, for example, Thirlwall and Pacheco-Lopez (2017); Meier and Seers (1984); Hirschman
(1981b); Howard and King, (1992); Glyn (2007); King (2009).
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lowest rungs on the ladder of global value chains. On both sides of the rhetorical
divide, impossibilists believe that rapid capitalist industrialization in poor econ-
omies will fail to create a sufficient number of jobs in factories.
We will then go on to look at a very different, but still commonly shared,
attitude: naive optimism. In particular, we are sceptical about widespread pro-
grammes promoting bottom-up, micro-enterprise, and cooperative development.
We argue that an analytical attitude of possibilism should not be confused with
naive optimism, and, as elsewhere in the book, warn against prettifying capitalist
development (or, indeed, African long-run history). The contradictions discussed
in Chapter 2 are not a ‘bolt-on’ for economic analysis, but are front and centre of
our analytical framework, and, we argue, ought to inform all analysis and policy
design (and evaluation).
A glance at some of the evidence on economic growth over the past sixty-odd
years, for example, suggests that common-sense stories about the preconditions of
growth are misleading. The country that had the least exposure through colonial
settlement to Western European ‘inclusive institutions’ (that Acemoglu, Johnson,
and Robinson see as critical to long-run development) achieved more cumulative
growth between 1960 and 2016 than almost every other African country
(Figure 3.1).³ What brief colonial settlement there was in Ethiopia took the form
of fascist Italian occupation, during which some infrastructure was built and there




















Figure 3.1 Cumulative growth in GDP (percentage growth 1960–2016, selected
African economies)
Source: Maddison Project (2018).
³ Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002); see also Chapter 2.
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was a spectacular massacre in Addis Ababa.⁴ Ethiopia was not landlocked for all
this period but became so after 1991, and was cut off even more from sea ports in
the war with Eritrea in the late 1990s. The country is also clearly in what some
economists classify as a ‘bad neighbourhood’. It has been characterized for much
of this period by what well-known orthodox economists call ‘policy syndromes’
(i.e. non-orthodox policies). And it has for most of the period clearly not been a
liberal multi-party democracy. Some of those African countries with the weakest
cumulative growth in this period—including South Africa and Zimbabwe—had,
by contrast, far greater experience of Western settler colonialism and—especially
in the case of South Africa—have adopted ‘market-friendly’ economic policies
more resolutely than other countries. Not only does the evidence in Figure 3.1
highlight the diversity of economic experience in sub-Saharan Africa, it also
challenges a number of common-sense assumptions about the ‘drivers’ of eco-
nomic development.
3.2 Common Sense and the Reproduction of Powerful Ideas
Exercising power involves both force and consent.⁵ Hegemony relies on accept-
ance. Getting people to regard a set of ideas and policies as ‘natural’ involves the
deployment of ‘rhetorical commonplaces’: key phrases and ideas that are circu-
lated, repeated, and insisted upon, until they come to shape the contours of
legitimate debate.⁶ We will highlight a number of rhetorical commonplaces in
this book, including ‘reforming the labour market’ and ‘getting prices right’, which
distil complex bodies of thought and argument into oversimplified forms.
Rhetorical commonplaces reinforce conventional wisdom: the ‘popular con-
ception of the world’. While common sense can mean ‘good sense’—the type of
things people say and do that are generally considered obvious and sensible—it
can have more complex meanings and ambiguous political implications, as
Antonio Gramsci has shown. For Gramsci, common sense involved the ‘given-
ness’ of a set of beliefs and ideas—their apparently self-evident quality. Common
sense can be a barrier to political change as it helps cement the idea among poor
and oppressed people that their circumstances are inevitable, or even for the best.
However, if popular pressure can be creatively combined with a disciplined effort
by intellectuals, it may be possible to reshape common sense to support political
change.⁷ In this chapter, we challenge conventional wisdom with a view to
developing more convincing accounts of previous experiences, as well as more
effective policies for the future.
⁴ Campbell (2017). ⁵ Anderson (2000); Purdy (2014).
⁶ Jackson (2006); Krebs and Jackson (2007). ⁷ Gramsci (1971: 422); Crehan (2011).
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In the battleground of common sense and how it relates to processes of socio-
economic transformation in Africa, ideas are weapons. They are used to disarm
opposing views, and reflect, serve, and combine with material interests. As Keynes
famously put it: ‘Practical men who believe themselves to be quite exempt from
any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.
Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from
some academic scribbler a few years back.’⁸ Donald Trump’s presidency draws on
a number of such scribblers, not least Ayn Rand and Samuel Huntington.
Meanwhile, economic policy in Julius Nyerere’s Tanzania was heavily influenced
by the ideas of the Fabian Society in the UK.⁹
There is never a straightforward causal relationship between ideas and policy
implementation. It is facile to explain Pinochet’s policies in Chile as merely the
outcome of ideas put forward by the ‘Chicago boys’, or to account for deflationary
policies introduced by the Central Bank of Uganda with reference only to the
intellectual influence of the Washington financial institutions.¹⁰ Even so, the
market for ideas is rigged: a huge amount of resources continue to be invested
in legitimizing a specific range of ideas about economic development in Africa and
elsewhere. The World Bank and donor governments have invested heavily in
‘capacity building’—a rhetorical commonplace that suggests obvious technical
needs while neutralizing the politics of such support.¹¹ The International Food
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) represents a specific example of this. IFPRI’s
ideological and political priorities were clearly described by Washington aid
insiders in a discussion of the sustained, influential, and well-funded ‘support’
programme in Ethiopia:
[T]he great bulk of IFPRI research (and the training of its research staff) is rooted
in neo-classical economics. The upshot is that a significant share of IFPRI’s
research in Ethiopia may be fairly characterized as seeking (second-best) solu-
tions to problems created by market failures, while another large share is directed
towards the creation and operation of institutions as a possible prelude to first-
best solutions.¹²
One IFPRI-recommended solution was the strengthening of the Ethiopian
Commodity Exchange, the results of which were disastrous for Ethiopia’s most
important export commodity—coffee.¹³
⁸ Keynes (1936: 383).
⁹ Smith (1985) on Nyerere; Marshall (2018) and Robin (2017) on Trump.
¹⁰ A more nuanced, but still rather mechanical, account of the determinants of Central Bank policy
in Africa has been provided by Dafe (2017).
¹¹ Van Waeyenberge, Fine, and Bayliss (2011). ¹² Slade and Renkow (2013: 11).
¹³ Slade and Renkow (2013: 19); Cramer and Sender (2019).
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Another example of international support for ‘capacity building’ is the African
Economic Research Consortium (AERC), funded by a variety of major donors,
including the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the
World Bank, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and the UK Department for
International Development (DFID). Evaluations of the AERC have noted that its
training has a ‘narrow’ focus on a technical and mainstream approach to eco-
nomics and that a restricted set of macroeconomic issues linked the international
financial institutions’ views of stabilization policy. The emphasis is on ‘rigour’—a
persuasive rhetorical commonplace in itself, with Thandika Mkandawire describ-
ing the AERC as ‘perhaps the most spectacular attempt to transform a discipline
ever carried out in any continent’.¹⁴ There have been close links between the
AERC and the Harvard Institute for International Development, which has
promoted a narrow neoclassical version of political analysis, as well as strongly
influencing African policy debates by embedding staff in the Mozambican and
Kenyan Ministries of Planning.¹⁵ The AERC is just one part of a network of
economists that helped to disseminate a single and exclusive neoclassical vision of
economics within Africa from the 1980s onwards.¹⁶ The broader phenomenon is
not confined to Africa, as former foreign advisors to Eastern Europe ‘seem to have
acquired the same “educated incapacity” . . . in the same schools and universities,
and to be applying in later life the same narrow, abstract and irrelevant
methodology’.¹⁷
When the AERC did start engaging with ‘political economy’, it did so largely by
appealing to public choice theory. The turn to public choice theory as a response
to criticism that AERC research lacked political economy is a good example of the
instinctive reaction of those working in the economics mainstream, which has:
a curious self-sealing capacity. Every breach that is made in it by criticism trying
to let in some air from reality is somehow filled up by admitting the point but
refusing to draw any consequences from it, so that the old doctrines can be
repeated as before.¹⁸
It is not only orthodox economists, though, who are immune to the accumulation
of contradictory evidence. Many of those firmly on the other side of the intellec-
tual divide, with their emphasis on structural barriers to development and the
dangers posed to poor countries by the capitalist world market, are also remark-
ably stubborn in the face of inconvenient evidence. One example, discussed in
more detail in Chapter 5, involves their shifting theoretical explanations for the
impossibility of achieving growth in export revenues, leading to the standard
¹⁴ Mkandawire (2014: 186). ¹⁵ Bates (2017). ¹⁶ Mkandawire (2014: 186).
¹⁷ Wiles (1995: 46). ¹⁸ Robinson (1977: 22). See also King (2015).
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policy conclusion—focus on production of manufactures for the domestic market,
or on South–South trade.
3.3 Sources of Pessimism in Development Economics
Mission Impossible: Constrained by
a Factor Endowment Straitjacket
Economists trained in neoclassical economics and many of those trained in more
structuralist development economics, or in neo-Marxist political economy, often
share the view that low-income countries have little realistic prospect of develop-
ing into industrial economies. This view taps into two streams of common sense,
each of which distils complex economic thinking into simple home truths. One
draws on the idea of comparative advantage, while the other draws on structuralist
(and sometimes dependency theory) ideas about the inevitable consequences of
trade between richer and poorer countries.
If ever there were a rhetorical commonplace in economics, it is the idea of
comparative advantage, with the authoritative New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics proclaiming it ‘the deepest and most beautiful result in all of
economics’.¹⁹ Comparative advantage is frequently deployed to deter govern-
ments from intervening to accelerate structural change, and even when econo-
mists enamoured of the idea recognize its limits, it still leads them to be
extremely pessimistic about the prospects of government intervention success-
fully flouting the principle.²⁰
The principle, deriving from David Ricardo’s eighteenth-century insights,²¹
suggests that a country should specialize in producing those things in which its
production costs, relative to other countries, are cheapest, irrespective of whether
it has an absolute cost and efficiency advantage in producing other things. This
involves producing and trading in products generated by locally abundant (rela-
tively cheap) inputs, with the least possible use of those inputs that are scarce
(relatively more expensive than in other trading partner countries). As suggested
by Chandra, Lin, and Wang:
An industry is an economy’s latent comparative advantage if, based on the factor
costs of production which are determined by the economy’s endowment struc-
ture, the economy could be competitive in this industry . . .²²
¹⁹ Findlay (1987: 514). ²⁰ Krugman (1987).
²¹ King provides a very clear discussion of the intellectual influence on later economists of Ricardo’s
views on trade (King, 2013a: 81–106).
²² Chandra, Lin, and Wang (2013).
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One influential version of the factor endowment approach to understanding
comparative advantage analyses differences between countries in the ratio of skills
to cultivable land. According to this analysis, African countries—which are
endowed with great expanses of cultivable land but relatively few people with
high-level technical skills—ought to specialize in unprocessed primary commod-
ities for international trade. Gradually, productivity in these African countries
may rise and, eventually, the stock of skills may increase relative to the stock of
cultivable land. Such an analysis is pessimistic about the scope for immediate
government intervention to support, for example, primary commodity processing.
The Chief Economist of DFID between 2000 and 2005 has underwritten this
analysis, arguing that:
The export share of primary products is consistently larger in the land-abundant
regions than in the land-scarce regions, as [Heckscher–Ohlin] theory and com-
mon sense predict.²³
It is easy to point to poor, labour-abundant countries that invested in capital- and
skills-intensive production only for their factories to run aground, failing to come
close to internationally competitive standards. Using comparative advantage as a
cautionary tale when advocating a reduction in barriers to trade, however, is not
the same as drawing policy conclusions from, say, a modified Heckscher–Ohlin
model built on bizarre assumptions about full employment, capital, and skilled
labour immobility. For some economists the non-realism of assumptions is a
badge of scientific honour; but it does actually matter that the way the model is
constructed does not in any way represent the world it is supposed to capture.
‘When policy conclusions are drawn from such models, it is time to reach for one’s
gun’, argued one mathematical economic theorist.²⁴ The trouble is, people do
draw policy conclusions from such models, again and again.
Such policy conclusions should also be rejected because of the evidence on trade
and economic growth. Even a generous interpretation of the regression literature
concludes that ‘the nature of the relationship between trade policy and economic
growth remains very much an open question’.²⁵ Unfortunately, a great many
economists were unwilling to await answers to this question, and ‘The tendency
to greatly overstate the systematic evidence in favor of trade openness has had a
substantial influence on policy around the world.’²⁶
It was this attitude of blind faith that, in the 1990s, prompted the World
Bank to pressure Mozambique into implementing a radical trade liberalization
policy. World Bank economists called for the removal of barriers to exporting
²³ Wood (2017: 6). ²⁴ Hahn (1984: 29); Lawson (2007).
²⁵ Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001: 338).
²⁶ Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001: 266 and 317). On the inadequacy of measures of ‘openness’ in the
trade policy literature, see Fujii (2017).
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unprocessed cashew kernels, as well as the lifting of state protection for local
factories processing raw cashew nuts. Mozambique had been the largest cashew
nut producer in the world and had a substantial processing industry. However,
after years of warfare and the exodus of most of the business class, the cashew
sector was, by 1992, in crisis. The government’s continued protection of the
processing industry, through a ban and then a high tariff on raw nut exports,
had failed to generate a regular supply of high-quality processed cashew exports.
To World Bank officials advocating trade liberalization, this was a classic case of
the dangers of state support for factories in Africa, as well as of the costs of
breaking the comparative advantage commandment.
If the government were to get rid of tariffs rapidly, what would happen next?
While World Bank economists expected the domestic processing industry to
suffer, they did not seem worried by the consequences for large numbers of female
factory workers. Any short-run shock would, they believed, be outweighed by
the large gains that were expected to flow later through ‘getting prices right’.²⁷
The common-sense logic was that a tariff (or a physical ban on exports) distorts
prices, sending the wrong signals about relative abundance and scarcity: in this
case, processors in Mozambique could buy raw cashew kernels at an artificially
low price.
Removing tariff protection would allow cashew traders acting for international
buyers to ‘find’ the ‘right’ price for unprocessed, raw cashews. In a liberalized
market, traders would compete to offer poor farmers a competitive price; farmers
would respond with an increased supply; and about a million rural households
would earn a substantial income by redirecting their unprocessed cashew output
away from inefficient local processing factories to meet buoyant demand (mainly
from India). This would tilt the economy back against the ‘urban bias’ that Paul
Krugman argued had previously prevailed: the export tax ‘almost certainly sub-
tracts from, rather than adds to, the country’s miserably low income’.²⁸ The
suggestion that the 10,000 female employees in Mozambique’s processing factor-
ies who lost their jobs had been the beneficiaries of an urban bias in policymaking
is absurd. These women were not a privileged urban worker elite, isolated from
rural households. Starting in the late colonial period, thousands of women had
migrated from rural areas to the cities, out of desperation, in search of jobs sorting,
shelling, and packing cashews. Once employed, they were commonly stigmatized,
labelled as loose women, and they were paid below the minimum wage:
They were suspect in the urban African community as a whole, in part because
they were disproportionately divorced, widowed, separated or single. Factory
work . . . was neither sought after nor prestigious.²⁹
²⁷ Hilmarsson (1995). ²⁸ Krugman (2000). ²⁹ Penvenne (2015: 213).
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But reforms invoking the common-sense commandments to ‘get prices right’,
liberalize trade, and follow comparative advantage achieved very little. The Bank
had not fully analysed the global cashew market or the political economy of a
rapidly changing post-war Mozambique. The market was not a perfectly com-
petitive level playing field: other, much more powerful countries were intervening
in their own economies to support cashew processing and production; the market
was dominated by Indian demand patterns rather than being spread globally; and
simple price reforms cannot address the fundamental causes of low output and
productivity in agriculture.
According to one assessment of the reforms, the benefits to cashew growing
households amounted to an average $5. Margaret McMillan and Dani Rodrik
argued that efficiency gains were ‘puny’. If prices did rise and some rural incomes
did grow a tiny bit, the overall gains were offset by losses: factory closures and
protracted unemployment. They concluded that the ‘aggregate static gains pro-
duced by the liberalization were a wash’, that is, they came to nothing.³⁰ A more
recent World Bank research paper reviewing the Mozambican cashew drama
found that real producer prices by 2008 were about the same as before the reforms.
Output per cashew tree remained generally very low, though higher among the
larger-scale producers. The larger-scale capital-intensive processing factories went
out of business. A number of smaller, more labour-intensive processing firms did
slowly emerge in the 2000s, though they depend heavily on public and external
support. The reforms also seem to be promoting a ‘re-cottagization’ of cashew
processing and there are claims that workers are paid below minimum wages.³¹
The fundamental problem with the sector remains the low level of output, the
poor quality of the cashews produced, and low productivity.³² Unshelled cashew
export volumes have never recovered from a post-war peak in 2001(Figure 3.2)
and revenues have been very volatile.³³
Mission Impossible: Paralysed by the Prebisch–Singer Hypothesis
If comparative advantage incites pessimism among neoclassical economists, the
pessimism of many other development economists springs from critiques of
comparative advantage. The source for much of this pessimism lies in the work
of structuralist economists, who nail a version of the Prebisch–Singer thesis to the
door of neoclassical orthodoxy. The thesis, which claims there is a secular decline
in the net barter terms of trade between primary commodities and manufactures,
³⁰ Macmillan, Rodrik, and Welch (2002). ³¹ Penvenne (2015: 229).
³² Aksoy and Yagci (2012).
³³ Food and Agriculture Organization Statistical Database (FAOSTAT).
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is based on empirical claims about patterns of income, demand, and production
globally. In 1949, Hans Singer (at the UN Department for Economic Affairs) and
then Raúl Prebisch (at the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean) highlighted important trends in the world economy: poorer countries
tended to specialize in the production of primary commodities; richer countries in
manufacturing. As incomes rise, people typically spend a smaller share of their
income on basic (food) goods. In a growing global economy, this means demand
for manufactures tends to be strong, while the demand for primary commodities
remains relatively weak. Put differently, there is a relatively high income elasticity
of demand for manufactures, and a relatively low income-elasticity of demand for
primary commodities. Consequently, there is upward pressure on the price of
manufactures relative to commodity prices.
An excess supply of labour in poor countries, combined with the greater
bargaining power of trade unions in richer societies, adds to this upward pressure.
So, in another pessimistic account of the export prospects of developing countries,
the power of trade unions in advanced capitalist countries means that most
gains from productivity increases and trade will be distributed unevenly: the
advanced capitalist country will exploit primary commodity-exporting coun-
tries by trading manufactured commodities (embodying small quantities of





1960 1980 2000 2020
Figure 3.2 Volume of exports of unshelled cashews from Mozambique (in thousands
of tonnes), 1960–2016
Source: FAOSTAT (2019).
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of low-paid labour).³⁴ Additional explanations for declining primary commod-
ity prices point to historic patterns of technological change—including the
introduction of synthetic substitutes (for example, Madagascan and Ugandan
vanilla beans, substituted in many confectionary factories by synthetic vanilla
essence, or Tanzanian sisal, which was hit by the introduction of polypropylene
substitutes in the 1970s)—as well as to declining prices received by primary
commodity exporters caused by the growing power of oligopsonistic purchasers
in these commodity markets.
Perhaps the most dramatic argument about the disadvantages of primary
commodity exports claims that they are associated with declining domestic food
grain availability. Distinguished Marxist scholars have argued that:
The classic case in more recent years of production for the metropolitan market
undermining food security relates to Africa. The integration of Africa as an
agricultural exporter to the advanced capitalist countries was greatly strength-
ened under the diktat of the Bretton Woods institutions at the beginning of the
1980s . . . because of the adverse shift in the terms of trade for their primary
commodity exports vis-à-vis manufactured goods . . . This thrust on exports of
agriproducts meant a shift away from food crop production.³⁵
Similar arguments have been used by scholars, political leaders, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to support a common-sense policy promot-
ing food self-sufficiency. However, the African evidence on recent and historical
trends in agricultural exports, food production for the domestic market, and
nutritional status, provides little support for such policies (see Chapter 9).
Those pessimistic about the export prospects of developing countries also
argue that
in their eagerness to industrialize, for which foreign exchange was needed for
importing machinery and other capital goods, each of the newly decolonized
economies of the periphery competed with the others to push out as much of its
traditional primary commodity exports as it could. The suppression of nominal
prices of tropical commodities (and the adverse movement in the terms of
trade) . . . continued even after decolonization for this reason.³⁶
A similar argument goes that, since an increasing number of low-income econ-
omies have tried to emulate East Asian success in exporting labour-intensive or
low-tech manufactured exports, the market prices of these manufactured goods
have fallen relative to the high-tech manufactures produced in advanced capitalist
³⁴ Smith and Sender (1983) criticize this form of unequal exchange theory.
³⁵ Patnaik and Patnaik (2017: 109). ³⁶ ibid. (2017: 107).
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economies.³⁷ The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) has for many years repeated the view that ‘It is well-known that
export-led growth strategies must sooner or later reach their limits when many
countries pursue them simultaneously.’³⁸
The policy implication of this dismal view of the external environment is that a
greater proportion of production in developing countries should be geared
towards domestic, rather than world, markets. UNCTAD theorists, like the
dependency theorists in 1970s Tanzania, hope that this ‘rebalancing’ of produc-
tion will also reduce imports and the balance of payments constraint on growth
(discussed further in Chapters 4 and 5).³⁹
Although ‘few hypotheses in development economics have been studied more
intensively’ than the Prebisch–Singer suggestion that there is a long-run negative
trend in the prices of internationally traded primary commodities relative to
those of manufactured products, ‘findings have varied to such an extent that there
is still no consensus in the literature’.⁴⁰ There is also no clear consensus on the
empirical case for greater diversification among primary commodity producers
(this being a key policy response to anxieties about the terms of trade).
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (and other) analysis of the evidence con-
cludes that ‘higher incomes are not typically associated with greater diversifica-
tion for commodity exporters’.⁴¹
Mission Impossible: The Global Business Revolution
Some dependency theorists introduce yet another set of pessimistic arguments,
highlighting the domination of research and development (R&D) by developed
economies. As a consequence, developing economies in sub-Saharan Africa can-
not produce the most globally competitive or innovative manufactures, as the
leading corporations in developed countries have created unbreachable barriers to
entry and ‘captured rents’.⁴² A less pessimistic view of the prospects for some
developing countries describes ‘the global business revolution’.⁴³
This revolution, beginning in the 1980s, unleashed powerful forces of concen-
tration, leading to cascading layers of suppliers being controlled by ‘system
integrator’ firms. Supply relationships are structured in what are known as global
value chains or global production networks, with the relevant literature often
emphasizing how very difficult it is for firms in developing countries to climb the
ladder of global production due to the barriers imposed by firms higher up.
³⁷ Chakraborty (2012). ³⁸ UNCTAD (2013: i).
³⁹ Mayer (2013: 1); UNCTAD (2014: 101–2). ⁴⁰ Cashin and Pattillo (2006: 845).
⁴¹ IMF (2014: 10); Lectard and Rougier (2018). ⁴² Kaplinsky and Morris (2008).
⁴³ Nolan, Zhang, and Liu (2008).
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During an earlier period, a few national economies were able to achieve industri-
alization, using protectionism and state intervention; they then tried to ‘kick away
the ladder’ of industrialization they had previously climbed. Now, first-mover
‘system integrator’ firms grease the rungs so that those lower down can rarely, if
ever, get a purchase on the ladder’s higher reaches.
The massive supermarkets at the head of ‘buyer-driven’ value chains, or the
firms at the summit of producer-driven chains, have enormous power, often
blurring the lines differentiating one firm from another. For example, it is not
always clear to what extent a Kenyan farm enterprise growing ornamental plants
for export to the Netherlands is independent from the Dutch corporation that
controls much of the genetic R&D and input supply, and that buys almost all of
the farm’s output. There is, though, evidence of successful national firms within
developing countries ‘climbing the ladder’,⁴⁴ including Thai firms like Thai Union
Frozen Products (TUF) (tuna and other seafood) and Charoen Pokphand Foods
(CPF) (poultry) that have become global leaders, or the Brazilian JBS (the largest
meat-processing firm in the world).⁴⁵
Dammed If You Do
Impossibilism appears in many guises in development economics. Two further
forms it takes can be seen in the resource curse literature and in the injunction to
avoid large-scale infrastructural ‘mega-projects’. In Chapter 6 we address the
gloomy argument that mega-projects—such as the proposed Grand Inga Dam
on the Congo River—are ‘over budget, over time, over and over again’.⁴⁶ As in the
cases already mentioned, we argue that this stance creates a cast-iron law out of
evidence that may not be universally relevant, and involves a partial view of the
history of such projects. As regards the resource curse, much has been written on
the subject, so we will make only brief comments here.
The resource curse argument, a version of primary commodity pessimism, itself
has variants. One—the original—is a straightforwardly economic argument,
which proposes that an abundance of natural resources leads to ‘Dutch disease’.
A resource boom leads to a foreign exchange bonanza, which pushes up the value
of the exchange rate in the country in question. An appreciating currency then
prices the country’s other exports out of international markets and, because they
are no longer competitive, these other exports collapse, together with their
associated jobs, fiscal revenue, and potential for domestic linkages. Dutch disease
⁴⁴ Ponte et al. (2014). ⁴⁵ Kingkaew (2012).
⁴⁶ The best-known and most persistent academic critic of mega-projects is Flyvbjerg (2011). NGOs
such as the Oakland Institute and International Rivers (https://www.internationalrivers.org/
resources/the-new-great-walls-a-guide-to-china%E2%80%99s-overseas-dam-industry-3962) also
publicize pessimistic views about the benefits of large-scale infrastructure projects in Africa.
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is exacerbated if we acknowledge that many natural resources—oil being the
classic example—may be ‘niche’ or ‘enclave’ activities. These are geographically
concentrated (and may even be offshore); are hugely capital intensive; rely on
highly specialized expatriate expertise; and generate little by way of domestic
employment or linkages. Oil production in Nigeria is often regarded as a classic
case of Dutch disease in Africa.
The other variant of the resource curse argument involves a slightly more
complex political discussion. Here, natural resources offer ‘easy money’ to greedy
governments, generating a large flow of royalties into the state budget from highly
concentrated sources. A government in this position need not bother with the
politically difficult and administratively challenging business of taxing the popu-
lation and providing public goods in return. With less connection to the popula-
tion and given the scope for resource rents to become something of a ‘honey pot’
attracting all manner of rival claimants, this is a potential recipe for corruption,
extreme inequalities, and violent conflict.⁴⁷
There is nothing particularly African about the resource curse: after all, the
disease was first identified in studies of the booming price of wool in Australia in
the first half of the nineteenth century and is named for the decline in manufac-
turing in the Netherlands after the discovery of natural gas in 1959. It is also worth
noting that neither country’s experience of the Dutch disease destroyed the
longer-run capacity of their economies.⁴⁸ Routes to economic collapse take
many strange turns and are not inevitable, even in Venezuela, which managed
to combine oil production with diverse industrial output and gross domestic
product (GDP) growth for rather a long time.⁴⁹
Within Africa, South Africa’s very rich resources of minerals and energy have
been associated with an inadequate growth rate of an unusually import-intensive
manufacturing sector; but manufacturing output did grow (and diversify) to some
extent and in some periods, when encouraged by state intervention. The complex
political economy of exchange rate and macroeconomic policy formulation in
South Africa—and of investment in its state-owned enterprises (SOEs)—cannot
be understood within a simple resource curse framework.⁵⁰
Finally, Norway’s history should give pause for thought to the geographical
determinists who have written about Africa’s poor and cursed prospects. Norway
industrialized ‘through the development of geographic features usually considered
adverse’ and on the basis of ‘the country’s greatest natural resource’ (at the time):
waterfalls. Hydropower fuelled the rapid development of a multitude of industries,
from electrochemical and electro-metallurgical factories to pulp and cellulose
plants.⁵¹ Much later, Norway managed to develop a successful oil sector—albeit
with strong upward pressure on the exchange rate—while preserving the country’s
⁴⁷ Collier (2008: 38). ⁴⁸ Stapledon (2013). ⁴⁹ Di John (2009).
⁵⁰ Clark (1994); Fine and Rustomjee (1996); Marais (2013). ⁵¹ Thomson (1938).
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remarkably egalitarian governance of natural resources and supporting a wide
array of technically sophisticated industries.⁵²
3.4 Naive Optimism and Capitalism with a Human Face
Impossibilism often involves insisting that efforts to accelerate structural change
will fail because of the binding constraints afflicting all late-late industrializers.
A very different approach is the ‘possibilism’ of Albert Hirschman, who thought
that the field of development was ‘an exceptionally good hunting ground for
exaggerated notions of absolute obstacles, imaginary dilemmas, and one-way
sequences’. In Chapter 2, we showed how many econometricians have claimed
to explain Africa’s development ‘failure’ by referring to a miscellaneous mix of
obstacles, encapsulated in the ‘Africa dummy’ variable.⁵³ The essence of the
possibilist approach, by contrast, ‘consists in figuring out avenues of escape
from such straitjacketing constructs in any individual case that comes up’.⁵⁴
Hirschman’s possibilism is not, however, to be taken as a licence for naive
optimism. Widening the limits of what may be thought possible comes at the cost,
Hirschman accepted, of ‘lowering our ability, real or imaginary, to discern the
probable’.⁵⁵ There are clear indicators of when possibilism is in danger of spiral-
ling into naive optimism. When the list of ‘ifs’—of all the conditions that would
need to be in place for a scheme to work—stretches too far, then the project or
policy may be unrealistic.
This section highlights two strains of common sense that exemplify naive
optimism. One has already been alluded to: the belief that reading the runes of
current comparative advantage will unleash future economic development and
structural change. The other is the belief that the best way to stimulate growth,
expand employment, and reduce poverty is by promoting small farms, as well as
small, or even micro, enterprises. Both are misleading forms of fantasy.
Although absolute advantage underpins most growth in world trade, African
policy officials are misguidedly encouraged to commit to the principle of com-
parative advantage. Naive optimism characterizes the insistence of neoclassical
economists that merely following the pointers of comparative advantage or ‘latent’
comparative advantage will unleash a smooth process of ‘convergence’, ‘catching
up’, and development. Such naive optimism also characterizes the faith of other
economists that policies such as additional South–South cooperation or a new
development bank will magically allow poorer economies to catch up by trading
among themselves.
⁵² Ossowski and Halland (2016).
⁵³ For a much less critical discussion of regressions using the Africa dummy see Collier and Gunning
(1999).
⁵⁴ Hirschman (1971: 28–9). ⁵⁵ Hirschman (1971: 28).
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Additionally, at a time when global capitalism is increasingly dominated by
massive corporations acting as ‘systems integrators’ for internationalized pro-
duction chains, a great deal of policy advice (and resources) continues to push
African policymakers towards strategies built around tiny enterprises.
Advisors and economists who usually claim to be fiercely opposed are again
united, this time in supporting ‘bottom-up’ approaches to structural trans-
formation. One version promotes faith in decentralization (in the hope it will
empower local people and increase responsiveness to the needs of local
communities), alongside the belief that dynamic smallholder farmers, micro-
finance, and micro-credit will create a breeding ground for female and other
entrepreneurs. Another version is influenced by the analytical presumption in
neoclassical economics that everything can and should be rooted in individual
choices—the so-called micro-foundations of macroeconomics. One of the
most pervasive nuggets of conventional wisdom in political discourse around
economics is the idea that an economy is similar to, and therefore should be
run like, a household.
Bottom-up policy prescriptions are consistent with the widespread but naive
notion that capitalism can be given a makeover by enlightened leaders com-
mitted to the liberal values of equality, solidarity, and citizenship—‘capitalism
with a human face’. In the late 1980s, influential development economists
scoured the world in search of a country successfully pursuing macroeconomic
policy that ‘fully protects the human dimension’.⁵⁶ For these individuals, capit-
alism’s ‘human face’ represented only good things; a social-democratic visage
unscarred by conflict, crisis, or exploitation. In effect, it is ‘photo-shopped’ or
Barbie doll capitalism: filtered, prettified, with the contradictions smoothed and
airbrushed away.
To imagine a fully inclusive, appealing ‘capitalism with a human face’ is to be
fooled by Oscar Wilde’s protagonist Dorian Gray, whose features remain exquis-
itely beautiful, young, and pure. A painting of Dorian, hidden away in a locked
attic, does change and age, unlike his human face; it bears the imprint of his
betrayals and crimes. When Dorian finally stabs the portrait with a knife, his
servants, hearing a scream, go up to the attic and find a painting of a beautiful
young man, as well as their master—with a knife through his heart.
He was withered, wrinkled, and loathsome of visage. It was not until they had
examined the rings that they recognized who it was.⁵⁷
We believe that understanding economic performance in Africa will be improved
by visits to the attic, by studying both sitter and portrait.
⁵⁶ Stewart (1991: 1861). ⁵⁷ Wilde (2006: 188).
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Global Free Trade or Pan-African Economic
Integration? Shared Naive Optimism
Strains of gloom and optimism run parallel through much of the history of
economic thought. What separates reflex pessimism and naive optimism is the
mix of assumptions made. Assumptions are a set of conditions—‘ifs’—that allow a
model or theory to hold together logically and generate predictions. Despite often
being counter-intuitive, these ifs are what underlie much of what is accepted as
common sense. They require closer scrutiny by policy officials.
The formal models that take Ricardo’s original insight about comparative
advantage and insist it should inform contemporary policy are built on a string
of ifs. Comparative advantage produces optimal outcomes and a ‘theoretically
harmonious world’⁵⁸ if there is no involuntary unemployment; if capital is immo-
bile between countries; if prices adjust instantly, automatically, and painlessly
following trade liberalization; if the only relevant gains from trade liberalization
are static gains; if the flow of ideas and investment and economies of scale are
irrelevant and there are constant returns to knowledge accumulation. Some
models go further. One, for example, predicts universal gains from trade liberal-
ization if knowledge is a non-rivalrous public good (that is, all technical know-
ledge is freely available to everyone), and if trade flows facilitate full diffusion of
knowledge.
The ifs are like advertising small print—few people bother to examine them
closely. These, however, are not minor details, but are at the very core of the
models built around them. A substantial body of critical literature addresses
these conditions, pointing out that, in reality, capital flows in ways that differ
radically from the assumptions made by Ricardo.⁵⁹ The critical literature also
argues that African policy officials should not be expected to sign up to a deal
based on the fanciful supposition that knowledge is a non-rivalrous public good,
or that payments adjustments are quick, automatic, and without costs. In a
global economy in which many sectors are dominated by huge corporations
with integrated systems of suppliers, knowledge is often jealously guarded
within supply chains. A single Illy coffee capsule, for example, has seven patents
in its design.
In a world economy where the ifs of comparative advantage theory are unful-
filled wishes, absolute advantage dominates. Relative prices are not enough to
propel changes in the structure of output. The relative price of land, labour, and
capital—the keys to the comparative advantage doctrine—matter less where rents
from ‘rivalrous’ knowledge are protected, and where competitiveness owes as
⁵⁸ Milberg (2004). ⁵⁹ Milberg (2004: 17–18); (King, 2013a: 98).
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much to state interventions creating the institutions determining productivity as
to relative ‘factor’ costs.⁶⁰
Meanwhile, many people nervous about global economic integration instead
pin their hopes on South–South cooperation and regional economic communities
(RECs). They expect trade among ‘Southern’ economies to cut the enduring bonds
of colonial history, thereby allowing for greater self-reliance and policy autonomy.
The swell of support for South–South cooperation and initiatives such as the
AfCFTA is partly based on a pessimistic view of possible integration into the wider
world economy. Such pessimism, however, quickly turns to optimism once the
prospect of escape from the clutches of the West (or North) is clear. Strains of
economic nationalism, pessimism about the prospects of wider global economic
integration, pan-African and broader ‘South–South’ solidarity, and orthodox
economics have been woven together to produce a blanket optimism about
prioritizing African economic integration.
The AfCFTA is expected to ‘boost intra-African trade, stimulate investment
and innovation, foster structural transformation, improve food security, enhance
economic growth and export diversification’.⁶¹ Accelerating intra-African trade is
regarded as especially beneficial because, while ‘Africa exports mainly commod-
ities to the rest of the world, intra-African trade displays high concentrations of
value-added products (and services)’.⁶² The AfCFTA is expected to ‘leverage
Africa’s progress towards attaining several Sustainable Development Goals’,
such as poverty elimination and gender equality.⁶³ Specifically, the hope is that
regional integration will allow for the exploitation of economies of scale, will
encourage investment, and will stimulate productivity-enhancing competition.
Regional value chains will emerge as a result. All these developments combined
will, in turn, lead to poverty reduction.⁶⁴
These visions of African economic integration rest on the same naive and
unrealistic ifs underpinning comparative advantage doctrine. For example, while
the case for integration may be made by spinning out predictions from a static
computable general equilibrium model, these models often—as the authors of one
such exercise note in a footnote—ignore ‘missing’ or ‘inefficient’ markets. (In
other words, these models ‘work’ if there are complete and perfectly competitive
markets.) Further ifs include: the AfCFTA will achieve all its goals if measures are
taken to address regional inequalities, if governments implement the agreements
they sign up for, if entrenched interests that have made it difficult for African
RECs to succeed are set aside. The list goes on.
⁶⁰ Some of the forms of state intervention and the types of banking institutions that determine
competitiveness are discussed in Mazzucato and Penna (2016).
⁶¹ UNECA, African Union, and African Development Bank (2017: xi). ⁶² Ibid.
⁶³ UNECA (2017: 11). ⁶⁴ Mold and Mukwaya (2016).
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 13/5/2020, SPi
    63
The push for greater regional integration in Africa attempts to make a virtue
out of a weak performance in wider global international markets. Figure 3.3
illustrates this failure, showing that despite an increase in the value of exports
from African countries since the early 2000s, their share in global exports has
remained below 6 per cent. In fact, their share is now smaller than in the late
1990s. Even Africa’s primary commodity exports (regardless of whether oil
exports are included) have shrunk to less than 5 per cent of global primary
commodity exports (see Figure 3.3b), meaning that other parts of the world
became successful exporters of precisely the commodities regarded as unpromis-
ing by some advocates of intra-African trade. Such advocates optimistically
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Figure 3.3 Sub-Saharan African exports as a share of global exports, 1995–2017
Source: UNCTAD (2018).
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countries will avoid this gloomy prognosis, as new opportunities for trade in other
commodities—including more processed exports—will emerge.
One reason to query high expectations for intra-African trade is the ‘dismally
poor implementation record’ of regional integration agreements.⁶⁵ Despite dec-
ades of negotiations and agreements within subregions and RECs in Africa, intra-
African trade remains a tiny proportion of the continent’s overall trade. As
Figure 3.4 shows, even taking into account some recent intra-trade growth, it
still only accounts for a fifth of total trade.
In short, while African regional economic integration and greater intra-African
trade may be rhetorically appealing on grounds of economic nationalism or
South–South solidarity, as a blueprint for accelerated development it is a
fantasy—based on exactly the same theories and conditional assumptions as a
push for global free trade on comparative advantage grounds.
Small and Bottom Up is Beautiful: Micro-Finance,
Entrepreneurship, and Cooperative Development
Another variety of common sense is the belief in the individual and the small-scale
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Figure 3.4 Intra-trade and extra-trade exports share by destination, sub-Saharan
Africa
Note: Intra-group trade is defined as trade between all members of a group.
Source: UNCTAD (2018).
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Supposedly competing views converge here too, for example in arguments for
financial inclusion and micro-credit, for entrepreneurialism, and for prioritizing
small farmers.
Many politicians have made use of the idea that ‘an economy is just like a
household’ in order to justify the economic policies they favour. Electorates are
routinely told that just as households need to be careful not to spend beyond their
means, so countries need to adopt the same attitude. This means national debt
should be reduced, and public and private borrowing (and spending) reined in.
This was at the heart of Margaret Thatcher’s rhetoric about fiscal policy in the UK
in the 1980s. Meanwhile, in the wake of the Global Financial Crash of 2008,
German Chancellor Angela Merkel used the common-sense maxim that ‘One
should simply have asked the Swabian housewife.’ This was because every house-
wife ‘knows that we cannot live beyond our means’.⁶⁶
This is perhaps the most striking case of a ‘common-sense’ idea in economics:
apparently obvious and sensible, easy to understand, powerfully influencing policy
debates, while at the same time deeply ideological (in Marx’s sense of ideology as
an inversion of reality). An economy is not like a household. It is not even like a
business firm. There are two main ways in which this Swabian housewife logic
fails. First, compared to private households, governments have many more and
effective tools at their disposal to manage debt. Furthermore, public sector debt
can be key to sustaining and expanding economic activity (the returns to which
can be used to make repayments). Second, the Swabian housewife logic runs into a
fallacy of composition. As Keynes pointed out, calling it the ‘paradox of thrift’, an
individual may increase saving by withholding spending, but if all individuals in
an economy raise their saving simultaneously then there will be a decline in output
and income, meaning aggregate saving will be unchanged (at best).
Methodologically, this logic is linked to the idea that macroeconomics is simply
the aggregation of individual micro-economic choices. Together, these form the
‘micro-foundations’ of macroeconomics, with causation running up from these
micro-foundations to the overall macro-economy. What is missing from this
vision is the possibility of ‘downward causation’: the idea that the structural
features of a society, including macroeconomic change, can exert a huge influence
on individual behaviour (it also leaves out the possibility that ‘macro’ and ‘micro’
can be jointly affected by other factors).
In development economics, this emphasis on the individual as the foundation
of the economy has wider implications, forming the backdrop for strongly held
beliefs about how economic policies should be designed to support plucky indi-
vidual development efforts in the smallest production units. African economies
are, in fact, defined by the small scale of most of their productive units, being
⁶⁶ Bennhold (2010).
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dominated (numerically) by tiny firms and very small farms. By one count,
approximately 80 per cent of farms in Africa are small, with the conventional
wisdom—discussed at length in Chapters 7 and 9 – being that ‘with few excep-
tions, land resources are distributed in a relatively equitable manner’.⁶⁷ When we
began fieldwork in Ethiopia in 2000, the internationally celebrated general man-
ager of the country’s most important coffee cooperative union spun us the same
story he had offered to other useful idiots, that all farmers producing both
Fairtrade and other coffee had one hectare.⁶⁸ It took 15 minutes of interviews
with members of a showcase primary cooperative to establish how deeply mis-
leading this claim was: there was very clearly a wide size distribution of farms
among cooperative members—from less than 0.5 hectares to more than 35
hectares. Some members only had a few coffee bushes while others were hiring
wage labour to cultivate their large coffee farms.
African businesses are predominantly very small, with small and medium
enterprises (SMEs) said to account for 95 per cent of all African firms. In one
sample of countries, the most common size category (the modal group) of
formally registered enterprises comprised those employing between zero and
nine people.⁶⁹ This understates the reality, however, as it ignores the proliferation
of tiny micro-enterprises, most of which are not formally recorded in enterprise
surveys and national accounts. The Rwandan economy, for example, ‘remains
dominated by a mass of single employee micro-enterprises’.⁷⁰ Many people
interpret this as showing that these micro- and small farms have ‘the greatest
development potential’. African heads of state have pledged to introduce ‘specific
policies and strategies to assist traditional small farms in rural areas’.⁷¹ Similarly,
many people argue that ‘SMEs are central to wealth creation by stimulating
demand for goods, investment and trade’ in Africa, through their contribution
to job creation, discovery of new markets, and capacity for innovation.⁷²
Such a ‘pervasive belief in the importance of small businesses for growth and
economic development’ has encouraged wanton distribution of resources—by
governments, donor agencies, and philanthrocapitalists—to SMEs or micro-,
small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), including generous funding for
training, financial access, and business development schemes.⁷³ This belief also
lies behind the commitment to entrepreneurship programmes by some African
leaders. For instance, Rwandan President Paul Kagame places responsibility for
economic development squarely on the country’s individuals (specifically, indi-
vidual entrepreneurs), arguing that ‘entrepreneurship is the surest way for a
nation . . . to develop prosperity for the greatest number of people’.⁷⁴ The
⁶⁷ NEPAD (2013: 25).
⁶⁸ He has a starring role in an influential film promoting a prettier model of trade:
https://blackgoldmovie.com/about-tadesse-meskela. ⁶⁹ Bloom et al. (2014: 16).
⁷⁰ Poole (2016). ⁷¹ NEPAD (2013: 45). ⁷² Muriithi (2017: 9).
⁷³ Naudé and Krugell (2002: 21). ⁷⁴ Kagame (2009: 12).
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Hanga Umurimo strategy has encouraged the National University of Rwanda, the
Private Sector Federation, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and a
selection of NGOs to back Kagame’s enthusiasm.⁷⁵ The strategy aims to inculcate
an entrepreneurial spirit among Rwandans, and exemplifies the assumption
among many policy officials that changing attitudes and customs is a prerequisite
to structural and economic change. It was precisely this view that Albert
Hirschman challenged, arguing that often the direction of causality ran the
other way round.⁷⁶
Where it is clear that there are many obstacles preventing small farms and
enterprises from succeeding, the next-best solution advocated by many is
supporting the clubbing together of small producers to form associations, credit
schemes, or producer cooperatives (or SME clusters). When economists argue
for cooperatives and group credit, they often emphasize that this can help with
pooling transaction costs and enabling economies of scale. Furthermore, econo-
mists in the ‘information theoretics’ tradition argue that peer monitoring in
small lending groups can address the information problems (chiefly concerning
creditworthiness) that beset rural finance and that often explain the high
administrative costs of loan disbursement and steep interest rates charged to poor
rural borrowers.⁷⁷ In such groups, borrowers collectively bear the burden of selec-
tion, monitoring, and enforcement that would otherwise be faced by the lender.
Other, often sweeping, claims are sometimes made in favour for cooperatives:
that they are a bulwark against communist uprisings,⁷⁸ that they protect small
producers against venal middlemen, that they are ‘pro-poor’, and that they are
‘empowering’, especially for women.⁷⁹ It has even been argued that rural
cooperatives
contribute in significant ways to . . . ensuring environmental sustainability,
tackling the HIV/AIDS and malaria pandemic, and mainstreaming gender.⁸⁰
For some naive optimists, rural cooperatives are a haven for women living in a
‘post-wage’ society and signpost possibilities of a life ‘outside of wage labour and
production circuits’.⁸¹ Bina Agarwal is perhaps the most prominent advocate of
the potential benefits of group farming for women, though she does acknow-
ledge that ‘there has been no systematic study of the impact of group farming on
women in developing countries, based on carefully collected quantitative and
qualitative data’.⁸²
⁷⁵ Poole (2016). Hanga Umurimo transliterates as ‘Create Own Jobs’ and was subtitled ‘Start Small,
Grow Big’.
⁷⁶ Hirschman (1971). ⁷⁷ For example, Hoff and Stiglitz (1993). ⁷⁸ Tooze (2014).
⁷⁹ Wedig and Wiegratz (2018: 349). ⁸⁰ Nannyonjo (2013: 3). ⁸¹ Williams (2017a).
⁸² Agarwal (2019: 3).
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Our own research into the political economy of rural cooperatives in Africa
suggests such grand hopes are ludicrously unrealistic. Ledgers from coffee
cooperatives in Ethiopia and Uganda explode rural egalitarian myths.⁸³ These
are producer organizations that serve the interests of a very small minority of
members, namely the farmers with the largest plots of land, who can obtain the
greatest benefits from access to cheaper fertilizer and higher priced market
opportunities. Cooperatives of Ethiopian coffee producers and Ugandan tea and
coffee producers—including those certified by Fairtrade—probably increase rural
inequality. Because they draw additional resources (e.g. in the form of ‘ethical’
trade price premiums), these disproportionately swell the income of the minority
of member-producers who sell the bulk of the cooperative’s ‘certified’ output.
These cooperatives also often fail to serve the interests of their poorest members,
let alone those excluded from joining in the first place.
Powerful ideas about the virtues of cooperative and small-scale farming enter-
prises are sustained not on the basis of evidence, but on the breeze of modern
economic theory and the idealism of many working in the NGO sector. Nowhere
is this clearer than in the arguments promoting small family farms, which claim
there is an inverse relationship between farm size and productivity: small farms
are deemed more efficient (crucially, on a measure of productivity per hectare
rather than labour productivity) than larger farms. One explanation for this
concerns the difficulties larger farmers have in monitoring labour on great tracts
of land.
We spend more time examining these arguments in Chapter 9, arguing that
African policy officials ought not to design agricultural policies on the basis of
such an empirically weak claim. Here, we stress how the faith placed in the
efficiency of small farmers by conventional economists—many occupying senior
positions in Washington institutions and the United Nations (UN)—fits surpris-
ingly well with the claims and preferences of a much wider range of intellectuals.
These include those in pro-peasant agrarian social movements and NGOs who
lobby against ‘big ag’ from bases in university-based think tanks. The Oakland
Institute, for example, has published not very rigorous research on large farms in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (and Ethiopia), lamenting the
devastating economic and social costs of ‘land grabs’ by agribusiness, while
dispensing patronizing policy advice: ‘Congolese farmers should be considered
innovative and hard-working entrepreneurs.’⁸⁴
For many very small-scale farmers in Africa, the hard work and ‘efficiency’
lauded by so many economists is that of eking out a limited existence while failing
⁸³ Cramer et al. (2014b).
⁸⁴ Mousseau (2019: 17). The empirical weaknesses of the ‘land grab’ literature are discussed in
Cotula et al. (2014).
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to avoid chronic undernutrition. It is a form of ‘efficiency’ that is irrelevant for
structural change, long-run development, or reducing the exploitation of
women. For example, a large proportion of Ethiopian coffee farmers cultivate
probably less than a quarter of a hectare.⁸⁵ A rapid and complete overhaul of
Ethiopia’s ageing coffee plant stock is urgently required, but the cost and
logistical demands of replanting on millions of dispersed, minuscule plots is
prohibitive. Very poor, very small-scale farmers cannot even afford to introduce
low-cost changes—for example, in planting density, mulching, weeding, and in
how beans are harvested and cared for after picking—that are known to generate
relatively quick gains in yield. Newly planted coffee takes a long time (about four
years) to produce significant increase in yields—too long for those living hand to
mouth.
Such tiny plots cannot be the basis for ‘catching up’ with the increasingly
complex, high-productivity, capital-intensive production that dominates global
agriculture (and the world coffee market). Colombia, for example, has been much
more successful in coffee production than Ethiopia, achieving substantial yield
increases and engineering a radical restocking of the national stock of coffee trees.
But Colombia’s success has not been achieved by ‘micro’ coffee farmers, whose
prospects are regarded as ‘bleak’. Farms growing less than one hectare accounted
for only about 6 per cent of the total area producing coffee in Colombia in 2007.⁸⁶
Small and micro-enterprises, as well as the urban self-employed, fare no better
than very small farms, a situation not confined to African or other developing
economies. In the UK, for example, self-employed people have lower median
earnings than employees do, while employees in new small firms have jobs that are
more volatile, less productive, and less well paid; huge state subsidies encouraging
new firms have not succeeded in creating sustainable new jobs.⁸⁷ The UK inci-
dence of self-employment is relatively high, but research finds no evidence that
changes in self-employment rates over time have any bearing on shifts in
real GDP.
Failure rates for small businesses are high internationally, with about half of
new small businesses in the USA and the UK failing within five years of starting
up. In Africa, about half of new small businesses fail within three years, with one
study finding that five out of seven new businesses fail within a year. South Africa
appears to have particularly high rates of failure for new small start-ups, with
estimates ranging between 50 and 95 per cent, depending on the sample and
sector.⁸⁸ Even if small firms in Africa do manage to survive (at least initially), they
tend not to grow.
⁸⁵ Minten, Schäfer, and Worako (2019); Cramer and Sender (2019).
⁸⁶ García-Cardona (2016: table 5.1 and 183). ⁸⁷ Nightingale and Coad (2013).
⁸⁸ Olawale and Garwe (2010: 730).
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SMEs that do survive in Africa usually make only a modest contribution to
the growth process. The value added of firms employing less than thirty
workers in Kenya (where very few start-ups last even a year) is lower than in
larger firms, with smaller firms found to be less effective in absorbing new
technology.⁸⁹ Small firms in Africa export less than larger firms too, so it can be
argued they are less useful for macroeconomic balance and sustained growth
(see Chapter 4).⁹⁰ Furthermore, evidence from developing countries more
broadly suggests that workers in small enterprises have less access to decent
on-the-job training than employees of larger firms.⁹¹ We will discuss other
research on the contribution of small firms to sub-Saharan African employment
in Chapter 8.
The policy response following the rapid demise of SMEs is often not to query
this policy fad or make more strenuous efforts to resist the lobbyists for entrepre-
neurs. Instead, the same tired reform proposals are wheeled out, from improving
the ‘doing business’ climate to throwing even more resources into business
support services and training. This is despite substantial resources having already
been poured into programmes supporting SMEs in low- and middle-income
countries, with underwhelming results.⁹²
The results of theHanga Umurimo programme in Rwanda are typical. The idea
was to identify people with the ‘right aptitude’ and expose them to IFC-backed
entrepreneurship training, thereby nurturing ‘good business ideas’. The reality
was that hardly any wage employment was created. Many beneficiaries thought
the loans were actually grants, resulting in low repayment rates. Also, the vast
majority of micro-credit loans (84 per cent) intended to support entrepreneurial
activity in Rwanda are actually taken to smooth consumption, which is in line
with wider evidence internationally.⁹³
What goes unnoticed are the ‘top-down’ policies that havemade a difference to
the success and wider role of SMEs in some countries. Successful state promotion
of SMEs has not been merely facilitative, but has introduced red tape and violated
market theory. SMEs (variously defined) in South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan have
advanced fastest where they are in concert with larger firms through various forms
of subcontracting. Between 1972 and 1981, the South Korean government priori-
tized the promotion of heavy and chemical industries, which involved support for
very large firms. At the same time, the government did support the SMEs
supplying these large industries; it increased this support through the liberaliza-
tion of the 1990s and into the 2000s.⁹⁴
⁸⁹ Muriithi (2017). ⁹⁰ Naudé and Krugell (2002). ⁹¹ Bloom et al. (2014: 39).
⁹² Among recent reviews see Bloom et al. (2014); White, Steel, and Larquemin (2017); Piza et al.
(2016). On the consequences and risks of fiscal and political decentralization in Africa see: Green
(2008) and Erk (2015).
⁹³ Poole (2016). ⁹⁴ Amsden (2013).
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3.5 Conclusion: Clearing the Fog
Our conclusion is not that a new mix of top-down state interventions combined
with the embrace of global markets and deals with large firms will promote
development in all contexts. Nor is our main aim the exposure of sworn ideo-
logical enemies appearing to advocate shared ‘common-sense’ policies. Rather, we
have sought to identify a problem: the fog of development economics.
In subsequent chapters we aim to cut through the murk and, above all,
encourage policymakers to query the theory and evidence underpinning
common-sense views, whether these are imposed by creditors, donors, and finan-
cial institutions, popularized by well-meaning (bien pensant) NGOs, or advocated
by home-grown nationalists. Such views are particularly unhelpful to policy-
makers when underpinned by impossibilist assumptions and/or tinged with
naive optimism.
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What can African policy officials do to promote sustained improvements in
output, productivity, wages, employment, and welfare (and how can they ‘catch
up’ with the advanced capitalist economies)? If investment is crucial, then how
can the investment rate be raised? And is investment in some economic activities
more important to the broader economy than others? Put another way, what are
the greatest constraints on growth, and are certain types of investment less
effective than others in promoting wider development?
Raising the investment rate is a necessary but insufficient objective if a society is
to accelerate the development of its productive forces: the tools, machinery,
sources of energy, and premises used in production, as well as the productive
capabilities of the labour force (skills and know-how). The ‘efficiency’ of
investment—its productivity—matters too, though it is not the overriding factor
some economists have argued it to be and their measures of productivity do not
make sense. Also vitally important is that policy officials identify which activities
investment incentives should encourage—specifically, those most clearly associ-
ated with increasing returns, spill-overs and linkages, direct and indirect gener-
ation of employment, and generating foreign exchange.
We further argue that while supply-side issues—and institutional issues that
may facilitate or hold back the development of productive forces—do matter, they
have been given excessive emphasis in most of the economics literature. Instead,
we emphasize the overriding importance of demand.¹ This in turn involves a
discussion of what forms of demand are important and how they influence
investment. One of these forms is external to a national economy: export demand.
The dynamics of structural change in low- and middle-income countries typically
generate a ‘balance of payments constraint’ that holds back whatever growth rate
it is possible to sustain. An important determinant of developing countries’ ability
to sustain high growth rates is how effectively their governments address this
constraint: that is, whether they can sustain a rapid rate of increase in imports.
¹ For a rare emphasis on the demand side as the key influence on patterns of industrialization in
Africa see Wolf (2018).
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Chapter 5 takes up this issue. However, there is another type of demand that is
important for welfare as well as being a powerful influence on investment levels:
domestic demand for wage goods (especially food, but also other basic consumer
goods).
We not only reject simple distinctions between macro and micro levels of the
economy; we also reject the orthodox neoclassical economic argument that there
are ‘micro-foundations’ of the macro-economy (i.e. that the macro-economy is
just the aggregate of choices made by a large number of individual ‘agents’).²
‘Society does not consist of individuals,’ Marx argued, ‘it expresses the sum of
connections and relationships in which these individuals stand.’³ Similarly, we
argue that an economy is the expression of a huge array of relationships (both
domestic and global). Investment drives savings more than the other way round,
but investment itself is shaped by a range of factors, including the distribution of
income nationally and internationally, the state of productive forces (including
levels of education and skill formation), and the level of demand. While invest-
ment decisions themselves may be ‘micro’, they are determined by macroeco-
nomic balances and trends, as well as by institutions and policies that affect
relative profitability across different activities, how restrictive monetary and fiscal
policy are, the ease of capital flight, and so on.
An oft-repeated view guiding many policy recommendations throughout
Africa is that savings are a prerequisite for investment. That is, low- and
middle-income countries will not be able to achieve more investment unless
they build up a pool of domestic savings to add to whatever foreign financial
flows can be attracted. The implications of this apparently common-sense state-
ment are wide-reaching and contentious. We contrast the ‘savings lead to invest-
ment’ approach, which is rooted in neoclassical economics, with another and—we
argue—clearer way of thinking about growth and development, based on the
thinking of economists such as Kalecki, Kaldor, and Keynes. Naturally, a different
way of understanding the dynamics of growth and accumulation leads to a
different way of thinking about how countries can improve investment, product-
ivity, wages, employment, and welfare. This in turn leads to very different policy
implications.
One question is how important it is to generate a high savings rate before and in
order to secure rising levels of investment. Another is whether it matters where
that investment is directed. The answer that emerged from a great deal of
neoclassical growth theory was that, given diminishing returns, it is irrelevant
which sector investment flows into. Another common argument is that rather
than focusing on manufacturing or industrialization, better gains can now be
² On the delusional dogma of micro-foundations of macroeconomics see King (2012).
³ Marx (1993: 265).
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made by supporting the service sector, particularly activities such as information
and communications, as well as tourism. According to this view, low-income
developing countries may be able to skip the long process of industrialization—
which has historically been socially disruptive and highly exploitative, as well as
environmentally damaging—altogether.
In reality, the evidence from many countries’ experiences of rapid economic
growth in the modern era suggests that the sectoral concentration of investment
really does matter. Historically, there has been something ‘special’ about manu-
facturing, with a high rate of investment in the sector particularly important to
overall growth and development. In short, manufacturing has been and is an
‘engine of growth’. We explain why.
In recent years, many neoclassical economists have ‘rediscovered’ industrial
policy, with the result that it now means different things to different people. We
do not agree, as others might, that there is a ‘convergence’ of views among
economists of different traditions regarding appropriate industrial policy. We
clarify why there are differences: for some economists industrial policy is only
sensible if implemented in ways that stick close to the principles of neoclassical
theory, in order to fix or correct market failures. For others, any sufficiently
ambitious industrial policy involves significant departures from the orthodoxy.
Just as industrial policy became fashionable again, however, a new fear arose
that a twenty-first-century trend—premature deindustrialization—will render
manufacturing irrelevant as an engine of growth, employment, and structural
change. Premature deindustrialization happens when the share of manufacturing
value added (MVA) in gross domestic product (GDP) begins to fall at levels of
income per capita significantly below those at which this shrinkage started
historically in the now industrialized economies. We discuss this issue in
Section 4.3 and argue that such evidence is not a reason for governments to give
up on industrial policy.
4.2 Investment, Savings, and the Wage Goods Constraint
Investment Matters: ‘Even a Skilful Cook Cannot Make
a Meal Out of Nothing’
It is not possible to generate sustained growth, structural change, wage and
employment growth, and welfare improvements without raising the level of
investment relative to national income (the investment ratio). Of course, there
can be wasteful, ineffective investments: capital sunk in wayward schemes or
frustrated by demoralized management lacking adequate technical know-how.
Also, economic development and structural change involves a progressive shift of
resources into a diverse range of higher-productivity activities. Even so, it remains
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the case that long-run growth and structural change require substantial and
sustained levels of ‘capital deepening’.
This point can get lost amid the complex debates economists have about
growth. An influential but implausible idea was that the historically unprece-
dented East Asian economic growth surge in the 1960s and 1970s could have been
even faster if fewer inputs (including capital) had been used, less wastefully. Some
argued that growth was a function of the accumulation of capital and not in any
significant way a reflection of productivity gains. Assuming diminishing returns,
growth in Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and elsewhere would, supposedly,
fizzle out, a victim of inefficient over-accumulation, rather like what had been
observed in the Soviet Union. Others argued the opposite: that East Asian growth
was the result of assimilating improved technologies from overseas and closing the
‘ideas gap’. However, these critics used essentially the same kind of model, just
using different estimates of variables. Both sides kept faith with the idea that free
markets played a leading role in the countries’ ‘miraculous’ growth.⁴
Behind this debate lay the history of growth theory. Thinking about what
determines rates of growth and why they differ over time and between countries
has long been a source of controversy. For many decades, perhaps the most
influential approach among orthodox economists was the neoclassical production
function. In an aggregate production function, output is a product of the factors of
production (essentially capital and labour) and an estimate of their overall prod-
uctivity, or ‘total factor productivity’ (TFP).
TFP estimates play a significant role in many analyses of growth in Africa. For
example, a simple production function, with a ‘productivity growth residual’, lay
beneath a major growth accounting exercise applied to 18 African countries in the
mid- 2000s.⁵ If capital and labour inputs are accounted for, then any growth over
time not accounted for by changes in these factor inputs is a ‘residual’, taken to
represent TFP. Contributors to an African Economic Research Consortium
(AERC) project on growth argued that TFP growth had been very slow in
Africa, and that this could be addressed if more African countries adopted
‘syndrome-free’ policy regimes. This meant not only avoiding the syndrome of
state failure, but also other syndromes, such as splurging natural resource wind-
falls on infrastructure or introducing ‘state controls’, which involved intervening
in markets and ‘distorting’ prices.⁶
The many difficulties in collecting, say, reliable demographic data or working
out the level and rate of growth of output, pale beside the problems associated with
TFP data. Growth accounting exercises that focus on estimating TFP rest on
assumptions that are at the core of neoclassical economics in its purer forms:
⁴ Birdsall et al (1993); Krugman (1994a); Romer (1992); Young (1992).
⁵ Ndulu and O’Connell (2008: 19). ⁶ Fosu (2012: 183).
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perfect competition, full employment, constant returns to scale and diminishing
returns to individual inputs, and perfect, easy substitution between capital and
labour. Aggregate production functions imagine a whole economy as a single
sector. But even if trying to work out TFP in terms of a single output—say, wheat
production in the Punjab, coal in South Africa, or steel in South Korea—this is an
exercise that will produce meaningless results, given the extremely varied outputs
and qualities of each product.⁷
Typically, explanations for perceived patterns of TFP have nothing to do with
the underlying model, and, in fact, often violate the very assumptions on which
the estimates are made. In some cases, wildly unrealistic explanations are given.
The debate about East Asian economies was kicked off in the 1990s by a paper
suggesting that Singapore was a free market economy (conforming to the model’s
assumption of perfect competition). We know this is far from true. A TFP account
of South Korean steel is ‘riddled with insoluble theoretical and empirical problems
that conceal rather than reveal the nature of the South Korean steel industry’.⁸
Estimates of TFP trends in the South African coal sector are similarly misleading,
constructed out of an imaginary model that, rather than being a technical simpli-
fication, is a complete misunderstanding of the sector. The market for coal in
South Africa historically has not been perfectly competitive, but instead highly
concentrated. One reason this matters is that the structure of the coal sector and
its political links have shaped trends in investment over time. A tight coordination
between a very limited number of mining (and energy) firms and the state, and the
apartheid state’s institutional exploitation of labour, underpinned the expansion
of the coal sector before political uncertainties and foreign disinvestment broke
apart the ‘political settlement’ in the 1980s.⁹ At the aggregate level, it is fairly easily
shown that the history of the modern Zambian economy cannot be understood in
terms of the perfect competition, constant returns, and full employment assump-
tions deployed in growth accounting models. In cases where these conditions do
not hold (and they have never held in Zambia), then it becomes unclear what it is
that estimates of TFP are actually supposed to be measuring (and this not even
mentioning problems with the underlying data).¹⁰
Although many well-known economists promoted efforts to quantify the
sources of East Asian growth using measures of TFP, they paid no attention to
the profound conceptual and empirical problems with aggregate production
functions.¹¹ A review of their work concludes that aggregate production functions
‘are a dead end because they ask the wrong question, which they try to answer with
the wrong data and because the model that underlies these approaches can never
be refuted empirically’.¹² Unfortunately, there is a huge amount of research on
⁷ Bharadwaj (1974); Fine (1992); Sato (2005). ⁸ Sato (2005: 636). ⁹ Fine (1992).
¹⁰ See Pollen (2018), critically assessing Mwanawina and Mulungushi (2008).
¹¹ Krugman (1994); Pasinetti (2000); Reati (2001). ¹² Felipe and McCombie (2017: 2).
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African economies that follows these East Asian examples, ignoring inconvenient
methodological difficulties when attempting to explain growth.
Orthodox growth thinking later followed two different, if related, tracks. One
of these built up the growth accounting approach used in earlier models, but
sought to include an ever-increasing number of variables to ‘explain’ the
remaining residual (i.e. the portion of growth outcomes not easily explained
by the shorter list of variables). In Africa, this took the form of a flurry of growth
regressions seeking to explain the difference between average growth rates over
time in Africa compared to the rest of the world, as captured in a dependent
variable (the variable to be explained) known as the ‘Africa dummy’. This
voluminous literature also reached a dead end,¹³ with a key figure in neoclassical
growth theory remarking that this growth regression literature was ‘statistically
unprepossessing’.¹⁴
The other track was the development of ‘new’ or endogenous growth theory.
This theory recognized that increasing returns do exist and are significant. In
reality, economists had really known this but found it difficult to deal with
technically. One of the key figures in neoclassical economics, Alfred Marshall,
explained that there was both a Law of Diminishing Returns and a Law of
Increasing Returns: ‘while the part which nature plays in production shows a
tendency to diminishing return, the part which man plays shows a tendency to
increasing return’. But the latter tendency faded into relative insignificance
through successive editions of his Principles of Economics.¹⁵ Much earlier, Adam
Smith also recognized the importance of increasing returns, but he too had turned
away from them, to the point that Nicholas Kaldor would later quip that eco-
nomics went wrong after Book 1, Chapter 4 of theWealth of Nations, when Smith
dropped the assumption of increasing returns.¹⁶
Thus, having for many years evaporated from economics, increasing returns
made a comeback in ‘new’ growth theory models, which attempted to account for
the origins and persistence of imperfect competition and make analytical sense of
sustained divergence between economies. If increasing returns matter, and are a
source of imperfect competition (because, for example, ‘first-mover’ firms build a
competitive edge through reaching a scale that competitors may take a long time
to achieve, if at all), then investment in economic activities with scope for
increasing returns matters more than it does in models assuming constant or
diminishing returns. Furthermore, states may play an important role in nurturing
such investment in larger-scale innovative production.
Unsurprisingly, there is huge debate about the usefulness of new growth theory,
with the most obvious critique being that it is not really new at all but is ‘old wine
in new bottles’. After all, economists outside the neoclassical orthodoxy had long
¹³ Jerven (2011). ¹⁴ Solow (1994: 51). ¹⁵ Marshall (1920: 196).
¹⁶ Thirlwall (2003: 7).
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argued for the importance of increasing returns in economic growth.
Furthermore, critics argued that these non-orthodox economists—such as
Kaldor—were more realistic in their ideas about growth as a process of cumulative
causation, proceeding through tensions and disequilibria, rather than a matter of
markets working themselves out through constant adjustments to a state of
equilibrium (see Chapter 6 for a discussion of equilibrium and balance in devel-
opment economics). Heterodox economists charge that ‘new’ growth theorists
grafted a partial recognition of reality (increasing returns, imperfect competition)
onto a core model still rooted in the same infertile soil, that is, the methodologic-
ally individualist, equilibrium-based theory of neoclassical economics.
By the 2000s, some of the protagonists of orthodox economic growth theory
finally began accepting the obvious: that it is extremely difficult to understand the
finer processes of economic growth. William Easterly, for example, who had
previously argued that high scores on an index of ethno-linguistic fractionaliza-
tion was a key reason behind ‘Africa’s growth tragedy’ wrote: ‘in reality, high-
growth countries follow a bewildering array of paths to development’.¹⁷ Other
economists aimed ‘to be comprehensive in including potential explanatory vari-
ables: firm characteristics, geography, infrastructure, access to finance . . . We
offer a menu of facts and explanations’ in the hope of explaining ‘Africa’s
disadvantage’.¹⁸ Growth, then, becomes something of a hodgepodge recipe; a bit
of market openness with a dash of good governance thrown in along with various
other ingredients. This approach does at least accept the importance of invest-
ment, with a recent analysis by International Monetary Fund (IMF) economists of
the long-run data for sub-Saharan Africa stating that ‘investment seems to play a
strong role in warding off growth stops and sustaining growth spells, as it not only
supports aggregate demand but also expands productive capacity’.¹⁹
Growth is about ‘accumulation and innovation’, with innovation—technical
change—itself embodied in the capital stock (for example, investment and innov-
ation combine in a new and faster pattern-cutting machinery in the textile
industry). The long-run evidence analysed by Maddison shows an ‘impressive
growth of non-residential gross capital stock per person employed’ in France,
Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the UK, and the USA between 1890 and 1987.²⁰
What is especially striking in his historical data is how the ‘followers’—those
countries, above all Japan, who were catching up to the UK (the first economic
leader of the modern capitalist era)—had the fastest growth over time in capital
¹⁷ Easterly (2009); Easterly and Levine (1997).
¹⁸ Harrison, Lin, and Xu (2014). See also Commission on Growth and Development (2008).
¹⁹ Arizala et al. (2017: 17); see also Ghazanchyan and Stotsky (2013: 3). Earlier cross-country
regressions produced fragile results on the determinants of growth. But Levine and Renelt (1992) did
find that across many different statistical studies the clouds parted to reveal a clear and strong
relationship between the investment ratio and growth.
²⁰ Maddison (1991: 65).
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stock per employee. Such historical experience itself embodies what is called ‘the
advantages of backwardness’.²¹
Maddison focused on the proximate causes of growth experiences, which he
distinguished from the less easily quantifiable and generally more debatable
ultimate causes (including institutions, ideologies, pressures from interest groups,
historical accidents, and variations in national policy). His explanation of episodes
of growth, convergence on the leader, and slow-down across these advanced
capitalist economies from the late nineteenth to the late twentieth centuries
emphasizes that ‘the movement of capital stock provides a much more powerful
degree of explanation for growth acceleration and slow-down than . . . the ana-
lysis of labour input’.²²
The post-SecondWorld War history of ‘catching up’ development confirms the
point. A comprehensive review of the most rapid experiences of economic devel-
opment found: ‘Capital accumulation holds the central place in East Asia’s
virtuous growth regime.’²³ Accumulation—the share of investment in GDP—
rose from 10 per cent in Korea and from 16 per cent in Taiwan in the 1950s to
more than 30 per cent in the 1980s; Southeast Asian economies such as Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Thailand began to raise their investment-to-GDP ratios in the
1970s and kept them high; while China sustained a rise from an already significant
25 per cent ratio in the early 1970s to more than 35 per cent in 1995–2000.
One argument in favour of pushing for a high investment rate is that ‘even a
skilful cook cannot make food out of nothing’.²⁴ All too often, however—in many
Latin American and African countries, for example—investment has either tailed
off too soon or gone into speculative urban construction (rather than productive
infrastructure). Furthermore, in a context characterized by an acute balance of
payments constraint, investment has often failed to promote a sufficiently fast rate
of growth of export earnings. Thus, a fundamental issue is what alternative returns
are available to those allocating investment finance—whether it be in tax havens
abroad, real estate, the financial sector, or in manufacturing—and how policy
affects these relative returns.
Savings and Investment: The Mainstream View
and the Fate of Financial Liberalization
How, though, are low- and middle-income countries to raise and sustain a high
rate of investment? How are they to finance investment? In this section, we argue
²¹ Research on these advantages was pioneered by Gerschenkron (1962) and has been discussed
more recently by Shin (2013).
²² Maddison (1991: 139). ²³ Storm and Naastepad (2005: 1073).
²⁴ Yongzhi and Kun (2020).
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that demand is a far more important driver of sustained investment than is often
acknowledged, and that levels and patterns of demand are shaped by institutions,
as well as historically specific social relations and politics. This is contrary to the
typical emphasis of economics texts, which emphasize supply-side sources of
investment and growth.
Given the assumptions underpinning growth accounting exercises and the
measurement of TFP (discussed earlier in this section), it is unsurprising that
the standard policy recommendations are designed to: bring economies ever
closer to the ideal of perfect competition (market deregulation, privatization);
encourage a proliferation of small and medium-sized, price-taking enterprises
(entrepreneurship programmes, access to finance schemes, micro-credit facilities);
and encourage frictionless switching between capital-intensive and labour-
intensive production in moves towards full employment (greater ‘flexibility’ of
labour markets without minimum wages, legal constraints on hiring and firing,
and/or powerful trade unions). A key market that, if sufficiently liberalized, is
supposed to funnel household savings into investible funds is the market for
finance.
Mainstream economists argue that economies need to build up both public and
private sector savings in order to create a pool of investible surpluses available to
private enterprises through the financial system. If the banking system lends these
savings at interest rates set by market transactions and conditions, this will help to
weed out unproductive borrowers incapable of generating high enough returns to
meet repayment obligations. In other words, market-determined interest rates will
lead to efficient investment, while institutionally regulated (or repressed) interest
rates may lead to indiscriminate and wasteful investment. According to this view,
it is best to let market prices determine interest rates and stimulate a gradual
increase in savings, which will in turn lead to a gradual rise in efficient investment.
As one summary of the influential McKinnon–Shaw argument for financial
liberalization claims:
introducing market principles and competition in the banking sector increases
interest rates on deposits. These higher interest rates lead to higher saving and
investment rates, ultimately contributing to higher growth rates . . . increasing
competition puts pressure on the profit margins of banks, in particular on the
interest rates demanded for loans. This reduces the cost of debt, leading to a rise
in investment and growth.²⁵
The empirical evidence does not confirm a causal relationship between financial
liberalization and growth.²⁶ Rather, data on GDP per capita growth rates in sub-
Saharan African countries from 1950 to 2016 show that financial liberalization is
²⁵ Hermes and Lensink (2014: 5). ²⁶ Ibid.
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linked to episodes of growth deceleration. Neither is there any evidence linking
fewer financial restrictions with growth acceleration elsewhere in the world,²⁷ with
financial liberalization in several Latin American countries, for example, followed
by a string of domestic financial crises, including the Mexican ‘Tequila Crisis’ of
1994–5.²⁸ Additional costs associated with financial liberalization include a higher
frequency of financial crises, more volatile flows of capital, and the social costs
associated with ‘financialization’.²⁹
In the wake of the global financial crisis, some of the problems of overenthu-
siastic ‘financial globalization’ were reluctantly recognized even by economists
employed by the IMF.³⁰ As a result, a new literature developed in largely main-
stream quarters, arguing that while the direct benefits of financial globalization
were ‘elusive’, there were indirect benefits. However, these indirect benefits only
tended to kick in when economies had passed certain ‘thresholds’ of financial
depth, institutional preconditions, and level of per capita income.
Investment and Savings: A More Keynesian/Kaleckian View
There is another view, usually associated with Keynes and Kalecki, that investment
generates the savings needed to cover its financing over time.³¹ Productive invest-
ment creates wage incomes and profits, some of which are saved—by employees
depositing savings in banks, by firms retaining profits or banking surpluses.
Again, the East Asian experience, where a high and rising investment-to-GDP
ratio preceded rising savings rates, is instructive. In terms of macroeconomic
balances, there was an ‘ex ante excess of investment over savings’.³² That invest-
ment was anything but gradual and market-led, instead being the product of
determined state intervention that amounted almost to ‘forced investment’. East
Asia may be exceptional in many ways, but in the basic fact of investment surges
driving rising savings there is nothing unusual about the region’s experience.
Elsewhere, for example in Mexico between the 1940s and late 1970s, firms made
investment decisions based on judgements of expanding market size and ‘inde-
pendently of the availability of finance’.³³
Even if there are investible savings generated domestically, they are often not
invested, becoming what Albert Hirschman called ‘frustrated savings’.³⁴ After
²⁷ Arizala et al. (2017). See also Arestis (2005) and Loizos (2018) on the theoretical flaws of the
financial liberalization thesis and the lack of convincing evidence for it.
²⁸ Ros (2012: 9). ²⁹ Karwowski, Shabani, and Stockhammer (2017); Sawyer (2017).
³⁰ Kose, Prasad, and Taylor (2009: 1).
³¹ For an introduction to Keynes’s economics see Skidelsky (2010).
³² Storm and Naastepad (2005: 1084). See also Vos (1982).
³³ Fitzgerald (1980). Between 1950 and 1981, real GDP in Mexico grew by 6.5 per cent per year
(Kehoe and Meza, 2011).
³⁴ Hirschman (1958: 35).
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financial markets and the capital account were deregulated in South Africa, for
example, there was a dramatic acceleration of purchases of short-term financial
assets (by both domestic and foreign speculators) to achieve quick capital gains,
while flows into productive investments dwindled.³⁵ Enormous sums of African
savings have been squirreled away abroad and in tax havens, or held by large
corporations but not invested productively within African economies. Between
1970 and 2015, capital flight from 30 sub-Saharan African economies reached
huge proportions, according to one reckoning much larger than the capital
inflows of official development assistance and foreign direct investment; and
capital flight has been accelerating.³⁶ These authors suggest that the main motive
for capital flight from Africa was to evade taxation or the seizure of illicitly
acquired assets; but this suggestion risks underestimating the significance of
demand. If savings are to be invested—and corporate profits reinvested in
Africa—there must be confidence in expanding demand.
Angola and Ethiopia provide examples of this dynamic. In Angola, following
the end of the country’s war in the early 2000s, rising oil prices and Chinese
demand did create opportunities for illicit asset accumulation and capital
flight.³⁷ But there were also incentives to invest domestically because of oil-
fuelled expectations of rising middle-income consumption; and high oil prices
also sustained the government’s ability to spend on urban housing and infra-
structure projects as part of its strategy for post-war reconstruction and political
consolidation. The infrastructure and housing boom had clear linkage effects,
leading to the emergence of a building materials and cement production indus-
try (and associated employment) within Angola. Rising Angolan middle-class
incomes in the wake of rising export earnings prompted investment in, for
example, the brewing and beverages sector. This in turn led to linkages to
bottling and canning facilities in Angola, some of which grew large enough to
export to other African economies.³⁸ In Ethiopia, a large-scale government
programme to construct middle-income urban housing was the demand spur
that led to a domestic cement industry (and then later expansion of foreign-
owned cement production as well) and to the proliferation of domestic building
materials and services firms.³⁹
These experiences confirm the views of economists working in the tradition of
Keynes and Kalecki. One of these, King, for example, highlights the proposition that:
The relationship between aggregate investment and aggregate savings is funda-
mental to macroeconomic theory, and causation runs from investment to saving,
and not vice versa.⁴⁰
³⁵ Isaacs and Kaltenbrunner (2018). ³⁶ Ndikumana and Boyce (2018).
³⁷ Ferreira and Soares de Oliveira (2018: 17–18). ³⁸ Wolf (2017; 2018: 211–91).
³⁹ Oqubay (2016: 105–48). ⁴⁰ King (2013b: 486).
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It bears repeating that there is a great rift between those who think savings ‘lead to’
investment and those who think investment can lead to and be matched by
savings. Most policy advice to developing countries is based on the former
(neoclassical) view and ignores the intellectual revolution in economics during
the 1930s:
Keynes’s intellectual revolution was to shift economists from thinking normally
in terms of a model of reality in which a dog called savings wagged his tail called
investment to thinking in terms of a model in which a dog called investment
wagged his tail labelled savings.⁴¹
However, the econometric evidence on the relationship between savings and
investment in 10 African economies suggests that this is complex, varying from
country to country.⁴² It may be difficult to make simple and universal statements
about causation for several reasons: first, there is a ‘chicken and egg’ problem: a
virtuous cycle of investment generating and being matched by savings (in macro-
economic accounting, savings must equal investment), which in turn allows for
more investment, has to start somewhere. This often requires high borrowing
(including borrowing abroad), directed credit, and government spending, and can
involve rapidly creating surpluses out of exploitation, wage repression, and forced or
deferred savings. Second, savings do not instantly and automatically appear to
rescue macroeconomic balances and match investment. Policy measures are
important in mediating this. And, third, the impetus to sustain investment can
peter out. Initial sources of financing may evaporate if the balance of political forces
changes such that profits are squeezed by high wages and demand for more
consumer goods is asphyxiated by high costs of living, or if broad consumer demand
fails to grow because of extreme income inequality, as has been argued is the case
with regard to sluggish manufacturing growth in Angola.⁴³ Flows of concessional
finance from abroad are often volatile and driven by geostrategic and political
forces.⁴⁴ The animal spirits (as Keynes called them) of both African and foreign
investors flicker and fade for various (licit and illicit) reasons, but often result in
massive shifts in the volume of capital flight. This third issue is obviously political,
involving struggles over the distribution of surpluses between profits and wages.
The State and Uncertainty
How, then, does it come about that the investment ratio is raised, increasing
aggregate demand and setting off a cumulative process of growth? Firms, both
⁴¹ Meade (1975: 82). ⁴² Adam, Musah, and Ibrahim (2017: 104).
⁴³ Wolf (2017). The theoretical and empirical difficulties of assessing the impact on economic
growth of inequality in the distribution of income are discussed by Hein and Vogel (2007).
⁴⁴ Broich (2017); Lang and Presbitero (2018).
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domestic and foreign, will be eager to invest if they can identify opportunities in a
large and growing market: demand propels investment. In the prevailing uncer-
tainty of capitalism, strong evidence of demand and an expanding market helps
create ‘animal spirits’—the herd-like behaviour characteristic of investors,
expressed in this case in the confident expectation that market demand will be
buoyant. Keynes emphasized the role that hunches, anxiety about the actions of
others, and emotions play in investment decisions. More recent and fashionable
work in ‘behavioural’ economics explores bounded rationality and systematic
‘biases’ and heuristics (what earlier economists might have called rules of
thumb) in economic behaviour, but much of this work effectively makes modest
tweaks for ‘irrationality’ on largely unaltered neoclassical models and principles.⁴⁵
However, the whole point about low-income economies is not only that the
supply of factories and new machines is low, but also that the absolute level of
aggregate demand is low. Furthermore, growth in demand is often faltering. In
middle-income countries the market for many goods and services might be larger,
but all too often the momentum of growth in aggregate demand stalls. Investment
decisions in developing countries rely not only on the choices of individual
capitalists or firms, but also a on a number of other factors, such as how liberalized
capital markets are, the pattern of income distribution, and how institutions and
infrastructure function. Additionally, how societies are structured—for example,
marked spatial, racial/ethnic, or gendered inequalities and the strength of trade
unions—shapes patterns of effective demand that has consequences for invest-
ment.⁴⁶ In these circumstances, sustaining high investment ratios has typically
involved a leading role for the state.
States can also have a powerful role in sustaining investment in order to avoid
the sudden collapses in growth that some economists have come to emphasize as
being a critical threat to sustained structural change. Economic historians
argue that
The improvement of economic performance over the long run has occurred
primarily because the frequency and rate of shrinking have both declined, rather
than because the growing rate has increased.⁴⁷
If public sector investment fails to grow, as in Latin American economies after the
1982 debt crisis, then both investment-to-GDP ratios and growth will stagnate.⁴⁸
In several East African economies, policy-induced declines in demand between
the 1980s and mid-1990s, signalled by massive reductions in real wages in the
public sector, were also associated with collapses in growth. Across a wider group
⁴⁵ On the difficulties of grafting behavioural twigs onto the root stock of Keynesian theory see King
(2013b: 505).
⁴⁶ Tilly (1999) outlines four mechanisms, of which the most important is exploitation, that sustain
‘categorical inequalities’ which prove extremely durable.
⁴⁷ Broadberry and Wallis (2017: 3–4). ⁴⁸ Ros (2012, 13–14).
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of sub-Saharan African countries it has been argued that lower government
expenditures (after signing agreements with the IMF) had the effect of reducing
growth and employment while widening inequality. Where policies were intro-
duced to restrain domestic demand without the direct intervention of the IMF, as
in South Africa since the mid-1990s, the economy remained ‘stuck in low gear’.⁴⁹
If the state is the central economic actor in the drama of late development, even
more so than in advanced economies, one important role it must play is in
stimulating and coordinating investment.⁵⁰ Aside from the issue of using state-
owned enterprises to achieve these ends, this includes managing monetary policy,
fiscal policy, and development finance: that is, organizing macroeconomic policies
and a financial system around the goals of sustained long-run economic growth
and structural change. These goals have to be defined in terms of growth,
productivity, employment, and the balance of payments. That, however, is com-
pletely contrary to the advice that has been meted out to the central banks and
governments of developing countries since the late 1970s or so. African govern-
ments who wish to avoid growth collapses are still subjected to conventional
policy exhortations—made to adopt monetary policy geared towards low infla-
tion, reduce market distortions, and improve the business climate—by some IMF
economists.⁵¹ Such economists appear to shrug off the doubts that the IMF’s own
Chief Economist expressed in 2011 about this skewed advice, that mainstream
economists and policymakers had ‘convinced [themselves] that there was one
target, inflation. There was one instrument, the [interest] policy rate. And that was
basically enough to get things done.’⁵²
Development Finance: Central Banks, Development Banks,
and Government Spending
The common-sense view dismissing development banks has been so powerful that
it can easily seem as if such banks are an historical oddity, a diversion from the
norm of prudent and sensible banking. A review of the history of debates on
financial systems from the early twentieth century onwards finds that the neo-
liberal way of thinking about banking, central banks, and monetary policy is
actually the exception.⁵³ A sensible approach is now said to involve keeping central
banks out of a government’s hands (‘independent’) so that the former can focus on
holding inflation as low as possible, and this approach is part and parcel of a belief
in the virtues of austerity and a commitment to curbing demand. It also involves
deregulating capital markets, making it harder for governments to kick-start a
higher investment ratio thanks to the increased difficulty of financing investment
⁴⁹ Simson (2017); Weeks (1999). ⁵⁰ See, e.g., Rodrik (1996) on South Korea.
⁵¹ Arizala et al. (2017). ⁵² Blanchard (2012: 1). ⁵³ Epstein (2013).
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projects through central bank policy. In this scenario, there is no incentive for
central banks to limit the flow of investment into shopping malls and luxury
condominiums and instead promote investments targeting structural change,
increased employment, and rising productivity.
The range of instruments that central banks can use, and have often used, is in
fact far wider than simply tinkering with short-term interest rates in the service of
low inflation. Rather, central banks can play many other roles, both through their
links to development banks and through their own policies and practices. Many
developing countries, and in the earlier part of the twentieth century also the UK,
US, and European governments, took a very different view of central—and
development—banks. Particularly after the Great Depression, central banks
came to be major agents of economic development, and there is a long and richly
varied history of state-owned ‘development’ banks. This evidence largely dispels
more recent myths claiming that state-owned banks are inevitably inefficient.⁵⁴
There are examples of lax and corrupt central bank regulation of the banking
sector that have undermined investment efficiency and political stability, includ-
ing in countries where reforms have been introduced to make the central bank
more independent.⁵⁵ On the other hand, central banks in many countries have,
among other things, successfully introduced capital controls to reduce exposure to
volatile surges in inflows and outflows of capital; made low-cost capital available
to specific development institutions; used differential discount rates to allocate
credit to large, priority capital projects; and imposed reserve requirements that
fund government bonds. Development banks, meanwhile, have been used to
provide concessionary loans, often with lengthy repayment schemes, to stimulate
investment in new manufacturing activities.⁵⁶
Central banks have also frequently got prices wrong—anathema to the neo-
classical economist—by engineering negative real interest rates, again to stimulate
borrowing for investment and to make it easier for governments to use deficit
financing to push for higher investment rates.⁵⁷ Governments often have to spend
more than they receive in tax revenue in order to bring about higher investment
rates, the aim being to sustain a high level of demand rather than restrict it. To re-
emphasize a key point: what might make sound economic sense for a household
does not make sense for an entire economy (see Chapter 3).
Of course, government deficit funding can also result in wanton spending and
wasteful use of extremely scarce resources, for example in accommodating mili-
tary adventures or providing for handouts to special interest groups in order to
⁵⁴ Marois (2016). ⁵⁵ Nyambura-Mwaura and Genga (2016) on Kenya.
⁵⁶ Lazzarini et al. (2015). On BNDES (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Económico e Social) see:
Tavares de Araujo Jr. (2013) de Aghion (1999); UNCTAD (2016); Di John (2016). Weiss (2015)
emphasizes the role development banks can play in counter-cyclical spending, boosting demand at
critical points in the economic cycle.
⁵⁷ Epstein (2013); Amsden (2001).
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preserve political power. An obvious example is the post-independence history of
Zimbabwe, a country whose sizeable formal sector, well-developed civil service,
and initially successful record of post-independence service delivery seemed to
mark it out from hyperbolic generalizations about weak states in Africa.⁵⁸
Ultimately, though, it suffered catastrophic economic decline, rapid deindustrial-
ization, shrinking agricultural output and exports, currency collapse, and periods
of hyperinflation.
There have been different phases of the Zimbabwean crisis but what unites
them is a political dynamic: the ‘violent intolerance’ of the leadership of the ruling
Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) in attempting
to remain in power.⁵⁹ This commitment was pursued through institutional and
policy measures that made large numbers of people with access to (but not title
over) land, minimum-wage protected jobs, and civil service positions dependent
on the central state. Institutions were increasingly politicized and in many cases
militarized.⁶⁰Meanwhile, an increasingly dominant group of rentiers accumulated
private wealth through the state while failing to play the role expected of a
productive capitalist class.⁶¹ In the 1990s, a poorly designed and implemented
enhanced structural adjustment programme (ESAP) was championed by domes-
tic elites (not imposed by the IMF andWorld Bank, which, whatever their failings,
insisted on the inclusion of a social programme, against the instincts of the
government). This paved the way for even faster deindustrialization and further
opportunities for personal wealth and rent accumulation. By the end of the 1990s
it had become obvious the government could or would not control its deficits and
confidence in the economy plummeted, with the currency collapsing in late 1997.
Further economic mayhem continued throughout the 2000s, encapsulated by,
among other things, unbudgeted pay-outs to war veterans, an economically
misjudged land reform, and a military excursion into the conflicts of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).⁶²
But if—by contrast with the Zimbabwean experience—‘excess’ demand repre-
sents investments in activities and capital equipment that raises productivity (and
foreign exchange earnings), then it makes no sense to rein in demand. A striking
example of a government refusing to repress demand and presiding over a sharp
increase in net borrowing from the rest of the world is Norway in the 1970s.
Norway encouraged a rapid surge in investments in capital equipment to facilitate
increased productivity in the country’s new oil sector. Thus, policy officials can
choose either to follow Norway’s example by provoking a supply response when
⁵⁸ Alexander and McGregor (2013).
⁵⁹ Raftopoulos and Mlambo (2009); Davies (2004); Alexander and McGregor (2013).
⁶⁰ Verheul (2013); Alexander (2013). ⁶¹ Davies (2004); Dashwood (1996).
⁶² Towriss (2013).
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macroeconomic deficits develop; or they can react how the orthodoxy of the past
forty years advises, by repressing demand.⁶³
The most important point here is how policy officials can bring about a rapid
increase in investment levels. One view is that positive high real interest rates will
make it possible for the more efficient private sector investors to borrow and
invest. If this leads to an external imbalance (because undirected new investment
may lead to imports rising faster than export earnings), then foreign investment
should be encouraged to cover the external gap or exchange rate adjustments
should be made to send more appropriate signals to investors. That is largely the
approach the South African government embarked on after the first post-
apartheid elections, when it set out to (and for a while managed to) reduce the
fiscal deficit, meaning the government no longer competed for savings with the
private sector and inflation could slow down. However, real interest rates
remained very high, growth was slow, and private investment—both domestic
and foreign—dismally failed to respond in the manner predicted by a large chorus
of mainstream economists.
The alternative is to argue that government deficit spending is central to
boosting the investment ratio, especially because private sector enterprises are so
reluctant to invest in low-income and slow-growing economies. Their reluctance is
perfectly reasonable. The market is relatively small and often stagnant, and, while
growth episodes happen, they are typically short-lived. Uncertainty is pervasive
and the risks investors face are very high. Additionally, the costs of investment are
high as it is difficult to get inputs and costly to install equipment; infrastructure is
either absent or creaky; and there are insufficient skills and technical know-how in
the economy. Particularly in more open economies, it is likely to take some time
before domestic enterprises can compete effectively in international markets, and
in some situations private investors may be wary of bearing the cost of making
production more profitable if others can cash in on their efforts without absorbing
some of the cost, for example, when providing irrigation or graded roads. Thus,
infrastructure becomes a critical issue: transport and power infrastructure short-
comings undermine investor confidence, but the large financing commitments
required to improve them are usually off-putting for private investors.
While the private sector makes only a small contribution to financing invest-
ment in African transport infrastructure, investment expenditures on road trans-
port absorb a relatively high proportion of total public sector investment in low-
income African economies.⁶⁴ Road construction costs per kilometre for activities
undertaken between 2005 and 2007 are said to have been have been two or three
times higher in some African economies than in other developing areas.
Unfortunately, the costs of irrigation investments in sub-Saharan Africa are also
⁶³ Sandbu (2017). ⁶⁴ Gurara et al. (2017).
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high compared to costs in South Asia and South East Asia.⁶⁵ In such circum-
stances, political risks loom larger too, with governments having to absorb a great
deal of the risk in order to provide collectively enjoyed goods such as rural
electrification and irrigation.
An example of these dynamics can be seen in Ethiopia’s Upper Awash Valley,
in which there is an ungraded road strung with sizeable farms on privatized land
capable of extremely high-value output: fruits, flowers, and wine grapes. None of
these enterprises has been able (or willing) to finance expenditures to improve the
road, and despite repeated pledges by the regional government, nothing was done
for years. This directly hits profitability and earnings, with a farm manager for a
very large fruit growing and processing enterprise estimating that this business
loses 12 per cent of the export value of packaged passion fruit puree because of
damage done when the cartons are shaken up on the bad road.⁶⁶
Investment, Savings, and the Question of ‘Crowding Out’
Governments do not compete against the private sector, shrinking a pool of
savings that would otherwise be used to fund efficient private sector investments.
Rather, the government may build up deficits through productivity-enhancing
expenditures that generate incomes (and savings), raising profitability across all
sectors and creating further scope for private sector investment, as well as incomes
and savings, to rise. The World Bank’s most recent discussion of the relationship
between public and private investment in Africa may be rather unsophisticated—
based on crude cross-country statistical evidence, but they conclude that there is a
significant positive association across the 26 countries studied—that is, public
investment crowds in private investment.⁶⁷
The same grudging acceptance that large-scale public expenditure can drive
growth in low-income countries characterizes an assessment of the recent record
in Ethiopia. Assuming unquestioningly that Ethiopia’s heterodox macroeconomic
policies must have perverse, growth-reducing effects, a standard neoclassical
growth accounting model reveals that ‘the negative growth effects of heterodox
macro policies were quantitatively much less important than the positive growth
drivers they helped to achieve’.⁶⁸ It is tempting to rewrite this statement: the
evidence suggests that heterodox macro policies have driven rapid growth in
Ethiopia. Critics of a dominant role for the public sector, such as Western donors
of development assistance, have responded to Ethiopia’s recent growth record
⁶⁵ Collier, Kirchberger, and Söderbom (2015: 31); Inocencio et al. (2007).
⁶⁶ Cramer and Sender (2019). ⁶⁷ Chuhan-Pole et al. (2017: 79–81).
⁶⁸ Moller and Wacker (2017: 199).
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with an implausible counterfactual assertion: privatization, more foreign direct
investment, and a smaller state ‘would have’ resulted in even faster growth.⁶⁹
Ethiopia’s heterodox policies have included financial repression, directing
credit at negative real interest rates towards public investment in infrastructure,
inflationary finance, and an overvalued exchange rate. These policies, combined
with a fiscal revenue-raising effort and public consumption restraint in the wake
of the Ethiopian–Eritrean War (1998–2000), enabled dramatic public investment
in areas such as roads and rail, energy, education, and health. These types of
public infrastructure investment (rising to 18.6 per cent of GDP by 2011) were
the main factor in Ethiopia’s growth acceleration, with real per capita GDP
growth of 8.3 per cent per year between 2004 and 2014 higher than had histor-
ically been the case in the country, and higher than regional and low-income
averages in the same period. However, despite noting the increasing consensus
that infrastructure is central to growth and development, World Bank econo-
mists have insisted on the short-term view that Ethiopia’s public sector-led
strategy has ‘led to a crowding out of many private investment projects owing
to a lack of financing’.⁷⁰ They also believe that whatever the possible short-run
contribution of heterodox economic policies, these are unsustainable:
[W]e anticipate that macroeconomic policies face increasing trade-offs between
public infrastructure improvements, private sector access to credit, and limits
to restraining government consumption . . . Ethiopia’s growth rate is likely to
decelerate in the future . . .⁷¹
A still cautious but rather different and more convincing assessment of Ethiopia’s
macroeconomic balances suggests that the core approach may well be sustainable,
as long as there is a greater commitment to generating rapid export growth.⁷²
Mobilizing Savings, Managing the Growth of Consumption
If an investment push evaporates without generating incomes, profits, and sav-
ings, the balancing act will then have to involve contractions elsewhere or sharp
increases in foreign borrowing (with strings attached). Thus, a government
engineering a sharp increase in the investment level has to adopt policies which
simultaneously ensure that investments are productive and that they result in
rising real wages (as a source of savings as well as a source of demand). This may
involve intervening to reduce some forms of consumption (for example, on luxury
⁶⁹ Wilson (2019a). ⁷⁰ Wilson Moller and Wacker (2017: 198). ⁷¹ ibid (209).
⁷² Coutts and Laskaridis (2019).
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goods or foreign holidays by the elite and their children) and/or introducing
incentives to save.
Restricting consumption (and domestic production) of luxury goods may be
more difficult to do today than it was, say, in South Korea or Taiwan in the 1960s
and 1970s. There is, for example, a sharp contrast between levels of car ownership
in South Korea and Japan, on the one hand, and South Africa on the other
(Figure 4.1).⁷³ At a per capita income level of around $3,000, car ownership in
South Korea and Japan was about 5 per 1,000 people; at a similar level of income
per capita in South Africa, car ownership is very much higher, about 65 per 1,000
people. Nonetheless, just as capital controls and development banking were
anathema in international development circles for many years but have become
more acceptable in the wake of the global financial crisis, so direct controls on
consumption may yet come to play some role. These need not involve outright
bans, but could include steep duties on luxury consumption as part of a broader
effort to promote a national developmentalist ethos.
Other policies that would encourage savings to catch up with rising invest-
ment levels include, among other things, post office savings schemes, keeping
import duties low on investment goods, using tax breaks judiciously to encour-
age investment, and directing the banking system to increase some forms of
long-term credit on favourable terms. The key to many of these incentives to
profitability is tying them to performance. This is what Alice Amsden called the
‘reciprocal control mechanism’ and is what has typically distinguished countries
that have succeeded with state-led development strategies from those which
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Figure 4.1 Passenger cars (per 1,000 population) in selected countries at different
levels of GDP per capita
Source: Maddison Project Database for real GDP per capita (constant 2011 US dollars), data on
passenger cars from African Development Indicators (2018) and Chang (2013).
⁷³ On Korea and Japan, see Chang (2006: 25).
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have had a similar array of incentives but have failed to sustain the momentum
of structural change.⁷⁴
The history of Mozambique since late 1992, to take just one African example,
illustrates a failure to monitor and control state resources. Carlos Cardoso, an
investigative journalist, was assassinated in Maputo in 2000 while investigating
corruption in a bank controlled by the state.⁷⁵ More recently, the travesty that is
industrial policy in Mozambique reached astonishing proportions with revela-
tions of a scandal involving loans contracted to support the development of a
national fishing fleet and maritime industry: three privately incorporated but
effectively state-owned enterprises failed to account for at least a quarter of the
$2 billion they had received in loans, as well as paying millions more for purchased
equipment than it was worth. The loans had been hidden from donors and, once
revealed, pitched Mozambique into a protracted conflict with the IMF and other
donors.⁷⁶
There is a different—less overtly corrupt and unpleasant—method of financing
investment. Many governments have financed a deficit-led investment pro-
gramme through inflationary finance (and the forced savings it generates, as rising
prices erode people’s spending power and reduce consumption). When govern-
ments spend more than they receive in revenue, they usually have to secure the
funds to do this from the central bank, which has to print money with potentially
inflationary implications for the overall economy. The resulting dynamic takes the
form of distributional (class) conflicts: inflation reduces real wages and raises
profits, at least in the short term. This shift of resources from wage workers to
capitalists releases resources for investment, given that capitalists are more likely
to save out of profits than workers are out of wages.⁷⁷ It can also shift resources
from wage workers to the state.
At the heart of many of the dynamics of investment, demand, government
spending, and related policies, is one issue that gets very little attention in most
economic texts and in advice to policy officials: what happens to the prices of basic
wage goods.
Wage Goods: The Fundamental Constraint
on Financing Investment
The most serious constraint on financing a cumulative dynamic of investment,
productivity growth, employment, and savings, stems from the price inflation of
⁷⁴ Amsden (2001). ⁷⁵ Fauvet and Mosse (2003).
⁷⁶ Kroll (2017). See also Cotterill (2017).
⁷⁷ Joan Robinson (1964: 341) attributed to Kalecki the pithy formulation that in a capitalist economy
‘workers spend what they get, capitalists get what they spend’, though Kalecki’s writings do not contain
this direct statement.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 13/5/2020, SPi
,  ,    95
basic wage goods. This compromises both savings by workers and the profitability
of investment, and can also threaten political stability. This is the insight of Michał
Kalecki’s development economics.
African wage workers, especially relatively unskilled workers in elementary
occupations—such as domestic servants, cleaners, and construction workers—
spend a large proportion of what they earn on a limited range of basic goods and
services. Spending on food takes up a large share (about 75 per cent) of their
disposable income, together with basic wage goods such as clothing, kerosene,
transport, and rent.⁷⁸ If the prices of these necessities rise relative to nominal
wages, there are a number of implications. Employers can face pressure to raise
wages in order that their employees stay in work and can work productively. This
is a very real issue and if the pressure does not come through organized labour in
the form of trade unions it may come through other mechanisms, including a
wastefully high turnover of labour.⁷⁹ The increasing cost of wage goods has been
one of the main reasons why flower firms and textile exporters in Ethiopia have
found it difficult to retain workers; the result being not only that employers face
recurring training costs, but also that labour productivity in Ethiopian floriculture
remains low compared to levels achieved on farms in other countries.⁸⁰ If firms
have to raise wages then their profit rate may be hit, negatively affecting the
momentum of new investment. Even if firms avoid this pressure and protect
profits, they may face insufficient domestic demand for the goods they produce,
and wage workers will find it difficult to sustain, let alone expand, their rate of
saving. Finally, sustained wage goods inflation may lead to a political reaction,
frightening existing and potential investors.
While inflationary financing of government deficit spending is one possible
source of wage goods inflation, the broader problem is one of how to finance
economic development, with the core challenge for policymakers in developing
countries being how to ensure an adequate, non-inflationary supply of these
goods. Kalecki realized there were often rigidities (social and economic) that
held back supply of agricultural commodities, leading to inflationary pressure as
the number of urban industrial workers expanded. These supply rigidities lead not
only to higher costs for wage workers, but also higher costs of intermediate goods
such as sugar or cereals used by manufacturing firms in agro-processing indus-
tries. So, for industrialization and structural change to proceed, ‘there must be no
inflationary price increase of necessities’.⁸¹ This is one reason why policies target-
ing investment to raise agricultural productivity are not an alternative to industrial
policy, but are integral to it (see Chapter 9).
⁷⁸ Ivanic, Martin, and Zaman (2012) and Headey and Martin (2016) assess the impact of food prices
and food price spikes, such as that in 2009, on poverty.
⁷⁹ Hardy and Hauge (2019). ⁸⁰ Schaefer and Abebe (2015); Melese (2015).
⁸¹ Kalecki (1976: 78).
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The domestic food supply may be a less binding constraint in a world of rising
food productivity and, often, internationally available cheap foods. Even so, the
volatility of global food prices means that carefully designed government inter-
ventions to protect the real wages of poor wage workers remain a priority.
Additionally, the broader point that structural change and growth are constrained
by the non-inflationary availability of basic wage goods holds. It is therefore
surprising that Kalecki’s insights have been largely ‘forgotten or discarded’.⁸²
Policy officials need to understand the importance of monitoring food prices
and money wages much more closely. If financing investment ignores basic wage
good inflation, then the distributional consequences may constrain the further
growth of investment. Such a strategy is not economically or politically feasible
over a long period of time, as it hits the lowest-paid worst, who have the least
bargaining power to increase their money wages rapidly in response to food price
spikes. And it is not—as some may think—a good thing for the rural population.
Most people in rural Africa—and most definitely the poorest, who as we show in
Chapter 8 depend on wage employment opportunities—are net food purchasers,
and thus food price inflation may hit them harder than urban workers. In fact,
food prices in difficult-to-reach rural areas and areas affected by violent conflict
are often even higher than in large towns.⁸³
Inflationary shocks may be unavoidable. Violent conflicts, global commodity
speculation, and climatic shocks can provoke or accelerate wage good scarcity, as
well as sharp price increases. In such circumstances, it becomes important to
address price fluctuations with appropriate policies. Another ‘lesson’ from the
historical record in East (and South East) Asia is that governments intervened to
manage basic goods prices and got them ‘wrong’. Two conclusions arise. First,
long-term success in addressing rural poverty and reducing vulnerability to
fluctuations in food prices requires public investment in rural infrastructure,
above all in irrigation—an argument made in more detail in Chapter 9. The key
to a secure non-inflationary supply of food is rising agricultural labour product-
ivity. Agricultural growth also makes it possible for rural wages to rise, without
which poverty cannot fall. Second, protecting low-income classes from periodic
food price spikes requires state intervention to stabilize prices. The very mention
of this is enough to alarm most economists, going as it does against established
‘best practice’, and raising the spectre of ineffective and long-lasting subsidies that
distort key price signals in agricultural markets.
That said, policymakers would be remiss not to pay some attention to these
warnings. There have been plenty of examples—in Africa, Latin America, and
⁸² Wuyts (2011: 5).
⁸³ For instance, prices of maize are often much higher in rural than in urban South Africa, according
to data in the National Agricultural Marketing Council’s regular Food Price Monitor (http://www.
namc.co.za). On the impact of violent conflict on food prices see Raleigh (2015).
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elsewhere—of disastrous state management and control of agricultural markets
that has resulted in the transfer of income from farmers to predatory bureau-
crats.⁸⁴ However, as the relative success of state intervention in cotton marketing
in some West African countries shows very clearly, such outcomes are far from
inevitable.⁸⁵ It is important not to ignore the fact that it has been possible for other
countries to successfully intervene to stabilize food prices against volatility on
world and domestic markets. Food price stabilization in Indonesia and the
Philippines, for example, has been expensive, but the benefits have outweighed
the costs. What marks out rice price stabilization in Indonesia and some other
East and Southeast Asian countries has been limited but sufficient government
intervention in markets to ensure adequate stocks, as well as a government
monopoly on importing rice to protect against huge swings in international
prices.⁸⁶
4.3 Sectoral Policies and Structural Change
In the first part of this chapter we discussed the challenge of raising investment
levels, emphasizing how investment is constrained by the supply of food and other
basic wage goods. The productivity of wage good production, in other words, sets
a limit on an economy’s ability to push investment to high levels and keep it there,
in order to sustain the long-run capital accumulation that has historically been at
the heart of growth, development, and catching up. Should resource allocation to
agriculture, then, be the major priority? More broadly, if raising investment levels
is key, does it matter which sectors attract investment?
The history of modern economic growth shows that contributions made by
particular sectors to output growth matter a great deal. Specifically, what matters
most is investment in manufacturing. However, a narrow, ‘traditional’ notion of
manufacturing would be misleading, and could lead to a strategy that ignores
gains from a range of activities that have not previously fitted neatly into this
category. Later in this section, we discuss an expanded and policy-relevant
definition of manufacturing.
Kaldor’s Growth Laws and Structural Change
Economic development involves shifting resources out of low-productivity activ-
ities into higher-productivity economic activities. This is what we mean when we
talk about ‘structural change’. Structural change can also mean, broadly, a shift in
⁸⁴ For example see Williams (2009). ⁸⁵ Gray, Dowd-Uribe, and Kaminski (2018).
⁸⁶ Timmer and Dawe (2007: 11).
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the relative weight of different sectors. So, for example, many advanced capitalist
economies have gone through phases during which they changed from predom-
inantly agricultural economies to industrial economies; then, in a process known
as ‘deindustrialization’, have become dominated by service sector activities.
Sectoral shifts are central to our sense of structural change, but their relevance
lies in what they imply for changes in productivity across the economy, as well as
the growth of employment and export revenue.
In low-income countries, large numbers of people languish in low-productivity
agricultural (and related rural) activities. They live and labour on small farms, and
however hard they work, grind out only modest outputs, often of low value and for
little material reward. Many live and work far from graded roads or railway links,
walking for hours to weekly markets, weighed down by bananas or tomatoes, only
to trudge back to farmsteads that are not irrigated and do not have any fertilizers
to increase yields. In the dry terms of economics, the returns to labour are low.
Their children often get insufficient nutritious food, no or at best poor-quality
schooling, and are poorly served by health posts and safe drinking water.
Arthur Lewis provided the classic way of thinking about changes in the
structure of employment during the process of development. It is frequently
alleged that he focused on the importance of rural–urban migration or the shift
out of agriculture into industry, but this is a misinterpretation—his point was
always more about the shift into higher-productivity activities than specifically
migration to cities. In his model of how accumulation might take place in a poor
economy, more and more people begin to work in activities with dramatically
higher productivity and returns to labour.⁸⁷ More capitalist enterprises are estab-
lished in the economy and more people work for larger employers, earning higher
wages. Historically, this takes the form of both a rising share of manufacturing
industry in GDP and a rising share of total employment in manufacturing. Higher
labour productivity comes about from a new combination of human labour and
other inputs, such as machines, the organization of farms and firms, and logistical
services.⁸⁸
There is a fundamental process by which the more people focus on specific
activities, the better they become at doing them, and then the higher the returns
they typically earn. This is the terrain of Adam Smith’s seminal discussion of
how the ‘extent of the market’ (i.e. market size) and ‘specialization’ play off and
support each other. The larger the market, the greater the scope for people
specializing in particular parts of a production process; the more people are
employed in these specialized roles, and the cheaper these efficiently produced
products become, the further the market for them expands. When this is
⁸⁷ Lewis (1954).
⁸⁸ Differences in labour productivity (and in the growth of labour productivity) between low-
income and advanced capitalist countries are discussed in Schaffner (2001).
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repeated across different goods, a cumulative causation process will kick in and
underpin sustained economic growth.
A corollary of the cumulative causation process is new opportunities for
production to benefit from economies of scale and scope. One reason that the
unit cost of producing outputs falls as more and more of them are produced is
precisely that the firm, and its workers, become increasingly efficient in producing
them: there is ‘learning by doing’. Adam Smith naturally saw this too, with
economies of scale playing a significant role in the early chapters of An Inquiry
into the Wealth of Nations. Increasing returns, however, faded from economic
view for a long time.
If the assumption of diminishing returns is a founding axiom of neoclassical
economists, for other economists, identifying where there is scope for increasing
returns is a key principle of analysis and policy design. What has become clear to
many is that the scope for increasing returns is significantly greater in manufac-
turing than in either agricultural or service activities (there is also a relatively high
scope for economies of scale in some other industrial activities, such as mining,
utilities, and construction).
Manufacturing seems also to be associated with higher productivity and swifter
improvements in productivity than other sectoral activities, with evidence show-
ing that ‘value added per worker is much higher in manufacturing than in
agriculture’. Shifting resources from agriculture to manufacturing, in line with
this evidence, results in a one-off economic gain. There may be more dynamic
gains too, if the rate of growth of productivity is faster in manufacturing than in
other sectors. In most developing countries, the historical as well as the most up-
to-date evidence shows this to be the case.⁸⁹
It was this kind of evidence that led Kaldor to craft his three ‘growth laws’,
though, as we show, these need to be expanded to four in order to take account
of the balance of payments constraint on growth. Kaldor’s original propositions
are as follows. First, there is a strong positive relationship between the rate of
growth of output in manufacturing and the rate of growth of GDP. This is not just
an ‘association’ but a causal relationship, for which there is a huge amount of
evidence.⁹⁰ It is this evidence that is behind the rediscovery of industrial policy—
active interventions by governments to accelerate and promote manufacturing
expansion—among many mainstream economists, and that has led to rather
misleading claims of a new consensus among economists. Unusually, a recent
contribution by IMF economists expressly referenced some of the well-known and
previously ignored heterodox work on industrial policy.⁹¹ Actually, there is no
such consensus; the mainstream case for industrial policy only justifies very
⁸⁹ Szirmai (2013). ⁹⁰ For a summary see Storm (2015). ⁹¹ Cherif and Hasanov (2019).
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limited forms of policy ‘correcting’ market failures rather than creating new
markets.⁹²
Kaldor’s second proposition is that there is a strong positive relationship
between the rate of growth of manufacturing output and the growth of manufac-
turing labour productivity. This is also known as Verdoorn’s Law and captures
dynamic economies of scale. It flows from the greater scope for learning by doing,
specialization, and economies of scale in manufacturing; as well as from rising
investment in industrial equipment and machinery that itself embodies
productivity-raising technical change.
There are implications for what happens to employment. If a firm can produce
the same output with fewer workers, or if firms are increasing output faster than
they take on new employees, then the employment elasticity of manufacturing will
decline. Tregenna finds that industrial upgrading and new labour-dislodging
machinery were associated in South Africa, between 1980 and 2005, with a falling
employment multiplier in manufacturing. Manufacturing is still the engine of
growth but it may not always carry quite so many people with it (at least, not
directly).⁹³
Policy officials in Africa might see a dilemma: why should they promote
manufacturing if it is not helping to address the fundamental challenge of creating
sufficient employment to absorb the (rapidly growing) number of new entrants to
the labour force? But there is no dilemma. Even within manufacturing, many
kinds of production generate large amounts of new employment, and even if
manufacturing has directly a low employment elasticity of output, it is hugely
important indirectly to the employment-creation capacity of the economy as a
whole. Evidence suggests that for every manufacturing job created two or three
jobs are also created outside the sector as a result of manufacturing expansion.⁹⁴
The contribution of manufacturing to employment is even stronger once we
accept a broader definition of manufacturing that takes account of agricultural
production, which is, on closer inspection, clearly industrial (see later in this
section). However, the most appropriate distinctions are not those between
manufacturing and other activities, but between those activities with a high
potential for increasing returns and employment multipliers, and those without
such potential.
Kaldor’s third proposition is that there is a strong positive relationship between
the growth of manufacturing productivity and productivity in the rest of the
economy. This is partly because, as manufacturing draws labour out of, say,
agriculture, it leaves behind a smaller agricultural labour force without shrinking
⁹² Cramer and Tregenna (2020).
⁹³ Tregenna (2012). This kind of engine without an employment chassis was dubbed, in one view of
economic performance in India, ‘growth sans employment’ (Kannan and Raveendran, 2009).
⁹⁴ Lavopa and Szirmai (2012).
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overall agricultural output. But it is also the outcome of a richer process, whereby
productivity gains in manufacturing are diffused to other sectors through the
supply of cheaper equipment and inputs to agricultural producers—for example,
agro-chemicals and irrigation pumps. They are also spread through industrial
demand for agricultural inputs—for cotton inputs into in textile production, for
example—and propagated by the spread of organizational know-how, though this
too is a matter for policy rather than just an automatic process.
Empirical work has largely confirmed the significance of these propositions.
For example, Wells and Thirlwall tested for and found clear evidence of Kaldor’s
growth laws across a number of African economies.⁹⁵ Elsewhere, another recent
study found support for Kaldor’s first and second laws in a group of 63 middle-
and upper-income countries.⁹⁶
The implication is that there is a very strong case for governments designing
and implementing industrial policy to promote manufacturing investment, as this
results in general economy-wide benefits. Later in this section we show how
important it is to think carefully about what kinds of activity to include within
the range of industrial policy, as well as highlighting some of its key features.
Before we do that, though, we focus on the significance of the balance of payments
constraint.
The Balance of Payments Constraint
One thing that can bring momentum to a standstill is, as previously discussed,
inflation in the prices of food and other necessity wage goods. Another equally
important factor is a shortage of foreign exchange. Developing countries have a
thirst for imports. Partly this is a function of rising incomes: as the demand for
basic goods starts to take up less of people’s incomes, there is rising demand for a
range of imported consumer goods, whether this be globally fashionable second-
hand jeans and T-shirts, or smartphone apps. Even more importantly, almost
by definition an expanding economy must invest in technology-embodying
machines and inputs, which creates a powerful need for imports. A developing
economy does not have to reinvent the wheel of industry—rather, one of the
advantages of backwardness is that expertly designed wheels can be imported. To
some extent, it may be possible to limit the rate of growth of luxury consumer
good imports, but it is impossible to successfully sustain rapid development if
imported capital and intermediate goods dry up. The building of the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the Kandadji Dam in Niger, and the infrastructure
renewal programme in Côte d’Ivoire are all associated with sharp spikes in
⁹⁵ Wells and Thirlwall (2003). ⁹⁶ Marconi, Reis, and Araújo (2016).
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 13/5/2020, SPi
102   
imports.⁹⁷ Across sub-Saharan Africa, electric and non-electric generating equip-
ment imports increased from $2.3 billion in 2000–3 to $11.6 billion in 2008–11.⁹⁸
The greater the demand for imports, the greater the challenge of securing
enough foreign exchange to cover the import bill. It is very difficult for an
economy to sustain a growing balance of payments deficit indefinitely. If the
size of the deficit is accelerating and will have to be financed from additional
foreign sources, then there is a real danger that a government may be forced to
abandon any kind of independent policy initiatives: arguably, this has sometimes
affected policy direction in countries such as Ghana and Mozambique.
An economy can acquire the foreign exchange needed to finance its import bill
by attempting to attract foreign capital flows, including concessional loans and
grants (i.e. foreign aid or overseas development assistance); or by earning foreign
exchange through exporting goods and services. All these sources of foreign
exchange involve costs and uncertainties. Commercial capital flows are regarded
as more beneficial to Africa than aid, especially by employees of Goldman Sachs,
such as economist Dambisa Moyo.⁹⁹ But ‘hot money’ funds shifted into African
emerging market bonds and stock exchanges, as opposed to foreign direct invest-
ment in farms and factories, are fickle, responding unpredictably to international
changes in interest rates, policy environments, and bandwagon hunches about the
next global bonanza or calamity. Those directing these flows to emerging markets
are said to be involved in ‘stampedes by intrinsically restless (and often under-
informed) fund-managers—so prone to oscillating between manias and panics’.¹⁰⁰
Additionally, lines of credit from China (secured by export commodities or escrow
accounts) are now an extremely important, but often poorly recorded and admin-
istratively opaque, source of finance for new energy infrastructure projects in
several African countries.¹⁰¹ At the same time, it has been the vogue in recent years
to use public–private partnerships (PPPs) as a means of financing infrastructure
investment across the world. PPPs have been promoted in Africa by the African
Development Bank, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA),
and the African Union, with the support of the World Bank and Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) among others.¹⁰² Supporters
argue that risk is transferred to the private sector and that PPPs are good value for
public money. But their record globally, including in the UK, which was one of the
pioneers of PPPs, has been unimpressive.¹⁰³ Many people, including research staff
at the IMF, warn how difficult it is to put in place effective institutional mechan-
isms to protect public finances against spiralling costs and fiscal unsustainability,
⁹⁷ See, e.g., World Bank (2013). ⁹⁸ Co (2014: 11–12). ⁹⁹ Moyo (2009).
¹⁰⁰ Palma (2012: 3).
¹⁰¹ Tang and Shen (2020); Brautigam and Hwang (2016). On the lack of transparency or effective
monitoring of a Chinese financing agreement for a mining project, see Landry (2018).
¹⁰² Loxley (2013).
¹⁰³ Boardman, Siemiatycki, and Vining (2016); Booth and Starodubtseva (2015); NAO (2018).
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‘particularly when governments ignore or are unaware of their deferred costs and
associated fiscal risks’.¹⁰⁴
The volatility of foreign aid flows has created very serious problems for
policymakers and economic performance in Africa. Donor agencies can swiftly
change the activities to which they commit resources depending on the latest ideas
in vogue.¹⁰⁵ The administrative costs of experienced public officials having to deal
with a proliferating number of donors, donor fads, and demands are high.¹⁰⁶
Foreign aid also comes with strings and narrows economic policy debates, pro-
viding material and intellectual support for African elites arguing for demand
restriction and market liberalization, and reinforcing flawed ideas through repe-
tition of rhetorical commonplaces. As has been pointed out, IMF programmes
still incorporate a considerable number of structural conditions, and the total
number of such conditions still far exceeds that observed in the pre-1994 period.
The emphatic return of structural conditionality in recent years calls into ques-
tion the IMF’s ‘we won’t do that any more’ rhetoric.¹⁰⁷
It is possible to negotiate important improvements in the terms by which foreign
investment and foreign aid inflows become available, as shown by the variety of
outcomes and negotiating strategies across African countries. Foreign aid ‘essen-
tially means an improvement of external conditions of growth’ and may be
compared to ‘a positive shift in terms of trade to the extent which both increase
the capacity to import’.¹⁰⁸ However, negotiations over concessional and non-
concessional flows might not always be successful—or even be conducted in the
national interest—so an over-reliance on these sources of foreign exchange is
unwise. Under the pressure of demand for imports, it may be a far more effective
strategy for sustaining growth to promote a rapid expansion in foreign exchange
earnings through exports. Thirlwall’s Law, capturing this insight, states that a
country’s growth rate over the long run is set by the ratio of the rate of export
revenue growth to the income elasticity of demand. The faster imports expand as
an economy grows, the faster export earnings have to rise if growth is to be
sustained.¹⁰⁹
There are two dimensions to why exports have to be at the heart of a develop-
ment strategy. One is that, as explained, the momentum of accumulation and
structural change cannot be sustained without a swift rise in export revenue. The
other is that exports—especially manufactured exports—are at the heart of the
dynamics captured in Kaldor’s propositions. Exploiting the economies of scale
¹⁰⁴ Irwin, Mazraani, and Saxena (2018: 1).
¹⁰⁵ On the impact of aid volatility on growth see Museru, Toerien, and Gossel (2014) and Hudson
and Mosley (2008); on aid uncertainty see Lensink and Morrissey (2000).
¹⁰⁶ Presbitero (2016: 18). ¹⁰⁷ Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King (2016: 14).
¹⁰⁸ Kalecki and Sachs (1966: 44, 24). ¹⁰⁹ McCombie (1989).
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that manufacturing has a special propensity for depends, just as Adam Smith
claimed, on the ‘extent of the market’. Given the extent of the market (i.e.
demand) is limited in developing countries and within the African region, the
rest of the world must ergo be the major source of demand. This is just one of the
ways in which manufactured exports matter to industrialization-led development.
More formally, there are two linked relationships that have been observed inter-
nationally. First, growth in manufacturing raises the rate of growth of export
earnings. Second, the faster export earnings grow, the higher the overall growth
rate of the economy.
What Counts as Manufacturing?
Auto assembly plants, furniture workshops, a tomato canning facility, industrial
parks exporting garments, a blueberry producer: all except one are classified in
standard statistics as manufacturing. The obvious exception is the blueberry
producer, but arguably blueberry producers and exporters ought to be regarded
as industrial producers. If a blueberry producer in South Africa is highly capital-
ized and has invested in a range of physical components, inputs, and processes,
and if that producer has organized the production process into a long string of
distinct and specialized operations, are they merely a large farmer? Expanding
the idea of what is included in industrial production has important policy
implications.
If policy officials want to take seriously the dynamics of structural change and
promote investment, they need to recognize the shifting boundaries around the
‘industrial’, classifying economic activities according to their role in an economy:
above all, their potential to generate increasing returns of scale and scope;
accelerate productivity gains; lead directly and indirectly to employment growth;
and produce foreign exchange earnings.
Changing the understanding of what constitutes manufacturing is even more
important when we consider that much agro-industry is in fact more labour-
intensive than a great deal of the manufacturing industry located in export-
processing zones or industrial parks. In Ethiopia, for example, the total number
of workers employed by agribusiness in floriculture was, by 2012, already consid-
erably larger than total employment in the manufacture of textiles or in the basic
metal and engineering industries. In Kenya, meanwhile, 125,000 workers were
employed in the cut-flower sector in 2015, which was about 3 times the number of
people employed in textiles, and 20 times larger than the number of people
employed in the motor vehicles subsector.¹¹⁰
¹¹⁰ See www.unido.org/statistics; EthiopianHorticulture Development Agency (2012: 16); Gebreeyesus
(2014); Mitullah, Kamau, and Kivuva (2017: 30).
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Farms nowadays increasingly require massive investment in complex technol-
ogy and equipment, and employ highly trained and productive workers. People
may (and do) migrate in search of employment opportunities with higher returns,
not simply from rural areas to towns and cities, but also from one rural area to
another. A development strategy designed to raise investment levels and increase
profitability in the economy has to take into account the huge scope for product-
ivity increases (and employment growth) within rural areas, as well as in urban
and peri-urban factories.
Premature Deindustrialization: The Latest Version
of Fracasomanía?
Rumours of the demise of industrialization as the engine of development are
greatly exaggerated. Many neoclassical economists traditionally argue that it
matters little which sector economic activities take place in, and that therefore
it is market ‘distorting’ to try and encourage manufacturing specifically.
Additionally, there are old populist arguments that it is possible to raise income
per capita without having to ‘pass through’ an (unhappy) industrial stage.¹¹¹
A similar tradition of pessimism about the feasibility of industrial policy in
Latin America led Albert Hirschman to coin the phrase fracasomanía—an obses-
sional fascination with failure.
More recently another theory of failure has gained currency: the risk of
‘premature deindustrialization’, which has shown that there is a global trend for
economies to experience, for structural reasons, a shrinking share of manufactur-
ing in GDP at much lower income per capita levels than has historically been the
case. An optimistic slant on this issue, tinged with the enduring appeal of
economic populism, is that services are nowadays more productive than manu-
facturing, and therefore it may be possible to have a service-driven development
strategy without having to grind through the socially, environmentally, and
technically challenging process of industrialization.¹¹²
However, the evidence across developing countries suggests a far more positive
interpretation of the ‘premature deindustrialization’ narrative, even taking into
account a traditional classification system that—we and others argue—is increas-
ingly unfit for purpose. In real terms, global MVA increased in every year between
1995 and 2015.¹¹³ In the developing countries as a group, aggregate MVA/GDP
has in fact risen rather rapidly since about 2002, as shown in Figure 4.2.
Disappointing shares of MVA in GDP and weak manufacturing employment,
¹¹¹ Kitching (1989) remains a classic critique of this populist tradition in development economics.
¹¹² Ggombe and Newfarmer (2018). ¹¹³ Hallward-Driemeier and Nayyar (2017: figure 0.5).
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with the UK economy as an extreme example of the latter, are attributable to
policy failure in some countries rather than the structural impossibility of indus-
trialization.¹¹⁴ The growth of MVA has been especially impressive in East Asia,
where China in particular has shown the enduring scope for manufacturing
expansion and manufacturing employment growth.
4.4 Conclusions: Criteria for Policy Priorities
We have argued in Section 4.3 of this chapter that manufacturing, suitably (re)
defined, plays a leading role in economic development. There are good reasons for
this, which are captured by Kaldor’s growth laws and supported by consistent
evidence internationally. Despite claims that ‘premature deindustrialization’
means that manufacturing is no longer an effective engine of growth and employ-
ment generation, the evidence demonstrates this is not true. What has been the
case in many countries in the recent past is not a guide to what governments can


















Figure 4.2 Aggregate share of MVA in GDP by development group, 1970–2017
Source: UN Statistics Division (2019), Income Classification: World Bank GNI per capita, Atlas
methodology (2019).
¹¹⁴ Haraguchi, Cheng, and Smeets (2017: 307). On the dismal performance of employment in the
UK manufacturing sector, see Rowthorn and Coutts (2013).
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remains central to economic development, and industrial policy remains central
to making industrialization happen.
The scope of industrial policy is wider than before. Manufacturing has become
increasingly imbricated with other activities traditionally labelled as services or
agriculture. This has resulted in the servicification of manufacturing and the
industrialization of freshness, meaning industrial policy has to address these
trends. The instruments of industrial policy have, for example, been shown to
be useful in supporting the expansion and competitiveness of high-value agricul-
tural production in some African economies.
Finally, industrial policy must focus on manufactured exports. The associ-
ation between manufactured exports and sustained higher rates of growth is a
strong one. Just as more diversified and higher-productivity manufacturing is
likely to help protect against the frequency and intensity of growth collapses, so
too is an effective manufacturing export sector. This is because, among other
benefits, it can help overcome the balance of payments constraint that is often a
cause of stalled growth.
Both industrial policy and linked policies promoting agribusiness should follow
four criteria guiding the allocation of all government support (other chapters pick
up on these criteria, so we will highlight them only briefly here). First, does an
activity or sector generate foreign exchange earnings (i.e. will it help relax the
balance of payments constraint on growth)? Second, is it characterized by scope
for rising labour productivity vis-à-vis other sectors and activities? Note that this
is not the same as asking whether or not it is manufacturing in the traditional
sense. Third, will it create employment (directly and indirectly), especially for
women? In particular, will it generate an increase in higher-productivity job
opportunities relative to other projects that might benefit from state support?
Fourth, will it help address the need for a non-inflationary supply of basic wage
goods? Even if resource allocation addresses these criteria, investment or invest-
ment support can only work if it is supported by other policies, for example
reducing the risk of export revenues flowing into tax havens abroad.
These criteria need to be combined with policy design that takes sequencing
into account. The question that should be asked when considering a potential
incentive or infrastructure investment is: how fast will this or that activity bring
foreign exchange earnings onstream? In some circumstances, there may be a
case for supporting an activity that does not meet all the criteria set out, but that
does promise to relax one binding constraint (e.g. foreign exchange or wage
goods supply) particularly quickly, creating greater room to pursue longer-term
objectives. This is relevant for debates about the role of primary commodity
exports, with many governments and development economists having neglected
investment in this area. In neglecting these activities for fear of, for example,
declining terms of trade, governments may miss out on high international prices
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for particular commodities, thereby foregoing short-run foreign exchange earning
opportunities that could be fundamental to deeper prospects for structural change.
To conclude this chapter with an example, a large-scale investment in Ethiopia
promoting a rapid expansion in high-quality, premium-priced, wet-processed
coffee production capacity may address several of our key criteria for selective
intervention by government. It would involve a large ‘lumpy’ investment in
infrastructure (e.g. rural roads and electrification) that without government
spending would not happen nearly fast enough. It would generate additional
foreign exchange, without a long lead time to develop international competitive-
ness. It would also generate a substantial increase in rural wage employment for
women. The output of each of these workers will be lower than the output per
worker in, say, factories producing sports shoes, but their labour productivity
would nevertheless be much higher than that of most workers in rural Ethiopia.¹¹⁵
An effective policy promoting the rapid expansion of high-yield, higher-quality
coffee would require exactly the kind of ‘reciprocal control mechanism’ charac-
teristic of effective industrial policy and for the same reasons; namely, the need to
provide selective incentives to those with a demonstrated capacity for and track
record of generating foreign exchange and employment in a sector with the
potential for generating linkages to other activities, which are also likely to be
producers with scope for scale economies. It would make industrial policy for
other activities—for example, packaging, cement, and machine tools—much more
feasible due to its contribution to the balance of payments.
These kinds of criteria for policy design, as well as the broader significance of
setting export growth as a high priority, are developed in Chapter 5 on trade.
¹¹⁵ Cramer and Sender (2017) developed a strategy for priorities in the complex Ethiopian coffee
sector.
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In mainstream development economics, the pursuit of macroeconomic stability is
elevated above all other objectives, including growth in production or employ-
ment. Macroeconomic stability is regarded as the fundamental prerequisite that
unlocks growth in output and then, if markets are suitably flexible, other positive
outcomes like employment expansion. This mainstream view also determines
trade and exchange rate policy: balancing the external account is the primary
objective of policy, rather than the level of output at which these accounts (have
to) balance. The key to both stability in the balance of payments and broader
macroeconomic stability, from this perspective, is restraining aggregate demand.
This, as we will explain, typically leads to policy advice designed to ensure low-
and middle-income economies rein in import growth. Rapid import growth may
signal ‘easy’ credit—representing excess demand—thereby upsetting the balance
of payments applecart. The two main ways of curbing excess demand in an open
economy are, first, to restrict ‘excess’ credit to the economy, and, second, to raise
the relative cost of imports through exchange rate devaluation.
Non-mainstream development economists also often warn against rapid
import growth, albeit for different reasons. The main reason for their anxiety is
a pessimistic outlook on the possibility of financing imports. Export pessimism
has long been entrenched in much of the advice emanating from, for example,
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). In some
versions, this pessimistic reflex reflects a broader anxiety about the dangers of
integrating into the world economy. The implications for exchange rate policy are
not always clear, although some economists taking this stance criticize International
Monetary Fund (IMF) calls for devaluation: they argue that there is little point
attempting to boost export revenues through reducing the price offered to inter-
national buyers by devaluing; they also berate IMF policy proposals because devalu-
ation has inflationary consequences that hit the poor particularly hard.
African policymakers are surrounded by economists who espouse trade and
exchange rate policy arguments derived from these (and similar) traditions. It is,
therefore, not surprising that they often feel the case against rapid import growth
being pressed upon them—by visiting consultants, or economists installed within
government ministries, departments, and prime ministers’ offices. Warnings about
rising and ‘unnecessary’ imports seem, at first sight, to be eminently reasonable.
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In this chapter, we advocate a different approach. We insist that production,
technological change, and employment growth should be primary policy object-
ives, and that macroeconomic policy should serve them. Furthermore, we argue
that what matters is the level of activity at which the external accounts balance out,
rather than a myopic focus on balance for balance’s sake (see Chapter 6). Finally,
we argue that African governments have to find ways to benefit from integration
into the global economy, rather than making a virtue out of retreat (into relying
overly on the domestic market or on regional intra-trade).
To accelerate growth and structural change, governments need to stimulate a
rapid rate of growth of imports—especially of producer inputs and capital goods.
For example, imports of capital and intermediate goods—embodying foreign
technology and contributing to domestic technological change—accounted for
more than 80 per cent of all imports by China between 1965 and 2007. Even as
China’s economy has evolved and its rate of innovation accelerated, imported
inputs have remained very important; although the share of imported inputs
in the value of manufactured exports has declined, it remains higher than
40 per cent. Furthermore, the total value of these imported inputs has continued
to rise sharply since the late 1990s or so (see Figure 5.1). More generally, as soon as
the East Asian ‘tiger economies’ began to grow rapidly, their ‘investment boom
required an increase in imports’.¹
But—as we set out in Chapter 3—the thirst for imports characteristic of rapidly
developing economies can easily threaten the sustainability of growth. This in turn
means any strategy for growth and structural change cannot ignore the need for a
rapid rate of growth of export volumes and earnings.
The evidence presented in this chapter shows that, historically, all experiences of
sustained economic development and structural change have involved rapid and
sustained import growth rates. Rising incomes, higher labour productivity, and
higher wages in Africa lead to a thirst for both imported consumer goods and for
the intermediate and capital goods needed to produce, for example, electricity. In
many countries, growth and structural change have historically required policies
encouraging a fast increase in imports, especially of producer goods, though also of
consumer wage goods including food. The experience of these countries highlights
the importance of the balance of payments constraint and leads to the policy
conclusion that, in order to sustain import growth, African economies (even oil
exporters flush with revenues) will need to allocate resources so as to ensure a
dramatic increase in the growth rate of their export earnings.
It is not sufficient to recognize a general need to expand exports. It is also
important to identify the specific types of economic activity and subsectors where
investment may yield the fastest and largest gains in productivity and in exports,
¹ Herrerias and Orts (2013: 783).
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as well as the accompanying policies required to achieve expansion of output.
These priorities, and the need to target investment, have been ignored in
‘common-sense’ policy advice to create an economy-wide ‘enabling environment’
and to avoid overambitious interventions that ‘pick winners’. We argue that it
would be a mistake to follow other ‘common-sense’ policy advice too, especially
warnings not to invest to expand primary commodity exports because of a ‘fallacy
of composition’. This misguided policy advice is based on the assumption that
these investments, if undertaken by a number of low-income countries, will cause
the market to become flooded, and therefore fail to increase export revenues. If
such warnings have been taken seriously by African policymakers, this may go
some way to explaining the region’s declining share in the world market for so
many primary commodities.
A better theoretical guide to these issues would be based on Thirlwall’s adap-
tation of Kaldor’s Growth Laws, which emphasize the centrality of manufacturing.
We broaden this, by also arguing for investment in higher-productivity, export-
oriented agriculture. This is partly on the grounds that Kaldor-type growth
effects increasingly operate in agribusiness enterprises, meaning they should
be considered an integral part of Africa’s industrial production (see Chapter 3).
Imported inputs value as a share of
manufactures exports value (left axis)
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Figure 5.1 Imported inputs required to produce China’s manufactured exports,
1998–2017
Source: UN Comtrade.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 13/5/2020, SPi
112   
We also argue that the labour intensity of many African agricultural exports
makes it possible to accelerate the shift of (especially female) labour from low-
productivity to high-productivity rural employment. In developing this argument,
we propose that policy officials redefine what is understood by structural change.
Any investment strategy designed to facilitate a rapid rate of growth of imports
must incorporate an effective exchange rate policy. This chapter discusses the
consequences of over- and undervaluing exchange rates in Africa, as well as the
difficulties of achieving (and defining) an appropriate exchange rate for any
particular country and time. We set out some of the main arguments used in
mainstream economics to address exchange rate questions, and we introduce
some criticisms of these arguments. Overall, we argue that African governments
should aim at competitive (i.e. undervalued) exchange rates—not in the vain hope
that market prices are sufficient to balance the books and unleash entrepreneurial
spirits, but as part of a set of policies designed to promote faster growth and
accelerated structural change.
The accumulation strategy presented here differs markedly from that proposed
by neoclassical economists. It also differs sharply, perhaps even more, from that
proposed by many heterodox economists. Our argument in this chapter, as
throughout the book, favours ‘possibilism’ (see Chapter 3) about import growth
over the impossibilist lament of many structuralist development economists. We
also query the views of economists who ignore the limits and costs of South–South
trade, and who believe that foreign direct investment by developing country firms
offers greater potential benefit to Africans than investment by other corporations.
5.2 The IMF and Macroeconomic Management
Many lower- and middle-income countries, faced with a rapid shift in the balance
of payments leading to an immediate problem in paying for vital imported inputs,
have to approach the IMF. The problem may have been caused by: a surge in
import costs (as a result, for example, of a spurt of productive infrastructure
investment); a terms-of-trade shock; or a spike in debt service obligations (if, for
example, dollar-denominated debt obligations jump on the back of US interest
rate hikes). Whatever the cause, the IMF tends to respond by looking for profli-
gacy and policy mistakes in deficit countries. The burden of international payment
adjustments must, as agreed at Bretton Woods after the Second World War,
always be shouldered by deficit countries.²
Frequently, the negotiation of a Fund programme is an act of desperation.
There may be few alternatives, as an IMF seal of approval is often necessary to
² Magalhães Prates and Farhi (2015).
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unlock other concessionary finance, and it is also believed to calm the nerves
of commercial lenders and investors. So it is important to understand the core
principles and practice of IMF programmes, which tend to emphasize three things:
first, ‘adopting demand-restraining measures consistent with available financing’;
second, securing ‘available financing’; and, third, putting in place reforms sup-
posedly promoting ‘adjustment’ and growth.³
We will discuss how the Fund has made subjective assessments of ‘available
financing’ later in this section. Here, we emphasize the central policy prescription
of IMF programmes: a rapid cut in the trade deficit achieved by reducing the
demand for and the volume of imports.⁴ At the heart of the Fund’s thinking since
the late 1950s lies the Polak model, which can be used to show that a fall in a
country’s reserves—a balance of payments deficit—happens when domestic credit
increases beyond the demand for and supply of money. The model can also be
used to disaggregate an increase in the stock of money into private and public
credit creation, pinpointing government borrowing and fiscal expansion as the
culprits for balance of payments deficits.
The model sees output as determined by the level of available finance and the
propensity to import.⁵ IMF staff have to assess the likely availability of external
finance. If, for example, they think bilateral donors will not provide additional
concessional finance to a government proposing a particular set of policies, they
will insist more firmly on sharp changes to those policies. However, assessing
‘likely availability of external finance’ is a matter of judgement, and such judge-
ments are open to dispute.⁶ For example, in 1997, a former World Bank Chief
Economist lashed out at the IMF’s (in his view) baseless assessment that Ethiopia
was unlikely to secure further international finance without a severe contraction of
economic activity. The IMF had suspended its programme support and was
insisting on drastic policy reforms, including financial sector liberalization, but
the Ethiopian government resisted.⁷ Despite IMF claims, there was little evidence
that major donors were prepared to abandon Ethiopia—their military ally in a
sensitive geostrategic zone. In fact, they seemed (confirmed by later experience) to
be increasingly confident about Ethiopia’s economic performance.
Some argue that Fund lending programmes can be quite flexible, and that the
emphasis on demand repression is greater where fiscal imbalances (governments
spending more than they receive in taxes) are the source of crisis, than where
balance of payments difficulties are brought about by terms-of-trade shocks.
Again, this raises the question of how to determine if budget deficits are ‘unsus-
tainable’—the Fund’s record in forecasting key macroeconomic variables is unim-
pressive.⁸ Fund programmes may also include some commitment to supporting
growth, typically taking the form of ad hoc adjustments to balance of payments
³ Mussa and Savastano (2000: 81). ⁴ Taylor (1997: 147). ⁵ Fine (2006). ⁶ Ibid.
⁷ On this controversy see Stiglitz (2002). ⁸ An, Jalles, and Loungani (2018).
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targets that allow for a slightly faster import growth rate than the model’s core
equations model would accept. One problem is that the Fund’s opaque decision-
making processes make it difficult to ascertain the relative importance of
this element of flexibility in negotiating positions (compared, for instance, to the
influence of the most powerful members of the IMF’s Board) on the outcomes of
negotiations.⁹
The global financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath led to some soul-searching
statements about the limitations of the traditional Fund analysis and policy stance.
But the evidence—from crisis packages negotiated with European countries in
particular, as well as from recent programmes in Africa—suggests that hopes for a
less deflationary and more flexible IMF approach to balance of payments diffi-
culties may have been overblown.¹⁰
5.3 Structuralist Fear of Imports
UNCTAD And IDEAs
The logic of many UNCTAD reports runs as follows. The import elasticity of
growth in advanced economies has shrunk. As they continue to grow—slowly—
they spend less of any additional income on imports. This makes it even more
difficult for developing countries to grow, and to manage balance of payments
challenges, by exporting to such economies. And when, as of late, the advanced
economies are growing slowly, developing countries can only expand their exports
by eating into other countries’ share of world exports. Given these global eco-
nomic conditions, developing countries should give ‘greater attention to domestic
and regional demand’ and ‘align their production structure more closely with their
demand structure’.¹¹
Others, for example, members of the International Development Economics
Associates (IDEAs) network, talk of a ‘collapse in developing country exports’
following the 2008 global financial crisis—though admitting this is a price phe-
nomenon, given that the growth rate of trade in terms of volume was barely any
different in 2010–17 compared to 2000–9.¹² This message is driven home with
claims of the ‘exhaustion of advanced capitalism’.¹³ Consequently, the ‘export
obsession that formed the basis of macroeconomic and development strategies is
no longer useful’.¹⁴ Against these pessimistic prognoses, it is worth noting that
global import contractions have, thus far, occurred only rarely in the capitalist era.
⁹ Killick (1993). ¹⁰ Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King (2016). ¹¹ UNCTAD (2014: 102).
¹² Chandresekhar and Ghosh (2018): http://www.networkideas.org/featured-articles/2018/04/the-
collapse-in-developing-country-exports/.
¹³ Ghosh (2018: 195). ¹⁴ Ghosh (2018: 204).
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In fact, between 1880 and 2010, global trade has contracted in just 12 per cent of
years. Furthermore, the idea of a worldwide collapse in imports masks the actual
heterogeneity of experience. Imports fell by far less in some countries than others;
and overall they fell by significantly less in 2008/9 compared to the previous major
episode of world trade shrinkage, the 1929 crash.¹⁵
There are other arguments advanced for focusing on domestic markets, or at
least prioritizing trade with other ‘Southern’ or neighbouring countries at (pre-
sumably) similar levels of development. A fast rate of growth of imports may be
dangerous because the dynamics of increasing returns give a competitive advan-
tage to those already established in particular activities: ‘when countries are open
to external trade in a world in which increasing returns activities are significant,
the chances are greater that such trade will cement existing divisions of labour
between countries’.¹⁶
A Secular Decline in the Net Barter Terms of Trade?
Although trade pessimism has taken different forms over the decades, at its core is
the idea that there is a structural (‘secular’) decline in the terms of trade—average
export prices relative to import prices or the net barter terms of trade—faced by
developing countries trading with richer economies. In its original form, as set out
by Prebisch and Singer, this identified a trend in the export prices fetched by
primary commodity exports relative to the price of imported manufactured goods.
The original Prebisch–Singer hypothesis laid the basis for import substitution
strategies, as well as strengthening pessimistic views on whether developing
countries could successfully pursue development through primary commodity
exports. Combined with observations on the greater price volatility of unpro-
cessed primary commodities, it inspired recommendations (by UNCTAD for
example) that developing economies should diversify the number and type of
their exports and that, prior to exporting, they should invest to process primary
commodity domestically.¹⁷ Later iterations of the pessimistic terms-of-trade argu-
ment suggest that even developing countries that achieve success in building up
light manufacturing export sectors will soon suffer from falling terms of trade.
One reason for this decline in the relative prices of manufactured exports from
poor countries is that the world market is becoming flooded with such exports.
Meanwhile, poor countries continue to expand their imports of more sophisti-
cated manufactured goods from higher-income economies.
An adverse movement in the terms of trade, especially if it persists, can
reduce growth rates. Even so, it is rash to take the Prebisch–Singer hypothesis as
¹⁵ Van Bergeijk (2018). ¹⁶ Ghosh (2019: 386).
¹⁷ Osakwe, Santos-Paulino, and Dogan (2018).
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reason to neglect investment in primary commodity exports, or to neglect export
opportunities more generally in favour of national or regional self-sufficiency.
First, the evidence for a secular decline in the net barter terms of trade remains
unclear, despite a torrent of research studies.¹⁸
Second, there is no doubt that primary commodity prices are volatile, just as
liable to undergo protracted surges as to tumble. While this is often taken to mean
governments should not over-rely on commodity exports, it also opens up the
opportunity to take advantage of price booms. The differences—for example—
between Chile’s long-term investment in copper mining and Zambia’s poor long-
term record in global copper production, are stark.¹⁹
Third, the Prebisch–Singer hypothesis has had an influence on academic debate
and policy for more than fifty years; but in that period there have been lengthy
periods of very strong prices for many commodities. The growth of China and a
number of other economies—including Brazil, Mexico, India, Indonesia, Russia,
and Turkey—led to a sustained increase in consumption and prices of energy,
metal, and even some foods. Recently, these countries have together accounted for
a larger share of consumption of coal, base and precious metals, and most foods,
than the G7 economies.²⁰ Furthermore, over the long-term history of modern
globalized capitalism, there can be no great confidence in the idea of a secular
decline in Africa’s terms of trade. A new long-run dataset of African commodities
shows there was a prolonged rise in the terms of trade for African countries
between 1820 and the 1880s, and that this terms-of-trade boom was larger in
Africa than it was elsewhere.²¹
Fourth, primary commodity prices do not all move together, as is clear, for
example, in Figure 5.2. It is misleading to take policy inspiration from an average
commodity terms of trade. Income elasticities of demand for different foods vary
hugely. While elasticities of demand for grains are typically less than one (i.e.
growth in demand is slower than growth in incomes), they are higher for foods
with a greater fat and protein content—as people get better off they can afford
more of these. Furthermore, as discussed in Section 5.5, there is increasing scope
within food production (and related commodities such as flowers) for branding
and product differentiation, which is one of the factors distinguishing ‘non-
commodities’ from commodities in trade. Indeed, income elasticities of demand
(and price trends) for macadamia nuts, avocados, specialty arabica coffees, and
other crops are extremely high. It is clearly important, when designing investment,
trade, and diversification strategies, to disaggregate the terms of trade. While the
wider group of ‘emerging’ economies account for much of the global consumption
of metals, energy, and foods, the higher-income economies—especially the
¹⁸ Spraos (1980); Cuddington and Urzua (1989); Pfaffenzeller (2018).
¹⁹ For further examples, see Cramer and Sender (2019). ²⁰ Baffes et al. (2018).
²¹ Frankema et al. (2018).
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European Union (EU)—are the most important market for ‘processed agricul-
tural’ products. Despite this, some African countries have, in recent years, experi-
enced a fall in the share of such high-value processed agricultural products sent to
the EU.²²
Fifth, African terms of trade held up well from the 1950s to 2000, even holding
steady after the oil price hike of the early 1970s when overall commodity terms
of trade fell. But whatever the trend in the net barter terms of trade for commod-
ities over a given period, this is absolutely no guide to the net barter terms of
trade for any individual country, or even group of countries. Thus, ‘there is little
evidence of a stable, long-run relationship between the commodity terms of trade
and the national net barter terms of trade for the majority of the countries of
Sub-Saharan Africa’.²³
There is no convincing reason that African governments should neglect invest-
ment efforts to expand primary commodity exports. Instead, they should design
policies maximizing their command over imports. This requires an investment
strategy targeting those exports where the greatest medium-term gains—in for-
eign exchange, but if possible also in employment—are likely. It also means
overcoming—rather than caving in to—difficulties that are sometimes used as
excuses to shy away from participating in global trade. For example, some African
government officials wring their hands at the strict phyto-sanitary standards







1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015
Peanuts Maize Wheat
Figure 5.2 Commodity prices: peanuts, wheat, and maize (US$ per metric tonne)
Source: IMF Commodity Prices (2018).
²² Partridge and Pienaar (2015). ²³ Cashin and Patillo (2006: 856).
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exporters have invested to meet many of these standards. In South Africa,
complaints about the imposition of these standards justify a strategy of making
a virtue out of investment failure—a claim that it is too difficult to succeed in
international markets helps turn trading with other African economies into a
rhetorical campaign of solidarity.
If the Prices Don’t Get You, the Rules Will
While there has been a proliferation of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in the wake of
formal trade liberalization (the reduction in tariffs and quotas),²⁴ this is often only
a partial reason at best for weak export performance. Again, South Africa’s
experience provides more convincing reasons for lacklustre export performance.
Access to large markets for apples, pears, and other fruits in China and Thailand
has been blocked, not by overly zealous phyto-sanitary rules, but by the South
African government’s failure to take the required action. Government officials
took years to provide basic information required by the Chinese authorities on the
amounts of pesticides used in apple orchards, while ‘South Africa’s fruit exporters
have been denied access to Thailand since 2008 because the South African
government has failed to update the phyto-sanitary rules applicable to the sector,
thus hindering the certification process’.²⁵
Prior to 2015, South Africa had not exported any plums to China for 10 years.
Trade pessimists and some South African officials might complain of ‘market
access’ problems. But Chile had managed to export large quantities of plums to
China during the same period. Chile invested in a massive trade negotiation effort
and succeeded in gaining access to the growing East Asian markets; South Africa
did not make this effort and access remains very limited. Similarly, Peru managed
to export avocados to US and Japanese markets, while South Africa failed. Thus,
behind the nationalistic stress on market access difficulties, there is often a
weakness in trade negotiation.
The WTO and ‘Policy Space’: Rules and Ruses
Similar weaknesses undermine the ability of many governments to make the best
of prevailing World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, although much of the
literature emphasizes that the governments of low-income countries have very
limited opportunities to evade the strict requirements of WTO membership. For
example, some critics fear that the WTO is little more than a crowbar wielded by
²⁴ UNCTAD (2013). ²⁵ Viviers et al. (2014).
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the richest economies to force open developing country markets while continuing
to protect their own competitive edge. The key argument here is that the WTO
has, since its inauguration in 1995, reduced developing country ‘policy space’,
making it virtually impossible for such countries to adopt industrial policies of the
type used in earlier developing economies (in East and South East Asia especially).
As Robert Wade argues:
the main international agreements from the Uruguay Round—TRIPS, TRIMS
and GATS—systematically tip the playing field against developing countries
[ . . . ] Taken together, the three agreements greatly restrict the right of a
government to carry though policies that favour the growth and technological
upgrading of domestic industries and firms.²⁶
Without doubt, the rules of the trading game have changed over recent decades.
There are now bans on quotas for manufactured imports (making infant industry
protection more difficult); limits on subsidies (making it more difficult for states
to back national exporting champions); bans on local content requirements, as
well as other trade-related investment measures (TRIMS), that might be used to
direct the behaviour of foreign direct investors; and demands for a dramatic
reduction in import tariffs. Tariffs are generally ‘bound’ at an upper limit, though
they are often ‘applied’ at a different, lower rate. The Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement makes it harder for developing
countries to secure technology transfer in time-honoured (piratical) ways, and is
said to have facilitated a large flow of patent-related profits from ‘Southern’ to
‘Northern’ countries. Additionally, using the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) is costly for resource-constrained developing countries.
In parallel with the WTO, there are many preferential trade agreements (PTAs)
and regional trade agreements (RTAs) that also often impose restrictions on
developing countries. Thus, while a PTA such as the African Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA) might give preferential access to the US market for
some African exports, this comes at a price. Conditions imposed by the
preference-giving country might include general commitments—to privatization
or market liberalization—and/or more specific commitments, for example,
regarding the relaxation of environmental standards or government procurement
policy. Sometimes, these rules and conditions are more restrictive than the WTO,
as the preference-giving country is able to negotiate better terms than they would
have been able to achieve faced with stronger collective action among a larger
number of developing countries.²⁷ Critics have also argued there may be quite
²⁶ Wade (2003: 622, 630). See also Weiss (2005).
²⁷ Aggarwal and Evenett (2014); UNECA (2016).
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high costs and limited benefits as a result of economic partnership agreements
(EPAs), negotiated between the EU and a number of African regional blocs.²⁸
The rules of trade can be tough. But these rules and constraints do not eliminate
the scope for policy initiatives: African policy officials do have room for
movement—‘policy space’. The rules themselves allow for a range of government
interventions that can support industrial expansion and exports. Furthermore, the
evidence is clear that governments can stretch these rules to expand the range of
interventions in support of exports. Besides, policy officials can and should
promote exports by adopting many other types of intervention not covered or
prohibited in WTO rules. For example, targeted infrastructure investments—
railways, ports, roads, and dams serving areas with a high capacity for foreign
exchange and job creation—are fine, as are targeted and subsidized investment in
skills formation. African states can intervene to provide marketing services to
domestic champions, as well as tax concessions to selected foreign firms.²⁹ State
financial institutions in search of economies of scale can adopt measures to bring
about mergers of firms in strategic activities. Governments can set up public
research and development (R&D) centres designed to generate and transfer tech-
nology to firms at ‘competitive’ prices (rather than at prices set to extract patent
rents). States can use public procurement policy—especially in developing countries
that are not signatories to the current agreements among only some WTO
members—to foster domestic firms that may later go on to build export capacity.
The WTO has ‘green light’ exemptions that allow for state subsidies: to support
R&D; to support disadvantaged regions of a country; and to help existing facilities
switch to environmentally cleaner technology. A country can introduce ‘trade
restrictive’ protection to encourage infant industries where the rate of aggregate
import growth threatens to provoke balance of payments difficulties (under
Article XVIII). It can also do this to protect a specific industry against an import
surge (Article XIX), as well as to protect an industry against unfair trading
practices (dumping, etc.) by other countries. Additionally, export taxes, for
example, can be imposed to discourage exports of unprocessed commodities.
There will, of course, be overt and covert attempts to interfere with the design
and implementation of policies such as these. There is substantial variation in how
WTO rules are agreed and applied. For example, rather than having tariff rates
forced down by WTO diktat, the governments of some countries have willingly
reduced them below what is agreed through their WTO commitments.³⁰ United
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) deserves credit for acknow-
ledging the degree of variation and what is possible:
[I]n carrying out such policy measures, the real test becomes that of the policy-
makers’ commitment to maintaining emphasis on industrial policy efforts. The
²⁸ UNECA (2016). ²⁹ Gallagher (2007: 82). ³⁰ Aggarwal and Evenett (2014).
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situation is challenging, but if policymakers are swayed by the prevailing
orthodoxy from the outset [or, we would add, by those who gain from that
orthodoxy], the lack of policy space will only be accentuated.³¹
Since the creation of the WTO, developing countries have been able to ‘game’ the
system effectively. Amrita Bahri’s research has shown that ‘With better bargaining
and litigation strategies, and with the consequentially enhanced capacity to raise
credible litigation threats, Member States can improve their “terms-of-trade”.’³²
This may involve both knowing the rules, and stretching, interpreting, testing, and
adjusting favourably to them: ‘strategic lawyering’.³³
Brazil, for example, has used the WTO’s dispute resolution system in a variety
of ways to protect domestic firms and support exporters, such as the formerly
state-owned aircraft manufacturer Embraer. Not only were Embraer’s export
markets successfully defended against Canadian aerospace interests, careful prep-
aration for litigation stimulated deeper productive relations between the Brazilian
state and private sector. The Brazilian experience suggests that developing coun-
tries seeking to make the international trading system work for them need the
services of experienced trade lawyers (and plenty of them); politicians with the
nous to decide which cases to litigate and which to leave alone; and officials who
can monitor trade practices in other countries.
African policy officials may be encouraged by another, even more dramatic,
example of how to use the WTO system to promote and protect domestic industry:
Despite expectations that China would abandon its more protective industrial
policies after entering the WTO, during the past decade the Chinese government
has increased its reliance on WTO-inconsistent measures as a key tool for
managing the country’s economy.³⁴
China’s officials have been astute in adopting policies, then holding out until they
are challenged in the WTO. They then continue with the policies through what is
typically a long, drawn-out period of negotiation and WTO procedures, before
finally, if they are ruled against, scaling back protective or ‘trade restrictive’
measures. By the time this stage is reached, the policies have often already done
much of the work needed to support a new domestic industry.
Foreign firms are pressed to operate through joint ventures with Chinese firms,
pushed to transfer technology in key sectors, and persuaded to meet local content
requirements. Meanwhile, the Chinese state promotes new sets of activity through
state-owned enterprises, many of which are incompletely privatized, and spon-
sored through measures such as subsidies and cheap, targeted credit. This kind of
approach was adopted in sectors such as wind power, high-speed railways, and
³¹ UNECA (2016: 117). See also Aggarwal and Evenett (2014); Amsden and Hikino (2000).
³² Bahri (2016: 642). ³³ Santos (2011: 594). ³⁴ Oh (2015: 1125).
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solar power. When China was challenged in the WTO, the resultant negotiations
took years. One tactic that drew the negotiation process out even longer was the
neglect, by the Chinese negotiating team, to translate key documents into English,
French, or Spanish (the three official WTO languages).³⁵
A concerted attempt to adopt at least some elements of China’s approach and
tactics could begin to halt Africa’s declining share of world markets, allowing
faster growth in the imports required for accumulation.
5.4 Exchange Rates as Development Policy
Exchange rates can, along with other prices, be manipulated or ‘got wrong’ for
productive, transformative, and competitive purposes. The standard economics
textbook approach to exchange rates treats them as relative prices that balance or
can create a tendency to equilibrium in the external account. But exchange rates
are, rather, about the pace of change in an economy; they are key to the level and
rate of growth of economic activity at which external accounts balance.
There are two main reasons why some economists are wary of government
intervention to make exchange rates ‘competitive’ or ‘undervalued’. The first is
simply the belief that any intervention in markets is distortionary, leading to
perverse economic outcomes. This follows from the approach noted in Section 5.2,
in which the exchange rate is key to maintaining balance in external accounts
(irrespective of the level of activity); and this approach prioritizes macroeconomic
balance and equilibrium above production, growth, structural change, and,
frankly, human welfare. These economists emphasize the possible costs of com-
petitive devaluations, arguing, for example, that large deviations from ‘equilib-
rium’ prices can be harmful for growth.
This goes for both large undervaluations and large overvaluations. If the
exchange rate is undervalued for any length of time, the consequences may
include: an inefficient build-up of low-yielding foreign reserves; inflation and
macroeconomic instability, especially if there are no countervailing measures to
restrain wage growth; a reduction in the scope for using monetary policy to
manage efficient levels of investment; and reductions in consumer welfare and
overall demand, because undervaluation can act as a tax on consumption
spending—though this ignores the scope for dynamic effects of an undervalu-
ation, as discussed later in this section.³⁶ From this perspective, the role of central
banks is limited, intervening in currency markets only to minimize large short-
term swings in the real exchange rate; otherwise, they should use the exchange rate
as a price helping to secure low inflation.³⁷
³⁵ Oh (2015). ³⁶ Haddad and Pancaro (2010). ³⁷ Frenkel and Rapetti (2014).
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The second source of anxiety about exchange rate undervaluation derives from
different theoretical and political concerns. Partly, it is based on very reasonable
fears about the impact devaluation might have on the price of wage goods and
aggregate demand, and hence on growth. Economists within a Kaldorian or
structuralist tradition—including staunch supporters of Tanzania’s efforts in the
early 1980s to resist IMF demands for devaluation—anticipate a redistribution of
income away from wage earners, largely because workers’wages are unlikely in the
short term to increase in step with the prices of already scarce imported goods.³⁸
This may increase political instability and encourage capital flight, as well redu-
cing overall demand because wage workers—who have a relatively high propen-
sity to spend their income—are experiencing falls in their real wages. With overall
demand declining as a result of the devaluation, growth may slow. Another risk is
that if external debts have been contracted in foreign currencies, then devaluation
exposes an economy to deeper debt-servicing difficulties.
Furthermore, when exchange rates become undervalued, elasticities of supply
and demand for African exports may scupper the benefits some economists
anticipate. On the supply side, it is not clear that the volume of Africa’s exports
responded very positively or rapidly to price increases enjoyed during the post-
2001 commodity boom.³⁹ Demand-induced responses may be weakened because
much global trade now flows through supply chain links between firms spread
across different countries. A country may export goods that are then intermediate
inputs in long chains assembling final consumer products. A devaluation in one
such exporting country may have only a modest impact on overall global demand
for the final product, given the complexity and the number of economies contrib-
uting to production of that good. This effect may well vary depending on how
significant a given country’s contribution is to the final value chain product.⁴⁰
It is also difficult to make confident predictions about the results of exchange
rate changes for other reasons: a depreciation may make exports more competi-
tively priced internationally, but at the same time it raises the cost of imports and
hence of production, which in turn will be reflected in profitability and/or export
prices. Thus, where the import content of exports is high—as is the case in many
African economies—depreciation may be less effective in promoting export
growth.⁴¹ In addition, a devaluation designed to stimulate growth in the volume
of exports may fail if capitalists prefer to concentrate their investment efforts on
high-profit niche opportunities in the domestic market, such as urban property
speculation. It may also fail because, as is common in many African countries,
there are supply-side rigidities blocking a rapid commodity response to demand
signals. Transport infrastructure may be weak or have collapsed, there may be
³⁸ Singh (1986). ³⁹ Mold and Prizzon (2010: 3).
⁴⁰ Ahmed, Appendino, and Ruta (2015: 17); Cheng et al. (2016).
⁴¹ Ahmed, Appendino, and Ruta (2015: 17).
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frequent power cuts and insufficient R&D to support production and increases in
productivity—the price signal of a devaluation may be a faint blinking torch in an
empty desert.
So there are reasons why some economic advisors to African policymakers (as
well as African leaders such as Julius Nyerere) have argued vehemently against
devaluation. But this opposition is usually eventually crushed, and it may be
misguided. Exchange rate policy is too important to be guided by gestural
opposition to Washington bullies, and insisting on maintaining an overvalued
exchange rate can be a way of giving up policy responsibility. The evidence shows
that growth episodes are clearly linked to competitive exchange rates, and there
are clear mechanisms that help explain why this is so.
This empirical claim is linked to the analytical idea that exchange rate move-
ments help determine the level and the rate of change of economic activity—at
which, necessarily, the balance of payments account balances. The link between a
competitive and stable real exchange rate and higher gross domestic product
(GDP) growth rates is evident in a variety of regression analyses that use a range
of datasets for GDP growth rates, as well as in historical case studies of growth
episodes. There is evidence, too, that the effect is especially marked in developing
countries, although the effect may be strong both in low- and high-income coun-
tries, but weaker in between.⁴² Nonetheless, there is a plenty of evidence suggesting
that targeting a competitive exchange rate is an effective growth-enhancing policy
for developing countries.
Exchange rates have complex links to the rest of the economy, but some of
the dynamics explaining how competitive undervaluations can generate faster
GDP growth are beginning to be understood. Policies that shift resources away
from non-tradeables towards tradeables can help accelerate structural change
and growth, as this shift will often involve transferring resources from low- to
high-productivity activities. Not all high-productivity activities fall into the sector
conventionally defined as ‘manufacturing’, but many do, and it has long been
argued that manufacturing is central to long-run growth and development (see
Chapter 3), and that manufactured exports in particular are associated with
sustained growth and development.
An undervalued exchange rate can signal profitability and provoke a shift of
resources to tradeable activities. In low-income African economies, however, the
incentive to invest in higher-productivity activities may have been dulled by the
small size of domestic markets, meaning that potential economies of scale cannot
be captured. Firms in these economies might be more confident about increasing
their profits if a depreciation of the real exchange rate opens up larger inter-
national market demand, making it possible for them to benefit from economies
⁴² Rodrik (2008); Rapetti et al. (2012).
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of scale. This in turn may help unleash the cumulative efficiencies that evolve from
spill-overs, linkages, and ‘intimate connections’ among firms within the country.
In short, a competitive real exchange rate can set off a virtuous cycle of product-
ivity improvements.
A currency undervaluation—changing relative prices with a view to promoting
particular kinds of production—can work like a subsidy, increasing investors’
profits and effectively acting as an ‘infant industry’ protection policy. It ‘gets prices
wrong’ in order to create a profitable environment within which developing
countries can generate competitive know-how, exploit scale economies, and
accelerate ‘learning’. It then works like one of Hirschman’s linkages (Chapter 6),
by providing a compelling signal of profitability and calling forth new invest-
ments. In one study, 92 episodes of manufacturing export growth were preceded
by currency devaluations (facilitating both growth into new export markets and
the growth of new export products). Other work confirms the structural change-
promoting effect of currency undervaluation.⁴³
Exchange rate policy is one (blunt) instrument, the effectiveness of which is likely
to be greater when combined with other policies. These include public R&D;
investment in education; and large investments in infrastructure, targeting espe-
cially those areas and activities with scope for foreign exchange earnings and
employment growth that are also likely to stimulate dynamic increasing returns.
There may also be a case for targeting how the subsidy that is an undervalued real
exchange rate works—combining fiscal and exchange rate policy as a kind of
selective industrial policy. One way to reroute the subsidy away from those trade-
ables less associated with structural change gains is to tax exports of products with
little scope for dynamic increasing returns, productivity increases, or employment.⁴⁴
In practice, it is difficult to determine the outcomes of exchange rate policy. If
the key objective is to sustain a moderate, stable, and credible undervaluation,
policy officials will need to agree on how best to assess the current level of under-
or overvaluation of the real exchange rate. The importance of monitoring trends
in the real exchange rate lies in the information it gives about relative profitability
across economies. Most mainstream economists do not focus on this information,
believing the main purpose of real exchange rate calculations is to highlight
variations in rates of consumer price inflation between countries. However,
these variations are not always a clear guide to relative profitability, and an
undervalued exchange rate can lower the time preference for saving (increasing
the willingness to save). It can also make investment more ‘efficient’, raising the
marginal product of capital. Uncertainties about profitability and future flows of
investment will continue to confront policymakers, but they can take comfort in
⁴³ Frenkel and Rapetti (2014); McMillan and Rodrik (2011); Freund and Pierola (2012).
⁴⁴ Guzman, Ocampo, and Stiglitz (2017).
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the finding that investment is more likely to be sustained if there is an expectation
that the exchange rate policy will not be subject to big swings.
Advocates of devaluation hope that a cut in domestic purchasing power
(among wage earners and local material suppliers) will be offset by a rise in
foreign demand for the country’s output. This includes both demand for goods
and services exported and demand to invest in assets in the country. If this is the
case, then the effect of the currency depreciation will be to raise investment and
output in the economy as a whole. As a result, wages may start to rise alongside
sustained growth and productivity increases. It is important to emphasize that the
positive effects of devaluation/undervaluation may be the result of attracting new
flows of foreign investment, just as much (perhaps even more) as through the
volume of trade.
It is clear from the discussion here that exchange rate policy is deeply political,
involving judgements well beyond the remit (or the competence) of IMF techno-
crats. Where wages are already very low and the cost of living is rising, will it be
possible to persuade people to accept a rise in the general price level? It is well
known that the inflationary effects of devaluations can be ‘politically disruptive
enough to derail’ IMF programmes.⁴⁵ As Kalecki noted (see Chapter 4), acceler-
ating wage goods price inflation may lead either to reduced investment, if it has to
be accommodated in higher wages and lower profits, or to rising political conflict
around falling real wages. An exchange rate devaluation risks something similar. It
needs very careful political management (e.g. in the form of a ‘deal’ to secure the
temporary acceptance of lower real wages, against the promise of faster growth,
rising productivity, and longer-term rising real wages). This needs to be combined
with an investment strategy to increase the non-inflationary supply of basic wage
goods, as well as short-term market interventions to ensure that the prices of food
staples do not rise above a certain threshold.
Finally, policy officials need to be aware of the complexities of judging exactly
how much an exchange rate is over- or undervalued. They will in all likelihood
find themselves in negotiations with the IMF, whose staff use a variety of methods
(some more transparent than others) to make a judgement. How far a particular
country’s real exchange rate and current account deviate from the ‘norm’
observed in selected comparator countries will determine the Fund’s estimate of
(typically) overvaluation. Sometimes the IMF simply draws a regression line,
roughly linking levels of per capita income to the real exchange rate across
economies. How far a given country’s real exchange rate veers away from the
line of best fit (‘the norm’) shows the degree of overvaluation. For example, this
method calculated the Ethiopian birr as being overvalued by 36 per cent in 2017.⁴⁶
⁴⁵ Taylor (1997: 148).
⁴⁶ If the sample of comparator countries had been expanded to include commodity producers, the
extent of overvaluation would have fallen to the less extreme figure of 22 per cent. IMF (2016: 32).
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Any attempt to achieve a real devaluation of more than 30 per cent would almost
certainly have had dramatic and unforeseeable consequences for the Ethiopian
economy.
Many would agree that in recent years the birr was not set at an appropriate
rate, despite nominal depreciations. Even so, the IMF assessment was probably an
exaggeration, and it is hard to make sense of the method used to arrive at this
extreme and risky assessment. We argue that because exchange rates really point
to differences across countries in profitability, it would be better to gather data
from several countries on unit production costs (wages and material/input costs
per physical unit of output) for a comparable sample of tradeable and non-
tradeable outputs. There is not good data on these for Ethiopia, or for many
other African economies.
5.5 Narrow Definitions of Industrial Policy and
Manufacturing: Assembly Plants or Plant Assembly?
In the past, economists and policymakers set priorities based on distinctions
between broad economic sectors: agriculture or primary commodity production;
manufacturing industry; and services. Non-mainstream development economists
have emphasized the distinctive features of manufacturing: the link between
manufacturing output and overall GDP growth; the link between manufacturing
output and productivity in manufacturing; and the link between manufacturing
output and productivity in the rest of the economy. Where neoclassical econo-
mists saw no distinctive features separating one sector from another, arguing for
‘horizontal’ policies that would affect efficiency across any sector, structuralist
economists argued for more ‘vertical’ interventions that would accelerate invest-
ment specifically in manufacturing.
Evidence supporting Kaldor’s views about the manufacturing sector’s
unique contribution to growth has been accumulating for several decades. The
evidence also supports an industrial policy that involves selective interventions in
support of particular industries, as well as the wielding of a ‘reciprocal control
mechanism’—a disciplining mechanism that ensures support for firms or indus-
tries is conditional on performance against specific criteria. In recent years, some
neoclassically trained economists claim to recognize the role of industrial policy in
economic growth and structural change. Two influences on this change of heart
have been, first, advances in technique that have enabled better modelling of
increasing returns—in the past, despite awareness of increasing returns, econo-
mists were unable to incorporate these returns in mathematical models. The
second influence has been the increasing popularity of the ‘market failure’ and
‘information theoretic’ strain of neoclassical economics. These developments have
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helped foster a belated enthusiasm within the mainstream for industrial policy.⁴⁷
In late 2018, for example, an International Finance Corporation (IFC) official
pronounced at a workshop on industrialization in Africa that industrialization
was ‘the dominant paradigm’ for development. The only eyebrows raised were
those of the few non-mainstream economists around the table not used to hearing
any enthusiastic orthodox pronouncements about industrial policy. The same
developments lie behind support for specific interventions in industries with a
particular proclivity for ‘learning externalities’ and facing other market failures.⁴⁸
These are contrasted with primary commodity exports. This rediscovery of
industrial policy is usually limited in two important ways.
First, the market failure underpinnings of some new advocates of industrial
policy leads to a narrow set of policies. This approach is exemplified in the work of
Justin Lin and the idea that industrial policy must be restricted to state interven-
tions that ‘facilitate comparative advantage’ in Africa, typically focusing on light
manufacturing and on removing red tape, improving the ‘doing business’ climate,
and investing in infrastructure. Arguments along these lines do at least acknow-
ledge that some form of industrial policy might be possible in Africa. But we argue
that Lin’s restricted view—imagine a car with huge blind spots curbing the view
behind and a windscreen so fogged up that only part of the road ahead is visible—
unnecessarily limits the possibilities for intervention. It represents a very partial
understanding of the evidence on and history of thought about industrial policy.⁴⁹
Second, while some acknowledge the significance of industrial policy in past
experiences of ‘catch-up’ development, they also argue that the policies used
(in countries such as Korea or Taiwan) can no longer be deployed effectively.
This is partly because the rules of the game (WTO and other regulations) are
misleadingly said to prohibit their use, and partly because it is thought that
structural changes in the global economy mean that manufacturing is now less
central to development: low- and middle-income economies are said to be in
the grip of premature deindustrialization. We have already argued (in Chapter 4)
that premature industrialization should not be considered an iron law preventing
African governments from adopting effective industrial policies. Here, we criticize
pessimists’ understanding of the role of manufacturing—and their policy
conclusions—in a little more detail.
Arguments about premature deindustrialization rest on a standard classifica-
tion of sectors that is increasingly outdated and unhelpful for economic analysis
and policy design. The irony is that the traditional three-sector classification is
becoming irrelevant just as neoclassical economists are discovering there really are
differences between sectors. The special characteristics that in the past were
associated with manufacturing have become detached from broadly defined
⁴⁷ Cherif and Hasanov (2019). ⁴⁸ Guzman, Ocampo, and Stiglitz (2017).
⁴⁹ For a critique of Lin’s new structural economics see Fine and van Waeyenberge (2013).
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‘sectors’ and attached instead to specific ‘activities’. The categorical boundaries
between sectors have become blurred by global technical and economic changes.
These have taken two forms in particular. First, there is ‘servicification’, meaning
that an increasing share of the final value of many products is derived from
services such as logistics or branding.⁵⁰ Second, there is the ‘industrialization of
freshness’: the production of high-value fresh fruit, vegetables, herbs, and flowers
is increasingly complex, sophisticated, and—by any reasonable definition—
industrial. For example, a fresh orange produced for export from, say, South
Africa to the UK, is technically more sophisticated, and industrially more com-
plex, than an apparently more ‘processed’ product such as a carton of orange juice.
Producing a consistent flow of top-quality oranges—meeting strict phyto-sanitary
rules of market access for the EU, ensuring the oranges are perfectly ripe and juicy,
and look the part—is an extremely difficult task. It involves an ‘intricate nexus’
that makes for a ‘roundabout’ production process—exactly the ingredients that
make something ‘industrial’.⁵¹ Much of this activity is not captured in standard
data on industrial output and is therefore missing from the literature on ‘prema-
ture deindustrialization’.
This blurring of categorical boundaries, and the resulting need to focus policy
not on ‘sectors’ but ‘activities’, should inform the design of structural change
policies. The two most important criteria to be applied before allocating resources
are, first, what scope an activity has to generate a rapid increase in export earnings;
and, second, what scope it has for generating employment (directly and indir-
ectly). Other criteria—the scope for technical learning, for economies of scale, for
generating ‘intimate connections’ between firms—may also be considered.
Policymakers need to know if these key criteria are satisfied more fully by, for
instance, promoting turnkey garment assembly sheds or supporting the expansion
of high-value horticulture and floriculture. Policymakers should also be prepared
to ask other detailed and politically difficult questions: for example, whether it is
appropriate to subsidize domestic food production when long-term price declines
on international markets imply favourable terms of trade for African cereal
importers; or whether subsidies should be directed towards the domestic produc-
tion of food types that make little or no contribution to improving the nutrition of
the poorest people.
5.6 Conclusions
We have argued that many policies are available for African governments to use in
influencing outcomes from international economic integration. The arguments of
⁵⁰ Lodefalk (2017). ⁵¹ Cramer, Di John, and Sender (2018).
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the trade pessimists are misleading. There are, of course, considerable difficulties
in trading with more powerful and wealthy partners, but there are many areas
where policy can overcome some of these difficulties. Securing these gains is
fundamental to successful structural change.
We have insisted that no simple magic trick policies are available: for example,
effective management of an undervalued exchange rate involves many comple-
mentary policies, including achieving a non-inflationary increase in the supply of
food and other basic wage goods. Above all, though, the argument presented in
this chapter is that African governments need to design public investment strat-
egies to achieve a rapid increase in the rate of growth of exports, so that they can
relax the balance of payments constraint on growth and allow a sustained rise in
imports—of capital goods, intermediate inputs, and consumer goods. Finally, we
have raised questions about which economic activities should be the main bene-
ficiaries of public interventions. If governments do not develop clear priorities
when designing policy, they may end up at the mercy of individual fancies or the
relative power of particular lobbying interests—all claiming to contribute to the
people’s welfare, the empowerment of women and the elimination of
undernutrition.
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Balance matters greatly to development economists from one end of the (ideo-
logical, methodological) scale to the other. For some, economies develop through
the continuous balancing out of market exchanges, with a high-wire act of
constant small adjustments facilitated by flexible prices, nudging the process
onward one step at a time. For others, markets left to themselves may hang in a
hopeless low-income equilibrium ‘trap’, snared by a series of ‘gaps’ (the savings
gap, the skills gap, the technology gap, the capital gap). These different sets of
ideas, converging on the importance of balance, lie behind a great deal of policy
advice meted out to officials in African (and other) governments.
In this chapter, we argue that these visions of balance are blind to the
history and dynamics of capitalism. They project fantasies of orderly and
largely predictable processes onto fundamentally uncertain, contradictory, and
frequently unstable realities. We contrast these illusions with a view of economic
development that positively embraces imbalance, contingency, productive mis-
takes, and unexpected chain reactions.
If the economy is to be kept moving ahead, the task of development policy is to
maintain tensions, disproportions and disequilibria.¹
In doing so, we resist the danger of replacing one fantasy with another by
emphasizing the difficulties that come with fundamental uncertainty and detailing
some grandiose development calamities. However, we also remind devotees of the
steady and balanced that there have often been overlooked developmental benefits
generated by supposed ‘development disasters’, like the infamous groundnut
scheme in British colonial Tanganyika.
The ideas of Albert Hirschman are at the heart of this chapter. We summarize
some of Hirschman’s ideas in Section 6.3, highlighting not only his arguments
about unbalanced growth but also his ideas about the ‘hiding hand’ (as opposed to
the ‘invisible hand’), as well as his broader ‘bias for hope’. Hirschman’s ideas have
always garnered wary respect from many mainstream economists, but, unable for
¹ Hirschman (1958: 66).
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the most part to absorb them into neoclassical models, they have nonetheless
largely dismissed them.²
Before discussing Hirschman, the chapter sets out balanced growth models,
assumptions, and strategies. We summarize the original ‘balanced growth’ strat-
egy as well as more recent variants, such as the big push strategy. The latter
include both structural adjustment programmes designed by the World Bank, and
strategies for sustainable and inclusive development put forward by United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). In arguing for
productive imbalance, this chapter complements what we have already set out
in Chapters 4 and 5 (on the economics of growth and trade), but here we focus on
particular examples of firms and very ambitious projects, including Sasol in South
Africa and Ethiopian Airlines, and large dams in Mozambique and elsewhere. The
chapter also discusses the considerable risks involved in pursuing an unbalanced
growth strategy (whether it is labelled that or not).
6.2 Ideas of Balance in Economics and Development
The idea of balance runs as a powerful current through much economic thinking
and development strategy. It is not one idea, however. Rather, balance plays
different roles in varying approaches to economic analysis. This section introduces
some of these ideas.
Accounting Identities and Macroeconomic Balances
Balance is semantically slippery and can mean many things. One of the main
usages involves balanced growth as a deliberate strategy for low-income econ-
omies to escape persistent low demand and low investment. However, there are
also other, and in a sense deeper, notions of balance. The conventions of account-
ing (one person’s liabilities are another’s assets) lie at the heart of a national
accounts system that, before and during the Second World War, was developed
into the foundations of modern macroeconomics.³ Analysing the interactions
among three related balances in the economy—public (spending and revenue in
the public sector); private (income, expenditure, and borrowing by private firms
and individuals); and external (the balance of import spending and export earn-
ings, plus capital account movements, and external borrowing)—is a fruitful way
² ‘Mr Hirschman was never awarded the Nobel Prize in economics he so richly deserved, perhaps
because his writing was hard to classify’ (The Economist, 2012).
³ On the history of the national accounts system in the UK see Tily (2009) and in Africa, Deane
(2011).
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of identifying trends in an economy, as well as spotting any alarming tendencies.⁴
An Ethiopian application of this approach in 2017 was probably the first time it
had been applied in sub-Saharan Africa. It confirmed the importance of the public
sector in leading growth in recent years; made it more obvious than is normally
acknowledged how important private sector investment has been, especially after
2012; and suggested that although external spending was sufficiently above earn-
ing to cause concern, there was no immediate danger of a ‘debt crisis’.⁵
While macroeconomic imbalances may be a source of crisis, some of the focus
on achieving macroeconomic balances is misleading, fetishistic, and obsessional.
In Chapter 5, for example, we argued that the key is not whether payments balance
out neatly, but what the level of economic activity (investment, employment, etc.)
at which the external sector balances is.
Equilibrium Thinking
Deeper in economic ideas and methodologies lies the notion of balance that is
equilibrium. Neoclassical economics considers that economies, especially if mar-
kets are left largely to their own devices, tend to equilibrium. Alfred Marshall, a
pioneer of modern economics, wrote:
As, in spite of the great differences in form between birds and quadrupeds, there is
one Fundamental Idea running through all their frames, so the general theory of the
equilibrium of demand and supply is a Fundamental Idea running through the
frames of all the various parts of the central problem of Distribution and Exchange.⁶
In general equilibrium models, this complex balancing act is achieved through
myriad adjustments of wants and offers—supply and demand—among buyers
and sellers, reflected in continuous movements in relative prices. Flexible prices
allow markets to ‘clear’ at an equilibrium price at which there is no excess of
supply over demand or of demand over supply. This powerful idea may be used to
analyse any manner of social phenomena beyond merely markets for goods and
services. In a trend that became known as ‘economics imperialism’, many econo-
mists took to claiming they could explain an ever wider set of social phenomena
by using the core precepts of neoclassical equilibrium economics.⁷ Equilibrium
became fundamental to the work of most economists during the twentieth century.
As a result, key aspects of industrial reality—acknowledged early on in Adam
Smith’sWealth of Nations and in Marshall’s analysis of diminishing and increasing
returns—were sacrificed on the altar of mathematical tractability. Mainstream
⁴ Godley (1999). ⁵ Coutts and Laskaridis (2019). ⁶ Marshall (1920/1997: 8).
⁷ Fine and Milonakis (2009), Cramer (2010).
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economics can be defined as the formal modelling of how maximizing individuals
with unbounded rationality behave, operating in markets with strong tendencies
towards equilibrium. Robert Solow summarized it in three words: ‘greed, rationality,
and equilibrium’.⁸
While such methodological constraints have shaped much of modern econom-
ics, some within the neoclassical mainstream have sought to escape them. Kenneth
Arrow showed how absurdly restrictive the conditions necessary to make general
equilibrium possible were; many others took their cue from his and related work
to explore the implications of more realistic departures from perfect competition,
price-taking by all economic ‘agents’, and perfect information. Endogenous
growth theorists attempted to incorporate at least some forms of increasing
returns into formal models,⁹ while others explored the manifold implications of
imperfect and asymmetric (i.e. decidedly imbalanced) information.
Even these economists, though, were nervous of policy officials taking the hint
and doing things ‘out of step’. Trade theorists such as Paul Krugman, who at least
for a while acknowledged how actually existing increasing returns placed limits on
comparative advantage theory, made a point of counselling developing country
governments not to abandon free trade. Economists who noted the ambitious,
unbalanced interventions promoting rapid industrialization in countries such as
South Korea and Taiwan, nonetheless advised African governments not to emu-
late such policies.¹⁰ Joseph Stiglitz, for example, argued that a government ought
to match its interventions to its current administrative capacity. Meanwhile, trade
economists such as Adrian Wood have argued the importance of waiting for the
stock of skills to rise relative to the extent of cultivable land until a shift in relative
prices indicates changing comparative advantage. Wood believed that, for most
African countries, this was ‘bound to be a slow process’.¹¹
Generally, policy advice emanating from those trained in neoclassical econom-
ics is doctrinally attached to what Alfred Marshall called the ‘Principle of
Continuity’, summed up in the epigraph to his major work: ‘natura non facit
saltum’ (nature does not advance by leaps).
Not all economists have been seduced by equilibrium economics, with one of its
most trenchant critics being Kaldor:
I should go further and say that the powerful attraction of the habits of thought
engendered by ‘equilibrium economics’ has become a major obstacle to the
development of economics as a science.¹²
⁸ Cited in King (2013c: 19). ⁹ Romer (1994, 1996); Ruttan (1998).
¹⁰ Krugman (1987, 1993). Rodrik (2016: 15) argues that other countries that built up a head start in
industrialization behind protective walls and through the use of import substitution and manufactured
exports ‘make it difficult for Africa to carve a space for itself ’.
¹¹ Owens and Wood (1997: 1468). See also Lin in Lin and Chang (2009) on the ‘high costs’ of
defying comparative advantage.
¹² Kaldor (1972: 1237), cited in King (2009b: 162).
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Kaldor’s critique was partly methodological: neoclassical economics typically
proceeded from assumptions that were either unverifiable (‘maximizing’ con-
sumers or businesses, for example) or observably false (perfect competition and
information, linear and homogeneous production functions), where it ought to
proceed from ‘stylized facts’. But his critique was also a substantive one, stressing,
among other things, the significance of increasing returns. Combining capitalism’s
competitive logic with the widespread role of increasing returns made for a self-
sustaining growth process (that nonetheless required government intervention to
keep rolling). In this process, the most important influences are endogenous, not
exogenous as neoclassical economics assumes them to be.¹³ Endogeneity—when
variables are not fully ‘independent’ of each either, meaning that a variable that is
a possible explanatory factor for an outcome may itself be influenced by changes
in that outcome—makes for what Myrdal called ‘cumulative causation’. Allyn
Young had earlier had the same powerful insight, arguing that economic growth is
‘progressive and propagates itself in a cumulative way’.¹⁴
Balanced Growth Big Push Strategies
Development economists have used other versions of balance, drawing implicitly
or explicitly on the ideas of post-Second World War figures such as Rosenstein-
Rodan and Nurkse, which advocated a purposive strategy of balanced growth.¹⁵
These proposals built on the observation that economies could become stuck in a
low-employment, low-income, low-investment equilibrium. Something was
required to provoke investments that would pull a developing economy out of
such a swamp of inactivity and low productivity. Given the low level of demand,
individual investors are unlikely to act alone, while the size of the market is too
small to generate demand for outputs from a new firm and thereby provoke a
cumulative process of specialization. These doubts about the behaviour of indi-
vidual investors in poor economies are a manifestation of Keynes’ insight that, in
conditions of fundamental uncertainty, private investors in richer countries will
not easily commit to investing. Something, then, is required to help investors
overcome their rational aversion to investing. For proponents of balanced growth,
what was required in a low-income economy was a concerted ‘big push’ by the
state—across a wide range of complementary activities.
The principle determining ‘big push’ resource allocation was the income
elasticity of demand across specific activities. For example, industrial expansion
should grow in step with food production and agricultural growth, while capital
¹³ King (2009b: 163–6).
¹⁴ Myrdal (1957); Young (1928: 533). On endogeneity and the challenge it poses to econometrics, for
example, see Esping-Andersen and Przeworski (2001).
¹⁵ Nurkse (1966); Rosenstein Rodan (1943, 1961).
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goods production should grow in step with consumer goods output. Here, ‘in step’
does not mean at precisely the same rate, but at rates in harmony with relative
elasticities of demand for capital and consumer goods, manufactures and food and
agricultural inputs, and so on.
Early balanced growth strategies usually had in mind closed economies and,
perhaps for that reason, remain attractive to those sympathetic to the views of
‘export pessimists’ (see Chapter 5). If there is scope for low-income economies to
take advantage of ‘autonomous’ external demand (for exports), as well as scope for
managing trade policy, then some of the demand and profitability concerns
motivating big push arguments fall away.
UNCTAD and Other Modern Forms of Balanced Growth Strategy
UNCTAD’s advocacy of a ‘comprehensive policy approach’ is the most sophisti-
cated recent development strategy stamped with the imprint of earlier balanced
growth ideas. This influence is explicit in UNCTAD’s explanation for stalled
industrialization in many countries, where ‘investment levels . . . may still be
too low to provide the big push required to trigger a self-sustaining process of
expanding production capacities and domestic demand’.¹⁶
The UNCTAD policy proposals are ambitious, envisaging a development
strategy where states effectively balance trade policy with industrial policy, design
interventions to stimulate mutually supportive linkages, and at the same time put
in place growth-enhancing institutions (the implication being that these institu-
tions are prerequisites for development).¹⁷ In the light of the instabilities and waste
revealed by the 2008 global financial crisis, developing countries are also advised
to ‘rebalance’ their economies away from financial sector dependence.
Given UNCTAD’s (and many other economists’) misgivings about relying on
global demand, these countries are advised to rebalance towards home market
supply and demand. Overall, ‘attention is focused on the challenge of building
linkages across various dimensions, the integrated policy approach this implies,
and the institutional geometry that has been found in all the successful indus-
trializers, irrespective of context, to meet this challenge’. They not only recom-
mend an integrated policy approach involving an alignment of trade, competition,
labour, and macroeconomic policies, but also argue that the initial ‘push’may now
(in the twenty-first century) need to be bigger than ever, because ‘the pace of
capital formation needed to kick-start and sustain a period of successful catch-up
growth has been rising’.¹⁸
This precarious balancing act places demands on states and societies that
trigger the same criticisms made about previous balanced growth strategies.
¹⁶ UNCTAD (2016: 78). ¹⁷ UNCTAD (2016: 179). ¹⁸ UNCTAD (2016: 175–6).
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UNCTAD’s strategy seems to imagine that low-income economies have no
debilitating scarcities—of resources, people, inputs, decision-making capabilities,
skills, or investible funds—that may constrain simultaneous resource allocation
across a wide range of activities. If there were no (or very few) such constraints,
then it is unclear why a big push would be required in the first place. Furthermore,
a balanced growth strategy assumes that different activities interlock seamlessly in
ways that are readily calculable—assuming, for example, that income elasticities of
demand can accurately be predicted for different goods.¹⁹ There is no room in
such a strategy for lack of data or unreliable estimates of future patterns of
demand, nor indeed for fundamental uncertainty about whether severe weather
events, domestic political struggles, or other disruptive events might clog the
integrating mechanisms.
There is a further, less discussed, problem with these strategies of balance. An
UNCTAD blueprint for sustainable economic growth indicates that many differ-
ent things are all desirable. In this it resembles consultancy reports and govern-
ment ‘vision strategies’ that set out lengthy lists of reforms, projects, interventions,
and institutional designs, without pausing to make a reasoned case for which
should be prioritized. Elsewhere we have given the example of international
reports and national research institute documents stating what needs to change
to improve Ethiopian coffee production and exports. These reports, whatever their
assumptions, evidence, and logic, usually set out a bewildering array of wish-list
changes.²⁰
Far from being the exclusive preserve of UNCTAD, such policy and blueprint
‘packages’ are widespread. The World Bank’sWorld Development Report 2005, for
instance, ‘contained a long list of reforms to systems of economic governance that
countries would need to undertake in order to achieve significant progress in
transformation’.²¹ Another lengthy shopping list of reforms is the outcome of a
recent attempt to put Africa’s industrialization prospects into historical perspec-
tive: some economic historians argue that the potential for a manufacturing export
boom in Africa—along the lines of what the UK and Japan achieved—is very
limited. This is because ‘Current wage gaps between African economies and late
industrializing countries in Asia such as Vietnam and Bangladesh, or even China,
are not nearly as large as the gap between Britain and Japan around 1900.’²²
Instead, they propose a development strategy that involves promoting growth
within Africa’s domestic markets, and requires the implementation of an
extremely long list of ‘priority’ policies and mutually supportive, conventional
preconditions: macroeconomic stability to enhance investor and consumer con-
fidence; institutional improvements in property rights protection and bureau-
cratic processes, and the support of credit facilities and financial services; targeted
technology transfer programmes and a limited, cautious use of protection to
¹⁹ See Thirlwall (2005: 235) and Sutcliffe (1964). ²⁰ Cramer and Sender (2019).
²¹ Balchin, Booth, and te Velde (2019: 12). ²² Frankema and van Waijenburg (2018: 547).
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pursue import substitution industrialization; social security for the poor; and
reform of fiscal policy to raise revenue on domestic transactions.²³
‘Structural adjustment’ programmes—designed by the World Bank for African
economies with balance of payments difficulties—also had echoes of the big push
idea. Programme funds came with ‘conditionalities’ that states were required to
sign up to if they were to secure the Bank’s support. Conditionalities flowed from a
‘Washington Consensus’ that economic stabilization and subsequent growth
could only come about through adopting fiscal discipline; ensuring positive real
interest rates; aiming at a competitive, ‘fundamental equilibrium exchange rate’;
liberalizing imports and foreign direct investment; privatization and deregulation;
and establishing secure private property rights.²⁴ The heyday of the Washington
Consensus passed, but in its wake came a variety of approaches—including
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and the ‘good governance agenda’—
which some have argued led to a further proliferation of conditionalities.
The ‘good governance’ agenda also bears the imprint of big push thinking. With
weak or ‘bad’ governance identified as the key obstacle to economic development
(once structural adjustment programmes had clearly failed), proponents of good
governance argued for ambitious accountability and transparency reforms across a
wide range of institutions, from revenue authorities to judiciaries and security
institutions. Their argument had two key features: first, putting in place governance
reforms was a fundamental precondition to sustained economic development; and,
second, the reforms involved a sweeping range of simultaneous, ‘big push’, reforms.
Governance reforms aimed at, for example, increasing public participation in policy
decisions or making officials more accountable for their decisions, are widely agreed
to be progressive.²⁵ This, though, is not the same as arguing that they are the first
steps in a causal chain of economic development. Indeed, empirical evidence shows
that the governance reforms proposed by international organizations and academics
have not, historically, been necessary preconditions for development.²⁶ Instead,
there is a more complex—or, as Hirschman put it when discussing the broader
relationship between politics and economics, an ‘on again, off again’—relationship
between governance, growth, and development.²⁷
Small Steps or Big Leaps
As a strategy, balanced growth may be attractive but unrealistic. Balance in the
broader sense of a framework of economics and policy advice based on the idea of
²³ Frankema and van Waijenburg (2018). ²⁴ Williamson (1990).
²⁵ This is the basis for Mo Ibrahim Foundation campaigns: http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/.
²⁶ Khan (2012: 52). ²⁷ Hirschman (1994).
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equilibrium provides a misleading conception of economic and structural change.
Advocates of both balanced and unbalanced growth are ‘united in their rejection
of development by piecemeal marginalism’.²⁸ Alfred Marshall put great emphasis
on the idea of continuity, and this was influenced by two huge advances of
nineteenth-century thought: Darwin’s insights into evolution and Cournot’s
development of differential calculus. In other words, the natura non facit saltum
idea was very much an idea of its time. In economics, it underpins a very different
image of change compared to, for example, Schumpeter’s vision of capitalism as a
‘perennial gale of creative destruction’, or the brute force of (especially) the initial
shift to and spread of capitalism described by Marx.²⁹ An intellectual apparatus
held together by the rebar of marginal analysis and assumptions of diminishing or
constant returns is not well suited to accounting for brutal real-world episodes of
growth acceleration; shifts in industrial organization, foreign direct investment,
and economic policy; or technical changes that have often come about during or
in the wake of major wars. One such example can be seen in the dramatic growth
rates experienced by Ethiopia (and Mozambique and Rwanda) since the early
2000s. Although some features of the past century may have helped lay the
groundwork for recent economic changes in these African countries, it would be
deluded to claim that such growth episodes reflect only a ‘Principle of Continuity’.
6.3 Albert Hirschman’s Development Economics
Pressures, Tensions, and Disequilibrium as the Motor of Change
It was exactly the problems that made a big push strategy unfeasible that pro-
moted a response from Albert Hirschman, in what has been dubbed ‘one of the
most provocative books ever written on development strategy’ (another, Paul
Krugman, called it ‘destructive’).³⁰Hirschman thought it more realistic to develop
strategies that worked with the grain of shortage, using scarcity to bring other
activities, capabilities, and investments into play. The idea at the heart of The
Strategy of Economic Development, first published in 1958, was that the ‘factor’ in
shortest supply in low-income economies was capitalist decision-making capabil-
ity. Economizing on this scarce factor, by concentrating decision-making in
specific kinds of activity, would, Hirschman argued, stimulate a chain of product-
ive responses:³¹
From Hirschman’s perspective there was a common problem: the view of
development as a grandiose release of tension and blockages so that the economy
²⁸ Sutcliffe (1964: 630). ²⁹ Schumpeter (1942: 83); Marx (2010: 873).
³⁰ Thirlwall (2005: 237). Krugman (1994b). ³¹ Hirschman (1958).
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could put itself on a smooth path to a new, ‘developed’ equilibrium. This was
pie-in-the-sky nonsense; the causality was the other way round. It was the very
creation of ‘pressures, tensions, and disequilibrium’ that had to prime the motion
and then unleash more frictions and tensions.³²
This is as dramatic a divergence from conventional wisdom as Alice Amsden’s
argument that economic development is a process of ‘getting prices wrong’, rather
than a gradual adjustment towards ever more ‘correct’ prices.³³
Rather than limit ourselves to the well-rehearsed ‘balanced versus unbalanced’
growth debate,³⁴ we draw out some common themes from Hirschman’s thinking
over several decades, many of them refined years after The Strategy of Economic
Development was first published. While Hirschman’s ideas have never sat easily
with orthodox neoclassical economists—nor, in fact, with many of their critics—
they are practically relevant for governments. They are not especially formal
(though some of them have been formalized to some extent);³⁵ nor especially
programmatic; nor do they fit neatly into categorical ‘frame views’, whether
neoclassical, structuralist, or neo-Marxist.
Models, Metaphors, and How to Be an Economist
Hirschman’s way of doing economics was profoundly different to what became
the global norm. He built from observation out to wider principles rather than
insisting on an unchanging basis of behavioural axioms and deducing real-world
patterns from them. He largely eschewed formal modelling. And he emphasized
uncertainty: uncertainty irreducible to statistical risk. The distinction between
calculable risk and fundamental uncertainty is one that goes back to Frank
Knight,³⁶ and to Keynes, who said:
The sense in which I am using the term [uncertainty] is that in which the prospect
of a European war is uncertain or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty
years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention . . . There is no scientific basis
to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know.³⁷
Paul Krugman argues that Hirschman did not wait to be exiled from the economic
mainstream but gathered up his followers and led them into the wilderness, where
³² Adelman (2013: loc. 6153 of 16488). ³³ Amsden (1992).
³⁴ Thirlwall (2005); Sutcliffe (1964);
³⁵ One lasting formal legacy is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of Concentration, often used, for
example by the US Department of Justice, in assessing levels of concentration and competition in
markets.
³⁶ Knight (1921). ³⁷ Keynes (1937: 213–14).
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they perished. Krugman argues that Hirschman’s great error (along with some
other ‘high development’ theorists) was that he favoured metaphors over models.
This is a curious criticism given the heavy reliance of orthodox economics on
metaphors, such as Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ (a ‘mildly ironic’ joke that
Smith himself barely mentioned)³⁸ or the idea of a ‘level playing field’.
Metaphors are inescapable in economics, with some more conveniently converted
into formal models than others.
Krugman misses the point.³⁹ First, what really obscured the insights of
Hirschman and others was the growing influence—as Stiglitz points out—of
ideas associated with Thatcherism (in the UK), Reaganomics (in the USA), and
more broadly what Perry Anderson has called ‘the single most successful ideology
in human history’: neoliberalism.⁴⁰ Second, it is not so much that Hirschman took
himself off into the wilderness, but rather that orthodox economics banished as
hopelessly maverick any analysis that did not fit with its highly particular,
mathematical form of ‘rigour’. In an age of ‘economics imperialism’, it was not
just offbeat economists who bore the brunt of this hubris.⁴¹
Albert Hirschman was no economics imperialist—he preferred to consider
himself a ‘trespasser’, venturing into other disciplines out of curiosity rather
than to assert the economist’s property rights or ‘civilize’ them with methodo-
logical individualism (let alone to set up the extractive institutions of randomized
controlled trial experiments).⁴² What he did commit to was ‘immersion in the
particular . . . essential for the capturing of anything general’.⁴³ In sharp contrast
to the mainstream economic approach, Hirschman became ‘increasingly aware
that thorough historical reconstruction was the only way to unravel the mechan-
isms of development’.⁴⁴
This approach allows for greater attention to the ‘centrality of side effects’ and
to uncertainty than most economics is able to entertain. Hirschman argued that
assuming away fundamental uncertainty and replacing it with probability calcu-
lations leads only to ‘pseudo-insights’. Indeed, uncertainty in, for example, invest-
ment projects was not a mere nuisance factor but the very point: ‘the element of
the unknown, the uncertain, and the unexpected which deflects projects from the
originally chartered course is considerable in all projects’.⁴⁵ Thus, what was
methodologically required to assess projects and learn from them was a way of
understanding what made the level of uncertainty greater in some projects than
others. The World Bank should, he reasoned, avoid the ‘pat air of certainty’, and
³⁸ Rothschild (2002: 216). ³⁹ Stiglitz (1992).
⁴⁰ Anderson (2000: 13). On neoliberalism as a ‘chaotic concept’ see Jessop (2013); also King (2009a),
Wade (2013), Saad-Filho and Johnston (2005).
⁴¹ Fine (2002, 2009). ⁴² Hirschman (1981).
⁴³ Hirschman (1967: 3) cited in Alacevich (2012: 7). ⁴⁴ Alacevich (2012: 5).
⁴⁵ Cited in Bianchi (2011: 9).
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instead emphasize the role of uncertainty when designing and supporting projects.
In effect, the Bank should explore the full range of possible outcomes (and accept
that it could not map all of these out ahead of time). It is strange that some
economists consider this approach backward, when there is increasing attention
within the natural and physical sciences precisely to these issues. One Nobel
laureate, in physics, for example, argues: ‘Much of the real world is controlled as
much by the tails of distributions as [by] means or averages . . . by the exceptional
not the common place; by the catastrophe, not the steady drip . . . we need to free
ourselves from “average thinking”.’⁴⁶
Hirschman wanted people to ‘widen the lens when evaluating projects and look
out for those unplanned hard to quantify dividends’.⁴⁷ Hirschman’s alertness to
the incidental benefits arising from projects, as well as to how social and political
context informs project outcomes, stood in contrast to the then-emerging frame-
work of cost–benefit analysis.⁴⁸ Sadly, his call to avoid a ‘pat air of certainty’ fell on
deaf ears. A corollary of Hirschman’s approach was the need to spend time ‘in the
field’ and talk to as many people as possible. This was a trademark of his work that
‘took shape in Colombian fields and factories. Getting to know the country meant
getting near its people: lots of travel to talk to farmers, local bankers, industrialists,
and artisans . . . ’⁴⁹
Perhaps because of how he approached economics, Hirschman came up with
what is perhaps one of the most emphatic distinctions separating different econo-
mists and other development ‘experts’ from one another. Many, perhaps most,
economists believe the secret to economic development lies in endowment, and to
what extent a given country meets the necessary preconditions for development.
Early in Development Projects Observed, Hirschman wrote that his own approach
‘stresses the importance for development of what a country does and of what it
becomes as a result of what it does, and thereby contests the primacy of what it is,
that is, of its geography- and history-determined endowment with natural
resources, values, institutions, social and political structure, etc.’.⁵⁰
This rejection of the primacy of endowment is a radical departure from the
views held by the various proponents of balanced growth; as well as from
influential ideas that geography, climate, or a particular combination of geography
and colonial history, determines outcomes.⁵¹ It also runs contrary to the idea that
societies have to put in place a particular set of institutions before any meaningful
economic or social change can be attempted:
⁴⁶ Cited in Cherif and Hasanov (2019: 6). ⁴⁷ Adelman (2013: loc. 7143).
⁴⁸ Little and Mirrlees (1974, 1990); Dasgupta, Sen, and Marglin (1972); Squire and Van der Tak
(1975).
⁴⁹ Adelman (2013: loc. 5408). ⁵⁰ Hirschman (1967: 5).
⁵¹ Perhaps the most influential of the geography plus institutions literature is Acemoglu, Johnson,
and Robinson (2001).
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The custom was (and remains) to think of institutions as the precursors of
projects; good institutions promote healthy ventures, bad ones produce disasters.
As one might imagine, this often led to fatalistic thinking about the Third World,
where institutions seemed so irrevocably bad . . . Hirschman considered this
kind of fundamentalist storytelling . . . unhelpful.⁵²
More recent work has confirmed Hirschman’s suspicions about institutional pre-
conditions. For example, Jaime Ros has examined the widespread institutional
reforms implemented in Latin America after 1980, which sought to bring countries
closer to the ideals of ‘inclusive institutions’—the rule of law, protection of private
property rights, democratic politics, market liberalization—favoured by many advi-
sors. Since then, economic performance in Latin America has been weaker than it
was in the heyday of state-led development between 1950 and 1980 (this is the case
even if the ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s is ignored): the ‘relative position of Latin
America in the world economy went back in 2003 to the levels of 1900!’⁵³
Other economists have shared his rejection of fundamentalist storytelling. An
example is Alice Amsden, who emphasized the importance of ‘experiment’ in
what she called ‘the rise of the rest’—the convergence in incomes per capita of
East and South East Asian economies with those of Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) economies.⁵⁴ While new constraints on
‘policy space’ were, as Amsden suggests, introduced during and since the late
1970s and early 1980s, it is important not to overemphasize the degree to which
developing countries have been compelled to do it the ‘Second American Empire’
way. Despite the heavy hand of conditionality, governments of developing coun-
tries have had and still have room for policy manoeuvre (as shown with regard to
trade in Chapter 5). Some have more room than others—for geopolitical
reasons—while some have taken more effective advantage than others of the
scope for experiment.⁵⁵ As the late Ethiopian Prime Minister put it:
[W]e determined that we would select what is most suitable for Ethiopia from
different countries around the world: the U.S., Germany, China, Korea, wherever.
I call it the ‘Frank Sinatra’ model: ‘I did it my way’.⁵⁶
Mechanisms I: Development of Institutions and Capabilities
through Tension and Disequilibrium
Pressure, disequilibrium, tension: these, according to Hirschman, were the motors
of developmental change and the source of his enduring ‘bias for hope’. Much of
⁵² Adelman (2013: loc. 7020 of 16488). ⁵³ Ros (2012: 12). ⁵⁴ Amsden (2009).
⁵⁵ Whitfield (2009); UNECA (2016). ⁵⁶ De Waal (2018: 2).
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Hirschman’s work concerned the mechanisms through which such changes came
about; in particular, the idea of forward and backward linkages and the idea of
the hiding hand. His notion of development creating institutional and other
change has been echoed by recent critics of the ‘good governance’ agenda. For
example, as Chang argues: ‘Historically, behavioural and institutional structures
that are considered to be pro-developmental have emerged and evolved as the
consequence, rather than the cause, of economic development.’⁵⁷ Another con-
temporary version of this approach is to argue that markets and institutions
‘co-evolve’, and that productive activities—at least initially—often develop within
institutional contexts that differ dramatically from those imagined in the ‘good
governance’ agenda.⁵⁸
One rapidly expanding industry in Nigeria has emerged in an institutional,
social, and policy context far removed from the dream world of good governance,
secure property rights, or ‘inclusive’ institutions: the Nollywood film industry.
While some observers have rushed to romanticize a tale of informality and
success,⁵⁹ there is still far too little known about the industry to make that a
convincing account. Nollywood films proliferated in the early 1990s; they were
pushed out fast through a network of distributors before producers’ profits were
wiped out by rampant piracy.⁶⁰ A macroeconomic stabilization programme had
led to a sharp devaluation of the Naira that, combined with lack of enforcement of
intellectual property rights laws and widespread physical insecurity (which meant
the abandonment and disrepair of cinemas), created a domestic market oppor-
tunity for supplying entertainment to people’s homes.⁶¹ What evolved was a form
of unplanned import substitution industrialization. Nigeria was ‘unfit’—in
Hirschman’s term—for any such development, and was ‘an unlikely locale for
the development of a video film industry’.⁶² Constraints included: ‘informal
distribution and marketing networks, extensive piracy, poor production quality,
lack of production, distribution, and exhibition infrastructure, lack of film studios,
insufficient funding sources and venture capital, inadequate skills and training,
industry fragmentation, and a lack of data necessary for planning and industry
decision making’.⁶³ As the Nollywood industry consolidated, attracting more
finance and catching the eye of diaspora Nigerians, there were increasingly loud
calls for the federal government to clamp down on piracy and enforce intellectual
property rights. From 2013/14, Nollywood was included in the new (and rebased)
national accounts, which made clear the film industry was a substantial contribu-
tor to national income. The state did eventually get more involved, but inconsist-
ently and with only partial effects. There has continued to be a struggle between
different interests within the industry (powerful financiers/distributors, pirates,
⁵⁷ Chang (2006). ⁵⁸ Ang (2016). ⁵⁹ Ang (2016: 232–7). ⁶⁰ Arewa (2012).
⁶¹ Igwe (2018: 37). ⁶² Arewa (2012: 13). ⁶³ Ibid.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 13/5/2020, SPi
  145
producers, etc.), and what appears to be an increasing differentiation of the market
as parts of it are subjected to ‘gentrification’.⁶⁴
What Hirschman identified as the core constraint—developmental decision-
making capability—mirrors the more recent focus on productive capabilities by
economists who take economic history and the history of economic thought
seriously.⁶⁵ Hirschman’s notion of how such capabilities develop has much in
common with thinking about increasing returns—what in Kaldor’s growth laws,
for example, features as ‘learning by doing’:
It could be argued that a country without much experience in solving techno-
logical problems should stay away from projects requiring a large capability in
this regard. But the opposite course can also be defended: how will the country
ever learn about technology if it does not tackle technologically complex and
problem-rich tasks? In this reasoning a certain ‘unfitness’ of the project for a
country becomes an additional and strong argument for undertaking it; for the
project, if it is successful, will be valuable not only because of its physical output
but even more because of the social and human changes it will have wrought.⁶⁶
Mechanism II: The Principle of the Hiding Hand
It is worth stressing how different Hirschman’s approach is from the standard
advice to match state interventions to current capacity.⁶⁷ Nowhere can this be
more clearly seen than in his principle of the ‘hiding hand’. The conventional view
is that ‘developing countries ought to stay away from bites bigger than they can
chew’.⁶⁸ Flyvbjerg is an influential critic of big bites or so-called ‘mega-projects’,
arguing that they are ‘over budget, over time, over and over’, and that they have
regressive distributional effects to boot.⁶⁹ This critique argues that planning
officials are misled into a ‘planning fallacy’ whereby they are systematically
over-optimistic about costs, benefits, and timing, to the extent that it is ‘difficult
to disentangle deception from delusion’.⁷⁰ The planning fallacy appears to out-
weigh the hiding hand in Flyvbjerg’s statistical analysis of 2,000 development
projects.
However, Flyvbjerg commits the very errors Hirschman sought to escape: his
analysis favours ‘the pat air of certainty’, overlooking the full range of possible
⁶⁴ Igwe (2018). ⁶⁵ Cimoli, Dosi, and Stiglitz (2009); Best (2018).
⁶⁶ Hirschman (1967: 129).
⁶⁷ This was, for example, the main argument of the World Development Report 1997 (World Bank,
1997).
⁶⁸ Flyvbjerg and Ansar (2014): https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/hydroelectric-
dams-emerging-economies-oxford-research.
⁶⁹ Flyvbjerg (2014). ⁷⁰ Flyvbjerg (2016).
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project outcomes. Instead, he treats projects as standalone, discrete ‘interventions’,
the costs and benefits of which are estimated beforehand and accurately recorded
upon completion, all within a self-contained model that is ‘independent of any
wider development calculus’.⁷¹ In doing so, the analysis has no room for full
project life-cycle outcomes or unintended consequences.
There is plenty to be wary of in Hirschman’s Development Projects Observed:
the sample of projects was very limited; there was not much probing of the role of
governments; and it failed to provide the ‘operational’ tool that the World Bank
officials who commissioned the work had hoped for. However, the essential
insights of the book remain valuable. In contrast to Flyvbjerg’s testing of an
extremely restricted (mis)understanding of the hiding hand idea against a dataset
of exclusively infrastructural projects, another statistical analysis by Ika sampled
161 projects across a range of sectors. Ika’s findings were very different, with, for
example, the hiding hand more common than the planning fallacy by a factor of
four to one.⁷² Examples within Ika’s study included the World Bank-funded
Ouagadougou Water Supply project in Burkina Faso. Despite suffering from
cost overruns of about $60 million, the project exceeded expectations, connecting
more than 90 per cent of the city’s population to the water supply. A project that
might appear superficially more successful was the Chad–Cameroon oil pipeline,
which came in ahead of schedule and without huge expenses. However, rather
than supporting poverty reduction, the revenues it has generated have largely been
funnelled into arms purchases and private accounts.
Tanganyika’s Infamous Groundnut Scheme
A ‘possibilist’ approach rejects any systematic pessimism about mega-projects.
Instead, it looks for unpredicted and less well-measured side effects, as well as the
scope for creative decision-making and the accelerated development of capabilities.
Such an approach reveals there were, in fact, important and (to varying degrees)
lasting social and economic effects that are absent from accounts of one of the most
renowned development failures of all: the groundnut scheme in colonial
Tanganyika. Driven by the UK’s desperate need to reduce shortages and import
costs of vegetable oils in the wake of the sudden US announcement—after the
Second World War—that it was ending financial support to its allies, the project
expressed ‘a faith (or fantasy) that the scheme would generate a great leap forward
of the productive forces in the area’s agriculture’.⁷³ It failed, spectacularly, due to a
host of misconceptions and errors:
What happened in practice was, first, that the targets of the scheme were reduced
year after year while, second, its cost was progressively adjusted upwards. When
⁷¹ Room (2018: 368). ⁷² Ika (2018). ⁷³ Rizzo (2006: 236).
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it was finally shut down in 1951, over £36 million of British public money had
been spent on a scheme that imported more groundnuts as seed than it actually
harvested.⁷⁴
Nevertheless, the groundnut scheme had multiple side effects, with very real local
consequences in Tanganyika’s Southern Province:
The money it brought into circulation through wages and other expenditure—
vast sums of money relative to conditions before the scheme—augmented the
spending power and welfare of many local people, at least for a few years. For
some, however, the scheme marked the beginning of a process of capital accu-
mulation that lasted well beyond ‘those days of great prosperity’.⁷⁵
There was also a learning externality that affected a proposed railway linking East
African and Rhodesian networks. Reacting directly to the failures of the ground-
nut scheme, consultants and planners for the railway shifted their focus away from
export orientation towards African agricultural potential and welfare outcomes.⁷⁶
Though the railway itself was not built in the colonial era, it was eventually revised
and built by China as the TAZARA Railway.
The TAZARA Railway as the Connective Tissue of a Rural Economy
The Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA) Railway is itself a good
example of how the more obvious forms of project evaluation can miss socio-
economic dynamics. The railway was a profoundly political undertaking: in the
late 1960s, the governments of recently independent Zambia and Tanzania
wanted to build a railway connecting Zambia’s Copperbelt with the port of Dar
es Salaam, reducing Zambia’s dependence on transport routes through what was
then Rhodesia. The World Bank would not finance it, nor would the USA, the UK,
Japan, or the Soviet Union. Finally, with China having agreed to finance and lead
construction of the railway, the project began in 1969 and was completed—two
years ahead of schedule—in 1975. Internationally, the railway was dismissed as the
‘bamboo railway’ and, in a number of ways, it did fail: engines and wagons
frequently broke down; transhipment and offloading at key points in Tanzania
and Zambia were slow; and cargo and passenger traffic were far below planned
levels. There were intermittent programmes to resuscitate the railway,⁷⁷ the latest
of which was a large-scale commitment, again by China, to support a TAZARA
rehabilitation scheme to the tune of some $1.2 billion.⁷⁸
⁷⁴ Rizzo (2006: 208). ⁷⁵ Rizzo (2006: 236). ⁷⁶ Bourbonniere (2013).
⁷⁷ Briggs (1992), Monson (2005).
⁷⁸ https://constructionreviewonline.com/2019/04/refurbishment-of-tazara-railway-line-to-receive-
us-1-2bn-boost/.
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Despite the headline disappointments of the railway, however, it has transformed
lives along its route: ‘local traders, farmers, and workers use the railway in many
ways to improve their lives, and an analysis of these railway-platform markets
suggests that the standard assessments overlook something real and important’.⁷⁹
The railway has made it possible for farmers to switch to the cultivation of higher-
value crops, and made it easier for them to market their surpluses. Itinerant
traders—wamachinga—help move products between the different agro-ecological
zones along the railway’s route, fostering an expansion of market size and refine-
ment of specialization. They also bring important basic consumer goods—plastic
buckets, used clothing, aluminium cooking pots—to remote rural villages. Casual
and temporary wage workers, as well as those laid off during the privatization of the
Kilombero Sugar Company, have used the railway to travel further when they
cannot get access to land near the sugarcane company and its existing outgrower
scheme area. The railway is, in short, the ‘connective tissue’ of a complex and
dynamic rural economy.
Cahora Bassa: Dammed if You Do, Damned if You Don’t
A possibilist perspective would also challenge critiques of Cahora Bassa Dam in
Mozambique. Opposed to the naively optimistic ‘high modernism’ of the
Portuguese colonial planners—and then the post-independence Frelimo
government—Isaacman and Isaacman swing to the opposite, consistently pessim-
istic, extreme. While they do describe ecological changes and the experience of the
people who most obviously lost out from the dam’s construction,⁸⁰ they fail to
capture the complex dynamics linked to its history.
Cahora Bassa was conceived at a challenging regional and international polit-
ical moment, and one way the Portuguese succeeded in getting the project
financed and built, towards the very end of their colonial rule, was to do a deal
with the apartheid regime in South Africa. This involved selling electricity from
the dam to Eskom, the South African electricity utility, at desperately low prices
for decades to come. In 2018, Frelimo negotiated a 46 per cent increase in the price
paid by South Africa for Cahora Bassa electricity (though this still left it below
market rates).⁸¹ While Mozambique’s hydro-sovereignty was clipped for many
years, exporting energy was nonetheless one way of mitigating the foreign
exchange constraint. Further indirect effects, for example through employment
in agriculture and the development of hydrologically related engineering and
management capabilities later applied to other dam plans in Mozambique, are
less well researched and are neglected in the Isaacmans’ account. Others argue
that ‘electricity provision in Mozambique plays an important role in statecraft
⁷⁹ Monson (2005: 1). ⁸⁰ Isaacman and Isaacman (2013).
⁸¹ https://mozambiqueminingpost.com/2018/08/31/mozambique-energy-hcb-announces-power-
tariff-increase-for-eskom-verdade/.
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and provides accumulation opportunities for governing elites’.⁸² A hydraulic
bureaucracy has indeed developed in Mozambique, sustaining a commitment to
projects geared towards reducing economic dependence on South Africa, while
increasing (especially southern Mozambican) agricultural productivity.⁸³
As Hirschman put it, the hiding hand is a way of ‘inducing action through
error’.⁸⁴ It is a corollary of Keynes’ argument that the rational investor, given
fundamental uncertainty, would never invest.⁸⁵ The hiding hand involves under-
estimating both the likely difficulties of setting up and running a project and the
problem-solving abilities of those implementing it. Planners, having been over-
optimistic prior to embarking on a big new infrastructure project—say, the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) or the Hoosac Tunnel in the USA—swiftly
run into an array of difficulties and obstacles they had not anticipated. However,
having committed considerable resources—and having used many rhetorical
devices—to mobilize public support, it is difficult to back out. A crisis in the
project may then provoke fresh and creative capabilities—technical, financial, and
even political—in order to find solutions. In Development Projects Observed,
Hirschman suggested that ‘the only way in which we can bring our creative
resources fully into play is by misjudging the nature of the task, by presenting it
to ourselves as more routine, simple, undemanding of genuine creativity than it
will turn out to be’.⁸⁶
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
The GERD is a particularly good example. The audacious idea of building a
5,250-megawatt hydroelectricity-generating dam on the Nile was, it appeared to
many from the start, wildly overambitious. The plan seemed especially ill-conceived
because the government could not secure World Bank or Chinese concessional
funding, partly because of the very real risk of a political, even military, backlash
from Egypt, which has always asserted ‘hydro-hegemony’ over the Nile.⁸⁷ The
Ethiopian government then had to find alternative sources of finance for the
dam—almost $5 billion was the original estimate—a major challenge for a low-
income country. Over-optimism, overcommitment, and the identification of this
project as the brainchild of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi meant there was no way
out. The government then did manage to find new ways of solving the financial
problem, partially at least, while also making more progress than many outside
observers had thought possible to finesse the diplomatic problem. The financing
measures they were forced to adopt could be described as ‘fiscal linkages’; they
included a new deferred savings scheme imposed on public sector employees; the
⁸² Power and Kirshner (2019: 500). ⁸³ Rusca et al. (2018). ⁸⁴ Hirschman (1967: 29).
⁸⁵ On the psychology of investment see Keynes (1936: 147–64) and Tuckett (2011).
⁸⁶ Hirschman (1967: 13). On the Hoosac Tunnel in the USA see Ika (2018: 370).
⁸⁷ Cascão (2008).
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creation of a diaspora bond whose marketing and results may have had complex
social and political effects on the relationship between many diasporic Ethiopians
(e.g. in the USA) and the Ethiopian government; and donations to the dam that
many foreign investors were invited to make.
The GERD has—as Flyvbjerg and others predicted—suffered delays, thanks to
political-technical difficulties and resource shortages. It remained unclear when,
and for some even whether, the dam would be completed. The chief engineer was
found shot dead in his car in Meskel Square in the heart of Addis Ababa. The
military enterprise Metals and Engineering Corporation (METEC) lost its con-
tract for much of the construction. The GERD is a good reminder that it would be
naive to assume the mechanisms Hirschman identified work out automatically for
the best. He argued, for example, that reducing one form of uncertainty could
create new and worse uncertainty in other ways:
‘a decrease in financial uncertainty may stimulate administrative uncertainty as
the securely financed project becomes more attractive to parasitic appetites and is
under less pressure to put up a good performance . . . The attempt to eliminate
totally one particular kind of uncertainty may therefore not only be futile, but
counterproductive.’⁸⁸
During the course of construction of the GERD, financial uncertainty has never
been wiped out, while ‘administrative uncertainty’ appears to have survived and it
does seem the case that ‘parasitic appetites’ have nibbled at the project.⁸⁹ But
parasitic appetites have not overwhelmed the project, in the way that they have in
many abandoned dam projects in Nigeria (for example, the failed Chinese-backed
Zamfara Hydropower Dam).⁹⁰
It is far too soon, at the time of writing, to write off the GERD, which, despite
cost and time overruns, may yet provide a huge boost to an economy that remains
sorely constrained by unreliable power supplies. Partly because of security and
political concerns, no research at all has been done and very little is known,
beyond the anecdotal, about the possibly manifold ‘side effects’ that this giant
construction project has had: we can only guess at the ‘human and social changes’
that it has wrought, from the many services and construction activities and input
supplies spawned by a large-scale construction camp, to the possible spill-over
effects (for example, on child nutrition or girls’ schooling) in the distant village
homes of the 8,000 or so migrant Ethiopian workers on the dam, to which they
doubtless send some of their wages. Very little is known either about the devel-
opment of Ethiopian decision-making capabilities either in engineering or in the
⁸⁸ Hirschman (1967: 84). ⁸⁹ Hirschman (1967: 52–5).
⁹⁰ Olorunfemi and Onwuemele (2017).
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management of local conflicts over displacement and resettlement or about
financial and fiscal capability development.
Mechanism III: Linkages
The better known of Hirschman’s unbalanced growth mechanisms is linkages.
A backward linkage occurs when a new activity makes viable or stimulates
upstream activities that feed into it by supplying inputs. A forward linkage occurs
when new activities emerge downstream as a result of a factory or facility coming
into operation, with its output used to produce other goods. Take, for example,
Bell Equipment in South Africa. The firm began as a backward linkage, respond-
ing to growing output from the agriculture and forestry sectors by investing in
equipment-making for sugarcane and timber cutting. Bell then developed the
capabilities to produce inputs for other, non-agricultural activities, and grew to
become a major supplier of large earth-moving equipment for the global mining
industry.⁹¹
Linkages spread beyond forward and backward to include employment, fiscal,
and spatial linkages. Linkages, though, are not mechanistic or automatic, and are
only likely to flourish where supported by government policies. There is scope, for
example, for fiscal linkages from resource extraction to generate revenue that
makes possible the funding of improved infrastructure, research and development
(R&D) investment, education, and health. However, such linkages can only
function if domestic conflicts over ‘the politics of the belly’—in which power
struggles are largely concerned with access to wealth—can be settled.⁹² The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) now advocates greater exploitation of fiscal
linkages related to natural resource exploitation in, for example, Zambia.
Elsewhere, many political economists agree that in Nigeria, Uganda, Zimbabwe,
and Tanzania, the introduction of effective policies to monitor and regulate (let
alone maximize) resource revenues has been delayed for decades.⁹³ One estimate
suggests African governments tax only about 3 per cent of the value of mining
output.⁹⁴
Backward linkages may not be maximized unless a government insists on local
content policies—that is, a commitment to source local inputs—in foreign invest-
ment project bids. Another possibility is to insist on R&D spending in-country.
In Brazil, for example, impressive innovations followed the introduction of a
⁹¹ Jourdan et al. (2012: 57). ⁹² Bayart (1993), Clapham (1994).
⁹³ See http://www.mining.com/imf-favour-zambia-mining-tax-changes/ on Zambia’s proposed tax
hikes on copper mining in 2015, for example; Doro and Kufakurinani (2018); Hundsbæk Pedersen, and
Bofin (2019).
⁹⁴ Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI): https://eiti.org/summary-data, cited in
Moore, Prichard, and Fjeldstad (2018: 92).
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contractual clause forcing oil companies to invest 1 per cent of gross revenues from
large oilfields into R&D.⁹⁵ There are, though, also plenty of counter-examples,
where inept policies have undermined linkage development. The neglect of R&D
in South Africa’s Chamber of Mines Research Organization (COMRO) and
Zimbabwe’s Institute ofMining Research, for instance, means that any development
of the platinum seams in South Africa’s Bushveld and Zimbabwe’s Great Dyke will
be pursued with imported rather than domestically produced equipment and
machinery.
Opportunities for forward linkage promotion in South Africa were missed
because the government prioritized fundamentalist market liberalization policies:
An example would be Anglo American’s divestment from its main platinum
group metals downstream beneficiator and technology developer, Johnson
Matthey Plc in the 1990s (when it was the major shareholder, at more than
40%), after investing heavily in it, especially in technology development, over the
previous 40 years. This was probably due to its increasing focus on ‘core
competence’ (mining) in preparation for its exit and London listing.⁹⁶
Another example of weak or failing linkages can be seen in the ‘destructive
restructuring’ of Scaw South Africa, a steel and engineering firm that, since the
1960s, had built up a range of sophisticated capabilities through linkages to mining,
transport infrastructure, and construction. After 2007, however, the Anglo-
American asset-striping strategy involved raising loans against Scaw’s balance
sheet, securing loan proceeds for the parent company, leaving Scaw to service the
debt, before finally ‘unbundling’ and disposing of Scaw. Another factor that weak-
ened Scaw’s linkage momentum was the decline in domestic infrastructure invest-
ment after 2010.⁹⁷More broadly, it has been argued that a lack of strategy to develop
linkages and a broader manufacturing base, alongside trade liberalization, low
public investment, an uncritical embrace of foreign ownership, and offshore listings
by the major South African corporations ‘contributed to a process of destructive
restructuring and unbundling of engineering and the subordination of steel to the
global strategies of new foreign owners’.⁹⁸
The intricate dance of forward and backward linkages is well illustrated by
the relationship between the floriculture sector and Ethiopian Airlines. Having a
well-run, state-owned airline made it much more feasible for the government
to promote expansion of the country’s floriculture sector, based on favourable
agro-climatic conditions and relative proximity to major European markets. It
meant the government could fairly easily push for improvements in freight
handling and airport cold storage, as well as offer competitive services to new
⁹⁵ Mancini and Paz (2018: 141). ⁹⁶ Jourdan et al. (2012: 61). ⁹⁷ Zalk (2017: 292–303).
⁹⁸ Zalk (2017: 318).
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investors (Ethiopian and foreign). The rapid expansion and then consolidation of
floriculture in turn provoked expansion and improvements in Ethiopian Airlines.
The just-in-time demands of global floriculture meant the airline had to be able to
provide higher-quality services, with its evolving capabilities in handling flower
exports then giving it a base to develop larger logistics services for other activities
in the economy.⁹⁹ Similarly, it was the severe balance of payments constraint that
resulted from Ethiopia’s unbalanced growth, as well as the big push of subsidized
investments in new industrial parks and the construction of a new railway linking
Addis Ababa with Djibouti’s port, that revealed severe logistical bottlenecks,
which in turn provoked massive new projects to overcome them. These included
a £150 million World Bank-financed investment to improve trade logistics,
particularly in the Modjo dry port.¹⁰⁰
‘Unfitness’ and ‘Exercises in Courage’: Large-Scale Projects
in Ethiopia and South Africa
Development through linkages, economic change propelled by disequilibria, and
the hiding hand are all mechanisms that may operate in a variety of contexts. How
effective they are, though, depends on a number of factors, the most important of
which are policy related and political. We close this chapter with two very
different examples—one from Ethiopia and one from South Africa—that high-
light these and related Hirschmanian themes, including the ‘narrow margin for
failure’ that is yet another possible influence on investment and project outcomes.
Ethiopian Airlines
Ethiopian Airlines is itself is a good case of ‘unfitness’. Common-sense thinking
and the vast majority of development economists would not recommend that one
of the poorest countries in the world support a state-owned airline.¹⁰¹ Ethiopian
Airlines was inaugurated as a small domestic airline shortly after the end of the
Second World War, at a time when 96 per cent of the population were illiterate.
The British had just ended Italian occupation, reinstalled Haile Selassie, and
plundered much of Ethiopia’s manufacturing equipment, shifting it to their
colonies elsewhere.¹⁰² Over the following seventy years or so, the airline grew to
be a ‘fully integrated, technologically sophisticated, internationally competitive,
and highly profitable 21st century aviation company’.¹⁰³ Ethiopian Airlines is the
largest carrier in Africa and its growth in recent years—including a fourfold
⁹⁹ Balchin, Booth, and te Velde (2019, 15–18).
¹⁰⁰ http://projects.worldbank.org/P156590?lang=en.
¹⁰¹ For a witty but offensively racist account of the state of Ethiopian transport not so long before the
founding of Ethiopian Airlines see Waugh (2010).
¹⁰² Pankhurst (1996); Wrong (2005). ¹⁰³ Oqubay and Tesfachew (2019).
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increase in passenger traffic between 2010 and 2018 (up to 12 million in 2018)—is
in marked contrast with the decline of (and allegations of corruption in) South
African Airways (SAA) and in Nigeria Air.¹⁰⁴ All manner of capabilities have
developed along the way, from the maintenance and technical facility to the
Aviation Academy serving Ethiopian, African, and Middle Eastern airline com-
panies, to the freight terminal and integrated airline catering facilities. While
several other state-owned Ethiopian enterprises have floundered, there has been
consistent support for Ethiopian Airlines as a ‘national champion’. This has
allowed the airline’s management to weather periods of instability and resist
intermittent interference from the government of the day.¹⁰⁵ Localization ‘has
been enforced by restrictive regulations governing foreign investment. These
stipulate that only the Ethiopian government can provide air transport services
on aircrafts with a capacity of more than 50 passengers, while only Ethiopian
citizens can provide such services on aircrafts with lower capacity’.¹⁰⁶
Both Ethiopian Airlines and the promotion of an Ethiopian floriculture sector—
with substantial support from the Ethiopian and also Dutch states—highlight
another Hirschman observation: that one of the determinants of whether economic
endeavours in developing countries are successful or not is whether they have a
‘narrow margin for failure’. This is something that very much characterizes the
floriculture business: rose stems snipped and packed, for example, on a farm on the
outskirts of Bishoftu need to be kept in precise temperature and humidity condi-
tions while being transported (within a day) to European markets. Should they
spoil, the financial costs would be huge. To get this right it has been necessary to:
adapt techniques from ‘role model’ firms and sectors in the Netherlands and Kenya;
mobilize the resources of Ethiopian Airlines; sharply improve the efficiency of the
Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC); and deploy the state’s monopoly of
legitimate force (every truckload of roses travelling from a flower farm to the airport
cold storage depot is accompanied by a state-employed armed guard). The devel-
opment of Ethiopia’s flower sector has been propelled by bottlenecks, crises, and
disequilibria, rather than by a fully planned and balanced growth package of across-
the-board investments.
Sasol
Hands visible, hiding, throttling, and doubtless others, have long been at play
moulding the history of Sasol, a formerly state-owned chemicals enterprise in
South Africa that was privatized in the late 1970s, though it has since continued to
benefit from state support. Sasol’s history is full of ambitious leaps, political
¹⁰⁴ See, e.g., Cotterill (2018); Ifeanyi (2016). For trends in international capacity within Africa see
https://www.anna.aero/2019/10/24/africa-has-1140-international-flights-within-the-continent-daily-
ethiopian-is-1/.
¹⁰⁵ Oqubay and Taffere (2019). ¹⁰⁶ Balchin, Booth, and te Velde (2019: 16).
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intrigue, imaginative leadership, ‘privatization by panic’, and technical linkages.¹⁰⁷
Despite there being nothing remotely balanced about its development, the com-
pany has somehow ‘survived the obsolescence many critics predicted’. In the early
years of Sasol’s existence, the company’s management felt badly let down by the
technical inputs of an American management consultancy firm. The consultants
responded by highlighting the uncertainty of the project and arguing they were
‘groping with the unknowns of a developmental project’.¹⁰⁸
Taking on a large-scale synthetic fuel production (oil-from-coal) scheme, in a
country that had a shortage of skilled labour, was an ‘exercise in courage’. Like
Ethiopian Airlines, Sasol reacted to the pressure of a domestic skills bottleneck by
setting up its own technical training college.¹⁰⁹ Formally created in 1950, the firm
perpetually teetered on the brink of technical catastrophe and economic non-
viability. However, its strategic significance became increasingly clear to the
apartheid government, even as labour costs rose in the 1970s. The company
only survived the technical problems it struggled with during the 1950s through
direct state financial support, as well as the very low cost of labour that made the
scheme viable in South Africa. The paradox is that while South Africa has created
an important chemicals industry as a result of Sasol’s creation and expansion (and
it is difficult ‘to imagine this as taking off historically without massive state
intervention’), Sasol has not been the crucible of a diversified national chemicals
industry.¹¹⁰
Through its early years Sasol developed technical and organizational capabil-
ities that, in the 1960s, enabled it to push aggressively for diversification. One
forward linkage was realizing the economic potential of methane generated in the
oil-from-coal process, using a subsidiary that distributed this gas to industries
through high-pressure pipelines. In fact, it became clear that the chemicals
produced in the oil-from-gas process were actually more valuable than the petrol
produced. Linkages fanned out backwards to mining; forwards to explosives,
fertilizer, and polymers. Two oil price hikes in the 1970s, as well as increasing
international hostility to—and sanctions against—apartheid, meant that Sasol’s
oil-from-gas capabilities suddenly seemed to make some economic sense.
However, the costs of new plants played into the hands of those keen to seek
private finance. Once privatized at an undervalued price, the new-look Sasol
continued to benefit from considerable state support through tariffs and price
regulations. This helped line the pockets of the previous management, though this
was by no means an unusual example of the effects of privatizing state-owned
enterprises in the 1980s.¹¹¹
Sasol’s history is a complex one, of rapid technical capability development, state
support, and both the development and thwarting of linkages. The absence of
¹⁰⁷ Sparks (2016). ¹⁰⁸ Sparks (2012: 57). ¹⁰⁹ Sparks (2012).
¹¹⁰ Freund (2019: 121). ¹¹¹ Meek (2014).
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forward linkages is particularly striking in South Africa, where the plastic industry
has effectively been prevented from taking advantage of low-cost polypropylene
feedstock. Linkages have been thwarted in Mozambique too, where Sasol engaged
in a project to extract and pipe natural gas to South Africa. It was Mozambique’s
first big natural resource project and the evidence suggests that the country was
badly disadvantaged by the deal (undermining fiscal linkages). Furthermore, the
potential of cheap natural gas to help promote social welfare benefits and indus-
trialization linkages within Mozambique and Southern Africa was not realized.
Instead, Sasol derived huge profits from buying natural Mozambican gas very
cheaply and selling to industries in South Africa at high prices.¹¹²
6.4 Conclusion: Exit Balance
Balance, as an organizing principle, runs through much thinking on economic
development, both from orthodox and more heterodox viewpoints. Balance is
fetishized above growth and development in IMF advice; is the defining feature of
neoclassical economic theory and modelling; and is the anxious concern of
UNCTAD advice to governments pushing for mutually supportive changes across
a huge range of sectoral and institutional activities.
We have argued that policy officials should reject this obsession with balance—
it creates unrealistic expectations, is analytically misleading, and can throw devel-
opment strategies off course. By contrast, we have argued for greater commitment
among policy officials to a strategy of unbalanced growth, using this as a jumping-
off point to explore the relevance of Hirschman’s economics. Hirschman is often
regarded as a maverick, not to be taken too seriously by the new generation of
economists, trained as they are to jump through the hoops of econometric and
mathematical techniques. While mainstream economics has dallied with some of
his ideas (most notably those in his book Exit, Voice, and Loyalty), it has largely
ignored or mangled his insights. On the other side of the coin, his ideas do not fit
easily within debates about grand ‘-isms’ (neoliberalism, imperialism) and so have
never found a secure place in the work of heterodox economists.¹¹³ We argue that
many of Hirschman’s ideas, as well as his methodological approach, should be
central to development economics. Hirschman’s methods—immersing himself in
the particular and drawing general principles from close empirical observation—
draw him close to Kalecki, who spent many years collecting detailed information
on factories and businesses, and to Amsden. His understanding of uncertainty
puts him firmly in the Keynesian tradition, while his ideas about linkages connect
with the economics of Adam Smith, Allyn Young, Kaldor, and many others.
¹¹² Mondliwa and Roberts (2017). ¹¹³ Grabel (2017).
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Hirschman’s observations regarding the hiding hand have more recently been
taken up by others, both in work on ‘adaptive efficiency’ and in larger sample tests
of Hirschman’s claims.¹¹⁴
One of the most useful ways for policy officials to draw on Hirschman’s ideas is
to see in unbalanced growth a justification for a bolder selection of priorities.
Bland wish lists—in government reports, consultancy advice, and international
development agency strategies—are the enemies of economic development. Ideas
about linkages and where they may be most concentrated, or ideas about the
conditions in which large projects may or may not provoke adaptive learning, can
potentially provide criteria for ranking policy support initiatives or targets for
interventions. But effective interventions will require much better mechanisms to
identify and respond to failures in economic policy.
Hirschman’s ‘narrow margin for failure’ is not just a function of technology.
The margin for failure can be a political matter and it is often reflected in urgency.
China in the 1970s, for example, was keen to complete the TAZARA Railway
ahead of schedule as much to make a geopolitical statement as for financial
reasons. The British government, in a rush to fix its post-war foreign exchange
shortage, pressed on with the Tanganyika groundnut scheme. And arguably the
GERD, and the speedy push to create a floriculture industry, were given added
propulsion by former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s explicit tying of political
legitimacy to delivering development gains.¹¹⁵ It has been argued that the ruling
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) had, after the
challenge of the 2005 election results, an even more urgent ‘need to seek “per-
formance legitimacy” through a project of economic transformation’.¹¹⁶ Such is
the political economy of being in a rush.
The pressure of time—contrary to the logic of gradual continuity, smooth
adjustment, and balance—is another form of disequilibrium or tension that
may, in a Hirschman-like way, provoke change. This can be seen in the rhetoric
of development policy, from Samora Machel’s exhortation to Mozambicans to
achieve ‘victory over underdevelopment in ten years’¹¹⁷ to plans for Ethiopia to
become a middle-income country by 2025. ‘Rushing’ has the potential to further
conceal the hiding hand, increasing optimism about what can be achieved, and it
may, through political urgency, create a form of narrow margin for failure.
Conversely, pushing at full tilt may encourage people to overlook problems that
come to undermine outcomes, or may lead to a failure to exploit gains that
otherwise might have been available. Rushing may reveal, not a hiding hand,
but a throttling hand. In the construction of the TAZARA Railway, there was very
little training to build up Tanzanian or Zambian capabilities, which might have
helped later in addressing issues related to repair work on engine and wagon
¹¹⁴ Giezen, Bertolini, and Salet (2015); Ika (2018). ¹¹⁵ De Waal (2013).
¹¹⁶ Clapham (2018: 1154). ¹¹⁷ Hanlon and Mosse (2010: 3).
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faults. Furthermore, the hiding hand of post-war urgency in the UK was no match
for problems such as erratic rainfall, inadequate soil analysis, the blight of disease,
or the failure to manage labour shortages in Tanganyika.¹¹⁸
In the global floriculture air freight business, and increasingly in the textiles
value chain —where styles and demand shift suddenly—profitability and compe-
tition enforce the narrow margin for failure. Even here, however, the conditions of
profitability depend in turn on the political and regulatory conditions within
which firms operate. A good example of the consequences of a rush (to privat-
ization) and the collapse of regulatory institutions can be seen in the failure of
South Africa to meet phyto-sanitary standards regarding citrus fruits, thereby
preventing it from expanding its share of the world market.¹¹⁹ Successful export-
ing depends on the presence and behaviour of the regulatory ‘referees’. Regulatory
failures can have disastrous consequences for exports in more industrialized
economies too, as the collapse in exports of the Boeing 737 Max shows.¹²⁰
¹¹⁸ Rizzo (2006: 201). ¹¹⁹ Cramer and Sender (2015).
¹²⁰ Lewis (2019); Bogaisky (2019); Travis (2019).
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Wage Employment in Africa
7.1 Introduction: Sweet Dreams of Self-Employment
and Nightmares of Dangerous Youth
Population and labour force data in Africa are astonishingly unreliable. But most
economists and policymakers do not regard this as an obstacle to making authori-
tative pronouncements and dreaming up policies. They readily make use of the
officially published estimates and projections to argue that there are far too few
employment opportunities, especially for the surge in young rural entrants into
African labour markets. This argument is made both by mainstream economists
and by their most vociferous critics; these critics share with mainstream econo-
mists a pessimistic assessment of the potential for a faster rate of growth of paid—
waged and salaried—employment.
The prospects for decently remunerated wage employment in productive
enterprises are believed to be especially bleak. It is taken for granted that, for the
foreseeable future, a proletariat is unlikely to emerge or to play a significant
political or economic role. For mainstream economists there is some hope of
new jobs if labour market flexibility can be maximized and public sector employ-
ment slashed; their critics hope to ameliorate the situation for new entrants by
promoting and subsidizing cooperatives producing for the domestic mass market.
Both sets of development experts place a great deal of faith in associations of the
self-employed, and in supply-side skills enhancement for income-generation
schemes.
Many economists now also believe that Africa is suffering from early onset
deindustrialization (see Chapters 3 and 4), so most youth will have to remain self-
employed or unpaid family workers in relatively low-productivity enterprises for
decades. Young people will not find jobs in the higher-productivity manufacturing
sector but will continue to flood into the service sector, much of which is
characterized by very low productivity. Policies to increase the returns to self-
employment in the service sector and/or on small-scale family farms are widely
recommended, usually concentrating on supply-side policy interventions to pro-
vide new young entrants with training, extension advice, and micro-credit. But
these policies involve a leap of faith, assuming that an increased supply of better-
qualified micro-entrepreneurs and job-seekers will benefit from a quasi-magical
automatic market mechanism ensuring that there will be sufficient demand to
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allow them to succeed. This leap of faith, involving yet another attempt to
resuscitate Say’s Law, has been diagnosed as ‘jobs dementia’.¹
At the end of this chapter, in Section 7.10 we develop our own arguments and
policy suggestions, which are very different in both tone and content. They are less
pessimistic about the possibility of increases in waged employment and they
highlight the need and scope for large-scale investments in those specific eco-
nomic activities most likely to generate rapid increases in demand for wage labour.
Recommendations to increase expenditure on training and micro-credit are a
knee-jerk response to political leaders’ fears that rural youth will flood into cities
on the off-chance of finding a job, become disillusioned, and riot. Some anticipate
a rural–urban flow more frightening than a flood, for example a tsunami or a
haemorrhaging.² Many African elites seem to believe that potentially dangerous
young people need to be trained (brainwashed) to accept individual responsibility
for their own economic survival rather than depend on state handouts or, worse
still, claim that the scarcity of decent jobs has been caused by the theft of state
resources or misguided macroeconomic policies. The Mozambican youth who
participated in the greves (strikes and demonstrations) of February 2008 and
September 2010 were described by ministers as vandals and bandits. In response
to these ministerial rebukes the youth became ‘outspoken in their contempt for
the current ruling elite’ clustered around President Guebuza; rap musicians
‘openly satirised the Frelimo elite as corrupt and out of touch’, while rejecting
government claims that falls in real wages were caused by adverse international
prices, rather than ministerial ineptitude.³
The training proposed by African governments has sometimes focused directly
on political views.⁴More often it aims to transform the ‘aspirations’ and ‘values’ of
young people, who would otherwise be ‘using substances like khat, marijuana,
tobacco, and alcohol and watching football to pass the time’.⁵ The laziness of
youth has been disparaged in speeches by, for example, Presidents Buhari, Mogae,
¹ Amsden (2010: 58; 2012). Keynes believed that Say’s Law, the hugely influential idea that supply
creates its own demand, was ‘the chief postulate he had to escape in writing the General Theory’
(Kent, 2005: 62).
² Meagher (2016: 484); Meagher, Manna, and Bolt (2016: 474).
³ Hossain et al (2014: 41). (See Azagaia lyrics in Portuguese at https://www.vagalume.com.br/
azagaia/povo-no-poder.html). ‘His Excellency the Ghetto President’ of Uganda has been less explicit
when rapping about Museveni: https://www.france24.com/en/20190725-uganda-opposition-figure-
former-pop-star-bobi-wine-2021-presidential-election.
⁴ Yibeltal (2017).
⁵ The unrealistic aspirations of youth in developing countries are stressed in OECD (2018: 27ff.).
The quote on substance abuse is from Desta, Bitga, and Boyson (2018: 41). Purdeková (2011) describes
the camps established to transform the ‘mindset’ of youth, urban hawkers, and ‘social deviants’ in
Rwanda. Efforts to transform the values of the unemployed are, of course, not confined to Africa: ‘the
personal belief systems’ of individuals are the main target of training offered to groups of unemployed
in Texas, who are promised ‘empowerment’ by ‘retraining the brain’, through a critique of the self
rather than a critique of the economy (Thomas, 2018).
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Museveni, and Zuma.⁶ Similar prejudices were expressed by Africa’s colonial
rulers in the late 1940s: they too accused everyone without a recognized form of
wage employment of not ‘having a culture amenable to work’;⁷ these rulers
justified brutal interventions because ‘recalcitrance, resistance, and unwillingness
to cooperate were . . . natural attitudes of lazy or uncivilized “Blacks” who had to
be coerced for their own good’.⁸
African labour force and employment statistics have often been collected,
classified, and analysed so as to reinforce prevailing conventional wisdoms or
prejudices: these include politically convenient stories designed to pillory idle
youth for having unrealistic expectations, and tales that blame a small number
of ‘privileged’ (unionized ‘core’) wage workers for crowding out the possibility of
faster employment growth for ‘peripheral’ workers—by pushing wages too high
while selfishly opposing the eminently sensible recommendations of mainstream
economists to reduce labour market regulation and inflexibility.⁹ We aim to
expose the weak underbelly of hegemonic ideas about labour market flexibility
and self-employment, as well as to strengthen the neglected case for radical
transformation of statistical authorities in Africa—so we devote substantial
space in this chapter to discussion of the quality of officially published labour
force data. We argue that the available evidence does not support the view that the
growth of wage employment has been, or must remain, pathologically slow
everywhere in Africa; and we query overconfident, generalized, and pessimistic
predictions of a growing excess in the supply of labour—by discussing heteroge-
neous trends in total fertility rates and the real possibilities for reducing these
rates.
We provide evidence that employment protection legislation (EPL) is compat-
ible with rising levels of total (and youth) employment; and we conclude by
recommending its vigorous implementation. This may have the added advantage
of forcing the least efficient employers to adopt improved technology rather than
continue to compete on the basis of starvation wages. At the end of this chapter,
we also recommend other policies to improve employment prospects. These
include policies that can sustain high levels of demand and an increasing volume
of targeted public sector capital expenditure. They also include the recommenda-
tion that most investment should specifically be designed to increase rural wage
employment, as well as the supply of basic wage goods and exports (see Chapters 4
and 5). The scope for public sector investment in irrigation and other productive
⁶ https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/04/nigerian-youths-not-lazy-adp-tells-president-buhari/; https://
citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/350441/zuma-slams-lazy-south-africans/; Makgala (2013: 56); https://news.
mak.ac.ug/2017/07/president-museveni-launches-national-mindset-education-programme.
⁷ Cooper (2017: 149). ⁸ Rossi (2017: 12).
⁹ Organized and privileged labour has been criticized for opposing wage ‘flexibility’ by, for example,
Nattrass and Seekings (2018: 4); the naivety and unrealistic employment expectations of African youth
have been emphasized by Rankin and Roberts (2011).
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rural infrastructure is immense; and these investments could accelerate the rate of
growth of wage employment, including both wage employment in high-tech
agribusiness activities and wage employment for millions of rural youth in
Africa who have not completed primary schooling. There is a strong human
welfare case for investments targeted at increasing the number of years that
rural girls spend in secondary education and at dramatically improving their
access to contraception, but one direct benefit is too rarely discussed: this type
of investment would immediately reduce the number of new entrants into the
labour market (and improve returns to their labour).
7.2 Young Africans Will Never Get Decent Jobs—Says Who?
Louise Fox, who was employed as the World Bank’s Lead Economist for the Africa
Region before becoming Chief Economist for United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), is a leading representative of one of the
variants of labour market pessimism, arguing that
owing to the demographics and current structure of low income SSA economies,
even exceptionally high economic growth rates in the non-farm sectors have not
and will not generate enough new non-farm wage employment to absorb both
the new entrants and those who seek to leave the agricultural sector.¹⁰
Two major supply-side problems will continue, in Fox’s view, to afflict the region
for many decades and are what lies behind these gloomy predictions. First, there
will be an excess supply of labour because fertility rates in Africa will not fall
rapidly, or as rapidly as they did in the more successful East Asian economies.
Second, the private sector cannot be expected to expand wage employment in
internationally competitive firms very fast, because it will take so long for schools
in rural Africa to improve the literacy and numeracy of their students and produce
sufficient new workers with a basic education.¹¹
Many additional reasons for inadequate rates of growth of wage employment
are given in other World Bank publications, but these reasons are rarely Africa-
specific. Usually they simply repeat familiar rhetorical warnings and the diagrams
from undergraduate economics textbooks cautioning against futile state interven-
tion in all labour markets: employers will be deterred from hiring by minimum
wage legislation, by legislation protecting employees from unfair dismissal, by any
encouragement of collective wage bargaining, and by other regulations requiring
¹⁰ Fox and Sohnesen (2012: 28). See also Filmer and Fox (2014: 5) and Fox, Thomas, and Haines
(2017: ix).
¹¹ Filmer and Fox (2014: 21). The OECD (2018: 17) makes the same argument.
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health benefits, and so on.¹² Employing the usual reactionary rhetorical devices,
the World Bank argues that these types of intervention and legislation risk
harming the poor—because they ‘could, when too stringent, exacerbate inequity
by increasing the share of workers who are either unemployed or in the informal
sector’.¹³ But even if governments could follow the advice of major aid donors—
immediately deregulating and ‘reforming’ labour market institutions—the World
Bank still predicts that structural shifts in African economies over the next decade
will not match East Asia’s achievements in expanding the role of manufacturing
employment.¹⁴
Surprisingly similar predictions have often been published by authors who
would regard themselves as bitterly opposed to the research methods and the
conclusions reached by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank,
and USAID. For example, Guy Standing, who until recently played an important
intellectual leadership and policy role in the International Labour Organization
(ILO), believes that
the old proletariat, the core, [is] shrinking fast all over the world. Its remnants
will continue, but they no longer have the strength to develop or impose their
agenda in the political domain.¹⁵
Franco Barchiesi is also unsympathetic to the Washington institutions and his
work has been praised as ‘at the cutting edge of contemporary debates on the
politics of the working class’.¹⁶ He argues that waged work in Africa has always
been ‘precarious’ and that, ‘despite few exceptions as in Nigeria during the 1970s
oil boom . . . the predicament of waged workers after independence was largely
unfavourable across the board’.¹⁷ Other development sociologists agree that
neoliberal policy reforms have ‘forced labour out of formal labour markets into
burgeoning informal economies in a process Marxist scholars refer to as “depro-
letarianization” ’.¹⁸ And if some members of Africa’s ‘vast informal labour reserve’
do become employed producing for the global economy, ‘low-income unstable
work’ or ‘adverse incorporation’ is all they will be offered.¹⁹ There is also the
argument that rural women, in South Africa for instance, should now be regarded
¹² Storm (2019) shows the extreme weakness in the economic logic and empirical analysis behind
one econometric paper that has been particularly influential in persuading governments ‘in India and
much of the developing world’ to turn away from EPL.
¹³ World Bank (2018: 28). On reactionary rhetoric, see Hirschman (1991).
¹⁴ Fox, Thomas, and Haines (2017: 20–1). The World Bank’s projections of shifts in employment in
the Côte d’Ivoire reach similar conclusions about the tiny contribution that wage employment in
industry will make to total employment (Christiaensen and Lawin, 2017: 60).
¹⁵ Standing (2015: 5). ¹⁶ Webster (2012: 88).
¹⁷ Freund (2018); Barchiesi (2017: 22). See also Phimister and Pilossof (2017: 215); while Larmer
emphasizes the weakness of Katangese trade unions and claims that the stagnation and precarity of
wage labour in Copperbelt cities is typical of all urban capitalist spaces in the global south (2017: 182).
¹⁸ Meagher, Manna, and Bolt (2016: 474–6). ¹⁹ Meagher, Manna, and Bolt (2016: 476).
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as members of a surplus population who have uncoupled their livelihoods from
wage employment and are quite successfully building a ‘post-wage’ existence.²⁰
A particularly popular variant of this view has been disseminated through the
International Development Economics Associates (IDEAs) network.²¹ According
to this view, Africa’s rural population will never become wage workers. For
example, in the Patnaiks’ historical account: ‘precapitalist producers lingered on
in real history as a subordinate mass in the periphery without becoming assimi-
lated into the capitalist workforce’.²² This long-term failure of assimilation has
recently become more acute, they argue, because of the sway of neoliberal policy-
making.²³ Some of these scholars draw inspiration from Samir Amin, who (a
century after Lenin) concluded that capitalism had entered into advanced senility,
incapable of generating decent employment and only likely to produce a planet
full of slums.²⁴
Neo-Marxist explanations for the inability of capitalist development in Africa
to absorb workers in productive non-agricultural wage employment often boil
down to the claim that there are insuperable problems faced by capitalist indus-
trial development in all economies located in the (vaguely defined) periphery of
the global economy. One of these problems is described using a strand of
dependency theory that used to be called technological dependency but was
refreshed by Arrighi using Schumpeter’s work on innovation processes. Arrighi
argued that the innovation process
‘tends to begin in the wealthier countries because high incomes create a
favourable environment for product innovations . . . by the time the “new”
products and techniques are adopted by the poorer countries they tend to be
subject to intense competition and no longer bring the high returns they did in
the wealthier countries’.²⁵
The intensity of competition between poor countries belatedly adopting these
techniques is likely to lead them into a race to the bottom (encouraged by
neoliberal policies), promoting falls in real wages. Declining real wages, in turn,
exacerbate another critical barrier to capitalist development in Africa and in other
²⁰ Williams (2017b).
²¹ IDEAs was founded in South Africa; its funders include the Ford Foundation, United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), Christian Aid, and ActionAid International.
²² Patnaik and Patnaik (2017: 143).
²³ Patnaik (2016: 11). Shivji agrees that throughout Africa ‘the dominant tendency is for the semi-
proletarianisation of labour’ (2009: 76); and see Moyo (2011: 70).
²⁴ Amin (2015: 18). For fulsome praise of Amin’s contribution see: http://roape.net/2018/08/21/a-
rebel-in-the-marxist-citadel-tributes-to-samir-amin/ and Prabhat Patnaik and Jayathi Ghosh: http://
www.networkideas.org/news-analysis/2018/08/obituary-samir-amin-1931-2018/.
²⁵ Arrighi, Silver, and Brewer (2003: 18). Rodrik follows the technological dependency line, arguing
that ‘new technologies disproportionately favor rich economies, well-endowed in skills and capital,
rather than developing economies’ (2018: 8, 11).
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poor areas of the world. This barrier is the low level of domestic demand generated
by the mass of impoverished people for the goods manufactured by proto-
capitalist enterprises in Africa.
The political context for demand deficiency in Africa is rising inequality of
income, of wealth, and of political power, as well as excessive fiscal austerity
leading to deflation. Inadequate aggregate demand and an inadequate growth
rate of decent jobs are not simply caused by a revival of neoliberal macroeconomic
policies (including real wage cuts in the public sector) and their enthusiastic
implementation by a comprador class, but also reflect capitalism’s ineluctable
trend towards stagnation. The central claim of these scholars is that a proletariat
will not emerge in poor economies because, as argued by Paul Baran in 1952,
(monopoly) capitalism and growth are incompatible both in advanced and back-
ward areas of the world.²⁶ Baran’s impossibilist argument was that ‘while in the
advanced countries capitalism leads to stagnation or militarism or both, in the
underdeveloped countries it strangles all efforts at economic advance’.²⁷
7.3 Contesting Ambiguous Evidence on Work for Wages
Perhaps the most reliable evidence on employment covers the small minority of
African employees who are defined by the ILO as ‘formally’ employed.
Unfortunately, the definitions of ‘formality’ used by the ILO have changed over
time, which is one good reason for caution when making judgements about employ-
ment trends in Africa.²⁸ But a glance at the best available (ILO) estimates of changes
in the absolute number of employees between 1991 and 2017 (in Figure 7.1) shows a
consistent and unambiguous increase in ‘formal’ wage employment.
Although many economists have expressed fears about the consequences of
stagnant global wage employment growth, the worldwide number of paid employ-
ees actually increased by almost 20 per cent between 1997 and 2017; and the share
of paid employment in total global employment also increased.²⁹ Part of the
explanation for these global trends is that China’s rate of growth of ‘regular’
wage employment was astonishingly rapid. The rate of growth of employment
in India’s ‘organized’manufacturing and construction sectors was also impressive
over the period 1999 to 2012,³⁰ with particularly rapid employment growth in
organized manufacturing between 2006 and 2016.³¹
²⁶ Baran’s economic thought is discussed by King (1988).
²⁷ The quotation is from the introduction to the Penguin edition by R. B. Sutcliffe (Baran, 1973:
100). Some useful criticism of Baran can be seen in Kaldor (1958: 169).
²⁸ ILO (2018c: 7–8). ²⁹ ILOSTAT (2018).
³⁰ Chan, Pun, and Selden (2017: 173); Majid (2015: 27); Ghose (2015: 6).
³¹ Basole and Narayan (2018: 23). Less up-to-date evidence on ‘the formal organized sector’ in India
has been used by Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU)-based economists to make an unconvincing
argument that this sector has failed to draw in more workers: Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (2015: 12).
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 13/5/2020, SPi
    169
What may come as more of a surprise to many is that ILO data also suggest a
rapid rise in the share of paid employees in total employment in Africa—in some
African countries this share has remained low, but in others it has now reached
well over 20 per cent (Ghana, Zambia, and Uganda); it is close to 40 per cent in
Kenya; it is 50 per cent in Senegal; and it is rising fast in Ethiopia and, more
erratically, in Tanzania and Nigeria.³²
All calculations of the share of paid employees in Africa involve estimating the
number Africans employed as ‘own-account workers’ and ‘contributing family
workers’; but these estimates are probably even less reliable than the data on the
more visible Africans employed for a wage or a salary in the ‘formal’ sector. A much
higher proportion of women than men are currently recorded as ‘contributing
family workers’, but there are good grounds for believing that many of the
women lumped into this category are actually doing some seasonal and/or casual
wage work or are employed ‘on commission’ in a disguised wage relationship.
One of the reasons women are so often misclassified by enumerators, (both in
Africa and in the USA), is that household surveys fail to probe respondents by
repeatedly insisting that they provide a complete list of all of the different types of
work that women, especially rural women, undertake over the year as a whole,





1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016
Figure 7.1 Total number of employees (millions) in sub-Saharan Africa, 1991–2017
Source: ILO Modelled Estimates (2018).
³² ILO Modelled Estimates 2018.
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period. Probing questions have, for example, been shown to significantly increase
estimates of the proportion of paid employees among the employed in Tanzania
and have identified a substantial additional amount of informal work activity in
the US Current Population Survey.³³ Another important reason for the under-
estimate of women’s labour is the widespread use of proxy respondents in Labour
Force and Household Surveys. These respondents (often male ‘household heads’)
answer questions on behalf of other household members, but are known to
provide inaccurate answers to questions about the wage employment of both
women and children. For example, the prevalence of child labour increases very
dramatically when children self-report.³⁴
The ILO defines ‘own-account workers’ and ‘contributing family workers’ as
more ‘vulnerable’ than paid employees in Africa, because the latter benefit from
more job security and better working conditions. It is puzzling that the declining
share of ‘vulnerable’ employment and the rising share of paid employment
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Figure 7.2 ‘Vulnerable’, wage, and salaried employment shares in total employment,
sub-Saharan Africa, 1992–2016
Note: The World Development Indicators (WDI) define ‘Vulnerable Employment’ as the sum of the
ILO categories ‘own-account workers’ and ‘contributing family workers’. The WDI defines ‘Wage and
Salaried Employment’ as the ILO category ‘employees’.
Source: WDI (2017).
³³ Abraham and Amaya (2018); Serneels et al. (2010). When a longer reference period was used in
the Ugandan Household Survey questionnaire, the estimate of labour force participation increased
dramatically (Fox and Pimhidzai, 2011: 11).
³⁴ Janzen (2018).
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If it is acknowledged that, for example ‘in Ghana, Rwanda, Zambia and Malawi,
wage employment is growing at nearly three times the rate of growth in self-
employment’, this important and positive trend is too often deflated by adding a
downbeat warning: ‘this rapid growth is starting from a very low base and thus
translates into a relatively small number of jobs each year’.³⁵More broadly, there is
surprisingly little interest in statistical evidence in discussions of precarity.³⁶ Good
examples of a cavalier attitude to statistical evidence (and reliance on tiny sam-
ples) can be found in the influential work of scholars such as James Ferguson and
Ian Scoones.³⁷
The positive trends we have identified (drawing on ILO Labour Force Surveys)
are likely to be significant underestimates of wage employment. One problem is
that Labour Force Surveys are out of date in most African countries: in some
relatively large African countries, such as Nigeria, Ethiopia, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ghana, Malawi, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, although
there have been important recent changes in the size of the total population and in
patterns of employment and urbanization, the ILO publishes analyses based on
survey data that are five (or more) years old.³⁸ In addition, these surveys are
implemented using methods that ensure a massive undercount of precisely those
forms of wage employment that have historically been particularly important for
early and low-paid entrants into developing labour markets, that is, the women
and children employed as domestic servants.
7.4 How to Hide Domestic Servants
and Child Wage Labourers
At the beginning of the twentieth century, about 1.7 million women and girls were
employed as domestic servants in England and Wales: ‘Measured by employment,
female and male, domestic service was bigger than agriculture in 1901, bigger than
coal-mining, and bigger even than textiles.’³⁹ Despite their dominant position in
labour markets in England and throughout Europe, these wage workers (like their
colleagues now working in Africa) were often ignored: ‘Servants remained in the
shadows: they were employed in a sector that from the late eighteenth century had
been increasingly considered unproductive; they were barely present on the
political scene . . . ’⁴⁰ Similarly, in Africa in the twenty-first century, the ILO
confirms that National Statistical Offices undercount domestic workers, although
a very substantial share of all wage employment for women and girls is as
³⁵ Yeboah and Jayne (2018: 820). On Rwanda see also World Bank (2016b: 55).
³⁶ Doogan (2015: 45). On the UK labour market evidence see also Choonara (2018).
³⁷ Ferguson (2019: 16); see also Ferguson and Li (2018: 2); Scoones et al. (2019: 8).
³⁸ ILO (2018a: table A. 7.1). ³⁹ Outram (2017: 893). ⁴⁰ Sarti (2014: 284).
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domestic servants (‘maids’) employed by private households.⁴¹ They are like the
protagonist of Ralph Ellison’s novel Invisible Man: ‘I am a man of substance, of
flesh and bone, of fiber and liquids—and I might even be said to possess a mind.
I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me.’⁴²
Research on domestic servants in Zambia, Uganda, Kenya, and several western
African countries suggests not only that millions of domestic servants have been
employed in both rural and urban areas in the past, but also that their number is
currently growing. For example, in Lusaka households across the socio-economic
spectrum employed domestic workers: ‘The demand for childcare was intrinsic-
ally linked to increased female labour-force participation, as many working
women sought “substitutes” to care for their children and take care of domestic
tasks in their absence . . . ’⁴³ The linkages extended further: female domestic
workers themselves have sought such substitutes for their own children’s care.
Despite the fact that so many Africans, including mineworkers, have employed
domestic servants since the 1950s or earlier, Zambian government officials, trade
unionists, and civil society activists very often ignore the domestic service sector.⁴⁴
They certainly do not publicize the negative aspects of the jobs found by some of
these ‘maids’:
Mary expressed real distress at the way she had been treated by the children of
her first employers, a Zambian couple with four children . . . the children would
spit in the dregs of their tea to prevent her from drinking anything they had left.⁴⁵
The lack of respect or recognition accorded to Mary in Lusaka is echoed in
research on casual domestic servants in Nairobi.⁴⁶ Tabloid journalists in
Nampula, Nairobi, and Lagos mix disdain for ‘maids’ and sexualized fear in a
cocktail familiar to students of the early history of the Witwatersrand.⁴⁷ The
number of specialized recruiting agencies and intermediaries in these cities is
growing rapidly, but the total number of very young girls (and boys) currently
exploited as domestic servants remains poorly recorded.⁴⁸
⁴¹ ILO (2018a: 168; 2013: 13–15, 11). Undercounts of undocumented internal migrant and child
domestic workers are also important in some countries (UNCTAD, 2018a: 10).
⁴² Ellison (2001: 1).
⁴³ Female labour force participation rates and the number of Zambian women in formal employ-
ment increased very rapidly between 2008 and 2012: ‘Formal employment growth has been slightly
faster for women than for men (14.6 per cent per year versus 13 per cent per year)’ (Harasty, Kwong,
and Ronnås, 2015: 45).
⁴⁴ Hepburn (2016: 102, 200, 85, 112, 4). ⁴⁵ Hepburn (2016: 113–14).
⁴⁶ Agaya and Asunza (2013: 8–9).
⁴⁷ On sexual fear, moral panics, and servants in rapidly urbanizing South Africa see Van Onselen
(2001). In rural Southern Africa at a later date, sexual anxieties about African servants were explored by
Lessing (1973). Unpaid wages, abuse, and repeated accusations in the media of the rampant sexuality of
‘housegirls’ in Lagos are discussed in detail by Nesbitt-Ahmed (2016).
⁴⁸ Jacquemin (2009); Nesbitt-Ahmed (2016). Underestimates of the employment of maids in
Uganda are discussed in Sender and Von Uexkull (2009: 65) and in Lyon and Valdivia (2010).
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Outside the major cities, there is even less quantitative information about the
employment of children for wages in rural Africa, although our own research in
Ethiopia and Uganda offers some data on prevalence in export crop-producing
areas, as well as many disturbing examples of cruel treatment.⁴⁹ It is not easy to
select the most distressing of the many accounts we recorded, but one combin-
ation of the compulsion to work as a domestic servant and as a coffee harvester in
southern Ethiopia illustrates exploitation that cannot be discussed using the ILO’s
National Child Labour Force Survey:⁵⁰
At a very young age, when she was about six, Eman was driven by hunger to leave
her father; she walked for more than five hours desperately trying to find an aunt
she thought could help her. Her aunt did not welcome her into the family.
Instead, she was put to work as a domestic servant—carrying water, preparing
food for the aunt’s family (which she was not allowed to eat) and was often
slapped when she performed these tasks too slowly or said she was tired. It is
Eman’s job to cook breakfast for her aunt’s children before they go to school; she
is not allowed to eat this food (or go to school) and this makes her cry. Whenever
coffee pickers are required she is sent to do this work in addition to domestic
chores; her aunt took most of her earnings and abused her on those days when
she could not find a job picking coffee. Many coffee farmers underpaid or
physically abused her. She does not think she could manage to find her way
home to visit her parents.⁵¹
7.5 How to Undercount Wage Labour in Agriculture
How is it possible to explain the failure of official surveys to capture the agricul-
tural wage labour we have observed so easily in our fieldwork? There is no simple
answer to this question. Officials and dominant classes in rural areas have always
found it easy to hoodwink urban authorities and well-meaning ‘useful idiot’
visitors.⁵² The District Agricultural Officer in Kabale denied the existence of
wage labour on small vegetable farms in Uganda until we pressed him to shake
The World Bank analyses urban employment in Ethiopia, but ignores the labour market for domestic
servants and child workers (World Bank, 2016c).
⁴⁹ Cramer et al. (2014b: Section 3.5).
⁵⁰ The National Child Labour Force Survey found hardly any children working as domestic servants
in Ethiopia (ILO, 2018b: table 6.3).
⁵¹ Cramer and Sender (forthcoming). Nelson and Brown (2017) provide very similar accounts of the
experiences of child domestic servants in southern Nigeria.
⁵² The Oxford Online Dictionary defines a useful idiot as a foreign citizen regarded by locals as naive
and susceptible to manipulation for propaganda: the term was often used to describe ‘sympathetic’
visitors to the Soviet Union in the 1930s.
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hands with a group of women in a field near his office; and an ILO-funded team
has described how it was deliberately misled about child wage labour by all the
local elite on the largest tea plantation in Ethiopia.⁵³ Efforts to impede statistical
investigation—especially the collection of data on farm labour—are well docu-
mented not only in Africa, but also in Europe.⁵⁴
Another part of the explanation for the ‘missing’ wage workers can be found by
studying the methods used in 35 widely quoted surveys promoted and funded by
the World Bank. Many of the common-sense policy proposals for rural develop-
ment in Africa are based on statistical analyses of Household Budget Surveys,
especially the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS) and,
more recently, the Integrated Surveys of Agriculture (LSMS-ISA). The results of
these surveys are ideologically convenient; they provide the data used by the
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and mainstream agricultural
economists to foster the notion that wage labour is unimportant in rural Africa
and to support populist proposals to skew the allocation of resources towards
‘efficient’ family farms.
Both the LSMS and the LSMS-ISA are designed as nationally representative
household surveys. The latter has ‘a strong focus on agriculture’, collecting panel
data on households in eight sub-Saharan African countries.⁵⁵ Two important
issues need to be raised immediately. First, as noted by the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) but glossed over in LSMS-ISA publications,
these surveys exclude non-household farms. They rarely acknowledge that ‘house-
hold farms are not representative of the entire agricultural sector . . . private
corporate farms also play an important role and may operate a large share of
the agricultural farmland in some countries’. The conclusion reached by FAO
economists is that a ‘substantial share of agricultural land in Malawi, Nigeria and
Uganda is unaccounted for by the LSMS surveys’.⁵⁶
A second important issue is often ignored in analyses of household surveys: not
everyone living in African rural areas is a member of an ‘agricultural household’ or
a ‘farm household’: migrants living in labour camps, landless or semi-landless
people, who may cultivate a tiny vegetable garden rather than owning a farm or an
agricultural enterprise, are unlikely to be recorded as members of agricultural
households in the LSMS-ISA. For example, rural households were excluded from
the sampling frame of a Tanzanian survey of farm households if they produced
too little agricultural output.⁵⁷ The Agricultural Sample Surveys (ASS) in Ethiopia
⁵³ Cramer et al. (2014b) and Kifle, Getahun, and Beyene (2005: 8); see also Chapter 3.
⁵⁴ D’Onofrio (2016: ch. 5).
⁵⁵ http://surveys.worldbank.org/lsms/programs/integrated-surveys-agriculture-ISA.
⁵⁶ Lowder et al. (2016: 7–9).
⁵⁷ Of course, the same survey also excluded large-scale agricultural producers on ‘estates’ or
‘plantations’ because their output was not defined as ‘household’ production (Christiansen and
Sarris, 2007: 163, 8).
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 13/5/2020, SPi
    175
have been the basis for many assertions about agricultural activities in Ethiopia,
but the sample excludes all Ethiopia’s large-scale farms—such as the Wush Wush
and Gumaro tea plantations (and contains no information about their wage
workers)—so it is rather predictable that the ASS underestimates the national
number of rural wage labourers. Similarly, if urban surveys are confined to
respectable residential areas and no special effort is made to sample less salubrious
areas near bars and massage parlours, the number of prostitutes will probably be
underestimated.⁵⁸ Waged work in agriculture is not as stigmatized as work
providing sexual services. But because efforts are so often made to deny its
existence, especially when child agricultural labour is involved, there is a good
case for venue-based sampling of individuals in ‘hotspots’, rather than the con-
ventional random selection of rural households.⁵⁹ Hotspots for child migrant
labour in Africa include cotton in Burkina Faso and cocoa in Côte d’Ivoire.⁶⁰
Most agricultural wage work is concentrated in specific areas and for a few
enterprises, that is, in high-value (export) crop production areas for dynamic
capitalist farmers. Similarly, hired workers are not employed evenly throughout
the agricultural sector of the United States; a very small number of large farmers of
fruits, vegetables, and horticultural speciality crops account for more than half of
the jobs offered to hired workers, most of whom are immigrants into the USA.⁶¹
In Africa, hundreds of thousands of agricultural wage workers also seasonally
migrate, for example, to the Western Cape deciduous fruit farms from the Eastern
Cape, from Zimbabwe and elsewhere. But South Africa’s first LSMS listed hardly
any rural households deriving an income from agricultural wage labour in the
Western Cape—they were excluded from the sample because they did not live in
conventional housing or ‘households’.⁶² Surveys designed to obtain nationally
representative information on all farming households will include a great many
farms located far away from the most important producing and wage-employing
areas—random sampling could miss the biggest concentrations of rural wage
earners. Besides, pretensions to representative sampling usually depend on sam-
ples drawn from an out-of-date National Population Census and/or on the
inaccurate lists of households compiled by local officials. These unreliable sources
for constructing a sampling frame may well exclude the newest in-migrants,
refugees, or squatters; but these excluded individuals are often important suppliers
of unskilled casual wage labourer.⁶³
The questionnaires used in the LSM-ISA (and in the Demographic and Health
Surveys) do not probe to obtain key information about the labour market
⁵⁸ Ethiopia’s ASS is criticized in more detail in Sender (2019). ⁵⁹ Cramer et al. (2014b).
⁶⁰ Edmonds and Shrestha (2012: 105). ⁶¹ Martin (2012).
⁶² Standing, Sender, and Weeks (1996: 240).
⁶³ Household surveys in Africa (and elsewhere) typically exclude the tails of the distribution of
households (Carr-Hill, 2017). Attempts to exclude new arrivals from the lists of officially sanctioned
rural residents are discussed in James (2013).
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experience of all the individuals with close economic ties to rural households; the
LSMS methodology requires enumerators to ask questions about the employment
and labour market participation only of ‘residents’ in rural households.⁶⁴
Following this protocol, a child who is a seasonal labour migrant to another
rural area may well not be defined as resident at the time of the survey and will
be excluded from the roster of individuals about whom the enumerators ask
questions.⁶⁵ Even if these seasonal migrants are identified (by proxy respondents)
as individuals remitting income to surveyed rural households, no detailed infor-
mation is obtained about where they are and how they earn their income; their
remittances are classified as ‘transfer income’ rather than wage income; and the
strange assumption is made that all transfer income should be classified as ‘non-
agricultural’. On the basis of this misleading classification it is argued that most
rural households derive a very low proportion of their income from wages.⁶⁶
7.6 Now You See Them, Now You Don’t:
Estimating Factory Workers
Governments in Africa are much more willing and able to produce statistics on
industrial employment. The absolute number of Africans employed in industry
appears to have grown substantially since 1991.⁶⁷ In the manufacturing sector,
employment has been growing in several African economies, suggesting that
predictions of a generalized decline in or stifling of manufacturing employment
may themselves be premature. In Ethiopia, for example, the number of people
engaged in manufacturing increased from 561,000 in 1995 to 2,825,000 in 2011,
while the comparable increases in Kenya and Nigeria were from 747,000 to
1,990,000 and from 1,271,000 to 2,345,000.⁶⁸ Recent increases in manufacturing
wage employment should be seen in historical context: in the 1960s, a tiny number
of Kenyans or Ethiopians (fewer than 50,000) found jobs in the manufacturing
sector; in 1960, about 47,000 Tanzanians were engaged in the manufacturing
sector, but by 2011 this sector employed about 700,000 workers.⁶⁹ Perhaps the
most dramatic recent increase in recorded wage employment in Africa was in
⁶⁴ Cramer et al. (2014: 176–9).
⁶⁵ Survey data from Burkina Faso show how a failure to obtain data on temporarily absent migrant
youth distorts analyses of inequality and poverty (Akresh and Edmonds, 2010). De Brauw, Mueller, and
Woldehanna (2013), Mueller, Schmidt, and Lozano-Gracia (2015), and Yeboah and Jayne (2018)
provide some quantitative evidence of the importance of rural–rural migration and of remittances to
the migrants’ ‘home’ households.
⁶⁶ It is admitted in passing that agricultural wages are an important source of the income in the case
of the of the very poorest rural households (Davies, Giuseppe, and Zezza, 2017: 161; table A. 3).
⁶⁷ ILO Modelled Estimates 2018.
⁶⁸ Groningen Growth and Development Centre Database (GGDC) 10-Sector Database.
⁶⁹ The early Ethiopian and Kenyan data are from Sender and Smith (1986: 95). The Tanzanian data
are from the GGDC. The growth in employment in Mozambique’s manufacturing sector is very recent,
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Ethiopia’s construction sector: between 2005 and 2013 the number of employees
tripled, increasing from 229,000 to 825,000.⁷⁰
Government officials and foreign consultants do not count more than a fraction
of the wage workers when they conduct surveys of Africa’s manufacturing estab-
lishments. There are several reasons for this undercount, including: the exclusion
of manufacturing establishments employing a ‘small’ number of workers—in
some countries the threshold for inclusion is 5 workers, but in others it is as
high as 10 or even 25 (in the case of Mozambique, for example);⁷¹ the exclusion of
manufacturing enterprises that are not registered by an official government
agency, leading to under-sampling of thousands of smaller firms and of all
enterprises unwilling to submit to state surveillance and taxation; and biased
sampling frames or dated lists of manufacturing establishments that fail to take
account of rapid structural change by excluding recently created firms, while
listing many firms that no longer exist.⁷²
7.7 How Long Will It Take for African Fertility Rates to Fall?
The evidence does not suggest that the growth of wage employment in Africa has
stagnated. Nevertheless, it is often argued that wage employment growth must be
regarded as too slow, because fertility rates in Africa are currently so high and, for
the foreseeable future (several generations), cannot be expected to fall very rapidly:
‘the decline in fertility rates has stalled—or not even started—in many African
countries’.⁷³ The more productive sectors of the economy will be unable to absorb
a labour force that is growing exceptionally rapidly in Africa—much more rapidly
than in the earlier industrializers.⁷⁴
In addition it is widely believed that, unlike the earlier industrializers, African
economies cannot escape from their labour absorption problem by exporting their
surplus workers to formal and informal colonies.⁷⁵ But, in some of the early
industrializers, including the Netherlands, France, and Germany, emigration
only reduced the local labour force by a tiny percentage between 1870 and 1910,
suggesting that capitalist success in raising manufacturing employment (and
wages) in these countries is unlikely to be explained by labour export opportun-
ities. Japan’s labour-intensive industrialization before the 1940s required access to
but extremely rapid—from about 70,000 workers in 2002 to 272,000 in 2008 (Sparreboom and Staneva,
2015: 40).
⁷⁰ Oqubay (2019: 632). ⁷¹ Le, De Haan, and Dietzenbacher (2018: 10).
⁷² Mozambique provides good examples of the problems arising from dated and inaccurate sam-
pling frames (Schou and Cardoso, 2014).
⁷³ Filmer and Fox (2014: 3). ⁷⁴ Scherrer (2018: 305).
⁷⁵ Patnaik and Patnaik (2017: 56).
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imports of food and raw materials; securing access to these resources was an
important motive for colonial expansion—far more important than opening up
new opportunities for getting rid of surplus labour through emigration.⁷⁶
We are unconvinced by repeated reference to ‘persistently high fertility’ in
Africa.⁷⁷ Policymakers should be suspicious whenever they are told that it is
‘impossible’ to achieve social change—such as a rapid improvement in women’s
reproductive welfare. The most reliable available source, the United Nations
Population Division, has a long record of incorrect assumptions about initial
demographic conditions and of underestimating the future rate of decline in
fertility. This record confirms the need for more ‘humility about our capacity to
anticipate major social changes’ and it confirms the need for African policymakers
to question all data underpinning the recommendations of international agencies.⁷⁸
The claim that fertility rates have ‘stalled’, like most generalizations about the
subcontinent, is obviously untrue. Figure 7.3 shows the dramatic and continuing
decline in the estimated total fertility rates for some large East and West African
economies between 1950 and 2025–30 (see also Chapter 1).
It may be possible to achieve an even faster decline in fertility rates and extend
these declining rates to a greater number of African countries. This potential exists







1950 1970 1990 2010 2025–30
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Kenya Senegal
Figure 7.3 Total fertility rate in selected sub-Saharan African countries, 1950–2030
Source: UN (2017).
⁷⁶ Taylor and Williamson (1997: table 1); Sugihara (2004). ⁷⁷ Losch (2016: 56).
⁷⁸ Khan and Lutz (2008); Lutz and KC (2010). Bongaarts describes the extreme pessimism of
researchers in the 1960s about the possibility of fertility reduction in low-income Asia, until the
evidence of dramatic declines in fertility in Bangladesh undermined their pessimism (2018: 2).
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of unmet need for contraception in the world and because there are some African
governments that ‘are still reluctant to make commitments to family planning’.⁷⁹
In Tanzania, for example, commitment to family planning was undermined in
2018, when the President described women using contraceptives as lazy and under
the influence of foreigners with sinister motives.⁸⁰
Although policy interventions have succeeded in achieving a substantial
increase in the use of contraception by African women since 1980, in the majority
of countries widespread use of family planning has not been achieved—it remains
restricted to the urban, best-educated, and privileged women.⁸¹ If investments
were made to ensure the availability of modern contraceptive methods to more
rural women and to raise the level of their education there could be a large impact
on fertility: ‘the decline in fertility could be faster than that currently foreseen by
the United Nations for African countries’.⁸² Reducing unplanned fertility would,
of course, lead to a reduction in the growth rate of the young population.⁸³ Many
economists continue to support fashionable (but ineffective) policies designed to
support young entrepreneurs. But too little attention is paid to the economic
benefits of specific interventions targeted to improve the reproductive health of
rural girls and women.
7.8 Employment Policies When Ideology Trumps
African Evidence
Pessimism about employment opportunities has not stemmed the flow of publi-
cations recommending supply-side policies to improve labour market outcomes
for African youth. These policy proposals usually begin by stating that there is a
shortage of skilled workers. A ‘mismatch’ between the demand for and the supply
of skills is said to be a major obstacle to growth and development. In overcoming
this obstacle, ‘Availability of quality, relevant training for in-demand skills and
occupations is a key factor, along with accessible and timely labour market
information.’⁸⁴ In Ethiopia, for example, the World Bank’s analysis is very clear:
‘skills shortages in Ethiopia constitute a key constraint to growth and improved
productivity in the manufacturing sector . . . In the short run, the provision of
Technical and Vocational Education Training (TVET) . . . could be used to
bridge the gap of skills supply to the manufacturing sector.’⁸⁵ TVET in Ethiopia,
⁷⁹ Bongaarts (2018: 5).
⁸⁰ https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Magufuli-advises-against-birth-control/1840340-4751990-
4h8fqpz/index.html.
⁸¹ Towriss and Timæus (2018: 2028). ⁸² Garenne (2018: 145). ⁸³ Bongaarts (2018: 9).
⁸⁴ International Labour Organization, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
and World Bank Group (2014: 17; emphasis added).
⁸⁵ World Bank (2016a: 41).
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as in many other developing countries, has been promoted through state
expenditures and by support for the introduction of competence-based training;
employers’ views about the detailed requirements for occupational competence
are supposed to have an increased influence on the curriculum. The explosive
growth of enrolment in TVET since about 2005—at an annual rate of about
30 per cent—reflects a major policy commitment by the Ethiopian state.⁸⁶
Ethiopia is following a global trend, described as ‘a VET renaissance in both
OECD and developing countries’.⁸⁷
The model followed is to ask some employers to play the key role in developing
a new and improved set of relevant qualifications. Young people, if they have
access to sufficient information about labour markets, will then be able to make
choices to enhance their ‘employability’; they can invest to obtain these new
qualifications, have their competence certified, and ensure, on the basis of their
newly acquired ‘human capital’, a smooth transition into employment.⁸⁸ An
additional reform of public policy is recommended—making this choice-theoretic
model even more appealing to neoclassical economists: It is argued that training
and certification should mainly be provided by private sector contractors, rather
than state-run colleges or schools.
Young people in this theoretical world will use improved information about
labour markets to abandon their unrealistic aspirations for white collar employ-
ment as civil servants, choose the most suitable training modules, and avoid
burdening their parents/family with carrying the costs of protracted employment
search. They will accept the fact that a decent full-time job as a wage worker is only
a remote possibility, even if the TVET college has issued them with an embossed
certificate of competence in skills selected by the managers of large firms. Most of
them will end up working in small and micro-enterprises, surviving as self-
employed workers and, therefore, they urgently need training in entrepreneurial
skills. This is the vision offered by mainstream policy advisors. It is a vision shared
by many of the critics of neoliberal economic policy, although their preference
would be to train people to juggle a complex bricolage or diversified portfolio of
entrepreneurial activities, or to train cooperative leaders. The consensus is that:
Entrepreneurship training provides young people with the skills they need to
create and manage a sustainable business likely to generate jobs.⁸⁹
What have been the results of Africa’s massive expenditures on TVET and the
training of entrepreneurs? The expansion of training opportunities does not
⁸⁶ Yamada et al. (2018: 14). ⁸⁷ McGrath, Alla-Mensah, and Langthaler (2018: 12).
⁸⁸ Allais (2012: 635ff.). See King (1990: ch. 3, especially p. 69ff.) for a critique of the concept of
‘human capital’ (and of the theories of labour supply offered by neoclassical economists).
⁸⁹ African Development Bank (2012: 139).
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appear to have reduced the risks of protests and rioting by violent youth and most
evaluations agree that
In practice, those who have followed the TVET path often take longer to find jobs
and when they find employment, the jobs are perceived to be of dead-end in
nature career-wise.⁹⁰
Technical and Vocational Skills Development systems in Africa suffer from a
shortage of qualified staff, obsolete equipment, ill-adapted programmes and weak
links with the job market.⁹¹
The unemployment rate for TVET graduates is high; few youth from rural, low-
income backgrounds graduate; and even fewer of the urban and relatively privil-
eged TVET graduates actually wish to work on a factory floor. Collaboration
between TVET colleges and factories remains very limited.⁹²
If education is a cumulative process, with later learning building on earlier
learning, it follows that an improvement in the levels of literacy and numeracy
achieved in African secondary schools could make in-employment training much
more effective; and these improvements would probably have a more positive
impact on labour productivity than expenditures to improve ‘skills’. There is good
evidence from several African countries of the disappointing performance of
schools, as well as on the variability of performance within and between these
countries.⁹³ In Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) economies, the decline in literacy and numeracy proficiency among
young adults since the mid-1990s does appear to have reduced their ability to
engage in further learning and to adapt to changes in the pattern of labour
demand.⁹⁴ And it has been argued that there is a causal relationship between the
maths/science scores achieved by 15-year-old school children and subsequent
economic growth in developing economies.⁹⁵
Diverting resources away from enhancing numeracy and literacy in schools to
create entrepreneurial skills is a policy that has also failed to achieve employment
or other economic benefits. A review of entrepreneurship training that focuses on
evaluations in low- and middle-income economies—including some sub-Saharan
African economies—argues that most interventions targeting micro-enterprises
with up to five employees or aiming to enhance youth self-employment cannot
be shown to have significant positive effects on employment, sales revenue, or
profits. Searching for something (anything) positive to say about the results of
⁹⁰ Oketch (2014: 3). ⁹¹ African Development Bank (2012: 147); Tripney et al. (2013: 77–8).
⁹² Yamada (2018: 18, 40, 45, 53, 24). ⁹³ Jones (2017). ⁹⁴ Liu (2018).
⁹⁵ Hanushek and Woessmann (2016). Komatsu and Rappleye (2017) question the empirical link
between test scores and economic growth, and the policy implications of this alleged link. Sandefur
(2016) discusses problems with the comparability of the data on maths scores in Africa.
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entrepreneurship training, the authors conclude by damning these interventions
with very faint praise: ‘Entrepreneurship training can . . . prevent non-profitable
business ideas from being started.’⁹⁶
High failure rates for self-employed businesses with no or very few employees
are a global phenomenon, but the failure rates of firms managed by young people
have been shown to be particularly high in a survey of about 14,000 very small
firms.⁹⁷ Policymakers might wish to take account of this result and other evidence
of an oversupply of start-up micro-enterprises in Africa by reallocating resources
away from supporting the efforts of youth to establish their own survivalist start-
up enterprise. Even if a few of these small enterprises do survive, evidence from
Mali, Malawi, and Tanzania suggests that they will each provide relatively few
wage employment opportunities for young people.⁹⁸ Worse, it is possible that:
Encouraging more businesses into the same limited niches may further
depress the incomes of existing self-employed people, or even force them out
of business . . . ⁹⁹
There is good evidence from South African and other panel data that most of the
net growth in national employment opportunities is provided by large rather than
small firms.¹⁰⁰Many young African workers looking for wage employment would
be well advised, if they can cover the transport and other costs, to go to where
most jobs are being created—the large and mature firms, specifically firms
employing more than a hundred workers that have been in business for at least
ten years. Young workers who can only find jobs in small enterprises risk losing
their jobs very soon and are unlikely to get as much training or be paid wages as
high as the wages received in larger firms. Page and Söderbom conclude that ‘it is
time to stop overselling small enterprise development as the panacea for employ-
ment creation in Africa’ (see also Chapter 3).¹⁰¹
Our own research in rural Ethiopia and Uganda has confirmed the ability of
larger rural enterprises to offer young people more stable employment, as well as
better wages and working conditions.¹⁰² In Chapter 8 we emphasize the similar-
ities between the mainstream policy recommendation—vocational and entrepre-
neurship training—designed to increase non-agricultural employment and the
policies recommended for smallholder agricultural development, especially the
popular proposals to invest in agricultural extension/advice. Chapter 8 also
⁹⁶ Grimm and Paffhausen (2015: 74). ⁹⁷ McKenzie and Paffhausen (2017: 16).
⁹⁸ Nagler (2017: 11). ⁹⁹ Burchell et al. (2015: 38).
¹⁰⁰ Kerr, Wittenberg, and Arrow (2014); Aga, Francis, and Meza (2015).
¹⁰¹ Page and Söderbom (2012: 20–1).
¹⁰² Cramer et al. (2017). For West African evidence on higher wages in large than small enterprises
see Mbaye and Gueye (2018: 21).
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presents evidence of the costly failures of micro-credit, which is often alleged to be
essential for the development of both non-agricultural enterprises and farms.
7.9 Policies to Avoid a Disabling Environment
for Employment Growth
Those who blame inadequate rates of growth of employment on the deficient skills
and personal attributes of Africans working in low-productivity jobs usually also
advocate reforms to create a more favourable environment for private sector
investors. Their argument is that ‘Regulation by a low-quality bureaucracy and
high taxes stifle the private formal sector . . . labor market distortions reduce
productivity . . . stalling overall growth.’¹⁰³ The importance of promoting
employment by reducing labour market protections for workers is stressed not
only by economists working for the African Development Bank in Abidjan, but
also by influential economists working in the World Bank in Washington: the
Bank’s flagship development report on ‘The Changing Nature of Work’ questions
the relevance of current labour laws and institutions in all developing countries,
urging that ‘governments should rethink policies that deter job creation’.
Governments should reform labour market rules, because ‘stringent regulations
make it costlier for firms to adjust the composition of their workforce’.¹⁰⁴ In short,
it is argued that labour protection is a luxury that poor economies cannot afford.
The claim that restrictions on dismissal and requirements relating to severance
payments contribute to unemployment by presenting firms with a disincentive to
hire workers is not based on any empirical evidence from African economies.
Instead, these proposals for labour market reform—to create a more business-
friendly environment—simply echo assertions made repeatedly since the 1980s by
orthodox economic policy advisers to the IMF, the OECD, and the European
Union (EU) Commission. The labour market outcomes of orthodox policy in
Europe were particularly disastrous in Greece, where the employment to popula-
tion ratio (as recorded by ILOSTAT) plummeted from about 50 per cent in 2008
to below 39 per cent in 2013. Labour market reforms have not had better
outcomes elsewhere: an analysis of panel data from 31 countries, including both
the OECD economies and the 10 new EU member-states from Central and
Eastern Europe, suggests that ‘there is no direct link between EPL and youth
unemployment . . . EPL is not a key culprit for unemployment, and thus govern-
ment efforts to tackle unemployment by liberalizing employment laws alone may
well be futile’.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, a larger panel of 117 countries and a more carefully
constructed measure of comparative levels of employment protection, covering a
¹⁰³ Mbaye and Gueye (2018: 24). ¹⁰⁴ World Bank (2018b: 31, 92).
¹⁰⁵ Avdagic (2015: 7, 22).
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longer time period (1991–2013), shows that increases in worker protection are
generally associated with rising employment and falling unemployment, although
these associations are relatively small when set against wider economic trends.¹⁰⁶
The ‘wider economic trends’ influencing rates of growth of employment and
the environment for private sector investment are conspicuously absent from and
rarely mentioned in the voluminous literature fuelling the panic about youth
employment in Africa. But it is a serious mistake to recommend fashionable
supply-side policies while downplaying the roles of aggregate demand,
Keynesian fiscal policy, and the pattern of public sector investment in influencing
labour market performance. Aggregate demand has consistently been shown to be
a fundamental determinant of the state of the youth labour market. Expansionary
fiscal policy, especially when based on increased government investment expend-
iture on infrastructure, has played a major role in raising employment rates. In
Europe, countercyclical discretionary fiscal policy appears to have increased youth
employment rates and to have reduced long-term youth unemployment.¹⁰⁷
In emerging and developing economies, the IMF has estimated that fiscal
consolidations achieved through reductions in public sector investment expend-
iture have a massive negative effect on the percentage of the working age popu-
lation in employment.¹⁰⁸ The IMF has also used a dataset covering the period
1989 to 2016 to confirm that discretionary fiscal contractions have a significant
adverse effect on the unemployment rate. In this dataset, there is also no evidence
that austerity provides an environment that encourages an expansion of the
private sector; on the contrary, fiscal consolidations were linked to falls in
private investment.¹⁰⁹
Of course, falls in aggregate demand and employment in Africa could also be
the result of increases in the price of food (or other basic wage goods) reducing the
real income of wage workers. Kalecki’s arguments, outlined in Chapter 3, reinforce
the need for policymakers to focus on ensuring sufficient growth in the availability
of wage goods as a fundamental determinant of employment growth, rather than
on a narrow range of supply-side microeconomic variables. One implication of the
discussion in Chapters 3 and 4 is that economic policy must be directed towards
increasing output in specific sectors and activities, for example, those making a
major contribution to wage good production and to labour-intensive export
revenue.
But African governments are constantly lectured about the impossibility of
‘picking winners’. They are told, instead, to establish a ‘business-friendly’ envir-
onment where market incentives are not distorted by bureaucrats, but provide the
¹⁰⁶ Adams et al. (2019: 23). An economic explanation of the links between employment protection
and a rising level of employment and wages has been provided by Storm and Capaldo (2018).
¹⁰⁷ O’Higgins (2017: section 2.2.1). ¹⁰⁸ IMF (2014a: 25).
¹⁰⁹ Carrière-Swallow, David, and Leigh (2018: 15). For additional evidence on how public invest-
ment ‘crowds in’ private investment in developing countries see Furceri and Li (2017: 18).
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‘correct’ price signals (reflecting the relative scarcity of factors of production) to all
agents in all sectors of the economy as a whole. Direct, targeted state interventions
to create an increase in the demand for unskilled rural wage workers, for example,
would be risky and would probably fail. These warnings about the impossibility of
picking winners are part of the standard ‘enabling’ package that includes recom-
mendations to cut the red tape stifling entrepreneurs, deregulate the labour
market, and restrict public sector investment. We have argued that the standard
package cannot be expected to result in an adequate rate of growth of aggregate
output in Africa. We also argue that policymakers should not be content simply to
accept the increase in employment historically associated with a market deter-
mined change in aggregate output, that is, the aggregate employment elasticity.
Instead, policies should be more interventionist, ambitious, and disaggregated,
targeting sectoral and subsectoral elasticities of employment. Moreover, employ-
ment elasticities need to be calculated not only for different sectors and activities
but also for different demographic groups, especially rural women.
7.10 Policies to Increase the Demand for Young
and Female Rural Workers
There are some obvious patterns in employment intensity in Africa: for example,
employment elasticities seem to be much lower in large-scale mining/extractive
industry than in agriculture. However, empirical work shows that
there is generally also considerable heterogeneity in the degree of employment
intensity within sectors, and even within subsectors. Subsectors generally include
a wide range of activities. Furthermore, even within an activity there are signifi-
cant differences in production techniques, with some being more employment-
intensive than others. Firm size . . . product characteristics . . . and manage-
ment choices would be amongst the factors affecting employment intensity at
firm level.¹¹⁰
The database on the labour content of exports currently available from the World
Bank does not cover all African countries and, more importantly, provides no
disaggregated information at all on the agricultural sector.¹¹¹ But this disaggre-
gated information should be the basis for interventions to increase employment.
Our own research in Southern Africa has shown that apricot production, for
example, needs about seven times more labour inputs per hectare than does
¹¹⁰ Tregenna (2015: 15).
¹¹¹ Calì, Francois, Hollweg, Manchin, Oberdabernig, Rojas-Romagosa, Rubinova and Tomberger
(2016).
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sugarcane; and deciduous fruit production on average requires some three hun-
dred times more permanent labour per hectare than maize production. Similarly,
crops like barley (and the production of beef or poultry) are very limited in their
employment creation effects, while other crops like grapes, avocados, carrots, and
blueberries are hugely more labour intensive—and most of their labour require-
ments are met by young women who have not had the chance to attend secondary
school. In short, we have shown that there is enormous employment generation
potential from expanding the area under cultivation of precisely those crops with
the highest labour input requirements.
If policymakers do not have immediate or easy access to all of the relevant crop-
specific data, they can nevertheless begin to make decisions on the basis of a few
stylized facts about employment intensity; and they can then learn by doing, that
is, adjust policy continuously, after careful monitoring and evaluation of the
employment and net foreign exchange consequences of public sector expenditures
and state interventions.
One important stylized fact about employment intensity in developing
economies—largely ignored in conventional diagnoses of African employment
crises—is that the level of public sector investment in irrigation and water control
has a major influence on labour intensity. The proportion of farmland under
irrigation has been shown to have a profound influence on the level of employ-
ment (labour use per hectare), as well on the intensity with which other inputs,
such as agrochemicals and machinery, are used. Irrigation and water control
therefore are regarded as the leading input in historical accounts of technical
change, output, and productivity growth in the most dynamic Asian economies.
In those economies, much of the required investment in irrigation schemes—plus
ancillary investments in transportation, storage, and fertilizer production—was
undertaken by the public sector.¹¹² This is in marked contrast to the African
experience. Since the 1980s, technically feasible opportunities to invest in expand-
ing the total area equipped for irrigation have been neglected in many African
countries, as will be argued in Chapter 9. Moreover, there has been insufficient
investment to rehabilitate existing irrigation schemes and to reduce the substantial
loss of potential crop area, production, and employment arising from inefficient
irrigation practices and maintenance backlogs.¹¹³
¹¹² Bramall (2004: 134); Pincus (2006: 208).
¹¹³ Only a tiny fraction of the irrigated area, even in the most technologically advanced African
economy, benefits from investment in drip and micro-irrigation (Cramer and Sender, 2015: 17).
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8
Working Out the Solution
to Rural Poverty
8.1 Introduction
What people think they know about poverty is clouded by misleading measures,
unreliable data, and ideology masquerading as common sense. Powerful
common-sense ideas—that poor people are rural, that they live in large, female-
headed households, and most of them live on small farms—appear to be con-
firmed in official surveys generating the raw data for a string of poverty measures
and indexes. However, most of these indexes are confused; the surveys have
serious shortcomings; and the ‘rhetorical commonplaces’ of poverty in Africa
are wrong. It is no wonder too little poverty reduction has really been achieved in
recent decades.
This chapter explains why we argue in this way. We begin by discussing issues
of measurement and definition. We then try to blow off the common-sense chaff
from the more useful grain of what we term stylized facts: facts that are broadly
supported by carefully collected evidence and provide policy-relevant ideas about
the characteristics of extreme poverty. We show that some, but not all, of these
stylized facts are uncontroversial and similar to the conventional wisdoms used to
identify the poor in Africa. The poorest people live in female-dominated house-
holds (not ‘female-headed’ households) and lack regular access to support from an
adult male; the adult females and children in these households probably have not
received an adequate education; they are severely threatened by the risks of
teenage pregnancy; they also rely on a monotonous and undiversified diet; and
the poorest people have been able to acquire barely any basic consumer wage
goods. More controversially, we also show that these households are relatively
small; and we stress the stylized fact that the poorest people in Africa depend on
low-paid wage labour (not self-employment on their own farms) for their survival.
Policymakers and researchers must question the data and arguments under-
pinning proposals to reduce poverty in Africa. Part of the problem is that national
statistical organizations (NSOs) are under-resourced and often under political
pressure. There is nothing uniquely African about this: it is a common issue
elsewhere and historically. We give some recent examples of difficulties experi-
enced by African NSOs, focusing on problematic census and agricultural data.
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This chapter provides an overview of evidence about the impact of policy
interventions on the poorest people in Africa (Section 8.3). We then try to explain
the skewed impact of many very fashionable, but obviously failing, poverty
reduction policies. We show how bad data and hegemonic ideas about how to
reduce poverty in Africa are intimately connected. Our conclusion is that com-
monly advocated policies to reduce poverty and increase agricultural output are
likely to continue to have disappointing results. The recommendations from
fashionable randomized control trials (RCT) are also very unlikely to make
more than very modest inroads on poverty.¹ What these RCTs actually show is
often stretched into far larger claims than the method justifies.² At their best,
RCTs can be useful in answering limited types of question; but they are not
designed to generate understanding of distributional dynamics or the political
economy of production, accumulation, and labour, let alone to generate effective
policies to make structural differences to the conditions of development and
poverty reduction.³ It has also been shown that some of the flagship RCTs used
to promote a much wider use of the method have not conformed to the standards
of research protocol that they set out; and that their claims to statistical signifi-
cance are often unfounded.⁴ The policy implications that we draw from the
stylized facts on rural poverty are elaborated through other chapters in this
book (especially Chapters 4, 5, 7, 9, and 10). The single most important mechan-
ism in poverty reduction (globally and in Africa) is, as it has been throughout the
history of capitalism, labour market development—the growth of demand for
labour in higher-productivity activities and the hard-won achievement of higher
wages and some legal protections for employees. We argue that a greater differ-
ence can be made—including in the relatively short term—by prioritizing policies
and investments designed to promote a rapid rate of growth of labour demand in
particular types of activity (in rural and urban areas) than by pouring resources
into safety nets that invariably fail the poorest or by ‘nudging’ the behaviour of
poor people themselves through small interventions based on very sketchy
empirical work.
Although a small number of countries have failed to make any progress at all in
reducing monetary poverty rates since 2002—mainly small countries classified by
the World Bank as ‘Fragile States’⁵—boasts that poverty is falling in Africa are
easily made. Some widely published data do support a less gloomy, if not a rosy,
interpretation of trends in the prevalence of poverty (Figure 8.1). Although the
¹ Labrousse (2016a). ² Deaton and Cartwright (2018).
³ Bédécarrats et al. (2019a); Pritchett and Sandefur (2013) argued that the scope of appropriate
application of RCTs is ‘vanishingly small’; and a group of Department for International Development
(DFID) managers estimated that less than 5 per cent of development interventions are suitable for
RCTs (Stern, 2012: 1, cited in Bédécarrats et al., 2019b: 10).
⁴ Bédécarrats et al. (2019b): https://replicationnetwork.com/2019/04/30/bedecarrats-et-al-lessons-
from-replicating-an-rct/; Young (2018).
⁵ Chandy (2017: 11).
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prevalence of extreme poverty in sub-Saharan Africa appears to have fallen a great
deal between 1993 and 2015—from 59 per cent to 41 per cent—we will alert
policymakers to serious problems that limit the usefulness of this particular
measure. We emphasize, in Section 8.5, the difficulties (and the costs) of identi-
fying poor households by estimating whether or not their consumption per capita
falls below the cut-off of an international poverty line.
Boasts about poverty reduction will be contested by those who mistrust gov-
ernments or are critical of their policies and wish to change them. Claims about
trend reductions in poverty are also questioned by rigorous applied economists,
such as Tony Atkinson, who insists that ‘any estimate—of level or of change—is
surrounded by a margin of error. This is often lost from sight in public pro-
nouncements, and it is important to convey to policymakers and other users that
they are operating with numbers about which there is considerable uncertainty’.⁶
The broad aim of this chapter is to encourage policymakers to probe very carefully







1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Figure 8.1 Percentage of people living below the ‘extreme poverty’ line in sub-Saharan
Africa, 1993–2015
Note: Extreme poverty defined by the World Bank using 2011 PPP and $1.9/day poverty line.
Source: Author calculation using PovCalnet, World Bank (2019).
⁶ World Bank (2016d: xv–xvi, xviii).
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8.2 Who Wants to Know? Struggles over Data
African political leaders such as President Kagame may be prepared to dispute
statistics measuring poverty, but few are prepared, as Stalin was, to execute
the nation’s most senior statisticians if data in a population census fail to
support implausible claims about output growth.⁷ More generally, as Angus
Deaton put it:
The state decides what it needs to see and how to see it. That politics infuses every
part of this is a testament to the importance of the numbers; lives depend on what
they show.⁸
The NSO in Malawi was subject to intense pressure after 2005, because it had
become politically imperative to exaggerate the success of the Minister of
Agriculture’s flagship farmer-support initiative, the Fertilizer Subsidy
Programme. This political pressure was difficult to ignore because the Minister
of Agriculture was also Malawi’s President, who was facing an impending election.
This political pressure, intensified by fiscal dependence on donors sceptical about
the benefits of subsidies, perhaps explains delays in the publication of the
Agricultural and Livestock Census (2006/7), which inconveniently showed that
maize output in Malawi was about 60 per cent below previous estimates provided
by agricultural extension officers. The embarrassing census also showed that the
Ministry of Agriculture had been allocating expenditures on the basis of hugely
inaccurate administrative estimates of the total number of farm households and
their regional distribution. The result was a skewed distribution of subsidized
inputs to ghost farmers and to the Northern Region, which was ‘the swing voting
region’ critical to the electoral success of President Mutharika in 2009.⁹
A better-known African example of the political sensitivity of the census
involves Nigeria, where there has not been a population census since 2006.
Estimates of the size of the current population range between 140 and 200
million.¹⁰ Political parties cultivating support in northern and southern Nigeria
are continuing to obstruct and contest the production of more definitive statistics,
because new and disaggregated estimates of the relative size of regional popula-
tions would have major resource (re)allocation implications. More recently, in
Tanzania a political leader was arrested in November 2017 for publishing an
analysis of anomalies in the statistics provided by the Bank of Tanzania and
suggesting that the government had been manipulating (and exaggerating) gross
⁷ Wilson (2019b); Merridale (1996). ⁸ Deaton (2015).
⁹ Jerven (2014: 10); Chinsinga and Poulton (2014: s140). See also Kilic et al. (2018: 4).
¹⁰ Jerven (2018: 468) and additional references in Serra (2018: 662). Marivoet and de Herdt (2017)
discuss census data in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
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domestic product (GDP) growth rates.¹¹ And in 2019 (an election year) the Head
of Mozambique’s National Statistical Institute was forced by the President to
resign after defending national census figures for the Frelimo-voting province of
Gaza against what appeared to be inflated numbers in the electoral register.¹²
Africa’s political leaders usually allocate limited and fluctuating resources to
NSOs, leaving the funding and much of the design of statistical investigations to
external donors.¹³ Most NSOs in Africa are said to be ‘constrained by budget
instability and a lack of autonomy that leave them vulnerable to political and
interest group pressures’. It is also reported that: ‘ad hoc donor-funded projects
generate significant revenue for statistics offices and individual NSO staff.
Increasing take home pay by chasing donor-funded per diems via workshop
attendance, training, and survey fieldwork is the order of the day. As a result,
NSOs lack incentives to improve national statistical capacity . . . ’¹⁴ Labrousse
concludes:
Dominated by external actors (private, public, supranational), African ‘statistical
sovereignty’ is profoundly incomplete.¹⁵
The World Bank has published an index of national statistical capacity for sub-
Saharan African countries. Among the reasons why this index is unreliable is that
it excludes important indicators, for example, data about labour force surveys.¹⁶
Another index aims to measure the degree to which the websites of African NSOs
follow best international practice in terms of coverage, accessibility, and quality of
publicly accessible data.¹⁷ Nigeria’s score on this index might be regarded as
surprisingly high in view of the absence of up-to-date population data; and
Rwanda’s relatively good scores on both these indices may raise eyebrows in the
light of recent controversies over the politicization of poverty data.¹⁸
The meaning of all the scores on these indices, including the high score and
apparent superiority of Statistics South Africa—so fiercely defended against aca-
demic critics by its recently retired leader¹⁹—needs to be questioned and exam-
ined alongside other evidence. In five major South African surveys, interviewer
cheating and other sources of error were widespread.²⁰ The most politically
embarrassing statistics, that is, the trends in South African inequality and real
¹¹ Human Rights Watch (2018): https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/
tanzania-and-zanzibar#; Taylor (2017); The Economist, 14 March 2019.
¹² Hanlon (2019). ¹³ Hoogeveen and Nguyen (2017).
¹⁴ Glassman and Ezeh (2014: xii). ¹⁵ Labrousse (2016b: 528).
¹⁶ http://datatopics.worldbank.org/statisticalcapacity/.
¹⁷ Hoogeveen and Nguyen (2017: appendix).
¹⁸ http://roape.net/2018/11/21/the-cover-up-complicity-in-rwandas-lies/. For another view of the
quality of Rwanda’s statistics see Krätke and Byiers (2014: box 3), and Wilson and Blood (2019).
¹⁹ Allison (2013) describes the extremely defensive response to criticism by South Africa’s
Statistician-General.
²⁰ Finn and Ranchhod (2017).
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wages, are difficult to analyse because of serious data quality issues and
because the officially published series has been interrupted by breaks in the
measurement process.²¹ The demographic impact of HIV AIDS in South Africa
has also been politically sensitive; different sources of data provide very different
estimates of the pattern and trends in new-born deaths, partly because ‘there is
uncertainty regarding the degree of completeness of reporting for young chil-
dren’.²² Earlier, President Mbeki’s obsessive AIDS denialism encouraged the
Department of Health to refuse medical researchers access to survey data while
this department published misleading statistics on trends in the epidemic between
2006 and 2008.²³
8.3 Ignoring Pro-Poor Policy Failures
There is accumulating evidence that allegedly pro-poor policies have an inegali-
tarian impact in rural Africa. Aid officials and the political elite have publicly
championed a variety of anti-poverty policies and social welfare expenditures; but
most of the poorest 20 per cent of the population in sub-Saharan Africa (as
defined by the World Bank) failed to benefit from any of these anti-poverty
programmes between 1998 and 2012.²⁴ An analysis for the period after 2012
examines African Development Bank and World Bank project aid to 17 African
countries and also ‘reveals that aid does not favor the poorest. Rather, aid
disproportionately flows to regions that hold more of a country’s richest people.’²⁵
Data on education spending in Africa provide a particularly clear illustration of
the degree to which large volumes of donor and state expenditure have been
channelled to benefit the rich: the children of the rich, defined in terms of a
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) Wealth Index, are far more likely to gain
access to higher levels of education; only about one in ten young people in sub-
Saharan Africa are able to enter higher education, but hardly any of this small
group of young people come from the poorest decile of households. Young people
in poor households are particularly disadvantaged in some countries: in Ghana,
for example, the poorest households only receive $16 for every $100 spent on rich
households, while in Malawi poorest can expect to receive less than $10 for every
$100 spent on the richest decile.²⁶
Those countries having the most extreme pro-rich spending patterns usually
show a consistent pattern of pro-rich public expenditure allocation at both
secondary and higher education levels. By far the most extreme pro-rich bias in
public expenditure on secondary schooling is found in Ethiopia (Figure 8.2).
²¹ Wittenberg (2017). ²² Bamford et al. (2018: 28).
²³ Dorrington and Bourne (2008); Lodge (2015). ²⁴ Ravallion (2015: 7, 23).
²⁵ Briggs (2017: 203). ²⁶ Ilie and Rose (2018: 637).
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Current public spending patterns on education in Africa generally allocate large
amounts to higher education at the expense of the primary and secondary sectors;
these spending allocations are clearly much more regressive (pro-rich) in some
African countries than in others.
By 2018, most African countries had established policies ‘to protect and
promote the poor and the vulnerable’; but, on average, these ‘social safety net’
programmes only cover a tiny percentage of the population. For example, less
than 3 per cent of the population participate in public works programmes and
most safety nets provide hardly any coverage of the huge internally displaced
populations in Africa. And a significant proportion of Africa’s social safety net
expenditures benefit the richest quintile of households: Malawi’s Social Action
Fund and Ghana’s Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty programme are
both good examples of benefit leakage to the richest households. A World Bank
evaluation concludes that most of the poor in Africa have not benefitted from
social safety net expenditure.²⁷
Ethiopia’s Public Safety Net Programme (PSNP) is the largest in Africa outside
South Africa and its impact has been evaluated several times, leading to some






















































Figure 8.2 Public spending on the richest decile relative to the poorest decile, by level
of education, selected sub-Saharan African countries
Note: The darker shaded bars in Table (b) indicate countries where the richest:poorest ratio exceeds
1,000.
Source: Adapted from Ilie and Rose (2017), based on UNESCO Institute of Statistics (UIS) and
DHS data.
²⁷ Beegle, Coudouel & Monsalve (2018: 73–5).
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rather positive conclusions.²⁸ Despite the size of Ethiopia’s safety net programme,
the bottom 10 per cent of rural households actually suffered declining consump-
tion between 2005 and 2011—at an annual average rate of close to 2 per cent
in real terms robust to the choice of deflator, while inequality as measured by a
Theil Index, a measure sensitive to the share of the poorest, increased between
2000 and 2011.²⁹
The beneficiaries of PSNP interventions to reduce malnutrition have been
concentrated in selected districts (woredas), with predictably skewed nutritional
results:
Ethiopia’s malnutrition rate could likely be substantially reduced by shifting
some of the programs from the woredas with a high concentration of major
programs into those with high malnutrition rates but no major programs.³⁰
The PSNP ‘excludes—by design—at least 52 per cent of vulnerable Ethiopian
households’.³¹ Econometric evidence suggests that this flagship anti-poverty inter-
vention has had no effect on household dietary diversity or children’s height-for-
age in participating households.³² Perhaps this is because the people benefitting
from Ethiopia’s PSNP (about one tenth of Ethiopia’s population) were not selected
by applying simple anthropometric rules or quantitative criteria.³³ People have
been excluded (graduated) from the PSNP for not supporting the political elite
and also because ‘the criteria were subjective and no household data existed to
support decision making’.³⁴
This type of outcome is predictable whenever local officials beholden to polit-
ically appointed leaders are required to distribute scarce resources. The political
imperatives underlying resource allocation in rural Ethiopia have been described
by René Lefort and have also been illustrated by ethnographic research in seven
different kebeles, which concludes that the ‘social protection programme is being
implemented in a way to eliminate opposition and . . . entrench power of the
existing elite’.³⁵ Similarly, in Uganda, donor-funded technical reports on ‘how to
select’ the beneficiaries of anti-poverty programmes have been brushed aside to
pursue ‘vote-buying clientelism’, while in Tanzania the rollout of the Productive
Social Safety Net and of earlier donor-funded schemes aimed at poverty reduction
has been manipulated for electoral purposes and has served to strengthen the
ruling party (the Chama Cha Mapinduzi; CCM).³⁶
²⁸ For examples of this evaluation literature see: Favara et al. (2019) and Desalegn and Ali (2018).
²⁹ World Bank (2015: 12–14). ³⁰ Rajkumar et al. (2011: 134).
³¹ World Bank (2015: 12, 49). ³² Gebrehiwot and Castilla (2018).
³³ Sharp, Brown, and Teshome (2006: 21).
³⁴ Cochrane and Tamiru (2016: 657); Roelen, Devereux, and Kebede (2017: 22). See also Elias et al.
(2013: 177).
³⁵ Lefort (2012); Cochrane and Tamiru (2016: 655).
³⁶ Hickey and Bukenya (2016: 18); Kjær and Joughin (2019); Jacob and Pedersen (2018: 23).
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It has been argued that in rural Zimbabwe the government intentionally
adopted policies to achieve ‘Extreme scarcity and dependence on the state for
agricultural inputs and food aid . . . [to] create an enforced loyalty that supports
regime perpetuation.’³⁷ The extreme bias in the pattern of distribution of food aid
to the rural poor by the rural cadres of Zimbabwe African National Union—
Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) has been ‘discretionary, clientelistic and exclusion-
ary’.³⁸ More recently, Emmerson Mnangagwa spearheaded the Command
Agriculture Programme to allocate resources to securocrats and other politically
important beneficiaries in rural areas.³⁹ Both the President and the Minister of
Agriculture are said to ‘have demonstrated a willingness to (ab)use food for
political gain in Zimbabwe’.⁴⁰
If policymakers and foreign advisors ignore the prevalence of violent struggles
to maintain political power and to monopolize access to state resources in rural
Africa, their proposals for interventions to reduce poverty are likely to be irrele-
vant. Resources ostensibly allocated to anti-poverty programmes, smallholder
development, and food distribution are routinely diverted—to subsidize accumu-
lation by larger farmers and/or conspicuous consumption by cronies.⁴¹ The policy
remedies proposed by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), for instance,
are unlikely to benefit the poor, because they so studiously avoid any discussion
of African political realities: instead, FAO resorts to platitudes about the need
for ‘strong political commitment’ as a precondition for ending extreme rural pov-
erty.⁴² Proclamations from Rome, together with the conventional surveys of rural
household poverty (criticized in Section 8.5) and the increasingly complex multidi-
mensional indicators of poverty promoted by other donor agencies, can readily be
manipulated or ignored by administrative elites within Africa.
8.4 Conventional Strategies for Rural Poverty Reduction
Policymakers are repeatedly advised to focus support on smallholder farmers not
only because of their allegedly superior yields per hectare but also because of
a belief that, when African smallholder output increases, poverty will fall.⁴³
We discuss the data on the yield of small farmers in Chapter 9; here we focus
on poverty reduction mechanisms.
John Mellor, the founder and first Director of International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI) and a Chief Economist for United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), has argued, since 1961, that increases in
³⁷ Simpson and Hawkins (2018: 338).
³⁸ Chinyoka (2017: 17); Marongwe (2012: 144–5); Munyani (2005: 69–73).
³⁹ Simpson and Hawkins (2018: 365). ⁴⁰ Cameron (2018: 42).
⁴¹ Jayne et al. (2018); Sender (2016). ⁴² De La O Campos et al. (2018: 38).
⁴³ Hazell (2013: 20).
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smallholder output ‘generate rapid, equitable, geographically dispersed growth
owing to agriculture’s substantial labor intensive linkages with the non-farm
economy’. The rural non-farm sector is a key source of income for the landless
or semi-landless poor and opportunities in this sector are positively linked to the
growth of small farmer income, because ‘smallholders spend substantial portions
of increased income . . . on employment-intensive, nontradable goods and ser-
vices produced by the rural non-farm sector’. In contrast, according to this
argument, much weaker rural consumption linkages are generated when large
farmers’ output and income grows; these farmers have ‘urban-orientated con-
sumption patterns’.⁴⁴
Anyone who has spent time in rural Africa will agree that many poor people do
depend on activities other than farming, although the poorest usually work on
farms as casual agricultural wage workers rather than in the non-farm economy.
But trading and village centres as well as small rural towns often provide poor
rural women and men with opportunities for part-time and unskilled non-farm
employment. These include many opportunities for low-paid wage employment:
in construction and transport, food processing and packaging, carpentry, alcohol
preparation, hairdressing, sexual services, guard work, and, of course, as domestic
servants in private households. In some rural areas the main impetus for the
growth of these local opportunities for wage employment may, as Mellor and
many others suggest, be an increase in the agricultural revenues earned by
scattered small famers. But elsewhere very different causal mechanisms have
been much more important, with dramatically better outcomes for the poor.
For example, when public sector expenditure constructs a district hospital, a
health clinic, a teacher training college, or a new irrigation structure, then salaried
staff cadres, together with the more numerous wage workers employed as cleaners
and security guards in these institutions, are likely to provide the breakthrough to
a new level of local demand for wage-labour-intensive goods and services. The
consequence may be increased competition for unskilled rural labour between, for
example, the construction and the agricultural sector and a tightening of the
labour market, leading to a rise in seasonal agricultural wages and a reduction
in rural poverty. This link between public sector investment in rural areas,
tightening labour markets, and rising agricultural wage rates is well documented
for rural India.⁴⁵ In other rural areas, the impetus may arise when large-scale
agribusinesses invest and create a new group of formal on-farm unskilled wage
employees, who then stimulate a surprising array of non-farm employment. This
is precisely what happened in Ziway, a town in Ethiopia that has grown very
⁴⁴ Mellor and Malik (2017: 2–3). In one Ethiopian simulation it is even assumed that ‘all the
additional income generated from increased production of these large farms is spent on urban
goods, spent on imports, saved or sent abroad’ (Dorosh and Mellor, 2014: 429).
⁴⁵ Sen and Ghosh (1993). For later years see: Himanshu and Kundu (2016).
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 13/5/2020, SPi
       197
dramatically since 2001 in the shadow of a few very large-scale floricultural and
wine-producing firms.⁴⁶ Figure 8.3 illustrates some of this growth: part of the
Figure 8.3 Mapping agribusiness and workers’ accommodation in Ziway, 2001–18
⁴⁶ Cramer, Di John, and Sender (2018).
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massive expansion in the area covered by greenhouses by 2018 can be seen in
the bottom right-hand corner; and the degree to which the original (blacked-
out) area of the town has been dwarfed by new residential areas constructed to
the west and to the north is also obvious. Google’s coloured satellite pictures
make it clearer that the density of buildings in the original area covered by
Ziway in 2001 has been transformed, with every available scrap of land
converted to provide rental accommodation for migrant wage workers.
There are other examples of this type of poverty-reducing dynamic. In northern
Senegal, where five large agribusiness estates have been established since 2003,
there was rapid growth in the incomes of agribusiness wage employees.⁴⁷ In
Tanzania, several emerging urban centres (EUCs) became ‘hotspots for rural
migration’, often providing a range of services for large-scale agribusiness man-
agers and their workers. When the population of salaried employees increased in
the 1990s, access to schooling, health, and financial services improved—and non-
crop-related wage employment opportunities for unskilled migrants from nearby
and distant rural areas expanded.⁴⁸
Strategies designed to increase the output of all small farm households will
result, according to conventional theory, in new wage employment opportunities
for people who are much poorer, because the beneficiaries will not only need to
hire additional seasonal agricultural labour inputs at harvest time, but will also
devote their incremental income to additional consumption of rurally produced
labour-intensive goods and services. But we are not convinced about the strength
of this indirect mechanism and its likely impact on poverty reduction. Even if
some farmers do achieve a marginal increase in their consumption of purchased
goods and services, only a few will have the capacity to use more hired labour
inputs. The well-connected individuals farming on a relatively large scale will
account for much of any growth in consumption stemming from state and non-
governmental organization (NGO) interventions.⁴⁹ These individuals are also
likely to purchase a high proportion of all hired labour days: the largest size tercile
of smallholder farmers in Tanzania, for example, are much more likely to use
hired labour than the smallest size tercile, and farmers who have acquired larger
extents of irrigated vegetables use more hired labour than farmers with access to
less irrigated land.⁵⁰ Where employers are oligopsonists in local labour markets,
then the bargaining power of and the daily wage rate paid to their agricultural
wage workers may be very low.⁵¹
If, instead, workers could find employment on much larger-scale farms, they
would reduce the risk of failing to find daily employment outside peak seasons
⁴⁷ Van den Broeck and Maertens (2017). ⁴⁸ Lazaro et al. (2017: 24).
⁴⁹ Cramer et al. (2014a); Ragasa, Mazunda, and Kadzamira (2016: 22); Gray, Dowd-Uribe, and
Kaminski (2018).
⁵⁰ Wineman and Jayne (2018: 24); Benali, Brümmer, and Afari-Sefa (2018: table 5).
⁵¹ Bardhan and Rudra (1980a, 1980b).
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and, as our own fieldwork over the past 30 years in Ethiopia, Mozambique, South
Africa, and Uganda has shown, they would typically benefit from better wages and
working conditions than those provided by smaller farmers.⁵² Policy initiatives
focused on improving the real annual wage of rural wage labourers—rather than
on increasing the profits of ‘small’ producers—are rarely discussed or advocated in
Africa by agricultural economists or donors. The need to monitor the real wages of
agricultural wage workers as an indicator of poverty trends in Africa is hardly ever
acknowledged.
There is no a priori reason to suppose that the non-farm linkages generated by
the expenditures of rural wage workers, especially if they are paid a better wage,
will be weaker and less poverty reducing than the linkages generated by the mini-
farmers who struggle to survive by cultivating a few plants. On the contrary, we
have good evidence that even the very poorest casual agricultural wage labourers
in Africa aim to purchase a few locally produced consumer goods—such as a new
dress, a table, bed, or cupboard.⁵³
The assumption that poverty-reducing linkages can only stem from small farm
development is also unconvincing because it has relied so heavily on strange and
slippery definitions of the ‘small’. Available data on the size distribution of farms in
Africa is inconsistent andunreliable, but inmany countries themedianoperated farm
area per household is probably below one hectare.⁵⁴ So it is surprising thatMellor and
his colleagues regard some farmers cultivating as much as 75 hectares as small. In
Africa, they choose to define the top end of the distribution of all family farms (i.e. the
‘commercial’ and ‘middle’ farmers—with reliable access to water) as ‘small’. In
Ethiopia, for example, these authors adopt an idiosyncratic ‘small’ category that
includes farmerswho cultivate farms as large as 33 hectares.⁵⁵ Such quirky definitions
can be useful when boasting that flagship policies supporting smallholders are pro-
poor.⁵⁶ But it is disingenuous and extremely unhelpful for policy officials.
8.5 The Fog of Poverty Reduction: How Not to Focus
on the Poorest
Angus Deaton argues that the ‘gold standard’—the World Bank’s central monet-
ary measure of poverty—is ‘inherently unreliable’.⁵⁷ He points out that it con-
tinues to be difficult to explain the large discrepancies between measures of
consumption derived from household surveys and from national income statistics.
⁵² Cramer et al. (20167). ⁵³ Sender, Cramer, and Oya (2018: 597).
⁵⁴ Lowder et al. (2016: 14).
⁵⁵ On Pakistan, see Mellor and Malik (2017: 3); on Ethiopia, see Dorosh and Mellor (2013: 423).
⁵⁶ Hazell (2019: 150).
⁵⁷ Deaton also argues against another supposed ‘gold standard’, that of RCTs as a means of finding
out ‘what works’: Deaton and Cartwright (2018: 2) argue that ‘any special status for RCTs is
unwarranted’.
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He also argues conventional methods of poverty estimation are ‘clouded in a fog
of technicalities’.⁵⁸ We will try to dispel this fog in our discussion of the most
widely used conventional method.
The ‘traditional basis’, ‘the core indicator’ or the gold standard for identifying
the poor, is the detailed information on consumption per household member
collected in household surveys, especially the Living Standards Measurement
Surveys (LSMS). On the basis of this costly, rather unreliable, and often dated
information, everyone who lives in a household failing to achieve some minimum
(cut-off) level of consumption per day is defined as ‘poor’. If an individual’s daily
consumption expenditure is below the cut-off, defined by an international poverty
line (set by the World Bank at US$1.90 in 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP)
dollars), they suffer from ‘extreme poverty’ (see Figure 8.1).
It is not considered a good idea to use official exchange rates to compare the
standard of living between countries, especially between low-income and OECD
countries. At the official exchange rate, one dollar (for example) will usually be
able to purchase far more goods and services in Dar es Salaam—cups of tea and
haircuts—than it could in New York. A more ‘correct’ exchange rate would make
one dollar worth the same, that is, have the same purchasing power in the low-
income and the OECD country. The PPP rate is an estimate of the ‘correct’
exchange rate in this sense and this estimate requires the collection of millions
of prices of comparable items all around the world. There is probably a 25 per cent
margin of error on either side of PPP exchange rates.⁵⁹
The mix of methods and countries used to select the US$1.90 poverty line—
originally a ‘dollar a day’—appears to have been strongly influenced by the Bank’s
own public relations requirements and a desire to achieve consistency with
previous estimates, rather than by examining the lived experience of the poor.
An earlier version of the current international poverty line was slightly below
$1.90, but the World Bank decided to round this number up.⁶⁰ Angus Deaton
labels the level of daily expenditure that has been selected as the poverty line cut-off
‘a miserable pittance’, while Jean Drèze points out that (even above the cut-off) the
amount a ‘non-poor’ person could afford to spend per month on health, for
example, would barely cover the cost of purchasing a single aspirin; their total
monthly expenditures could not possibly ‘meet the requirements of dignified
living’.⁶¹ It has been suggested that the apparently arbitrary choice of such a low
cut-off line was influenced by a desire to applaud the success of governments and
international agencies in achieving an impressive reduction in poverty.⁶²
⁵⁸ Deaton (2016: 1223). Drèze and Deaton (2017: 66). ⁵⁹ Deaton (2013: 228).
⁶⁰ Ferreira et al. (2016: 161).
⁶¹ Deaton (2013: 223); Drèze (2019: 55); https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zfxH6qL9_ik.
⁶² Edward and Sumner (2016: 10).
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In sub-Saharan Africa the consumption level in 2015 of a huge percentage of
the population (41 per cent) fell below this cut-off line and all these people are
defined by the World Bank as living in extreme poverty. In 11 sub-Saharan
African countries ‘more than half of the population live in extreme poverty’.⁶³
No less than 86 per cent of the rural population of South Sudan is, according to the
latest estimate (for 2016), living in extreme poverty.⁶⁴ A large proportion of
African households are consuming at levels only very slightly above or below
the level of the international poverty line.⁶⁵ One implication is that a recalculation
of the PPP rate by economists in Pennsylvania, or a proposal in Washington for a
very small increase/decrease in the poverty cut-off, will immediately shift millions
of Africans into or out of poverty. For example, a tiny increase in the international
PPP poverty line (from $1.90 to $2.00) would add 100 million people to the
extreme poverty headcount.⁶⁶
The World Bank argues that ‘In 2015, more than half of the global poor resided
in Sub-Saharan Africa’ and forecasts that by 2030 about 87 per cent of the global
poor will live in sub-Saharan Africa.⁶⁷ But the proportion of global poverty that is
accounted for by sub-Saharan Africa (as opposed to South Asia) is determined by
the Bank’s questionable decision to set the international poverty cut-off at a
relatively low level. Whether those living just above this line really are now
‘non-poor’ depends on whether or not we accept that someone can live decently
when their level of consumption is so low. Policymakers should also be aware that
trends in poverty reduction can easily be exaggerated when household survey
questionnaires or methods change between surveys and when the available con-
sumer price indices do not accurately reflect the changing consumption basket of
very poor households. For example, poverty reduction has been exaggerated in
Uganda for both of these reasons; and it has been exaggerated in Rwanda by
manipulating the Consumer Price Index.⁶⁸
Any optimistic assessment of trends in poverty also depends on whether or not
we accept claims that household surveys reliably capture the consumption of
individuals at the tail end of the distribution, for example, the meagre consump-
tion of migrant construction workers, squatters, and agricultural wage labourers.
Quite apart from the problem of these excluded individuals at the tail end,
even officially included ‘poor’ individuals have not enjoyed the consumption
gains reflected in the aggregate trend for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole: growth
rates of consumption for the ‘poor’ were negative in Uganda, Zambia, Ghana,
Niger, and South Africa between about 2010 and 2015 and, over roughly the same
period, were barely positive in Ethiopia and Rwanda.⁶⁹ Consequently, it is not
⁶³ World Bank (2018: 27). ⁶⁴ Pape and Parisotto (2019: 3). ⁶⁵ World Bank (2018: 75).
⁶⁶ Aguilar and Sumner (2019: 2). ⁶⁷ World Bank (2018: 4).
⁶⁸ Daniels and Minot (2014); ROAPE (2018).
⁶⁹ http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/povOnDemand.aspx; see also Clementi, Fabiani, and
Molini (2019).
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surprising that the share of national income currently received by the poor is
minuscule. The latest available disaggregated data on the income share of the
poorest (defined as the lowest 20 per cent in Figure 8.4) show large differences
between African countries, but also that the income share of the poorest











































Figure 8.4 Income inequality in sub-Saharan Africa (shares of the lowest and highest
20% of population)
Source: World Bank PovCalnet (2019).
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20 per cent is always disproportionately small; it is below—in some countries
way below—10 per cent.
8.6 Alternatives to the ‘Gold Standard’?
We have discussed some of the problems of using conventional consumption per
capita and cut-off lines to analyse poverty. Many development economists are
aware of these (and other) difficulties with LSMS data in Africa. Nonetheless,
when economists advise policymakers on how to select the ‘best’ method of
identifying the poor the only selection criterion continues to be accuracy in
predicting household per capita expenditure.⁷⁰ It is not necessary for policymakers
to accept this definition of the ‘best’ indicator: they can turn to well-established
alternative indicators of poverty or socio-economic status, such as wealth or asset
indices based on DHS data.
Asset indices have been used rather successfully in Africa to identify rural
households containing less educated people with more health problems, higher
fertility, and greater risk of child stunting than other households.⁷¹ They can also
offer other important advantages to policymakers: they are usually constructed
from a few dichotomous indicators of asset ownership and housing characteristics
(e.g. does the house have access to a radio, improved sanitation, or have an earth/
dung floor?). Answers to these questions do not require respondents to perform
unrealistic feats of recall, and can be collected more cheaply, more quickly, and
probably with less measurement error than the huge number of questions about
past and current expenditures in the LSMS. (The costs of LSMS in Uganda and
Tanzania amounted to about US$400 per surveyed household.⁷²)
The accuracy of responses to questions about ownership of inanimate items
of furniture, a bed for example, can be confirmed visually by enumerators.
But responses to questions about other key assets in rural Africa—the number
of chickens and animals owned—are always much more unreliable.⁷³ And there
are other important problems faced by all attempts to construct these asset
indices: if the aim is to use the asset index as a proxy for wealth, researchers
must either use depreciated values or make arbitrary choices about how to weight
different assets; but the relevant time series of prices to estimate depreciation is
unlikely to be available in poor rural areas. Besides, it will always be difficult to
account for differential quality: it may be obvious to all enumerators that an Apple
iPhone is not the same thing as the most common mobile phone in Africa (a
Tecno T201—costing about US$15), but less obvious that the quality of one
cooking utensil is very much lower than another (home-made) item, or that the
⁷⁰ Ngo and Christiaensen (2018). ⁷¹ Stifel et al. (2018). ⁷² Kilic et al. (2017: 21).
⁷³ Lesnoff (2015); Himelein, Eckman, and Murray (2014).
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quality of access to sanitation varies dramatically, for example, between those
with access to piped water 24/7 and those with only intermittent access.⁷⁴ Also,
huge seasonal price variations have been recorded for rural assets—in Tanzania,
for example, the price of a bicycle can more than double in the dry relative to the
wet season.⁷⁵
The theoretical and practical problems of how to justify the selection of the
specific items to be included in an asset index—and of how to weight these
items—are often side-stepped in published research on rural poverty. Most studies
are content to follow conventions and procedures established by earlier social
scientists. Researchers admit that there is little underlying theory to support the
choice of variables to include when using statistical procedures—such as the
principal components analysis (PCA) used by the DHS.⁷⁶
Besides, unweighted indices of socio-economic status have often been found to
perform just about as well in identifying low socio-economic status rural house-
holds as the indices constructed using PCA to estimate weights.⁷⁷ Since many
policymakers may not be inclined to unpick the meaning of the weights used or to
query the arguments for including one asset rather than another, PCA (and other
statistical techniques such as multiple correspondence analysis) would seem
merely to lend a spurious aura of scientific, quantitative precision to conventional
policy prescriptions.⁷⁸
A bewildering smörgåsbord of implicitly or explicitly weighted indices and
recondite definitions of poverty now confront policymakers in Africa. Apart
from asset/wealth indices and the ‘gold standard’ monetary measures, a mixed
assortment of new non-monetary indices of poverty has been added to the buffet
table, including indices that make brave attempts to quantify levels of ‘empowered
decision-making’ such as the Relative Autonomy Index (RAI), providing a direct
measure of women’s motivational autonomy. Another, though less fashionable,
non-monetary index facetiously claims to track the quality of governance in public
institutions—the Gross Toilet Index.⁷⁹ Some poverty experts mix and match,
using these novel indices in combination with the increasingly fashionable
Multidimensional Poverty Index (or other ‘mash-up indices’) to report, for
example, the percentage of women ‘deprived in at least three dimensions’, or the
proportion of children deprived in three to six dimensions.⁸⁰
⁷⁴ https://humantechlab.org/2019/01/10/which-chinese-phone-giant-dominates-sales-in-africa-
against-apple/; Gulyani, Rizvi, and Talukdar (2019).
⁷⁵ Kaiser, Hruschka, and Hadley (2017: 2).
⁷⁶ Tusting et al. (2016: 651); Ngo and Christiaensen (2018: 12); Rich, Desmond, and Makusha
(2019: 494).
⁷⁷ Sender, Cramer, and Oya (2018): Liu, Esteve, and Treviño (2017); Kabudula et al. (2017). There is,
of course, no such thing as an unweighted index; it simply means that the components of an index are
given equal weights.
⁷⁸ Some of these statistical techniques are outlined in Vollmer and Alkire (2018).
⁷⁹ Vaz, Pratley, and Alkire (2016); Mahajan (2014).
⁸⁰ Ravallion (2012); Beegle et al. (2016: 108).
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One noteworthy feature of the Multidimensional Poverty Indices is a failure to
include any indicators of the fundamentally important determinants of the stand-
ard of living of rural children and adults, that is, their wages and working
conditions or, in the case of children, their exposure to teenage pregnancy.⁸¹
The World Bank has made an effort to explain its failure to include any employ-
ment indicators in its 2018 Multidimensional Poverty Index, but inconsistent and
unfounded arguments citing relevance and data quality smack of ideology:
Employment is not part of the multidimensional poverty measure presented here
for two reasons. First, many of the frequently used indicators of employment in
high-income countries, such as . . . wage employment, are not as relevant in low-
income countries, which have very different labor market structures . . . Second,
whatever relevant indicators of employment exist, these indicators are not available
or not sufficiently harmonized in the different surveys considered here.⁸²
Since 2009, the World Bank has promoted an index of development that is
sensitive to inequality of opportunity, that is, an index that can take account of
the fact while average access to education or maternal health services for women
in Africa has been improving, some (rural) women have not been able to benefit
very much from expanded coverage. But this Human Opportunity Index (HOI) is
very highly and significantly correlated with the United Nations Development
Programme’s (UNDP’s) Human Development Index (HDI); and the Bank’s
Multidimensional Poverty Indices produce a similar global poverty profile to the
monetary ‘gold standard’ measures based on the $1.90 poverty cut-off.⁸³ Our
conclusion is that many of the growing number of newly minted poverty indices
are redundant—they may appear to satisfy NGOs’ demand for non-monetary,
more ‘human’ development measures, but they do not get us closer to identifying
the realities of the economic lives of the poorest people and they do not help in
sharpening the focus of policymakers on these poor people.
8.7 The Most Vulnerable People: ‘Common Sense’
and Uncontroversial Stylized Facts
Nicholas Kaldor used stylized facts to criticize theories and explanations published
by neoclassical economists; he regarded them as guilty of producing theories based
on assumptions that were not even approximately true and, therefore, could not
justifiably be used for purposes of explanation or policy analysis.⁸⁴ Something
⁸¹ Alkire et al. (2017: table 1). ⁸² World Bank (2018: 94).
⁸³ Brunori, Ferreira, and Peragine (2013: 17); Aguilar and Sumner (2019: 22).
⁸⁴ Lawson (1989: 76).
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similar affects much economic analysis of poverty and of contemporary African
economic development. Most economists agree on several conventional wisdom
propositions about African poverty. In this section we begin by listing and
questioning the policy relevance of three of these popular, conventional proposi-
tions about poverty. We then introduce a selection of stylized facts about
poverty—uncontroversial facts that are much less likely to mislead policymakers.
Finally, we introduce a particular stylized fact that has too often been ignored or
dismissed as irrelevant for understanding broad trends in poverty or making
policy but that we argue is at the very core of the problem.
Conventional Wisdom I: Poverty is Rural
In most African countries most of the people who are poor live in rural rather
than urban areas. It makes little difference how poverty is defined—with a
money metric, an asset index, an anthropometric cut-off, or a mix of multidi-
mensional indicators: rurality dominates the poverty profile. The percentage of
the poor who live in rural areas in the 2010s is about three times greater than
the percentage of the poor who live in urban areas.⁸⁵ About two thirds of the
total population of sub-Saharan Africa live in rural areas and in some countries,
for example, Burundi, Uganda, Malawi, Niger, South Sudan, and Ethiopia, more
than 80 per cent do so.
But this does not help policymakers to design very precise or effective inter-
ventions.⁸⁶ A geographically defined strategy claiming to benefit ‘rural’ house-
holds will, for political economy reasons already discussed in Section 8.2, probably
exclude the poorest households. Besides, a growing number of rural households in
Africa’s rapidly differentiating countryside are by no means poor; they operate
medium and large-scale capitalist enterprises.⁸⁷
The policy relevance of a simple rural–urban distinction is also questionable for
another reason: the boundaries between the rural and the urban are shifting very
rapidly in Africa and are often contested.⁸⁸Many non-poor households are falsely
classified as ‘rural’ when they live just outside the dated and arbitrarily drawn
administrative boundaries of a city.⁸⁹ On closer examination, they are primarily
engaged in urban occupations and well integrated into urban economic activities,
including, in some cases, real estate speculation. If relatively prosperous urban
people can make false claims to be living in ‘rural’ households with customary
⁸⁵ Beegle et al. (2016: 10); De La O Campos et al. (2018: 9).
⁸⁶ Aguilar and Sumner (2019: table 5); World Bank (2018: table 4C.1).
⁸⁷ Jayne et al. (2016); Lay, Nolte, and Sipangule (2018); Whitfield (2017); Greco (2015); Schaefer
(2016).
⁸⁸ Van Noorloos and Kloosterboer (2018). ⁸⁹ Pincus and Sender (2008).
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land rights, then the poorer rural households may again be at the back of any
queue for allocating valuable resources.
The rural–urban gap in consumption per capita is, like the headcount rate of
poverty, much larger in some countries than others. For example, Integrated
Surveys of Agriculture (LSMS-ISA) suggest that the level of consumption per
capita in urban Tanzania is 2.2 times higher than in rural Tanzania, while in
Uganda urban consumption per capita is 3.3 times rural consumption per
capita.⁹⁰ Non-monetary poverty indicators can also provide evidence of inter-
country differences in the urban–rural welfare gap: for example, while the under-5
mortality rate (U5MR) is very high in rural Sierra Leone, the urban mortality rate
is not much lower; but in Nigeria the urban rate is much lower than the rural rate;
in Kenya, the rural–urban gap has already disappeared and the urban U5MR is
now actually higher than the rural rate.⁹¹ While these variations are important,
average data for a group of 23 African countries can be used to illustrate the
general disadvantages of rurality (Figure 8.5). This figure highlights the huge
disadvantages faced by rural women, especially in their ability to achieve adequate
education and antenatal care.
Stunted
Mother under age 20
Mother’s education –10+ years
Father’s education –10+ years
Asset index (2nd quintile)






Rural areas Urban areas
Figure 8.5 Urban and rural inequality: mean comparison for selected variables (for a
group of 23 sub-Saharan African countries)
Source: Stifel et al. (2018).
⁹⁰ De Magalhães and Santaeulàlia-Llopis (2018: table 2). ⁹¹ Beatriz et al. (2018: table 1).
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Geographical inequality is only one form of inequality that can be used to
investigate disparities in standards of living and to design policy, but it is con-
ventional common sense to focus on geography and on the mapping of admin-
istrative units, rather than political economy and class analysis. The widely
accepted view is that geographical mapping of poverty indicators can make a
major contribution to the design of poverty reduction strategies.⁹² But there is
good evidence that the pattern of U5MR, as well as other indicators of risks to
health, cannot be explained in terms of rural or urban residence. Instead, much if
not all of the urban health advantage can be explained by socio-economic factors
such as household wealth and maternal education.⁹³ For example, urbanization
does not appear to have a direct and positive association with child nutrition
outcomes and diets. When socio-economic controls are introduced into linear
probability regressions, the results suggest that the rural–urban child nutrition gap
does not remain significant; instead of geography, ‘the key nutritional disadvan-
tage of rural populations stems chiefly from social and economic poverty’.⁹⁴
Influential populists have claimed for decades that the poor will benefit if
interventions are rebalanced to favour rural rather than urban areas, but policy-
makers face a much more difficult task—to reduce unacceptable differences in the
standard of living within rural and urban locations.⁹⁵ The broad claim that most of
the poor in Africa are young is also not very useful for (or surprising to)
policymakers; it is also true by definition because children and young people
account for such a very high proportion (about 60 per cent) of Africa’s total
population.⁹⁶ The scatter-gun targeting of the poor as ‘youth’ has fuelled spurts in
expenditure on tertiary education and training that, while claiming to be pro-
poor, have mainly benefitted the children of richer parents and very few of the
poorest young people. It is also driven by a supply-side fantasy that more
education will lead neatly to more growth and employment, another nugget of
conventional wisdom contradicted by the evidence.
Conventional Wisdom II: The Poorest People
Live in Large Households
There is a long tradition emphasizing the negative social consequences of exces-
sive fecundity among poor women; and these views have often fuelled regressive
policy interventions and moral panics.⁹⁷ One of the founders of the London
School of Economics believed that children living in large households in Britain
⁹² Marivoet, Ulimwengu, and Sedano (2019); Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative
(2018: 71); Alkire (2018: 11).
⁹³ Beatriz et al. (2018). ⁹⁴ Stifel et al. (2018).
⁹⁵ The high priests of the movement to reduce ‘urban bias’ are Bates (1980) and Lipton (2012b).
⁹⁶ United Nations (2017: 10). ⁹⁷ Shepard (2007).
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at the end of the nineteenth century risked poverty because of irresponsible
breeding by an inferior type of ‘thriftless and irresponsible’ immigrant Catholic
and Jew.⁹⁸ In fact, during the nineteenth century the poorest decile of
households—paupers and vagrants—lived in very small households. Unskilled
labourers lived in much smaller households than richer classes.⁹⁹
In Africa, larger households are conventionally believed to be more vulnerable
to poverty. For example, an analysis of poverty in Uganda based on LSMSs
concludes that ‘the chronic poor have relatively large households . . . Those that
have never been poor have small households.’¹⁰⁰ But the view that large house-
holds are more likely to be poor than other households leans towards tautology.
Households are defined as poor because household per capita expenditure/
consumption is below the cut-off. If the denominator (i.e. the size of the house-
hold) is large, it is not a surprising arithmetic result that the incidence of
poverty is higher in larger households. It also follows arithmetically that a small
reduction in the size of the denominator as a result, for example, of the death of a
new-born baby, could immediately raise per capita household expenditure above
the poverty cut-off.
Whether or not a household is classified as poor is obviously influenced by the
accuracy of and the methods used to count the number of household members,
that is, survey estimates of the size of the denominator. The problem is that these
estimates are, in many African contexts, unreliable. They continue to rely on an a
priori standardized, narrow, and inappropriate definition of ‘the household’ and
its ‘residents’, despite decades of vigorous criticism showing the difficulties of
using conventional (residential) definitions of the household in studying rural
Africa.¹⁰¹ There is no coherent account of how survey enumerators should delimit
the boundaries of the household and the pattern of visits by enumerators that may
be required: ‘little attention has been paid to the issue of what “household”means
in these surveys: how it is defined for data collection purposes and what the
definition implies for the analysis and interpretation of results’.¹⁰² Moreover, ‘The
probability of finding no one at home in a one person household is larger than in a
multiple person household. Small households are therefore likely to be under-
represented in the survey.’¹⁰³
⁹⁸ Cited in Aldrich (2019: 19). ⁹⁹ Schürer et al. (2018: table 9).
¹⁰⁰ Van Campenhout, Sekabira and Aduayom (2016: 150). For similar views on Ethiopia see:
Abebaw and Admassie (2013: 127). More generally, see Beegle, Coudouel, and Monsalve (2018: 50).
See also: Beegle et al. (2016: 130) and World Bank (2018: 38).
¹⁰¹ Guyer and Peters (1987); O’Laughlin (1995); Adato, Lund, and Mhlongo (2007); Akresh and
Edmonds (2010); Cramer et al. (2014b: 178–9).
¹⁰² Randall, Coast, and Leone (2011: 217). Estimating ‘household size’ in Victorian Britain is also
difficult because of shifts in instructions to census enumerators (Schürer et al., 2018: tables 1 and 3).
¹⁰³ Hoogeveen and Schipper (2006: 77–8). Poor widows are also likely to be under-represented
(Randall and Coast, 2016: 150).
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Although poverty has often been associated with large households on the basis
of household expenditure data, very different conclusions are reached when
poverty is analysed using a wealth index. For example, DHS survey data
show that household size in the poorer wealth (not expenditure) quintiles in
2011 was smaller than in the richer quintiles in Uganda and Ethiopia. In South
Africa too, the poorest decile of households are not significantly larger than
other households, if poverty is defined in terms of an asset index rather
than expenditure per capita.¹⁰⁴
Historical arguments support the view that very small households face greater
risks. The most distinguished historian of poverty in Africa points out that: ‘In
several African languages the common word for “poor” . . . implies lack of kin
and friends, while the weak household, bereft of able-bodied male labour, has
probably been the most common source of poverty throughout Africa’s recover-
able history.’¹⁰⁵ The intuition that successful farming may be impossible for some
very small households is also supported by survey evidence from Ethiopia, Ghana,
South Africa, and elsewhere: the challenges of crop production are likely to be
insurmountable where small households lack sufficiently close links to adult
males, or to the network of local connections necessary to acquire land, agricul-
tural inputs, seasonal credit, and certain types of labour.¹⁰⁶ One implication of
these difficulties was noted many years ago by Iliffe, but has since been insuffi-
ciently emphasized, that is, that in these small and very poor households the main
or most reliable source of income may be casual wage labour for neighbouring,
larger households.
Conventional Wisdom III: Female-Headed Households
are the Poorest
In UN agencies ‘there is a continued focus on comparisons between households,
and especially between male-headed and female-headed units. The thorny ques-
tion of how to define “female headship” is often ignored.’¹⁰⁷ World Bank publi-
cations also continue to argue that ‘For several countries, a larger share of the
multidimensional poor live . . . in female-headed households’, although a num-
ber of their economists have admitted that the classification of households as
either male or female headed is ‘not very useful’.¹⁰⁸
¹⁰⁴ Rich, Desmond, and Makusha (2018: 8). In Vietnam, LSMS results linking poverty with large
households have been criticized in detail by Dinh Vu Trang Ngan, Pincus, and Sender (2012).
¹⁰⁵ Iliffe (1987: 7, 238). The poor in England during the Industrial Revolution lived in much smaller
households than other social classes (Allen, 2019: 92).
¹⁰⁶ Siyoum (2012: 50ff.); Skalidou (2018: table 9); Palmer and Sender (2006).
¹⁰⁷ Bradshaw, Chant, and Linneker (2017: 16).
¹⁰⁸ World Bank (2018: 109); Boudet et al. (2018: 4). The emphasis on female-headed households is
widespread among African leaders of NGOs (ACPF, 2019: 33).
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There have been many attempts to link deprivation with ‘female-headed
households’ or ‘female farm managers’ in sub-Saharan Africa (and elsewhere),
but these typically reach ambiguous conclusions.¹⁰⁹ One reason is that, like ‘rural’
households, female-headed households are a very mixed bag. A highly educated
woman on a career break can choose to spend some time bringing up children
alone on her own peaceful farm; her husband may very rarely leave his highly paid
urban job to visit her, but he does send her a large monthly money order. The
bucolic standard of living enjoyed by this woman cannot easily be compared to the
survival struggles of a landless widow or divorcee bringing up children and
grandchildren in a rural area without any support from an adult male. The gulf
between these two women has been papered over in key documents produced by
UN Women, where ‘lack of consideration of differences between women is a
recurrent theme’.¹¹⁰
One problem is that ‘A household is likely to report a female head if the usual
male head is a migrant working out of town, in which case the household may
benefit from remittances that make them less likely to be poor.’¹¹¹ More generally,
we have already argued that most survey enumerators do not depart from
simplistic tick-box rules and local social norms when they identify ‘the head’ (or
list all approved ‘members’) of a ‘household’. If enumerators were sufficiently
trained and supervised to collect all the data necessary to understand the fluidity
of residential arrangements in rural Africa and the role of labour mobility and
remittances in reproduction strategies, then the gendered disadvantages faced by
individuals (as well as households) could be highlighted. A recommendation in
2018 that poverty analysts should abandon the simple classification of households
by ‘headship’ and gender in favour of an array of new household typologies, for
example ‘multiple adults, only female—with children’, may be a step in the right
direction.¹¹² But there will still be difficulties in probing respondents to enumerate
all household members (currently resident or non-resident) and the economic
relationships between them.
Domestic servants and other female (and male) migrant workers remit part of
their wage earnings to other rural individuals. Unfortunately, no information is
recorded in conventional surveys about the workers who remit. This information
gaps make it extremely difficult to understand how the poorest rural households
actually pay for children’s school expenses and food; the gendered and gener-
ational dynamics of power and labour market inequalities are obscured in a rural
black box ‘household’ especially if, as is usually the case, the education levels
achieved by, and the gender of, ‘non-residents’ are unrecorded.
¹⁰⁹ Milazzo and van deWalle (2015); Liu, Esteve, and Treviño (2017); Djurfeldt, Dzanku, and Isinika
(2018); Fransman and Yu (2019).
¹¹⁰ Bradshaw, Chant, and Linneker (2017: 13). ¹¹¹ Casteñada et al. (2018: 257).
¹¹² Boudet et al. (2018: 25ff.).
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In our own surveys we have tried both to overcome these difficulties and to
analyse gendered experiences of poverty in rural Africa—without making any
attempt to identify ‘household heads’. Our methodological innovations have been
discussed at length elsewhere.¹¹³ The broad aim of our research was to collect data
on vulnerable wage workers, especially female workers engaged in seasonal,
casual, and low-paid jobs outside major urban centres. We recognized that
many of these individuals are frequently not ‘resident’ in households. They live
and work for long periods in labour camps, construction sites, and illegal squatter
settlements, or they have been given some space to sleep at their workplace during
the harvest season, or while working as domestic servants: they are the ‘nowhere
people’.¹¹⁴
With more information on a larger range of individuals than are usually
recorded in DHS or LSMS household rosters, we had the information to develop
a clearer idea of the nature and implications of economic flows between male and
female individuals, wherever they were currently located. If more than 75 per cent
of the whole range of listed adults were female, then we described these house-
holds as ‘female dominated’; and these households were much more likely than
other households to be extremely deprived.¹¹⁵ The proposed definition of female
domination and how we measured ‘extreme’ deprivation—using a simple
Deprivation Index—did not require any technically complicated weighting,
smoke or mirrors. We use an index that is transparent, easy to construct, and
intuitively appealing.
8.8 Selecting Stylized Facts with an Extreme Deprivation Index
Some of the rural women we met are difficult to forget, especially their embar-
rassed faces when they could not even offer us a seat while we talked—not even on
the simplest stool or bench. They lived in utterly bare rooms. These women helped
us to understand that owning a few consumer goods could result in large absolute
improvements in the quality of rural life. Without reliable access to electricity, a
torch makes the night safer; sleeping on earthen floors cannot be compared to
sleeping on a bed; a radio and a mobile phone can expand intellectual horizons,
reduce isolation, and even help in searching for casual wage employment.
Respondents may also be able to benefit in less obvious ways if they own
‘honorific’ or ‘prestige-based’ consumer goods—such as a sofa. The women we
have talked to in poor rural areas of Southern and Eastern Africa are, of course,
well aware of these benefits and our surveys do show rather widespread ownership
of this type of consumer good. For example, about half of all our respondents in
¹¹³ Cramer et al. (2014b). ¹¹⁴ Breman (2010: 135).
¹¹⁵ Sender, Cramer, and Oya (2018: table 4).
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Uganda and Ethiopia owned a radio and more than half owned a table, while 60
per cent owned a bed. It was intuitively obvious that individuals who had access to
none or hardly any of these basic wage goods were extremely deprived.
Building on this intuition and rejecting statistically driven methods for con-
structing and weighting asset indices, we designed a new and very simple
measure—the Extreme Deprivation Index (EDI). The practical relevance of the
EDI is that it allows a quick, reliable and cost-effective way of identifying people
who suffer from extreme deprivation and of assessing the distributional impact of
policy interventions. The EDI takes out the ‘unavoidable guesswork in establishing
who is poor’ that a leading proponent of RCTs seems simply to accept.¹¹⁶ We
made a context-specific selection of 10 basic non-food wage goods, each of which
would probably make a difference to the quality of rural life in many areas of rural
Africa. The goods we selected were: a cupboard; a metal or wooden bed; a table; a
sofa; a stove or cooker; a thermos; a torch; a mobile phone; a radio; and a cassette/
CD player. We did not estimate the prices of these items or attempt to justify a
complex weighting system: the EDI gives a score of 1 to ownership of each of the
10 selected basic consumer goods; the lowest scoring quintile of our respondents
either scored no points or a maximum of 2. We defined these respondents
recording a score in the bottom quintile of the distribution of EDI scores as living
in the ‘most deprived’ households.
Many other surveys have shown that a high proportion of rural African
households in the lowest expenditure/wealth quintile fail to consume the amount
of food necessary to prevent child stunting,¹¹⁷ but these surveys also agree that
relatively poor households do devote some of their expenditure to non-food
consumer goods; they often do manage to acquire items very similar to the simple
furniture and other basic consumer goods that we suggest should be the basis for
constructing a context-specific EDI. For example, in rural Kenya, the expenditure
elasticity for furniture—‘beds, chairs, tables, etc.’—has been found to be very high
in a random sample of poor households.¹¹⁸
We have used survey data from Uganda and Ethiopia to compare the charac-
teristics of households in the bottom quintile of the EDI (the ‘most deprived’) with
other households; and we found little evidence to support conventional conclu-
sions about the vulnerability of large households or female-headed households.
But we did find that a significantly higher percentage of the ‘most deprived’
households was small and female dominated.¹¹⁹ In East African rural contexts
where women and widows are often subjected to brutal forms of discrimination
and gender inequalities are pervasive, it is perhaps not surprising that the ‘most
¹¹⁶ Banerjee (2015: 8). ¹¹⁷ Black et al. (2013).
¹¹⁸ Haushofer and Shapiro (2013: 30). For similar results in rural South Africa, see Browne,
Ortmann, and Hendriks (2007: 571).
¹¹⁹ Sender, Cramer, and Oya (2018).
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deprived’ households contain relatively few adult males and that relatively few of
these households have regular access to any financial support from an adult
male.¹²⁰ For example, in tea-growing areas of Uganda, about half of the ‘most
deprived’ households had no regular male support, compared to 15 per cent of
other households.
We have also used the EDI to confirm the importance of other uncontroversial
stylized facts about gender relations and deprivation. For example, it is widely
acknowledged that adolescent pregnancies are hazardous both for the mother and
the child.¹²¹ Teenage mothers in Africa and elsewhere are at greater risk than more
mature mothers of mortality; and their lifetime labour incomes are likely to be
significantly lower than the earnings of women who did not have children
when they were teenagers.¹²² In the ‘most deprived’ households identified by the
EDI, young women aged between 20 and 30 years are very likely to have had a
child as an adolescent. In Uganda, for example, the risks of teenage pregnancy are
remarkably high in the ‘most deprived’ households: only a very low proportion of
young women in the ‘most deprived’ households (17%) had their first child when
they were mature (20 years old or older), while a much higher proportion of
women in other households (44%) were able to delay having their first child until
they were mature.
A low level of female educational attainment is widely and correctly viewed as
a particularly useful marker of poverty and of the adverse longer-term conse-
quences of deprivation in Africa, because a woman’s lack of education is likely to
be transmitted inter-generationally, negatively affecting the health, productivity,
and lifetime earnings of her children.¹²³ Our analysis using the EDI confirms the
relevance and policy importance of the uncontroversial stylized fact that parental
education and poverty are linked: we show, for example, clear associations
between the ‘most deprived’ households and the absence of any adult who had
graduated from secondary school, the presence of children not attending school,
adult failures to complete primary school, and adult functional illiteracy.¹²⁴
Another uncontroversial and policy-relevant stylized fact is that African chil-
dren are vulnerable to chronic undernutrition if their diet is monotonous—if they
can only achieve a low dietary diversity score.¹²⁵Again, our rural surveys were able
to use the EDI to confirm the importance of this link. We simply asked respond-
ents how frequently different types of food were eaten by anyone in the household.
¹²⁰ Marshall, Lyytikainen, and Jones (2016); Semahegn andMengistie (2015); Bantebya, Muhanguzi,
and Watson (2014); Sharp, Devereux, and Amare (2003: 56).
¹²¹ Saloojee and Coovadia (2015: e342). ¹²² Pradhan and Canning (2016: 1).
¹²³ Castañeda et al. (2018: 258); ICF International (http://www.statcompiler.com); Alderman and
Headey (2017: 456); Bado and Sathiya Susuman (2016); Ambel and Huang (2014: 14); Keats (2018:
155). See also: Tusting et al. (2016: 653).
¹²⁴ Sender, Cramer, and Oya (2018: 7–8).
¹²⁵ Hernández (2012); Herrador et al. (2015); Hirvonen, Taffesse, and Worku Hassen (2016);
Hirvonen et al. (2017); Muhoozi et al. (2016).
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The EDI proved surprisingly useful in predicting dietary diversity: only about 14
per cent of the ‘most deprived’ claimed to eat any high-value food items regularly,
compared to over 45 per cent of other households.
We conclude that it is possible to identify policy-relevant stylized facts about
the poorest people in Africa: they live in relatively small, female-dominated
households and lack regular access to support from an adult male; adult females
and children in these households probably have not received or are not receiving
an adequate education; these women and children are threatened by the risks of
teenage pregnancy; they also risk undernutrition because they rely on a monot-
onous and undiversified diet; and they have been able to acquire hardly any basic
consumer wage goods. The absence of these goods in their homes can rapidly (and
accurately) be confirmed by enumerators, using an EDI. This index can reliably,
and at low cost, predict many of the difficulties they face.
Perhaps the least controversial and easily accepted policy implication of these
stylized facts would be an agreement on new funding to reduce educational
deprivation, especially investment to allow rural girls to complete or even attend
secondary school. Appropriate expenditures on education would probably delay
pregnancy and improve the labour market prospects for rural women, but the
targeting of these interventions—for example, scholarships or conditional cash
transfers—towards the ‘most deprived’ girls would involve a major reallocation of
resources (see Figures 8.2 and 8.4), and an ability to resist powerful political
demands for wider inclusion and/or the retention of patriarchal and other atav-
istic privileges.¹²⁶
In some African countries, advocating policies to reduce high levels of unmet
demand by girls and women for contraception (Chapter 2) will also face powerful
opposition. In these countries, effective policies will not be given priority as long
as the relationship between teenage pregnancy and poverty is downplayed or
blamed on the moral failures of girls.
8.9 Wage Labour and Poverty:
The Most Controversial Stylized Fact
It is even more unlikely that the policy implications of another, often ignored,
stylized fact will be accepted with any enthusiasm by aid donors, capitalist
employers, and other powerful political forces in Africa. This stylized fact,
emphasized both here and in Chapter 7, is that the poorest rural people depend
on wage labour. We have shown that the ‘most deprived’ households in Uganda
and Ethiopia depend on the earnings of agricultural wage workers. Similarly, a
¹²⁶ The strength of political demands for wide inclusion in Ghana is discussed in Abdulai (2019).
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very high proportion of women in poorer Malawian households are engaged in
seasonal agricultural wage labour; and an analysis of surveys covering over half of
the population of sub-Saharan Africa found that ‘poorer rural households tend to
have a higher rate of participation in agricultural wage employment . . . the share
of income from agricultural wage labor is more important for poorer house-
holds’.¹²⁷ Often, too little attention is paid to this evidence, or to research on the
importance of hired labour inputs on smallholder maize and wheat farms in
Eastern and Southern Africa by the Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research (CGIAR).¹²⁸ Instead, there is a romantic stress on the
resilient self-sufficiency of African rural families—in the face of growing evidence
that a high proportion of rural households not only purchase their food but also
engage in agricultural wage labour.
We have used the EDI to analyse the recent labour market experience not only
of our principal respondents but also of all other (broadly defined) members of the
‘most deprived’ households. We began by identifying two crude categories of job:
the ‘worst’ and the ‘more decent’. The ‘worst’ is a large category covering all the
lowest paid and least desirable and most stigmatized types of rural wage work,
especially manual labour performed in the open air. Other menial jobs in this
category include working as a domestic servant for a rural private household and
shining shoes. The ‘more decent’ jobs ranged over many different types of
(mainly) non-agricultural wage employment, including: nursing, teaching, police,
supervisory work inside processing plants and pack-houses, and so on. One of the
largest groups of workers in this category were ‘guards’. Female respondents were
much less likely than male respondents to have found employment in a ‘more
decent’ job.
Escapes from poverty are conceivable if at least one household member can
obtain more decent employment. Unfortunately, if a respondent works as a
manual agricultural wage labourer, she/he is unlikely to live in a household
where anyone listed on the household roster has managed to secure a more decent
job in the last 12 months. This suggests that the consequences of deprivation can
be cumulative; it may never be easy to escape from poverty by building on the
success in the labour market of your parents or another household member. In the
USA after 1945, a surprisingly similar story can be told—of cumulative disadvan-
tage, rooted in a labour market unable to provide adequate job opportunities for
people with low education.¹²⁹
What policy implications follow from the stylized fact that that vulnerable rural
women depend on the income they earn from wage labour and, therefore, on the
number of days of wage employment they are offered (and the real daily wage
rate)? We are not confident that legislative interventions to improve the wages and
¹²⁷ Koolwal (2019: 8); Davis, Di Giuseppe, and Zezza (2017: 161 and table A2).
¹²⁸ Baudron et al. (2019). ¹²⁹ Case and Deaton (2017: 29ff.).
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working conditions of these women will achieve rapid results, partly because of
the well-documented failures of a battery of progressive legislation and of a
relatively strong trade union movement in South Africa.¹³⁰ There is perhaps a
better case for two immediate interventions: a massive increase in expenditure to
monitor and publish the wage rates of poorly educated seasonal and casual
workers; and a surge in investments to expand the demand (direct and indirect)
for their labour in rural areas. Regular publication of these wage data may
encourage long-overdue policy debates, new political demands, and even organ-
izational successes. In Chapter 9, we focus on the untapped investment potential
to increase rural wage employment and agricultural output in Africa.
¹³⁰ Devereux (2019).
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9
Technical Change and Agricultural
Productivity
9.1 Introduction: From the Missionary Position
to Modern Charitable Fantasies
Rural development policy in Africa has been weighed down by a long tradition of
pessimism and catastrophic prediction. Missionaries, colonial officers, and settlers
all had their reasons for vociferous anxiety about disastrous land use; and their
lurid visions of degradation, drought, food shortages, and starvation still colour
many current official, academic, and non-governmental organization (NGO)
publications.
We begin this chapter by illustrating the remarkable persistence and popularity
of gloomy views about how difficult, if not impossible, it will be to sustain
increases in agricultural output. We find little support in the available data for
generalizations about an irreversible African environmental crisis. And we are not
convinced that the barriers said to limit the adoption of Green Revolution
technologies are all insuperable; on the contrary, we point to evidence, in
Section 9.4, of interventions and economic policies that have been remarkably
successful in increasing agricultural productivity. We argue that there is consid-
erable agro-ecological potential to build on the success of recent interventions to
increase yields.
As in Chapters 7 and 8, we insist that policymakers would be wise to question
the quality of the data used in debates about agricultural technology, especially
data used to justify ineffective interventions to reduce land degradation and
hunger—such as brutal interventions by agronomists and others to police (and
resettle) rural populations and demand changes in how they farm, or massive
expenditure on the salaries of agricultural extension officers and on subsidies for
micro-finance institutions (MFIs).
9.2 Panic and Paternalism
In the 1820s, the Scottish missionary Moffat ‘was pre-disposed to designate the
inhabitants of all the dry lands north of the Orange River as responsible for a
situation of moral and environmental disorder’. Moffat depicted the Tswana as
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‘environmental destroyers’ in urgent need of European Christian tutelage. This
Methodist missionary’s disapproval was echoed by colonial forestry and conser-
vationist officials, ‘directly equating veld-burning and tree-felling carried out by
Africans with moral degeneration and criminality’.¹ By the 1930s it had become
increasingly fashionable to warn of the extreme dangers posed by soil erosion. The
Colonial Office in London and administrators in East Africa had become con-
vinced of the need to intervene coercively to regulate the husbandry practices of
African farmers, because ‘the apparently increasing incidence of drought condi-
tions in many parts of East Africa over the period 1926 to 1935 indicated that the
region was becoming progressively more arid’.² After the Second World War,
‘the dominant colonial view was that African farmers were incompetent as they
were responsible for environmental decay in the reserves’.³ The Head of the
Economic Bureau of the Colonial Office (and his French counterparts) doubted
the possibility ‘of any technical change at all’.⁴
In the post-colonial period, neo-Malthusian alarmism influenced agricultural
policy in many African countries. The historical evidence for Africa does not
provide much support for these policies, suggesting that there is no direct link
between soil degradation and population growth: ‘There are cases where “more
people” accompanied “less erosion”, as well as cases where soil degradation
occurred in spite of declining population pressure.’⁵ Nevertheless, officials, agri-
cultural economists, and agronomists in Africa continue to claim that population
growth leads to environmental degradation. For example, the Director of Statistics
at the African Development Bank warns of the dangers of downward spirals and
an immiserating rural process throughout Africa:
Rapid population growth, inadequate food production . . . and increasing deg-
radation of natural resources have created a vicious circle of poverty and envir-
onmental degradation, especially in rural areas.⁶
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD’s) Economic
Development in Africa Report highlights the same trends.⁷ Some of the most
influential American agricultural economists repeat these warnings, claiming that
African farmers are making the wrong choices:
[A]t present most African smallholders appear not to be choosing sustainable
paths, hence the interlinked crises of rural poverty, declining per capita agricul-
tural productivity, and environmental degradation.⁸
¹ Grove (1989: 166, 184). ² Anderson (1984: 322–3). ³ Shanguhyia (2015: 2).
⁴ Cooper (2004: 20). ⁵ Koning and Smaling (2005: 5). ⁶ Lufumpa (2005: 369).
⁷ UNCTAD (2018: 17–18).
⁸ Reardon et al. (1999: 377, 389). For similar views see: Nhamo et al. (2019: 2); and Rigaud et al.
(2018: 82).
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This long history of anxieties and periodic panics about impending rural
catastrophe can partly be explained by elite preoccupations with political risk.
There might be threats to those in power if land degradation and declining
agricultural productivity cause accelerated migration by ‘climate refugees’ out of
rural areas, swelling the slum population and the ranks of the urban dangerous
classes, or the number of squatters invading more fertile capitalist farms. In
Nairobi, for example, rapid migration into squatter settlements from rural areas
appears to have reinforced ‘the government perception that informal settlers are
uneducated, unhealthy and dangerous. Indeed, the informal settlements are
perceived as crime zones.’⁹
These conventional wisdom fears about migration are very weakly supported
by the evidence. There are other—and well-established—facts about migration
from rural Africa that subvert the conventional views: first, only a very small
proportion of the projected increase in Africa’s urban population will be the result
of climate change impacts—about 0.1 per cent according to recent estimates;
second, urban conflict and food riots in Africa have complex causes and cannot
simply be attributed to an influx of ‘climate refugees’ or to anthropogenic climate
change, variability in food production, food availability or prices;¹⁰ third, there is
evidence that climate change may—paradoxically for those unfamiliar with
Hirschman’s hiding hand (see Chapter 6)—create important opportunities for
rural–rural migration and encourage investment to increase crop production
and rural incomes, for example in new areas of coffee cultivation in the south-
west highlands of Ethiopia.¹¹
Internationally, moral panic about ‘climate refugees’ has been encouraged by
some of the more xenophobic media, by NGOs, by political demagogues and the
leaders of populist movements in the European Union (EU).¹² The imagined
political consequences of Africa’s agricultural retrogression or stagnation do not
require further discussion here. Having suggested that it is important to look
closely at the evidence before indulging in fervid speculation about political
futures, we turn to a more detailed examination of the most prevalent (negative)
assessments of rural technological change in Africa, especially the conclusion that
Africa’s Green Revolution has been ‘delayed and weak’.
9.3 Chronicle of a Failure Foretold
The Green Revolution, when cereal yields jumped from one to two or more tonnes
per hectare in a few years after the late 1960s, has been described as the most
⁹ Kyed, Stepputat, and Albrecht (2017: 24). For the fears of the urban bourgeoisie during the British
Industrial Revolution see Enzensberger (1974).
¹⁰ Rigaud et al. (2018: 87); Selby (2014); Mach et al. (2019). ¹¹ Moat et al. (2017).
¹² Kelman (2019: 11); Bettini (2013).
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important episode of agricultural innovation in modern history; the World Bank
(and others) have spent more than a decade trying to explain why ‘it didn’t
happen in Sub-Saharan Africa’.¹³
[T]he impact of agricultural innovation in sub-Saharan Africa cannot be com-
pared to its success in transforming rural economies of many Asian and Latin
American countries during the 1960s–1990s.¹⁴
In the period after 1960, public funding was used ‘to apply scientific understand-
ings of genetics to the development of improved crop varieties that were suited to
the growing conditions of developing countries’. The initial research to develop
high-yielding varieties (HYVs) of wheat and rice was extraordinarily successful,
resulting in an extremely rapid spread of HYVs from the research centres to many
farms in similar agro-ecological areas, especially to those areas in countries with
extensive irrigation and/or reliable rainfall. In other areas and for other crops,
including crops that are particularly important in Africa, diffusion has taken
much longer.¹⁵ For example, in the 18 years between 1965 and 1983, HYVs of
rice and wheat were adopted on more than 120 million hectares in Asia and Latin
America (but only about 0.7 million hectares in sub-Saharan Africa).¹⁶
Africa is said to have had ‘a delayed and weak Green Revolution’ and this
failure is explained in different ways: Africa does not have large tracts of agro-
ecologically similar land, comparable to the irrigated lowlands of South East Asia
or the Indo-Gangetic plane of South Asia; Africa’s production environments are
extremely heterogeneous and localized so that no single regional or district
package of HYVs and agrochemicals can be recommended and distributed;
Africa’s soils are generally poor and degraded;¹⁷ very low and stagnant levels of
fertilizer use exacerbate land degradation;¹⁸much of the land in Africa’s dry zones
is currently poorly responsive to agrochemical inputs and ‘generally unfavourable
for agriculture’; many dryland zones are badly served by transport infrastructure
so that many of the agricultural producers living in these zones (about 171 million
people) face extremely long travel times to reach the nearest large town;¹⁹ if they
purchase agricultural inputs the costs will be relatively high and the farmgate
prices they receive for their output are likely to be relatively low;²⁰ although less
than 3 per cent of Africa’s total cultivated area is irrigated—compared to about 39
per cent in South Asia and 29 per cent in East Asia—the rate of expansion of the
irrigated area since 1961 has been very much slower than in tropical Asia,
averaging only about 1 per cent per year since 1995; in several African countries
¹³ World Bank (2007: 55); Goyal and Nash (2017: 7).
¹⁴ Ogundari and Bolarinwa (2018: 19, 3). ¹⁵ Gollin, Hansen, and Wingender (2018: 2).
¹⁶ Fuglie and Marder (2015: 339). ¹⁷ Tittonell and Giller (2013: 88).
¹⁸ World Bank (2008: 55).
¹⁹ Cervigni and Morris (2016: 115 and 49–63). See also You (2008: 1). ²⁰ Porteous (2020: 2).
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there has been a decline between 2000 and 2015 in the percentage of arable land
equipped for irrigation; the cost per hectare of irrigation projects in Africa has
been very much higher than the cost in other regions, partly because African
irrigation projects are relatively small—too small to take advantage of scale
economies to reduce unit costs.²¹
The rapid development of rice and wheat HYV production appears to have
depended on two earlier specific forms of investment: first, a long history of
accumulating the infrastructure required for irrigation and for rural transport;
and, second, decades of appropriate earlier research on wheat and rice in advanced
capitalist countries prior to the 1960s. There was no similar stock of scientific
knowledge about the crops—cassava, yams, millets, and sorghum—and the crop
mixes that are particularly important in Africa.²² Sorghum and pearl millet
account for about one third of Africa’s cropped area, but hardly any of Africa’s
scientists are currently working on these crops—less than 5 per cent of full-time
equivalent (FTE) researchers. Since the 1960s, national agricultural research
programmes in Africa have received relatively little funding, especially for their
operating budgets, and their expenditure was particularly volatile and squeezed in
the period from the mid-1980s to the end of the 1990s.²³
One policy conclusion that could be drawn from this abbreviated list of the
difficulties involved in cultivating areas with degraded soils and erratic rainfall
patterns would be to decide to concentrate on lower hanging fruit, that is, to
allocate far more resources to zones with much higher immediate production
potential and lower risks of climate shock. The slogan that each and every
administrative area should receive a similar amount of state resources to promote
rural development may be politically seductive—because it addresses regional
inequalities, historic neglect, or ethnic discrimination—but is likely be costly in
terms of lost opportunities for accumulation and technological progress. It is a
false remedy for the problem of insufficient ‘inclusiveness’ in resource allocation.
If Africa has failed, for all the reasons given (and others), to replicate the
record-breaking speed of Asia’s Green Revolution, there is no need for policy-
makers to despair or accept all the pronouncements made by the prophets of
ecological doom. For it is not difficult to make certain negative types of prophecy:
we can confidently predict, for example, that most countries in the world will fail
to produce many marathon runners as fast as Eliud Kipchoge or Mary Keitany.
But, if we use a less demanding criterion, we can predict great success for many
non-Kenyan aspiring athletes, that is, we can be confident that the average time
they take to complete a marathon will fall substantially. Policymakers should not
be browbeaten by long lists of reasons for failure; they can reject the usual story of
²¹ Nhemachena et al. (2018: table 3); Inocencio et al. (2007).
²² Gollin, Hansen, and Wingender (2018: 12, 8–9).
²³ Alwang (2015: 15); Beintema and Stads (2017: figures 11 and 13).
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African agricultural production as shrouded in an air of dismal inevitability, of
preordained productivity stagnation—failure foretold. Less stringent criteria can
be used to assess African agricultural success, such as the speed of output and yield
growth relative to Africa’s own past performance, or relative to the agricultural
growth rates achieved when Europe was industrializing.
It is important too for policymakers to recall the failures of past predictions
about future trends in African agricultural output. There were many confident
predictions, for example in the 1980s and 1990s, of progressive declines in
agricultural production as a result of the HIV epidemic; but some of the academic
prophets later published a rare mea culpa, admitting that ‘as advocacy took over,
so science flew out of the window’. When the areas that were the original source of
the data used to support these catastrophic predictions were resurveyed, it was
discovered that ‘the AIDS epidemic seems not to have had the profound long-
term impact in this part of East Africa that was predicted 20 years ago’.²⁴ There
has not been enough reflection on the reasons for these mistakes, including the
severe limitations of the researchers’ aggregated conceptual model of ‘a Ugandan
farming system’ and the unreliable (but trusted) methods of data collection.
9.4 Measuring Agricultural and Food Production
Assertions about food production in Africa have often been quite gloomy.
‘Comparing the 1970s with the present’, as one example has it, ‘it is readily
apparent that the state of African agriculture is far worse now.’²⁵ There is a
particular anxiety that food production has suffered throughout Africa because
of greater integration into global markets. Thus:
Most developing countries have succumbed to the demand to open up and
engage in free trade. This produced area diversion to export crops, led to decline
in the food grains growth rate which fell below the population growth rate,
resulting in falling per capita output and availability of food grains . . . we find
declining per head food grains output combined with fast growing per head
exportables output in every important developing region . . . and the whole of
Sub-Saharan Africa.²⁶
But we will argue that these assertions—often made by aid bureaucrats as well as
by Marxist or neo-Marxist scholars—are questionable. This is a continuation of an
²⁴ Barnett, Dercon, and Seeley (2010: 958); Seeley, Dercon, and Barnett (2010: 333).
²⁵ Bryceson (2009: 56).
²⁶ Patnaik (2016: 145). For similar views see Sundaram and Chowdhury (2017); and Traore and
Sakyi (2018: 6).
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argument made more than three decades ago by one of us, who queried pessim-
istic pronouncements about African food production that were as popular then as
they are now.²⁷
Too little has changed since the mid-1980s: there are still many reasons for
extreme caution when using African food and agricultural production statistics,
including the fact that agricultural censuses have become less common. The Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) itself considers that only two countries in
sub-Saharan Africa have high standards in data collection, while standards in
21 other countries remain low, and the remaining African countries could not be
rated.²⁸ Published data available on the Food and Agriculture Organization
Statistical Database (FAOSTAT) and CountrySTAT sites do not always agree
about the level of cereal and starchy root crop production, for example in
Nigeria or Zambia.²⁹ The FAO has argued since the 1950s that high-standard,
reliable estimates of yields can only be obtained by using their recommended
‘gold standard’ method, that is, a crop-cutting survey. But in a rigorous discus-
sion of crop-cutting samples to measure yields on maize plots in Uganda several
concerns were raised regarding the accuracy of even the most costly crop-
cutting methods.³⁰
Most commentators on hunger continue to rely on the estimates of domestic
food production in the FAO’s published data on food balance sheets (FBS), which
are the basis for estimates of food consumption per capita in all African countries.
But more reliable, individual-level national dietary surveys have established that
the FAO estimates tend to either over- or underestimate consumption of most
types of food.³¹ These well-known problems with FAO food production and
consumption data, as well as with the Gallup data on self-reported degrees of
hunger, have not prevented the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), for example, from expressing the gloomy view—based on these data—
that African dietary intakes have been growing too slowly and that African food
production has been growing ‘at a very slow rate’.³² Other United Nations (UN)
officials including, for example, a UN Assistant Secretary-General for Economic
Development, are also pessimistic about nutrition, but for very different reasons:
‘In Zambia, greater use of seeds and fertilizers from agribusiness tripled maize
production without reducing the country’s very high rates of . . . malnutrition.’³³
No evidence is provided to support this paradoxical assertion: in fact, the preva-
lence of undernutrition (PoU) and of child stunting fell in Zambia between 2004
and 2006 and 2015 and 2017. Gloom has also been spread by Michael Lipton, who
²⁷ Sender and Smith (1986: 100). ²⁸ Carletto, Jolliffe, and Banerjee (2015: 137, 134).
²⁹ Luan et al. (2019: 15). ³⁰ Gourlay, Kilic, and Lobell (2017: 10).
³¹ Del Gobbo et al. (2015). Grünberger (2014: 4). Additional criticisms of the FAO’s FBS approach
are summarized in de Weerdt et al. (2016).
³² Chauvin, Mulangu, and Porto (2012: 4). ³³ Sundaram (2019).
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is well aware that ‘Africa’s data for output of food staples are largely worthless’, yet
who nevertheless asserted in 2012 that ‘calorie output and intake per person in
most of Africa are no higher than in the early 1960s’.³⁴
Despite all the dismal pronouncements quoted, it is surprisingly easy to use
FAO (and United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)) data to question
gloomy assessments of food and staple production in Africa and of the supply of
calories available per person. We do not believe that the data used in Figures 9.1
and 9.2 are reliable. We will continue to provide policymakers with much ammu-
nition to criticize them. But the aggregate official data on food production and
food supply used in these figures can serve a similar purpose to the International
Labour Organization’s (ILO’s) suspect data on African trends in employment
presented in Chapter 7: they frame and provide a corrective perspective to the
widespread pronouncements by economists about Africa’s allegedly tragic
performance.
We now turn attention to the rising trends in the output and yield of those basic
food grains that are so critical for the consumption of Africa’s poor. The trends in


















Net Production Index (base 2004–2006 = 100)
Figure 9.1 Food production and average food supply in sub-Saharan Africa,
1960–2015
Note: Countries included: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South
Africa, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Source: FAOSTAT (2018).
³⁴ Lipton (2012a: 3).
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cultivated cereal in Africa.³⁵ Because crop failure, drought, and yield fluctuations
are so common in Africa, it is always important to look at long-run data: the
production data for maize and rice in Figure 9.2 cover more than fifty years.
It is also important to stress (again) the heterogeneity of African experiences:
recent agricultural performance has been very much more impressive in some
African countries and areas than others. For example, between 1990/2 and 2012/
14, rather rapid growth rates in total and per capita agricultural production were
recorded for Malawi, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, and Tanzania, while, over
the same period, total and per capita agricultural output plummeted in Zimbabwe
and the growth rate of per capita output was relatively slow in Senegal and the
Côte d’Ivoire. Within countries, a high and probably increasing proportion of
total marketed agricultural output was produced by a small number of farms, with
many farmers only producing tiny or even declining amounts. The policy impli-
cations of more disaggregated agricultural production data will be discussed in
Sections 9.5 and 9.7, while the mediocre growth of agricultural exports and the
rapid growth of food imports—which still account for a very small percentage
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Right axis: production (1,000 MT) Left axis: yield (MT/HA)
Figure 9.2 Maize and rice production and yield in sub-Saharan Africa, 1960–2018
Source: USDA (2019).
³⁵ Wiggins (2018: 28). African evidence suggests that income elasticities are low for cereals and
tubers (Choudhury and Headey, 2016: table 2.1).
³⁶ Vorley and Lançon (2016: 8).
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The trends shown by the unreliable data in Figures 9.1 and 9.2 may be con-
sidered plausible to the extent that they are consistent with much more reliable
evidence, such as such as the evidence on undernutrition (measured by child
stunting and provided in the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World
Health Organization (WHO), World Bank Group Joint Malnutrition Estimates).
These estimates suggest that, between 1990 and 2016, there was a fall in the
proportion of sub-Saharan African children under the age of 5 suffering from
stunting—from 45.7 per cent to 33.6 per cent.
If food production, availability, and calorie intake were actually failing to
improve in sub-Saharan Africa, then well-documented and widespread declines
in child stunting become difficult to understand, because improved nutritional
intake does appear to play an important role in the growth performance of African
infants.³⁷ Apart from the decline in stunting, a more comprehensive measure also
shows a very large reduction since 1990 in the health burden of chronic hunger in
sub-Saharan Africa. Disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) have been used to
measure the number of healthy life years lost in a population that can be directly
attributed to chronic hunger. One econometric analysis suggests that Africa’s
rising total food supply has been associated with a lower burden of chronic hunger
in Africa.³⁸
The FAO (in collaboration with other international organizations monitor-
ing food, hunger and undernutrition—International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD), UNICEF, WHO, and the World Food Programme
(WFP)) publishes an annual report that appears to be designed to convince
bilateral and other funders of the need to replenish the budgets of these
organizations. In 2018, this flagship report claimed that ‘Undernourishment
and severe food insecurity appear to be increasing in almost all subregions of
Africa.’ The necessary caveats that the FAO itself makes about this self-serving
headline about recent trends in the PoU are relegated to an appendix:
Due to the probabilistic nature of the inference and the margins of uncertainty
associated with estimates of each of the parameters in the model, the precision of
the PoU estimates is generally low.³⁹
9.5 Against the Poor Measurements behind a Defence
of the Small Farm Orthodoxy
The latest donor efforts to improve the quality of data on crop production and
yields, the Living Standards Measurement Study—Integrated Surveys on
³⁷ Stewart et al. (2019). ³⁸ Gödecke, Stein, and Qaim (2018: 25–6).
³⁹ FAO et al. (2018: 142). Given these margins of error, it is hard to assess the meaning of the finding
that the PoU in sub-Saharan Africa ‘increased’ from 22.3 to 23.2 (ibid.: table 1).
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Agriculture (LSMS-ISA), are funded by the Gates Foundation and managed by the
World Bank rather than the FAO or African statistical agencies. Implementation
began in 2010 but to date these household panel surveys cover just eight African
countries. We already noted, in Chapter 7, one very important methodological
limitation of the LSMS-ISA surveys: their incomplete coverage of the national
agricultural sector and exclusion of the most dynamic large-scale capitalist farm
enterprises. Moreover, the method used by LSMS-ISA to measure the crop
yields in the sampled agricultural households is unreliable: these surveys solicit
farmer-reported information on crop production at the plot level; but research in
Uganda and Ethiopia has shown that farmer-reported data suffers from system-
atic measurement error and leads to biased estimates of production and yield.
When compared to more reliable measures of yield—based on remote sensing
and full-plot cutting, as opposed to cutting from a small sample within a plot—
the farmer-reported yields are particularly likely to be overestimates on smaller
plots; on average, these self-reported yields in Uganda were almost double the
yields measured by more accurate methods.⁴⁰ Similarly, surveys of maize pro-
duction in Ethiopia indicate that self-reported production is likely to be over-
reported by up to 50 per cent on small plots, but under-reported by 25 per cent
on larger plots.⁴¹
Evidence this faulty immediately calls into question an ideologically powerful
piece of conventional wisdom. For the implication is that African household
survey evidence supporting an inverse size–productivity relationship is deeply
unreliable. Policymakers should not assume that smaller farms usually achieve
higher yields per hectare than larger farms, or that large farms in Africa are
unlikely to benefit from scale economies. Faith in the relative efficiency and
productivity of smallholder farmers—a powerful nugget of common sense (see
Chapter 3)—underpins almost all policy advice on rural development and poverty
reduction, but this advice appears to be based on the naive view that the largest
and richest farmers have actually been included in the national sampling frame
used by Agricultural Household Surveys (and will usually agree to tell official
surveyors the truth about output and yields on their farms) and that smallholder
farmers give a precise account of their own yields.
The conventional wisdom is that ‘the most productive farms will be small in
most places in Sub-Saharan Africa’ and that these farms, because they are ‘man-
aged and worked primarily by family members’, can reduce hired-labour super-
vision costs and avoid shirking to achieve high yields. Furthermore, differentiation
or a change in the size distribution of farms in Africa and the increasing domin-
ance of capitalist farmers is unlikely in the foreseeable future: ‘Poorly functioning
land markets . . . work to help keep farms small, because they keep the risks and
⁴⁰ Lobell et al. (2018: 13). ⁴¹ Desiere and Jolliffe (2018: 90–1).
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costs of renting or purchasing land unnecessarily high.’⁴² This conventional
wisdom fuels campaigns:
Melinda and I started to realize that the poorest people in the world shared an
occupation in common: They were small farmers. The conclusion was obvious:
They could lift their families up by growing more food.⁴³
The Agriculture and Rural Development Team in the World Bank confirm that
‘Most rural development strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa focus on improving the
productivity of smallholder farms.’⁴⁴ When the evidence is ambiguous or flatly
contradicts the hegemonic faith in the productive potential of these farms, some
mini-farm champions—especially those trained in mainstream micro-econom-
ics—can reach for another weapon to defend their belief: they can deploy the
simple neoclassical model of a unitary farm household to prove that small farmers
‘could’ (theoretically) be more efficient ‘if ’market imperfections and information
asymmetries disappeared. These neoclassical economists can confidently antici-
pate the disappearance of such market glitches as soon as appropriate institutions,
for example, cooperatives, a high-tech electronic commodity exchange, and com-
petitive financial/insurance services, are conjured out of the air by waving a magic
wand or brandishing a mobile phone.⁴⁵
The two most important policies and expenditure priorities derived from the
small farm household model and pessimism about technological progress in
Africa involve efforts to provide additional credit and extension advice. Even
economists critical of neoclassical methods and optimistic about African devel-
opmental prospects agree that these policies are urgently needed. Ha-Joon Chang,
for example, argues that ‘credit provision to small farmers has been one of the
most important challenges that has faced the policy-makers in the early stages of
economic development’.⁴⁶ Chang quite rightly emphasizes the significance of state
provision of, subsidies to, and regulation of rural credit, but seems to put too
much faith in what we have shown to be a very vague and problematic category of
‘small’ farmers. We question the impact of these popular policies to support
extension services and private sector credit to small farmers in Section 9.6; and
in Section 9.7 we discuss the potential for alternative policies and investment
priorities.
⁴² Larson, Muraoka, and Otsuka (2016: 9).
⁴³ https://www.gatesfoundation.org/media-center/speeches/2012/02/bill-gates-ifad.
⁴⁴ Larson, Muraoka, and Otsuka (2016: 2).
⁴⁵ The weak economic logic, patchy evidence, and dubious claims about rural poverty advanced by
believers in the inverse size–productivity relationship are discussed in more detail in Sender and
Johnston (2004). The myth that poor producers in rural areas use mobile phones to obtain more
accurate and lower-cost information on market prices has been criticized by Burrell and Oreglia (2015).
⁴⁶ Chang (2009: 489, 494).
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9.6 Do Farmers Fail without Advice and Subsidized Credit?
Farmers have good reason not to tell the truth to outsiders and rural development
tourists participating in focus group discussions. But we do think that some of
what they say about extension officers, or about the advice they have received from
young people with technical qualifications employed by the Ministry of
Agriculture, should be taken seriously. We have met successful capitalist farmers
who simply laugh at the idea that inexperienced, wet-behind-the-ears advisors
know what they are talking about and might have something useful to say. The
poorest, especially women who cultivate very small areas and do not have the cash
to purchase agrochemicals and HYVs, have told us that no advisor has ever visited
their farms; they do not even know the name of the local extension officer or the
precise location of his or her office.
But we do not have to rely on our own anecdotes to question the impact of
agricultural extension services in Africa. Historians of the most successful epi-
sodes of technological change in rural Africa emphasize the role of African traders
and capitalists—not agricultural extension officers—in explaining the introduc-
tion and extraordinarily rapid expansion of cocoa in Amansie between 1900 and
1916.⁴⁷ More recently, there have been hundreds of evaluations of the impact on
agricultural production of expenditure on extension. Policymakers may find it
tedious to wade through all these studies, because when polite and judicious
mainstream economists are funded to evaluate the impact of extension, they
usually hedge their bets on the evidence: ‘Results from these studies are mixed
and few generalizations can be made’; ‘evidence from systematic reviews regarding
the effects of extension and advisory services on poverty is extremely thin’; ‘there
is limited rigorous evidence on the effectiveness of . . . potentially scalable exten-
sion services provided by public agencies in developing countries’.⁴⁸ These diplo-
matically fudged conclusions suggest there is an elephant in the room—an
awkward fact that no one wants to mention.
The uncomfortable truth is that, after many decades of devoting a high pro-
portion of government recurrent expenditure on agriculture to paying the salaries
and wages of extension staff, it cannot be shown that their work has improved
agricultural productivity. Negative evaluations of extension services have some-
times led to changes in the types of extension projects donors are willing to fund.
For example, the high recurrent cost training and visit model was all the rage at
the World Bank, promoted from 1975 to 1998 in over fifty countries, but it fell out
of favour in Africa to be replaced by models that purport to be more participatory,
geared to farmer field schools and to the average rather than to ‘progressive’
⁴⁷ Austin (1987).
⁴⁸ Alwang et al. (2019: 2); Bernstein, Johnson, and Arsalan (2019); Kondylis et al. (2017: 13); Fabregas
et al. (2017: 8); Waddington et al. (2014: 37). See also Ragasa et al. (2013) and Berhane et al. (2018: 22).
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farmers, sensitive to gender relations and to farmers’ demands, based on farmer-
to-farmer interactions, and decentralized.⁴⁹ But there is no evidence that the new
fads have made much difference. In Kenya, for example, a field experiment on the
impact of text messaging concluded that ‘we do not find consistent evidence that
advice delivered through mobile phones was effective in increasing knowledge or
use of recommended inputs’.⁵⁰ In Ethiopia, research on an NGO programme in
North Shewa Zone (to train farmers in soil conservation) concludes that ‘there
were no differences in crop productivity between attendees and non-attendees,
and higher rate of participation in farmer trainings was not associated with
changes in land-use intensity at the village level’.⁵¹ An evaluation of a larger
NGO programme providing training in soil fertility management to the members
of farmer-based organizations in Ghana’s Upper Volta Region also could not
demonstrate a positive impact.⁵² Government-provided advice through salaried
cadres of advisors appears to have been equally ineffective in Ethiopia andMalawi,
for example.⁵³
Why then do so many governments, donors, and NGOs continue to devote
resources to training and advising smallholders in Africa? There are several
possible answers: it may be politically difficult to retrench large numbers of
government workers or to disappoint college-trained young aspirants to posts in
the bureaucracy; it may also be politically convenient to have eyes in the villages
and a means of policing potential troublemakers, for example, by fining and
imprisoning them or refusing to supply them with subsidized inputs and credit.
Rwanda and Ethiopia provide good examples of rural areas where the line between
state officials and party officials is blurred and an important function of the
development and extension agents, the umudugudu leaders or ‘the delegates’,
may be to eliminate opposition and entrench the power of the existing elite.⁵⁴
Insistent demands to increase expenditures on agricultural extension, like
proposals to increase the level of resources devoted to agricultural credit, micro-
credit, and financial inclusion, have often received ideological support from
mainstream economists; these demands have also been amplified by domestic
and international political pressures that policymakers cannot easily ignore.
According to mainstream theory, farmers and other potential capitalists in rural
Africa suffer because they are cut off from the opportunities for investing, risk-
taking, and risk spreading that would be available through better financial inte-
gration into larger national and global financial markets. They do not have access
to critical financial services because they are ‘afflicted’ by fragmented, imperfect
markets; in rural Africa markets do not look anything like the neoclassical ideal
type—information asymmetries and the high costs of attempting to enforce
⁴⁹ Anderson, Feder, and Ganguly (2006). ⁵⁰ Fabregas et al. (2017: iii).
⁵¹ Chesterman et al. (2019: 7). ⁵² Andam, Makhija, and Spielman (2018).
⁵³ Bowser (2015: 22); Ragasa (2019). ⁵⁴ Cramer and Sender (2019a); Huggins (2017: 729).
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contracts in rural areas are major obstacles to adopting new inputs to accelerate
development.⁵⁵
The policies prescribed by those who believe in reducing market imperfections
to allow untrammelled individual entrepreneurs to spearhead African economic
development are predictable: states and donors should focus on supporting
institutions that ensure the legal enforcement of financial contracts, make prop-
erty rights more secure, and diffuse information. Of course, states should also
remove all forms of ‘financial repression’—directed credit and the regulations that
hinder the entry and expansion of new private (and especially foreign corporate)
lenders in Africa. More recently, mainstream policy conclusions have become a
little more nuanced: it is sometimes acknowledged that the private lenders and
financial institutions may have to be ‘crowded in’; they will need to be bribed by
access to privatized assets at very low prices and by additional state subsidies,
especially if the aim is to introduce innovative financial products (such as crop
insurance now heavily subsidized by United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) and the Gates Foundation).⁵⁶
The advocates of conventional liberalization policy packages cannot avoid the
unpalatable conclusion that there is a case for state and donor expenditure to
subsidize rural credit, because they have been unable to find any evidence of the
surge in private sector lending anticipated by the mainstream theorists of ‘finan-
cial repression’ (see Chapter 4), despite the space for private sector initiatives
created by savage cuts in public sector agricultural credit between the 1980s and
the end of the 1990s.⁵⁷ The dominant view now is that Africa’s rural credit needs
can effectively be provided by subsidizing MFIs that benefit from lower transac-
tion costs and informational hurdles than larger-scale, bureaucratic, and more
formal lenders such as national rural development banks. By the 1990s, the cost of
the subsidies provided annually by donors to the newly fashionable micro-finance
sector was about US$1 billion.⁵⁸
Despite massive subsidies and repeated policy recommendations to increase
interest rates, very few MFIs in sub-Saharan Africa show any signs of achieving
operational sustainability or reaping the cost advantages of operating at scale.
Those institutions that are least effective in reaching poor farmers have received
more subsidies than institutions making smaller loans to the poor.⁵⁹Most credit in
rural Africa continues to be supplied by family, friends, usurious shopkeepers/
traders, and employers seeking to secure labour at below the local market wage
rate. Where there is access to micro-credit, it does not appear to have a discernible
impact on the use of new agricultural inputs such as chemical fertilizer. This was
⁵⁵ Conning and Udry (2007: 2859–60).
⁵⁶ De Bock and Gelade (2012). The uptake and renewal rates for micro-insurance in Africa are still
very low.
⁵⁷ De Bock and Gelade (2007: 2867). ⁵⁸ Hudon and Traca (2011: 966).
⁵⁹ Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (2018).
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the conclusion of case studies in Tanzania and Kenya, for example, where panel
data also suggest that both rice yields and household income have failed to
increase with credit use.⁶⁰
There is even better evidence that most MFIs fail to provide any credit to the
smallest farmers and the poorest rural people. Access to any type of formal
credit by African households at the bottom of the distribution of income is very
low and barely increased between 2011 and 2017.⁶¹ The much-hyped success of
the fintech innovation for digital money transfers in Kenya (M-Pesa) cannot be
shown to have reduced the poverty of those Kenyans who do not have links to
the relatively wealthy. In western Uganda, women’s access to a micro-finance
cooperative did not prove ‘an unconditional blessing’. In South Africa, where
the micro-credit bubble expanded at a quite extraordinary rate, the National
Income Dynamics Survey panel data 2008 to 2015 suggest that access to micro-
and informal loans by the poorest rural women has a negative effect on their
quality of life.⁶²
The distribution of credit in Africa usually excludes poor borrowers in rural
areas and results in problems of financial sustainability. Most donors and the
public relations staff of the MasterCard Foundation and Citibank now prefer to
focus on MFIs’ contribution to the nebulous goal of ‘financial inclusion’, rather
than sticking to the old and widely missed target of poverty reduction.⁶³
Ignoring evidence on the impact of expenditures to subsidize rural credit may
be convenient for other reasons: regimes often seek to attract support from
influential power brokers by channelling short-term credit to wealthy and
powerful rural borrowers—not merely at de jure rates of interest way below
those charged by private sector informal lenders, but also on the implicit
understanding that de facto there will be no repayments at all. We have argued
that most expenditure to promote MFIs and on financial inclusion continues for
ideological and political reasons: investment resources have not been allocated
to those national institutions that have historically (in Japan, Brazil, South
Korea, the Netherlands, Austria, and Switzerland, for example) been extraor-
dinarily successful in providing savings and money transmission facilities to
relatively poor people—post offices.⁶⁴ On the contrary, there has been donor
pressure to limit the role of post offices and, in some African countries (Mali, for
example), a structural adjustment programme led to the demise of the post’s
facilities and network.⁶⁵
⁶⁰ Nakano and Magezi (2019).
⁶¹ Awaworyi Churchill (2018); Bernards (2019: 4); Adjognon, Liverpool-Tasie, and Reardon (2017:
table 5a).
⁶² Bateman, Duvendack, and Loubere (2019); Bateman (2014); Meier zu Selhausen and Stam (2013);
Greyling and Rossouw (2019: 10).
⁶³ Bateman and Chang (2012: 17). ⁶⁴ Mader (2018: 479); Rillo and Mlyamoto (2016).
⁶⁵ D’Alcantara, Dembinski, and Pilley (2014: 9).
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9.7 Massive Potential to Sustain and Accelerate Increased
Yields per Hectare: Policy Opportunities
There are several ways to make a more realistic assessment of Africa’s potential to
improve its agricultural performance. We begin by emphasizing the immense gap
between the yields actually achieved on some farms and the low yields achieved by
others farming in the same agro-climatic zones. An important implication of these
carefully measured cropland yield divergences within homogeneous zones is that
there is a huge potential to increase output and productivity, if currently observed
best cultivating practices are diffused throughout the zone.⁶⁶ Satellite-derived
images have made an important contribution to identifying hotspots of yield
divergence within each African country; they could be used by policymakers to
argue for concentrating investment in specific sub-districts and for closer moni-
toring of the impact of policy on yields.
The current level of adoption of HYVs also provides a good indicator of a
potential for dramatic increases in crop production. Although the HYV adoption
rate in sub-Saharan Africa probably increased by as much in the 2000s as in the
four preceding decades, adoption is very far from universal, as suggested by the
data on yield divergence. By 2010 the total area sown to improved varieties of food
crops exceeded 37 million hectares, more than double the estimated area in 2000;
but this impressive achievement represented only 35 per cent of area planted to
these crops.⁶⁷ Adoption rates are, for example, only 23 per cent for improved
varieties of cowpea in sub-Saharan Africa; they are as low as 20 per cent for
improved varieties of a key food crop (cassava) in some countries. While
improved varieties of maize are now cultivated on 57 per cent of the total maize
area in West and Central Africa, some countries in this region have only managed
to plant improved varieties on less than 10 per cent of the maize area; in
Mozambique and Angola, improved varieties of maize are also planted on only
10 per cent of the maize area, compared to about 70 per cent in Kenya and 84 per
cent in Zambia.
Increasing the proportion of African farmland cultivated with varieties devel-
oped through modern crop-breeding techniques could make a huge contribution
to improving living standards and to economic growth.⁶⁸ Already, according to
the estimates of one econometric model, the adoption of improved varieties in
sub-Saharan Africa has boosted average net crop yields by about 0.55 tonnes per
hectare, equivalent to an increase of 47 per cent above average yields achieved
during the period 1976–80. Part of the explanation for the faster rate of adoption
of HYVs in some African countries than others is that these countries have
invested much more in agricultural research, enabling them to release larger
⁶⁶ Luan et al. (2019). ⁶⁷ Fuglie and Marder (2015: 338).
⁶⁸ Gollin, Hansen, and Wingender (2018: 32–3); Walker and Alwang (2015: 74–122 and 206–227).
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numbers of new varieties and achieve more rapid rates of diffusion.⁶⁹
Unfortunately, in a rather large number of sub-Saharan African countries the
growth rates of public agricultural research spending between 2000 and 2014 were
stagnant (seven countries) or negative (five countries).⁷⁰ Even worse, in several
countries a smaller share of public agricultural expenditure was devoted to
research and development (R&D) than to extension services, despite the much
higher estimated returns to expenditure on R&D than other types of public
agricultural spending.⁷¹ There is an urgent need for a better-informed policy
debate about how to increase the level and improve the functional allocation of
public agricultural spending. We argue that proposals for reallocating spending
both to R&D and to export crops should nowmove to the top of the policy agenda.
But a precondition for improving government policy is the availability of much
more transparent, consistent, and accurate data on current patterns of public
agricultural expenditure in Africa.⁷²
The rate of adoption of HYVs, especially of new varieties of maize, rice, and
vegetables, could be accelerated by prioritizing public sector investment in irriga-
tion and water control because, as noted in Section 9.3, these investments in ‘the
leading input’ improve the prospects for introducing not only HYVs, but also
complementary inputs—such as fertilizers and agrochemicals—that farmers can
use to maximize crop yields. In South Asia the irrigated area represents about 42
per cent of the cultivable area; in sub-Saharan Africa most of the area currently
cropped (at least 95 per cent) is cultivated in the rainy season without irrigation;
producers face the risk of extremely uncertain water availability both in terms of
quantity and timing.⁷³ The potential to reduce the (often life-threatening) risks of
relying on rainfed cropping systems is considerable: estimates of the precise
magnitude of this potential do differ and are sensitive to underlying assumptions
about cost, yields, internal rates of return, and so on, but all agree that it is possible
to escape some of the risks of rainfed production; that the scope for economically
and technically viable investment to expand the area under irrigation is
considerable.
In the drylands of sub-Saharan Africa, about 5.2 million hectares are currently
irrigated. There is a well-established potential to irrigate an additional 14 million
hectares, equivalent to about 8 per cent of the total area that is currently being
cultivated in the drylands. The impact on sub-Saharan African crop production of
this realistically assessed addition to the irrigated area would be ‘transformational’:
one estimate is that dryland cereal production could increase by 52 per cent.⁷⁴ The
impact would be particularly dramatic in those countries where the area that could
be developed for irrigation accounts for a large proportion of the total cultivable
⁶⁹ Fuglie and Marder (2015: 356–7). ⁷⁰ Beintema and Stads (2017: 7).
⁷¹ Benin, McBride, and Mogues (2016: 115). ⁷² Mogues and Caceres (2018).
⁷³ Walker (2016: xvi). ⁷⁴ Ward (2016: 53, 64).
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area. For example, in Malawi fully 70 per cent of the cultivable area in the drylands
could be brought under irrigation and in Ghana and Tanzania the comparable
proportion is more than 25 per cent. Nigeria has the potential to irrigate millions
of hectares of dryland, but many other countries also have the potential to irrigate
large areas—200,000 hectares or more—including Angola, Burkina Faso, Chad,
Ghana, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, and Uganda.⁷⁵
Successful cultivation of HYVs has usually been associated with improved
water management and has depended on the extremely positive response of
these seeds to fertilizer. An increase in the use of fertilizers appears to have played
a key role throughout the world in raising cereal yields and promoting structural
change.⁷⁶ Many farmers in sub-Saharan Africa are currently not benefitting
sufficiently from the potential yield gains offered by plant genetic improvement
because they are not applying adequate nutrients to their soils.⁷⁷ Despite recent
relatively fast rates of growth of consumption in some African countries, fertilizer
consumption remains way below the levels recorded in South Asia: in Bangladesh,
for example, average consumption per hectare is about 280 kg, compared to the
sub-Saharan African average of 15 kg per hectare. There is massive potential to
increase and improve fertilizer use in Africa from a very low base, which has
motivated investors such as Dangote to invest billions of US dollars in fertilizer
production in a number of African countries.⁷⁸
Policies that combine increases in Africa’s irrigated area with increased (but
appropriate) levels of nutrient application would increase yields in Africa.
Enhanced investment in agricultural R&D should result in more disaggregated
and efficient fertilizer recommendations linked to the push for public sector
investment in irrigation and transport infrastructure in precisely those rural
areas with the greatest potential for wage employment and export production.
⁷⁵ Ward (2016: 58). ⁷⁶ McArthur and McCord (2017). ⁷⁷ Tittonell and Giller (2013).
⁷⁸ Oxford Business Group (2019: 18).
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High-Yielding Variety Policies in Africa
10.1 Introduction: Proving Hamlet Wrong
Many policy seeds have been planted in African soil, but their yields have often
been considered disappointing. These seeds, often older ones rather than the most
recently improved cultivars and hybrids, are sown with the folkloric wisdom of the
most cited and renowned economists; they represent the common varieties of
policy thinking that we have drawn attention to throughout this book.
Our metaphor can be stretched to cover other similarities: following the
practice of many African farmers, policy officials often to try to compensate for
low and erratic yields by planting a mix of different types of seeds and plants on
their fields, in the hope that some at least may thrive and even generate cash
returns. Just that kind of hope and risk-averse, scatter-gun approach is reflected
too in the endless wish lists and unweighted bullet-point lists of recommendations
that pepper the concluding sections of government policy plans, international
agency advice, and consultancy reports. What we have argued for, by contrast, is a
concentration on a very small number of priorities and criteria and a commitment
to ongoing research and development (R&D) to support high-yielding variety
policies (HYVPs) that can be adapted to the socio-political contexts of specific
African economies.
There are two kinds of R&D required if HYVPs are to flourish. First, there has
to be the adaptation to specific locations and the development of the most
appropriate modern policy variety, using plant stock material stored in gene
banks that have been curated as a public good. There is a large stock of research
to draw on for this: the analysis of ‘what has worked’ across a huge range of
contexts historically. Throughout this book we have highlighted many policies
that have been effective. They are often different to those packaged and pushed as
appropriate for all African economies and we have explained why the standard
packages are in fact typically inappropriate. But, second, what has worked in one
context—one political, historical equivalent of a specific agro-climatic zone—does
not necessarily work at all or in the same way elsewhere.
This is true for certain varieties of rice, for example: the New Rice for Africa
(NERICA) varieties are the result of interspecific crosses between the Oryza sativa
rice species from Asia and the locally adapted and multiple-stress resistant Oryza
glaberrima African rice species: ‘NERICA varieties can smother weeds, resist
drought and pests and can thrive in poor soils like the African parent. Like its
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Asian parent, NERICA has high yield.’ But NERICA varieties have been far more
successful for some types of farmers in some African countries and regions than
others.¹ Relatively few improved rice varieties have been released that are appro-
priate for Africa’s more difficult and complex upland and rainfed environments;
the varieties used on irrigated lowlands have usually been more successful.² Just as
the drugs developed by pharmacogenetics are effective for some patients but not
others, the same is true for economic policies. Liberalizing a market—for fertilizer
and seed distribution, say—may have initially positive results in one country but
in another, given its specific political economy and the ability of the state to act
independently under pressure from globally concentrated fertilizer producers, it
may simply reconfigure concentrated market power without promoting lower
prices or more efficient spread. Advocating a state-owned airline may draw on
examples of success in some countries, even in one African economy (Chapter 6),
but that does not mean a state-owned airline will be viable in another African
economy.
That is one reason we cannot provide a policy blueprint. It would be satisfying
to suggest a neat plan, and there are plenty of attempts to do so. They are the
branding equivalent of Fairtrade labelling: policy officials may want to ‘do the
right thing’ yet they have too little detailed evidence or knowledge about the
complex reality they are dealing with and about the history of capitalist develop-
ment, so a tidy blueprint cuts the information corner for them and guides them to
what is generally believed to work. But such neat plans are largely pointless. Time
and again their recommendations, even if drawn from theoretically elegant
models or extrapolating from some randomized controlled trial results, fail to
fruit when grafted onto different contexts. (We have also argued that they are
often built on poor theory and evidence anyway.)
Setting out a branded blueprint would also be a vain exercise because of
uncertainty. Fundamental uncertainty, the role of contingency within cumulative
causation dynamics, and the fact that tensions, imbalance, and struggles always
trump equilibrium mean that broad sweeping claims to generalizable laws of
policy effectiveness cannot be trusted. Moreover, unintended consequences are
not always positive ones. Green Revolution initiatives like improved varieties were
part of a mix of intensification policies with social and economic, and environ-
mental, implications. Some of these were environmentally and distributionally
negative. New systems of crop production using new types of inputs have been
shown to have contradictory impacts on gender and labour relations; they may
well exacerbate intra-household conflict in the short run. For example, it is argued
that the diffusion of a disease-resistant genetically modified banana is more likely
to benefit capitalist (male) farmers in the south-west of Uganda than the large
¹ Arouna et al. (2017: 55). ² Diagne et al. (2015: 203).
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number of smaller producers relying on the exploitation of female family workers
in central and eastern Uganda.³ It is also argued that the Green Revolution in
Punjab and Haryana had serious environmental consequences, partly because it
was associated with a level and pattern of subsidized urea applications that
damaged both soil and human health.⁴ High-yielding economic policy varieties
will also require constant monitoring and adaptation to respond to unanticipated
and damaging distributional and environmental outcomes.
So we hedge our policy discussion with doubt and issue stern warnings to
officials to be alert to unintended adverse consequences. Much of the success of
policies lies in allocating sufficient resources to enhancing policymakers’ ability to
collect the data to monitor their effects closely; and to have the flexibility to change
tack if needed. High-yield crop varieties have rarely achieved their yield potential
without massive investment in infrastructure, above all irrigation; high-yield
policies are unlikely to be effective, or even to avoid catastrophe, without a similar
commitment to investment in the infrastructure of data collection and monitor-
ing. It is necessary to develop an institutionalized ability not only to learn, but
especially to learn from failure. For this reason, we advocate a policy officials’
version of the ‘error cabinet’ in Enzo Ferrari’s head office. Ferrari often held board
meetings in a room whose walls were lined with glass-fronted cabinets displaying
malfunctioning motor parts. Every time a Ferrari car broke down during a race,
the offending parts were studied, and advances made on the basis of learning what
had gone wrong.
Nonetheless, there are some things that we can say with confidence. There are
strategic decisions that the evidence suggests are important almost everywhere
and that policy officials in particular countries can study, considering how they
could be tweaked, modified, and adapted to local conditions. There are criteria
that have to be satisfied if a dynamic of economic development is to take hold that
can be sustained over time with broadly progressive effects on welfare. This
chapter, pulling out some of the implications from earlier chapters, therefore
highlights priority areas for policy and a small number of criteria that officials
do need to consider when making resource allocation decisions.
What shapes our priorities and criteria is our commitment, shared with
Hirschman and his brother-in-law Colorni (who was also an anti-fascist activist),
to ‘proving Hamlet wrong’. If Hamlet’s endless self-questioning freezes him into
inaction in Shakespeare’s play, Hirschman and Colorni emphasized the product-
iveness of doubt: the importance of doubt to spur action even in the face of
apparently overwhelming and barbaric obstacles—‘possibilism’. Thus, with
Hirschman, we would encourage in policy officials even in the poorest African
economies a ‘bias for hope’: not a dreamy utopianism fuelled by grand theory or
³ Addison and Schnurr (2016). ⁴ Abrol et al. (2017).
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pan-Africanist dreams but an insistence on the possible, enriched by realistic
analysis and by evidence.
As with doubts about the adverse unintended ecological consequences of high-
yielding Green Revolution inputs, these doubts should not lead to an impossibilist
resignation to a future with low yields but to redoubled research efforts to achieve
adaptation. That means that we distinguish our approach from the impossibilist
gloom of many development sages and many ‘dismal’ economists.⁵ Impossibilists
continue to: make sweeping critiques of ambitious and large-scale projects; insist
that global capitalism allows no space for economic development within Africa or
for wage workers to develop defensive political powers; argue that straying from
the purity of comparative advantage principles is ruinous; allege that state-owned
enterprises are necessarily wastefully inefficient; and remain convinced that the
stranglehold of rent-seeking, the politics of the belly, corruption, or what de Waal
calls the ‘political marketplace’, means that there is no possibility of implementing
progressive policy ideas.
10.2 Possibilism and Experiment
Some development economists have relatively recently come to acknowledge what
before were dismissed as unsound arguments: that the development of capitalism
has always owed a particular debt to the role of manufacturing; and that indus-
trialization has always and everywhere depended on state intervention that has
‘got prices wrong’. But the typical refrain of common sense is still: ‘well, it may
have worked before—in Taiwan, in Vietnam, or somewhere, but please please
don’t try this yourself!’ The argument is that the risks of failure are so high (and
the historical record certainly does show many failures), and capacities in Africa
so low, that it would be unwise to try to emulate the ‘lessons’ of economic history.
For example, Paul Krugman came to realize that theoretically, there was a very
good case for ignoring the principle of comparative advantage, but, he argued,
officials should actually stick to the principle and to producing unsophisticated
goods because otherwise politics will get in the way and ruin things.⁶ Rather,
prudent African policy officials should bide their time, getting the elements of
good governance aligned, gradually building capacities, and confining themselves
to the modest work of the facilitating state. African states, this plausible version of
impossibilist common sense has it, should intervene up to and not beyond their
current level of capacity.
⁵ The ‘dismal science’ is widely believed to refer to those classical economists (the original impos-
sibilists), above all Malthus, who believed that capitalist growth would run aground before long
(Heilbroner, 1987: 78).
⁶ Krugman (1987).
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Meanwhile, the other strand of impossibilist common sense rolls out a series of
warnings suggesting that almost all policies or accumulation strategies simply
have no chance of succeeding because the dominant material and ideological
forces of global capitalism are stacked against low-income peripheral countries.
Global value chains are controlled tightly by powerful systems integrators that
brook no significant technological upgrading by developing country producers,
who remain constrained to producing relatively simple goods on a lowly rung of
the ladder. The world market prices for all the goods produced in poor countries
are so volatile that the imports required for dynamic growth and political stability
cannot reliably be acquired. The World Trade Organization (WTO) imposes rules
so binding on developing countries that they are now unable to avail themselves of
the kinds of policies in the trade and financial sectors used successfully by earlier
‘catching-up’ countries.
We acknowledge that it is easier to fail than to succeed with development
policy—often more for domestic political reasons than reasons of measurable
technocratic ‘capacity’. For example, in Ghana and Kenya political pressures were
able—at some times more than others—to overwhelm sophisticated economic
technocrats.⁷ We also acknowledge that the external financial and economic
environment confronting developing country economies and governments is
prone to wild fluctuations, often hostile, and poses risks to improving welfare.
But there is still significant, proven scope for governments to intervene in support
of an accelerated dynamic of accumulation, structural change, and not insignifi-
cant welfare improvement. And there is scope for governments to intervene
beyond their current capacity levels, to experiment.
10.3 The Political Origins of Economic Institutions
and Shifts in Policy
Keynes emphasized the fundamental uncertainty that might stall investment by
rational actors. Something, for example the sentiments of a mimetic rush of
animal spirits sparked by government spending, was needed to provoke private
investors into action. By analogy, rational officials working for a state faced with a
list of constricting rules of global governance and weighed down by the evidence
of many failures in other African and Latin American economies might, like
Hamlet, do nothing decisive. Something is required to push them to act in
effective ways.
That something has eluded textbook economists: it cannot be modelled. It
probably takes different forms and these may include a flush of nationalism or an
⁷ Fahnbulleh (2006).
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impending external military threat. Our greater understanding in recent years of the
economic role and impact of institutions ‘has not beenmatched by our understand-
ing of their political origins’.⁸ There are accounts of African economic development
that consider being in a ‘bad neighbourhood’ one of the key ‘traps’ that prevents
growth;⁹ being surrounded by countries mired in instability and violence can of
course have negative spill-over effects, but it would not be wise to take this so
literally, for the regional effect (just like being landlocked, for example—another
‘trap’) may provoke creative policy responses that lead to faster growth. Wars, and
the presence of both internal and external threats, have historically played a
significant role in prompting shifts in growth, in state organization and capability,
in fiscal revenues and in the coherence of policymaking. Generally, jolts of political
crisis have tended to be more important spurs to substantial reshaping of economic
policy and production than the steady assembly of preconditions (of governance, of
capability, of comparative advantage). It is the same with reductions in inequality:
‘Across the full sweep of history, every single one of the major compressions of
material inequality we can observe in the record was driven by one or more of these
levelers’: calamitous war that drew in societies as a whole, similarly violent revolu-
tions, state collapse, or appalling pandemics that raised the wages of poorer (and
suddenly scarcer) people.¹⁰
Similarly, historically, states have made war and war has made states. The main
mechanism through which this has worked is resource mobilization. Needing to
find ways to mobilize people to fight and to mobilize the resources to keep fighting
forces fed, transported, clothed, and armed, states have resorted to all manner of
extortion, borrowing, and, over time, above all, taxation. Those states that have
most effectively raised revenue have not only won wars and secured the state but
also created lasting institutions of statehood.¹¹ War has also often—very far from
always—led to shifts in the extent and types of state intervention in economies and
societies that is politically acceptable (even imaginable). It has had major effects
on the organization of large capitalist firms and their links to state institutions that
have often survived long after the end of wars.¹²
In the North East Asian economies of South Korea and Taiwan, for example,
‘systemic vulnerability’ played a very important role in the political origins of
institutions and policies associated with ‘developmental states’ and rapid eco-
nomic growth. One argument is that such institutions only emerge ‘when political
leaders confront extraordinarily constrained political environments’, specifically
where they stare down the barrels of
⁸ Doner, Ritchie, and Slater (2005: 327). ⁹ Collier (2008). ¹⁰ Scheidel (2017: 36).
¹¹ Tilly (1992). ¹² Cramer (2020).
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three different guns: (1) the credible threat that any deterioration in the living
standards of popular sectors could trigger unmanageable mass unrest; (2) the
heightened need for foreign exchange and war matériel induced by national
insecurity; and (3) the hard budget constraints imposed by a scarcity of easy
revenue sources.¹³
Similar constraints lay behind the shift in Ethiopia—associated with the then Prime
Minister Meles Zenawi—towards efforts to create a ‘democratic developmental
state’. Without copious natural resource rents and in one of the very poorest nations
in the world, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)
took power in a context characterized precisely by ‘a scarcity of easy revenue
sources’. Violent insecurity in neighbouring countries and tense relations with
some of these countries, including military intervention by Ethiopia in Somalia
and a war with Eritrea, resulted in a ‘heightened need for foreign exchange and war
matériel induced by national insecurity’. And national insecurity was also fragile in
a context of the fundamental strains on Ethiopian political economy. There was
tension between the long historical source of political power in the highlands while
the sources of economic reproduction were greater in the lowland peripheries.¹⁴
This tension at the heart of an unfinished project of creating a coherent ‘imagined
community’¹⁵ of the Ethiopian nation state was exacerbated by rapid population
growth, accelerating urbanization, continued poverty, and rising political chal-
lenges in the 2000s to the EPRDF.¹⁶ The EPRDF then committed, under Meles
and his successor as Prime Minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, to delivering
economic development in the pursuit of legitimacy. The latest dramatic turn of
policy direction—in 2019—may perhaps be explained by the fact that sustained
and remarkably rapid economic growth had failed to resolve this systemic vulner-
ability, and that the foreign exchange shortage was becoming even more pressing.
Dramatic political upheaval has been at the heart of major leaps in the national
organization of production and productivity in the history of the USA, too. In the
wake of the War of Independence from Great Britain, Alexander Hamilton
famously pioneered American industrial policy. Hamilton’s practical policy
involvement led him, in his Report on the Subject of Manufactures, to argue that
Adam Smith’s academic approach led to propositions that were ‘geometrically
true’ but ‘practically false’.¹⁷ The American Civil War in the 1860s led to a range of
technological, organizational, and policy innovations with lasting consequences.¹⁸
And much later, when the USA entered the Second World War, President
Roosevelt launched his campaign to build an ‘Arsenal of Democracy’. The strategy
to produce victory involved creating ‘a production system that linked
¹³ Doner, Ritchie, and Slater (2005: 328). ¹⁴ Clapham (2017). ¹⁵ Anderson (1987).
¹⁶ Markakis (2011). ¹⁷ McNamara (1998). ¹⁸ Cramer (2006).
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technological innovations in weapons with the production capability to absorb
and integrate technological change’, in other words to graft the mass production
system pioneered in the USA onto a technologically advanced war production
system.¹⁹ The ‘industrial empire’ that ensued was financed through ‘public-sector
entrepreneurship’, in the form of a non-market leasing system through which the
state financed two thirds of war-oriented private sector production.²⁰
10.4 Priorities for Strategies of Economic Development
One of the main uses of our book is to offer practical suggestions about how to
argue against fashionable policies that are not rooted in evidence or are theoret-
ically incoherent. We also offer a guide to implementing some other and less-
discussed economic policies, although we are aware that this guide may only prove
useful in particular political conditions.
The evidence and arguments presented here, especially in Chapters 4–9, lead us
to propose the following broad, strategic priorities.
Objective 1: A High Investment Ratio
Governments should promote a high investment ratio as an urgent priority.
Stimulating a sustained high investment to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio
is fundamental to prospects for rapid and lasting growth and structural change.
The historical evidence shows this clearly. The state has to lead this investment
push by making a commitment to economically productive public spending. This
does not have to be financed by deregulation of the financial sector. Indeed,
liberalizing the financial sector too much and too rapidly, the evidence shows,
undermines such a strategic objective.
Objective 2: National Champion Firms
Rather than supply-side small-is-beautiful entrepreneurship programmes, policy
officials should prioritize the creation and subsidize the success of large national
champions and ensure the complementarity of public and private initiatives.
These large firms are the ones that can capture the productivity gains from
increasing returns to scale, they are more likely to survive than small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (among which there are typically high rates of
¹⁹ Best (2018: 27). ²⁰ Best (2018: 24–54).
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collapse), they make a disproportionate contribution to exports, and they are
more likely to create large numbers of decent and unionized jobs.²¹
Officials should acknowledge the historical evidence that major private sector
investing firms have typically developed thanks to state support. This support has
taken a wide variety of forms, including: protectionist and ‘infant industry’
policies, the creation of state-owned enterprises, procurement policies, supporting
legal cartels, laying the base for private sector firms through public research and
development, and other mechanisms of the ‘entrepreneurial state’, as well as
effective management of social conflicts and security provision to secure the
conditions of capitalist investment and production. These are not just policies of
historical interest. They are what governments around the world do (in advanced
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) economies
and in middle and lower-income economies)—with varying degrees of success—
to support successful large firms. It is what the Brazilian state has done in
supporting second-generation bio-tech firms, through innovative financing mech-
anisms. Sometimes, major firms emerge from mutual interests in a tangle of
calculation among politicians and business—winners picking states just as much
as states picking winners. A case in point is Aliko Dangote, founder of the
immense Nigerian and now continent-wide cement firm. Dangote had made
strenuous efforts to develop very close political ties, including to General
Obasanjo, over many years of accumulating rents from a number of ‘crony
capitalist’ trading enterprises. ‘Dangote used his close connection to Obasanjo to
influence the Nigerian government to adopt and sustain a Backward Integration
Policy (BIP) for the cement industry in Nigeria.’²² There is clearly an element of
the contingent in these histories, but it certainly helps for officials to be aware of
the scope of the possible, rather than to continue wasting resources chasing
fantasies of development and structural change through tiny start-ups.
Objective 3: A Rapid Rate of Increase in Imports and in Exports
A publicly led investment boost will necessarily imply a faster rate of growth of
imports. This is only sustainable if there is a rapid rate of increase in exports.
Investment booms tend to lead to debt problems. This is natural. What matters is
preventing a debt problem becoming a debt crisis. There are all sorts of ways of
negotiating and managing external debt, all of them an important part of a
shrewd strategy, including: ensuring a sensible spread of debt maturities, limiting
non-concessional borrowing, renegotiating repayment structures, preventing
²¹ On ‘national champions’ in China and China’s industrial policy learning from other East Asian
economies, see Li and Chen (2020).
²² Akinyoade and Uche (2018: 835).
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unregulated private sector borrowing abroad, and others. Investment–import
booms in Africa can also be financed in part by resort to concessional foreign
funds or aid. But just as exposure to commercial debt is risky, so is too great a
reliance on too few sources of foreign aid, because individual donors may be
unreliable, and because the strings attached to some aid are difficult to reconcile
with the strategic objectives of sustained economic growth. The real key to
managing a rapid rate of growth of imports is to promote very rapid export
expansion. Despite naysayers, this remains possible. While improving the scope
for (and reducing costs of) intra-African trade may be a boon to economic activity,
it is most unlikely to be an effective substitute for maximizing exports to demand-
ing (in terms of quality and phyto-sanitary or labour or other standards) large
higher income markets. Intra-African trade should be a complement to, not a
refuge from, a strategy of wider global economic integration.
Objective 4: Promoting Investment in Specific Types
of Economic Activity
Investment, especially public investment in infrastructure and state-owned enter-
prises, and government policies designed to encourage private sector productive
investment, needs to be targeted—directed towards particular types of activity.
There are three particularly important criteria to bear in mind here. First, invest-
ment will have a greater economic and social impact if it is concentrated in those
activities most likely to create growth of demand for the labour of women
with little education. (This should be combined with measures to keep girls in
school longer: both to improve their own knowledge and skills and to tighten
the labour market.) Such investment may be in high-value agriculture (not just
‘agro-processing’), which should be recognized as industrial, complex, and sophis-
ticated production, as well as in urban/peri-urban manufacturing factories.
Complementary policies might support both types of investment by reducing
the financial and social costs of labour mobility as labour shifts from low to
higher-productivity forms of employment (low-cost accommodation, travel, the
cost of phone network usage for communicating with family and transferring
savings home, or to rural post offices).
Second, investment is needed to underpin rapid export growth. If possible, the
selected activities absorbing unskilled female labour migrants from rural areas
should therefore also make a rapid net contribution to foreign exchange earnings.
That involves a range of policies including the competitive undervaluation of the
exchange rate.
Third, and complementary to investment in export capacity, we have shown
that it is extremely important to allocate investment resources to increase the
supply of food and other basic wage goods, which in turn underpins dynamics of
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investment. Investments are required to monitor real wages and to intervene
rapidly in food markets to smooth price spikes. In the longer term, investments
to accelerate agricultural production of wage goods and exports requires R&D
expenditures and targeted infrastructure provision focused on particular crops
(e.g. coffee and avocados for exports and cassava or yams—rather than dairy and
poultry—for the poorest consumers); and it requires betting on the strong, that is,
on farms with a proven track record either in expanding exports or in producing
large marketed surpluses of basic foods for domestic consumers. Clearly, it would
be desirable to combine several strategic objectives, selecting national and ‘export’
champions that also employ large numbers of, especially, women from poor rural
backgrounds, or selecting the most dynamic and efficient producers of wage goods
for a low-income domestic mass market that also employ large numbers of
unskilled wage workers (see Chapter 3).
Objective 5: Develop Capability for Monitoring and Disciplining
Designing incentives for well-targeted investment promotion is not difficult. But it
is bordering on pointless to introduce incentives to firms if there is no parallel
development of capacity to monitor performance and to discipline firms (includ-
ing by withdrawing access to exemptions or subsidies, etc.). This quid pro quo—
the reciprocal control mechanism to ensure that firms meet targets for exports,
investment, employment, and productivity– is a sine qua non of effective policy.
If labour productivity is to improve and if absolute poverty is to be reduced,
there is one aspect of the performance of capitalist firms that it is particularly
important to monitor. In return for state support, firms need to be set targets not
only to increase exports, but also to encourage the organization and effective voice
of the workers they employ. We are well aware that firms can and do evade modest
levels of employment protection legislation in Africa (and elsewhere). But min-
imum wage, health and safety rules, child protection, gender rights, and other
legislation to enforce decent working conditions may nevertheless be expected to
have positive effects, encouraging the growth of trade unions and strengthening
their negotiating capacity. Even when states appear unable to impose strict
discipline on capitalists—ensuring that all subsidized enterprises comply with
agreed rules—employment protection legislation can provide a rallying cry and
a reference point for struggles to organize workers. Workers’ organizations and
professional associations, together with relatively efficient compliant firms, may
also put pressure on state institutions to monitor and discipline those firms
continuing to compete on the basis of illegal working conditions and low labour
productivity.
There are many good reasons for policymakers to make a serious effort to
create the institutions and mechanisms to monitor (preferably on a monthly basis)
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the real wages of all wage workers, especially the lowest-paid female workers.
Publishing trends in these wages would improve the quality of public debate about
poverty reduction and support Objective 6. It would also help to rapidly identify
failing investment projects and to legitimate strict disciplinary action by govern-
ments against errant subsidized capitalists. Most importantly, it would provide
emerging workers’ organizations with the information necessary to target their
limited resources towards particular sectors and employers.
Objective 6: Protecting Welfare, Profitability, and Political
Stability through Grain Market Management
A key feature of the analysis in this book (chiefly in Chapters 4 and 7) has been to
highlight the importance of a non-inflationary supply of basic wage (especially
food) goods. This protects the ability of firms employing workers to ensure
that profitability is not eroded by wage hikes necessary to allow workers to meet
rising costs of basic living; and it protects politicians from the political conse-
quences of wages not rising sufficiently in such circumstances. Part of the
strategy, (Objective 4) involves promoting investment in the supply of basic
food goods (especially those cereals purchased by the poorest wage workers).
But the evidence from elsewhere (especially in Asia) is that part of the strategy
also has to involve direct intervention in food grain markets to prevent price
spikes. If export revenues are increasing and the long-run real international
market prices of certain foods are declining, a successful accumulation strategy
in Africa (as elsewhere) will involve increases in the volume of food imports
(and the manipulation of tariffs on food imports to smooth domestic price
fluctuations).
10.5 Conclusion: Impossible is Nothing
In conclusion, we emphasize two features of the analysis and argument in this
book. First, we have argued that variation matters. Descriptively, identifying
variation in policies and in performance is crucial to analysis and is often
smothered in averages. Closer attention to variation reveals, for example, that
there is usually more variation within sub-Saharan African countries—in under-
nutrition, in wealth, in access to education, and so on—than there is between
African countries, while, nonetheless, the variation between countries is itself
more significant than often acknowledged. But we have also argued that it matters
to ask: variation in what? Much poverty analysis, for example, focuses on
categories—simple geographical distinctions like rural/urban or categories such
as ‘female-headed households’—that can be misleading. These analyses, we have
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argued, obscure ‘intra-category’ variation, for example, inequality within areas
classified as rural or huge diversity of living standards among ‘smallholders’ or
‘female-headed households’. And we have suggested some examples of what we
argue are more useful categorical distinctions. The same is the case for distinctions
between broad economic ‘sectors’, which we have argued have become even less
useful analytically than they may have been in the past. The blurring of boundaries
captured in the idea of ‘servicification’ and of ‘the industrialization of freshness’ is
a prompt to recalibrate the assessment of which kinds of activity are most relevant
for the objectives of economic policy, which then leads to the identification of new
kinds of variation.
Variation can then become a source of policy possibilism. That it has been
possible to achieve very steep declines in fertility rates in Rwanda compared to
Burundi, despite many similarities of ‘structure’, history, and endowments, or in
Kenya compared to Uganda, or Ghana compared to Nigeria (Chapter 2) suggests
a clear role for policy. And the policy history of these countries confirms a clear
commitment to meeting women’s contraceptive needs—sustained over a lengthy
period—in those countries with sharp fertility declines. Again, the variation in
the incidence of insecticide-treated bed nets or in the equity of their distribution
cannot simply be ‘read off ’ from indices of endowments but reflects purposive
policy design and implementation. Similarly, the fact that some farms have
managed to generate far higher agricultural yields than others within the same
agro-ecological zones suggests a clear role for officials to identify why and to
pursue policies that can clearly secure higher yields on a much larger area. And
differences between African countries in the rate of adoption of high-yield
variety (HYV) seeds reflect variation in an important policy choice: public
spending on agricultural research (Chapter 9). It is also extremely important
to emphasize, as in Chapter 4, that some African countries have adopted policies
to achieve much higher and more sustained levels of public sector investment
than others.
Second, we have not only shown that mainstream economic analysis and policy
advice is empirically unfounded, has deep theoretical weaknesses, and has not
produced the results insistently claimed, but we have also provided a coherent
(and possibilist) alternative. But criticizing the mainstream is relatively easy
and also commonplace. Subjecting alternatives to a non-mainstream critique is
more uncommon and, we argue, necessary. Because these alternatives have so
readily and uncritically been accepted by non-economists in Africa and by
heterodox economists, it has been all too easy for orthodox economists and
advisers to deploy dodgy quantitative evidence to brush these alternative policy
proposals aside. We have therefore, at the risk of alienating those we have
worked with and often agreed with, also tried to offer an alternative to the
most widespread forms of critique of the mainstream: these oscillate between
stifling impossibilism and fanciful expectations of capitalism with a human face,
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of South–South solidarity, of homogeneous and mutually supportive rural
societies, of the triumph of small-scale capitalism (based on millions of very
small farmers and entrepreneurs).
Above all, we have sought to contribute analysis and evidence that make it
easier for policy officials to pursue some variant of what Meles Zenawi called the
‘Sinatra model’ of policymaking—assessing what has been effective in a range of
contexts and adapting to specific African contexts, and then doing it ‘my way’.
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